World War I in East Africa 1916-1918 by Anderson, Ross
Glasgow Theses Service 
http://theses.gla.ac.uk/ 
theses@gla.ac.uk 
 
 
 
 
 
Anderson, Ross (2001) World War I in East Africa. PhD thesis. 
 
 
http://theses.gla.ac.uk/5195/ 
 
 
 
Copyright and moral rights for this thesis are retained by the author 
 
A copy can be downloaded for personal non-commercial research or 
study, without prior permission or charge 
 
This thesis cannot be reproduced or quoted extensively from without first 
obtaining permission in writing from the Author 
 
The content must not be changed in any way or sold commercially in any 
format or medium without the formal permission of the Author 
 
When referring to this work, full bibliographic details including the 
author, title, awarding institution and date of the thesis must be given 
 
WORLD WAR I IN EAST AFRICA 
1916-1918 
Ross Anderson 
Octobcr 2001 
Submitted to the Department of Modem History, University of Glasgow in partial 
fulfilment for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy 
0 
C Ross Anderson October 2001 
ABSTRACT 
The campaign in East Africa is one of the lesser-known and understood theatres of the 
First World War. Strategically unimportant to the main war effort, East Africa has 
remained in the shadows of the much better known Western, Mesopotamian and 
Palestine Fronts. Despite this, the campaign lasted from August 1914 to November 
1918 and covered a large portion of East Africa as well as drawing in the majority of 
its population. Scholarly works have been greatly outnumbered by popular accounts 
and the final two years, 1916 to 1918, remain vague and contradictory. Nevertheless, 
a great deal of valuable primary material exists in various archives and it is the aim of 
this dissertation to describe and analyse the military operations of this period. 
At the outbreak of war, the imperial powers in East Africa were unprepared for a 
major campaign. Although the colonies possessed little strategic value in themselves, 
the dynamics of imperial rivalry quickly generated armed conflict. The East African 
campaign evolved haphazardly from neutralising German wireless communications 
and naval facilities to a wildly over-ambitious plan to conquer the whole of the colony 
with scant forces. The British wanted to keep any potential spoils for themselves, but 
were also strongly influenced by the expansionist policies of South Africa, largely 
propounded by Louis Botha and Jan Smuts. 
By September 1916, the British forces, commanded by Smuts, had occupied the bulk 
of German East Africa with all the railways, towns and ports in their possession. 
However, he had failed to bring the German Schuatruppe to battle and it remained a 
powerful and well-motivated force. Furthermore, his reliance to manoeuvre and 
reluctance to fight battles led his troops ever-deeper into enemy territory and 
dependent on inadequate lines of communication. 
Smuts continued his advance until January 1917 when he left for the Imperial War 
Conference. His forces were in terrible condition and unfit for further offensive 
operations. He was succeeded by the British General Hoskins for a bare three months, 
but, who nevertheless instigated badly needed reforms and reorganisation. In May 
1917, the South African, General, van Deventer assumed command, an appointment 
that he would hold until the end of the war. Vah Deventer continued to build on 
Hoskins's work while instigating an aggressive policy of fighting hard battles 
whenever possible, while concurrently trying to destroy German food supplies. These 
methods were continued throughout the remainder of 1917 and until November 1918 
when the war ended with the Schuatruppe being pursued from Portuguese East Africa 
into Northern Rhodesia. 
For both sides, the campaign was dominated not by heavy fighting, but by the 
questions of health and supply. The levels of sickness, particularly malaria, were 
many times worse than other theatres and constantly hindered military operations. 
The provision and distribution of food and other supplies was an enormous problem 
that was only partially solved by the widespread use of motor vehicles and road 
construction. For the British, relations with their Belgian and Portuguese allies were 
never smooth as imperial rivalries often created ' 
friction and misunderstanding. In the 
end, the East African campaign was one of mobility and evasion and quite unlike 
campaigns fought in Europe and the Middle East. 
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CHAPTER I- INTRODUCTION 
The First World War has been the subject of intense description and analysis for 
over eighty years. Given the scale of operations there, the Western Front has 
understandably received the bulk of English language attention, although recently, the 
secondary theatres of Mesopotamia, Gallipoli and Palestine have come to be considered 
in much greater detail. The opening of archives and increased access to hitherto private 
papers have enabled scholars to develop their understanding of the conflict while also 
disposing of a number of popular myths enroute. The background to the formulation and 
the execution of grand strategy, operations and tactics has been examined under a critical 
and less nationalistic light with very interesting results. 
It is true that compared to the Western Front, the campaign in East Africa was 
very small scale and strategically unimportant. British troop strengths there peaked at 
58,000 in August 1916 while total wartime casualties of 349,311, of whom nearly 
330,000 were sick, represented some 5.62 per cent of the Western Front's and 3.15 per 
cent of the British Empire's total losses. ' Yet it is easy to become fixated on numbers 
alone and it is worth recalling that the war there lasted from August 1914 until November 
1918, covering a huge swathe of Africa. It ranged from the modem states of Kenya and 
Uganda in the north, through the Congo, Ruanda, Burundi, and Tanzania in the centre, to 
Zambia, Malawi and Mozambique in the south. Few inhabitants, European or African, 
escaped its effects or ravages, while the colonial empires were irrevocably changed by 
the conflict. It is worth noting too that the casualties suffered were comparable to those 
incurred in the Anglo-Boer War that had ended just twelve years previously. 2 Perhaps 
insignificant in global terms, the war was of overwhelming local consequence. 
1 WO 33/ 858, European War Telegrams, Series D, Volume 1,29' January 1915 - 29h February 1917, London: War Office, 1918. Henceforth Telegrams D 1. No. 1235, Telegram N 1394 General Headquarters to War Office, 14 September 1916, pp. 327-329; 
Mitchell, Major TJ and Smith, G M, Official History of the War, Medical Services, Casualties and Medical Statistics, London: 
HMSO, 193 1, reprinted by Imperial War Museum and Battery Press, [n. d. ]. Henceforth, Official History - Medical Statistics. See Table I "Approximate Total Casualties in British Expeditionary Forces during the Great War", p. 12. East African troop casualties 
reached 349,311 over the course of the war as compared to 6,218,540 suffered on the Western Front and 11,096,338 throughout the British forces world-wide. 
2 Official History - Medical Statistics, See Tables 2,3 and 4 on pp. 253-254 for East Africa and Tables 2,3 and 4 on p. 269 for South Africa. Casualties amongst the troops are fewer in the East African campaign than the South African, but the inclusion of the followers' figures for the former reverses the situation. 
1 
HISTORIOGRAPHICAL BACKGROUND 
Over the past forty years, it has been popular accounts rather than academic 
studies that have provided the bulk of the limited coverage of the campaign. It has been 
only very recently that the scholarly neglect has been rectified by the publication of the 
first volume of Hew Strachan's The First World War which devotes a substantial and 
informative chapter to Africa. 3 Apart from this excellent and much-needed work, which 
is a wide-ranging synthesis of the existing literature in English, German and French, most 
attention has been directed onto detailed studies of subjects such as labour, medicine and 
transport. 
The question of strategy and operational aims has never been covered in great 
depth, perhaps owing to the theatre's lack of strategic importance. Certainly, the question 
of why the campaign was actually fought requires greater examination as the politics 
involved were complex and involved many players outside of London. However, David 
French has produced two useful studies of British decision making, namely British 
Strategy and War Aims 1914 - 1916 and The Strategy ofthe Lloyd George Coalition. 
4 At 
present, there is nothing of similar value concerned specifically with East Africa. 
This is not from want of resources as a vast amount of primary and secondary 
material exists in several languages, but it has not been fully exploited in the published 
official histories. Study has not been helped by the relative paucity of reliable secondary 
information in English. In English, the author of the authoritative Official History died 
before the second and concluding volume could be finished and the period of late 1916 to 
the war's end in November 1918 remains vague and contradictory. 5 On the other hand, 
the Belgians produced a detailed and thorough history of their own forces' operations. 
3 Strachan, Hew, The First World War: ToArms, Volume 1, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001, pp. 495-643. 4 French, David, British Strategy and War Aims 1914-1916, Unwin and Allen, London, 1986; and The Strategy of the Lloyd George Coalition, 1916-1918, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995; other earlier, but still useful sources include Gooch, John, The Plans of Wor: The General Staff and British Military Strategy c 1900-1916, London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1974; Rothwell, VF British War Aims and Peace Diplomacy 1914-1918, Oxford, 1971; and Guinn, Peter, British Strategy and Politics 1914-1918, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1965. The German view is considered in Louis, W R, Great Britain and Germany's Lost Colonies, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1967. 
5 Hordem, Lieutenant Colonel Charles, History of the Great War: Militapy Operations East Africa: August 1914 - September 1916, Volume 1, London: HMSO, 1941, reprinted Nashville, Tennessee: The Battery Press, 1990. Henceforth, Hordern, Military 
2 
These volumes are well-documented and possess excellent maps, with good background 
coverage of concurrent British and Portuguese operations. But, as Belgian direct 
participation in the campaign ended in late 1917, it is only a partial corrective to the 
deficiency. 6 It appears that the Portuguese Government never produced an official 
account of the considerable, although largely unsuccessful, operations of their forces 
during the campaign. 
On the German side the coverage is variable, with the naval history providing a 
great deal of useful information on the defence of the colony while the land operations 
7 
volumes are disappointingly thin and short on detail. Apart from the narrative memoir 
accounts, a number of books emerged in the post-war years largely aimed at chronicling 
and justifying German rule. Much of the debate resulted from indignation at the victors' 
accusations of German atrocities and alleged unfitness to hold colonies. It seems that the 
rise of Nazism and the d6bacle of the Second World War put paid to further interest in 
the subject. In recent years, secondary works emerged mainly from the former GDF, and, 
although slanted against the Wilhelmine and capitalist regimes, they contained some 
useful insights. 8 
Much of the historiographical deficiency can be traced to the fact that the bulk of 
all modem English language accounts are based on the version of events presented by 
General von Lettow-Vorbeck on the German side and Colonel Meinertzhagen on the 
British. 9 While both were first-hand participants and keen observers, neither could be 
described as impartial and each had his own domestic points to score. The former's 
Operations East Africa. A partial draft of Volume II can be found in the Public Record Office (PRO), London in the CAB 44 series. 
A number of maps and sketches for the planned volume are contained in the CAB 45 and WO 808 series. 6 Royaume de Belgique, Les Campagnes Coloniales Belges 1914 - 1918, Tomes I-3, Bruxelles: Imprimerie Typographique de 11C. M., 1927-1932. 
7 The naval works of interest include Assmann, Kurt Konteradmiral, Der Krieg zur See 1914 - 1918: Die Kampfe der Kaiserlichen Marine in den Deutschen Kolonien, Berlin: Verlag ES Mittler & Sohn, 1935; Raeder and Manley, Der Kreuzerkrieg in den 
ausldndisches Gewdssern, 3 Volumes, Berlin: Verlag ES Mittler & Sohn, 1922-1937. The military works are only bare summaries of 
the known situation and are much less valuable. See Der Wel1krieg 1914 bis 1918: Die Militarischen Operationen zu Lande: 9. Band, 
"Der Krieg in den Kolonien bis Ende 1915. Die Ereignisse in Deutsche-Ostafrika bis zum Ende des Jahres 1915", Berlin: Verlag ES 
Mittler und Sohn, pp. 480485 with Skizze 28; also 13. Band "Der Krieg in Ostaftika seit 1916 ", pp. 452462. 11 Stoecker, Helmuth (ed), German Imperialism in Aftica. - From the beginnings until the Second World War, Transt Bemd Zoellner, 
London: C Hurst & Co, 1986 (originally published in DDR 1977); Helbig, Klaus, Legende und Wahrheit. -Der erste Welikrieg in 0stafrika 
und Rolle des Generals Lettow- Vorbeck, PhD Thesis, Leipzig: Karl-Marx University, 1968. 
9 Lettow-Vorbeck, General Paul von, My Reminiscences of East Africa, London: Hurst and Blackett, 1920, reprinted Nashville, 
Tennessee: The Battery Press, [n. d. j. Henceforth, Lettow, Reminiscences, Meinertzhagen, Colonel Richard, Army Diary 1899-1926, 
London: Oliver and Boyd, 1960. 
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account suffers from a lack of precise detail as it was written largely from memory and 
has a distinct whiff of hindsight, particularly when dealing with tactical or operational 
decisions. 10 The esteem accorded by his former enemies to the commander of the 
Schutztruppe has given his work an undeserved aura of authoritativeness; that it was 
almost the sole German account produced in English greatly increased its attractiveness 
to monoglot authors. Von Lettow was the decisive personality on the German side and 
was responsible for the strategy of the campaign. The work seems quite reliable when 
dealing with von Lettow's own experiences, but its accuracy suffers whenever discussing 
events and personalities away from his immediate presence and his often glib comments 
do not always stand when set alongside the surviving documents. Provided that it is used 
in conjunction with other sources, it does, however, remain an important memoir of 
considerable value. 
On the British side, Meinertzhagen's account of his time as an intelligence officer 
in General Headquarters provides an insider's view that is both immediate and highly 
critical of the conduct of the campaign, and most especially of the high command. It also 
provides a number of character sketches and battle descriptions that are of considerable 
value. However, doubts have been raised about the veracity of all of Meinertzhagen's 
recollections and whether the diary was "corrected" after the event. " He was a talented 
soldier, but an unusual and difficult personality who was keen to present his version of 
events. Again, his coverage of events is uneven and ends in December 1916, when he 
was evacuated from the theatre on medical grounds. Like von Lettow, Meinertzhagen is 
a useful guide, but should not be used in isolation. 
A number of popular accounts have been written in the last 30 years, but most of 
them suffer from the undue reliance on Lettow and Meinertzhagen, and detailed coverage 
of the period beyond January 1917 is virtually non-existent. Charles Miller's book, The 
Battle for the Bundu, is often cited as being the standard popular account of the 
10 Lettow, Reminiscences, p. vii. In the preface to his work, written soon after the war's end, von Lettow frankly admitted that the loss 
of his records, lack of time and inability to consult former colleagues made errors of detail inevitable. " Amongst the reasons for this scholarly suspicion is the fact that Meinertzhagen's numerous volumes of diaries are composed of 
typed, ring-bound pages interleaved with captioned photographs. It would have been impossible to produce such an immaculate and 
error-free work under wartime field conditions and the possibility of subsequent amendments cannot be discounted. His book, Army Diary, reproduces selected diary entries almost word for word. 
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campaign, but it suffers from a number of drawbacks, most notably the lack of any 
considered analysis of the fighting. While drawing on an extensive list of sources, in 
both English and German, the book tends to accept statements uncritically and generally 
ignores the importance of supply and health as vital factors. Several other popular 
accounts appeared in the same period, although none could be said to have advanced 
knowledge of the campaign significantly. 12 As a genre, these books are largely confined 
to narrative accounts based largely on the printed literature in English and make no use of 
archival sources. In a number of cases, factual errors and a number of myths get recycled 
without serious question. 
This is unfortunate as a great deal of very useful material exists both in print and 
in various national repositories. From the German perspective, probably the most useful 
is the semi-official account, Die Operationen in Ostafrika, produced by Major Ludwig 
Boell, a participant in the campaign and later an historian in the Reichsarchiv. 13 This 
clear and detailed work describes the German war effort from start to finish, giving much 
valuable information on plans and intentions together with the detail of operations. The 
composition of detachments or Abteilungen is laid out as are casualty figures and the 
determination of success or failure. It is written with a degree of detachment and analysis 
that makes it invaluable as a source. Sadly, a large number of sketches intended for the 
volume were destroyed by Allied bombing, although several useftil, large-scale maps are 
provided. 
Equally valuable as a primary source is Governor Heinrich Schnee's book, 
Deutsch-Ostafrika im Weltkrieg, written immediately after the war's end. 14 Schnee kept 
a careful set of diaries and was a perceptive observer. Although not a professional soldier 
himself, in many ways his account of the campaign is clearer and more accurate than von 
Lettow's. Certainly, it covers important, but frequently neglected areas, such as the 
medical system, supply and transport, civil governance and war finance in some detail. 
12 Mosley, Leonard, Duel for Kilimanjaro, London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1963, Sibley, Maj J R, Tanganyikan Guerrilla, 
Pan/Ballantyne Illustrated History of the First World War, Book No 4, London: Pan/Ballantyne, 1971; Hoyt, E P. Guerrilla: Colonel 
von Lettow-Vorbeck and Germany's East African Empire, New York: Macmillan, 1981; James, Lawrence, Savage Wars: The British 
Campaigns in Africa 1870-1920, London: 1985 and Farwell, Byron The Great War in Africa, New York: WW Faber, 1986. 13 Boell, Ludwig, Die Operationen in Ostafrika, Hamburg: Walter Dachcrt, 195 1. Henceforth, Boell, Die Operationen. " Schnee, Heinrich, Deutsch-aytaftika im Welikrieg, Leipzig: Quelle et Meyer, 1919. Henceforth, Schnee, Deutsch-Ostafrika. 
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Central to his story is the failure of civil-military relations that resulted in the bitter clash 
between himself and von Lettow over who would decide the direction and scope of the 
colonial war effort. Also useful is a later work, entitled Als letzer Gouverneur Deutsch- 
Ostaftika Erinnerungen, in which he reconsiders the conflict after the passage of over 
twenty years. 15 A synopsis of the dispute together with analyis of the respective points of 
view is contained in a book review by the former colonial minister, Wilhelm Solf . 
16 
Taken together, both Boell's and Schnee's works shed a rather different light on 
German operations than is provided by von Lettow alone. This can be further 
supplemented by the perceptive accounts of several other participants, most notably 
doctors, who served away from the headquarters in the various Abteilungen. " A number 
of commanders and soldiers produced their own memoirs during the inter-war period, 
many of which are of some considerable value. 18 Perhaps a less traditional source for 
military history, but nonetheless a useful one, is the account of the Governor's wife, Frau 
Ada Schnee, as it gives clear picture, but also focuses on the economic and medical 
systems that underlay the fighting forces. 19 The German colonial state has also been little 
examined in the context of the war, yet the fighting effectiveness of the Schutztruppe 
depended on the civil administration for the provision of food, equipment and porters. A 
very useful analysis is provided by John Illiffe, while a newer study by Juhani Koponen 
helps readers to understand the nature of the colonial state and Wolfgang Eckart examines 
the politics of colonial medicine. 20 
The Belgian contribution to the East African campaign is not fully appreciated. 
Apart from the excellent official history on the Africa colonial campaigns, further 
background information on the pre-war organisation of the Force Publique is provided by 
15 Schnee, Heinrich, Als Le&er Gouverneur in Deutsch-Ostafrika: Erinnerungen, Heidelberg: Quelle und Meyer, 1964. 16 Solf, Wilhelm, "Schnee und Lettow-Vorbeck", Die Deutsche Nation, 2 (1920), pp. 87-95. 17 Deppe, Ludwig, Mit Lettow-Vorbeck durch Afrika, Berlin: Verlag August Scherl, 1919; Hauer, August Dr, Kumbake: ErIelmisse 
einesArtze in Deutsch-Ostafrika 1914-1919, Berlin: Hobbing, 1922. 
" Lettow-Vorbeck, Gen Paul Emil von, Mein Leben, published by Ursula von Lettow-VoTbeck, Biberach an der Riss: Koehlers, 1957; 
Kohl, Hauptmann Franz, Der Kampf um Deutsch-Ostafrika, Berlin: Verlag KameradschA [1919]; Methner, Wilhelm, Unter drei 
Gouverneuren: 16 Jahre Dienst in den deutschen Tropen, Breslau: Kom, 1938. 
'9 Schnee, Ada, Meine Erlebnisse wdhrendder Kriegszeit in Deutsches Ostafrika, Leipzig: Verlag Quelle und Meyer, 1918. 20 Iliffe, John, Tanganyika under Germany Rule 1905-1912, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1969; Koponen, Juhani, 
Developmentfor Exploitation: German Colonial Policies in Mainland Tanzania, 1884-1914, Helsinki: Finnish Historical Society, 1994; 
Eckhardt, Wolfgang U, Medizzin und Kolonialimperialismus Deutschland 1884-1945, Paderbom: Schoningh, 1997. 
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Flament while WR Louis has written a very useful study of Belgian policies in the 
region. 21 
The Portuguese participation in the war was undistinguished by martial success. 
Despite contributing forces for over two years and having one of their most important 
colonies as a major battleground, there appear to be few published primary works on the 
subject and those that do are remarkably difficult to track down. 22 Of the secondary 
sources, two books stand out, the first by Ren6 Missier and the second by Malyn 
Newitt. 23 P61issier covers the war in greater detail, but both help to explain the 
conditions that enabled the Germans to continue resistance throughout most of 1918. 
II "Sub-imperialism" was a key factor in determining the fate of the German 
colonies as South Africa in particular pursued goals divergent from those of London. 
Much can be gained from Prosser Gifford's and William Roger Lewis's study, Britain 
and Germany in Africa: Imperial Rivalry and Colonial Rule. 24 This work highlights 
many of the local frictions and aspirations that helped to shape the conflict. Of 
considerable value, too, is Ronald Hyam's book, The Failure of South African 
Expansionism, which examines the attempts to incorporate much of southern Africa into 
a single state, most notably by Jan Smuts. 25 
Overall, despite the many different studies, there can be said to be no generally 
authoritative work on the entire campaign and certainly none that looks at the conflict 
from more than one national perspective. This gap is not due to lack of archival material; 
on the contrary large amounts remain, untapped and largely unseen in various 
repositories. Britain has a huge amount of material in the Public Record Office in the 
form of Cabinet Office, War Office, Admiralty, Colonial and Foreign Office files, to list 
21 Flament, F et at, La Force Publique desanaissance a 1914: Participation des militaires a I'histoire des premiaresanniesdu 
Congo, Brussels: Departments of State and Public Institutions, 1952; Louis, W R, Ruanda-Urundi 1884-1919. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1963. 
22 Pires, Antonio J, A Grand Guerra em Macambique, Porto: [n pub. ], 1924; and Martins, General Ferreira DSO, Portugal's Co- 
2 
op. eration with Great Britain in the Great War 1914-1918, Lisboa: Servicos de Informacao e Imprensa da Embaixada Britanica, 1943. 2 Pdlissier, Rend, La Noissance du Mozambique Rgsistance et Revoltes, 2 Volumes, Orgeval: Pdlissier, 1984; and Newitt, Malyn, A Hlsto? Y of Mozambique, London: Hurst & Company, 1995; Isaacman, Allen, The Tradition of Resistance in Mozambique, Berkeley: UCLA Press, 1976. 
24 Gifford, Prosser and Louis, William Roger, Britain and Germany in Africa: Imperial Rivalry and Colonial Rule, New Haven: Yale University Press, 1967. 
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the most prominent. The British Library, the Imperial War Museum and National Army 
Museum in London also contain a great deal of relevant material as do archives in Oxford 
and Cambridge Universities. Both the South African National Defence Force (SANDF) 
Documentation Directorate and the South African National Archives contain a large 
amount of valuable information on the war. The Belgian Musee Royal de lArmej has a 
considerable amount of printed and original material relating to the campaign, while it 
appears that a number of important military reports are in the Archivo Historic6 Militar in 
Lisbon - although these have not yet been consulted. 1ý 
The German records in the BundesarchivlMilitdrsarvchiv in Freiburg contain the 
terse wartime diaries of General von Lettow together with the huge account of the 
26 campaign written subsequently by Major Boell. These are invaluable in supplementing 
the limited printed sources and making up for the loss of most of the official colonial 
records during the war. Other Bundesarchiv sources, such as the Schnee papers in 
Koblenz and the Reichskolonialsamt collection in Potsdam, promise to be useful although 
time has prevented their exploitation. 
The greatest problem with archival sources is the sheer mass and weight of paper; 
the British sources alone go well beyond the capability of one individual to search and 
examine comprehensively. These efforts must be viewed as a pioneering attempt to 
locate and discuss the most important sources. It is highly likely that much of value will 
continue to be discovered over the coming years. 
AIM 
The aim of this dissertation is to examine the critical period in the East African 
campaign from September 1916 to November 1918. This period covers the events from 
the time that the advancing Allies had reached the centre of German East Africa, through 
the Germans' evacuation of their colony in late 1917 and the subsequent campaign in 
25 Hyam, Ronald, 7he Failure ofSouth African EqAansion 1908-1948, London: Macmillan, 1972. 
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Portuguese East Africa until the armistice in November 1918. The dissertation will look at 
operations from a high level, with emphasis being placed on the strategic and political 
imperatives that drove the campaign for both sides. It will use a dual thematic and 
narrative approach to fill in the numerous gaps in our existing knowledge of the fighting. 
The thematic chapters will be used to provide a background to operations in East Africa, 
which differed considerably from those in other theatres, particularly in the areas of tactics, 
supply, transport, medicine and inter-Allied relations. The narrative chapters will then 
explain how events unfolded in the period of September 1916 to November 1918. 
INITIAL BRITISH STRATEGY AND SOUTH AFRICAN INVOLVEMENT 
War initially came to Africa not for reasons of expansionism, but for those of 
British imperial security. From the outset, the British put in place a strategy of protecting 
their maritime interests and attacking the German system of overseas communications 
without detracting from the efforts in the main theatre of war. 27 In practical terms this 
meant the destruction of the German colonies' system of wireless transmitters as well as 
denying bases to their fleet. This policy was also attractive to the government as it could 
be largely achieved by amphibious operations and did not require the conquest of 
substantial inland territories. In order to maintain unity with its allies, the British had 
specifically ruled out acquiring territories for the purposes of imperial expansion, stating 
that all permanent decisions would be subject to any post-war peace conference. 
29 
However, this high-minded declaration did not rule out the conquest of enemy colonies, as 
such prizes could be useful negotiating pieces. 29 It also recognised, if only informally, that 
the self-governing dominions, such as South African and Australia, might have their own 
aspirations towards their German colonial neighbours. 
' The diaries are pocket-sized and written in a short-hand covering details of movements, stocks, and casualties together with an end 
of year summary, They cover from 1914 to 1918. Boell's work, upon which he based Die Operationen is enormous running to over 
4,000 sides of paper. Unfortunately, there are a few gaps owing to wartime destruction, but overall it is invaluable 
i; 
the historian. 
'7 Hankey, Lord, The Supreme Command, Volume 1, London: George Allen and Unwin, 1961, p. 168; French, British Strategy, pp. 
27-28; Oxford and Asquith, Earl of, Memories and Rey7ections 1852 - 1927, Volume II, London: Cassel and Company, 1928, p. 25. 23 CAB 21/3, Proceedings of a Sub-Committee of the Committee of Imperial Defence Assembled on the 14 1h August, 1914", 14 
August 1914. "... no formal proclamation annexing any such territory should be issued without specific instructions from His 
Majesty's Governmentý and further, that an agreement should be come to with our Allies to act on similar lines. " ; French, British 
Strategy, p. 15. 
2" Churchill, Winston S. 7he World Crisis: 1911-1914, Volume 1, London: Thomas Butterworth Limited, p. 283. 
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The other European powers in Africa had their own views on the subject, but the 
British made it quite clear, in diplomatic language, that their allies' offers of military 
assistance in East Africa were unwelcome. The Belgian, Portuguese and even French 
attempts to contribute contingents against the common enemy were rebuffed early in the 
war. 30 This may be attributed to British over-confidence in their own abilities to eliminate 
the Germans as rivals as well as a wish to deny other countries a claim in the potential 
spoils. Despite the pressing need for military victory over the Central Powers, imperial 
rivalries and colonial aspirations would remain significant factors throughout the war, and 
East Africa would be no exception. 
However, this littoral strategy did not last very long in its pure form as other factors 
induced the British to invade German colonies shortly after the outbreak of the war. Sub- 
imperialism and local fears for security played their part in forming a more aggressive 
attitude. Togoland fell by the end of August, while colonial expeditionary forces were 
being prepared to attack the Cameroons in the north and German South-West Africa in the 
31 south . While these campaigns were to drag on much 
longer than initially expected, it was 
in East Africa that this alteration to the initial British strategy was to have the most visible 
effects. 
Germany faced the war in East Africa from two points of view: one from Berlin 
and the other from Dar-es-Salaam. From the imperial viewpoint, colonies were not a major 
priority although, prior to the war, efforts had been made to reduce colonial tensions with 
Britain, actions that had been only partially reciprocated. Indeed, the two powers had 
initialled the draft of a secret treaty aimed at carving up the Portuguese colonies in the case 
of an expected financial default. 32 However, once hostilities broke out, thoughts of 
conciliation were quickly forgotten and a more aggressive position was taken. A group in 
I 
30 MS Harcourt, dep 507, "Colonial Office Telegrams Circulated to the Cabinet August 1914 - August 1915", 22 September 1914, Telegram No. 1, Secretary of State for the Colonies to the High Commissioner for South Africa; 3 October 1914, Telegram No. 3, 
Secretary of State for the Colonies to the Governor East African Protectorate (for the Belgians); dep 507,27 August 1914, Telegram, 
No. 2, Secretary of State for the Colonies to High Commissioner for South Africa; and dep 590 Foreign Office Print, 26 August 1914, Telegram No. 176, Sir Edward Grey to Mr Carnegie (for the Portuguese); CAB 21/3,12 August 1914, Telegram Foreign Office to Sir 
F Bertie; and Andrew, Christopher and Kanya-Forster, France Abroad, London: Thames and Hudson, 198 1, pp. 62-63 (for the French). 
3t French, British Strategy, pp. 27-28. 
10 
the government, exemplified by the Colonial Secretary, Dr Wilhelm Solf, aspired to a 
German Mittelaftika, built on existing colonies and augmented by helpings from the 
Portuguese- and Belgian-held territories. 33 However, by the end of 1914 all effective links 
with the colonies had been cut off and regardless of his aspirations, Solf understood the 
realities of the strategic situation and that any exchanges of territory would follow a general 
peace settlement. 34 
On the other hand, the German colonial authorities were faced with the much more 
immediate concern of survival. They realised both the extent of their isolation and the 
weakness of their own means. The Governor, Dr Schnee, initially tried to claim neutrality 
under the provisions of the Berlin Act 1885, but these concerns were not shared by the 
35 British, nor indeed the Belgians once their homeland had been invaded. Furthermore, the 
commander of the Schutztruppe actively opposed this attitude of non-belligerence and a 
dispute between the two ensued . 
36 In fact, pre-war German planners had considered the 
situation and had correctly concluded that the British were unlikely to accept neutralisation 
as it went against their direct interests. Accordingly, they had directed that preparations be 
made for defending the interior of the colony rather than the coast. 37 Therefore, if early 
surrender in the manner of Togoland was not to be contemplated, the only effective 
strategy was to delay and try to survive for as long as possible. Von Lettow's personality 
and the course of events eventually won out, and his strategy of distracting as many enemy 
troops and resources, even at the expense of evacuating the colony, continued until the end 
of the war. 
While a Belgian colonial adventure may appear unusual with most of the home 
country under occupation by the Germans and the remainder largely a battleground, the 
"Fischer, Germany's War Aim Aims in the First World War, London: Chatto & Windus, 1967, pp. 38-39; French, British Stratesy, p. 
9-10 and 14; Langhorne, Richard. "Anglo-German Negotiations Concerning The Future of the Portuguese Colonies 1911-1914", 
Historical Journal, XVI, No. 24, (1973), pp. 378-379. " Andrew and Kanya-Forster, France Abroad, p. 57; Fischer, Griff nach der Weltmacht, p. 94. 34 Fischer, Fritz, Germany's War Aims, pp. 102-103. 35 Schnee, Deutsch-Ostafrika, pp. 37-38; Hordern, Military Operations East Africa, pp. 527-528, CAB 8/5, Colonial Defence 
Committee, No. 431 M. "East and West African Protectorates Position in the Event of War with a European Power", 24 January 1911. 
The British had examined and ruled out a declaration of neutrality for its East African colonies as early as 1911. It saw such neutrality 
as favouring the Germans. 
36 Lettow, My Reminiscences, pp. 27-28. 
37 MS Boell, N 14/14, Denkschrift aber Mobilmachungsvorarbeitenfar den Fall eines Krieges mit Grossmachtftr Deutsch-Ostaftika, 27 April 1912. 
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prospect of a campaign held a number of attractions for the government-in-exile. The 
advantages included both national pride and diplomacy; in short they needed some tangible 
gains in order to negotiate from a position of strength in any peace conference. 38 As the 
official Belgian instructions directed, they wanted "a pawn in the form of a portion of 
German territory". 39 The proximity of German East Africa and the support promised by 
the British made the campaign attractive, as did the wealth and fertility of its provinces of 
Ruanda and Urundi. A limited campaign to seize and control some of the best parts of 
German territory at relatively low risk was a most attractive option. It also had the 
advantages of placing the much stronger British in their debt, of enhancing their Congo 
colony, and of inflicting pain on the despoilers of their country. Under these conditions 
and from a Belgian point of view, an offensive made strong strategic sense. 
The last of the four powers involved in the East African campaign, the Portuguese 
also emerge as by far the weakest and least effective, virtually drifting or being pushed 
along by the will of their stronger neighbours. Hated by their African subjects for the 
venality and brutality of their rule, the Portuguese were also despised by the European 
protagonists, including the Germans, for their military and administrative incompetence. 40 
They were also aware that the British and Germans had been eyeing up their colonies and 
that both considered their administration to be hopelessly inefficient and cruel . 
41 With the 
outbreak of war, Portugal stood aloof, declaring neither neutrality nor belligerence, largely 
in accordance with British desires. 42 This policy also accorded with Portugal's desire to 
protect its African colonies against encroachment while recognising Portugal's own 
financial and military weakness. However, a combination of internal politics and external 
pressure led it into the war in March 1916 with ultimately disastrous results. 
All of the European powers were in comparable positions with very small white 
populations ruling over millions of blacks who had no say in questions of war or peace. 
" Louis, Ruanda-Urundi, pp. 216-217. 39 Campagnes Coloniales Belges, Volume 11, p. 125, "Instruction minist6rielle no 563 du 22 avril " quoted and the terms "3. Occuper a litre de gage uneparlie du terriloire allemand: 1effortprincipale devait etreportd vers le Ruanda. " 40 Pdlissier, Naissance de Mozambique, Volume 11, pp. 650-651 and 656. 41 Teixeira, Nuno Severiano, LEntreif du Portugal dons la Grande Guerre, Paris: Econornica, 1998, pp. 114-119; Vincent-Smith, J D, "The Portuguese Republic and Britain, 1910-1914", Journal of Contemporary History, X, No. 4, (1975)o pp. 714-717. '2 Vincent-Smith, John, "Britain, Portugal and the First World War, 1914-19", European Studies Review, IV, No. 3, (1974), pp. 210- 211; Teixeira, LEntrie du Portugal, pp. 188-194. 
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Yet the African population was to be drawn into the war in a manner and scale quite 
unprecedented in its history. Whether it was through volunteering to be soldiers or porters, 
or being compelled to provide manual labour, food and information, frequently by force, 
few communities escaped the effects of the war and many were devastated by it. Owing to 
illiteracy and the undeveloped nature of their societies, their voices are largely silent in 
most historical accounts, yet without their participation few of the events described could 
ever have occurred. 43 Silence must not be confused with lack of importance and the 
African contribution to the campaign was absolutely essential if not yet fully explained. 
THE DEVELOPING STRATEGIC SITUATION FROM 1915 - EARLY 1916 
The East African campaign evolved from the relatively simple plan of destroying 
coastal wireless facilities and denying the use of Dar-es-Salaarn as a port into an ill- 
judged attempt to seize the whole of German East Africa with two lightly equipped 
brigades of the Indian Army. The decision to attack was made on a number of erroneous 
assumptions that arose through a combination of poor planning, inter-departmental 
rivalries and a lack of firm leadership; it was to have long-lasting effects on the 
campaign. 
44 The result was the disastrous attempt to land at Tanga in early November 1914 . 
Decisively defeated by the numerically inferior German forces, the British retired to British 
East Africa where, on the orders of Lord Kitchener, the War Secretary, they went over to 
the defensive. He correctly realised that East Africa was a strategic backwater and refused 
further substantial reinforcements as he generally opposed any moves to diminish the main 
effort on the Western Front. 45 
4' Hodges, Geoffrey, 77je Carrier Corps: Military Labor in the East Aftican Campaign 1914-1918, Westport, Connecticut: 
Greenwood Press, 1986. See pp. 223-226 for his African oral history sources; CAB 45/14, Transport Difficulties in EastAfrica 
During the Great War, by Sir HD Lawrence, [n. d. j. In North-eastern Rhodesia alone, the Administrator estimated that any one time a 
third of the taxable adult male population (c. 40,000) was directly engaged in carrier service while their wives and children were 
growing food crops. 
"A fuller account of the political background and of the battle of Tanga itself is at Anderson, Ross, "The Battle of Tanga 2-5 
November 1914", War in History, VIII, No. 3, (2001), pp. 294-322. 45 WO 33nl4, European War Secret Telegrams Series B, Volume 1,31*July 1914 - 31-*January 1915, London: War Office, 1915. No. 1522,4 December 1914, Telegram 2343, War Office to Wapshare. Henceforth, Telegrams B 1. 
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The abject failure at Tanga and the inability to provide significant reinforcements 
for East Africa led to a change in attitude. By January 1915, official meetings were 
underway in London between the British and Belgian governments to determine the best 
method of military co-operation, while unofficial feelers were being put out to South 
Africa. 46 Despite London's reluctance to bring Portugal into the war, the Governor of 
Nyasaland was authorised to request military assistance as a measure of last resort. 
47 
On the other side, the Germans had much less strategic choice as they had only 
intermittent communications with their colony that were based on frequently distorted 
48 
wireless signals and occasional messages spirited through the British blockade. The 
conquest of German South-West Africa and the Cameroons, together with the destruction 
of the German overseas raiders, made German East Africa's position much more 
vulnerable. 49 Throughout 1914 and 1915, it remained a strategic and military backwater 
for the British while the Germans could do little directly, as their fleet had been penned into 
the North Sea and the blockade was having an increasing effect on their war efforts. 
50 
Although the new U-Boat weapon began to emerge as a major threat to the Allied merchant 
fleet, the technology of the day limited the range of these vessels to mainly European 
waters. Without access to overseas bases and with insufficient numbers available, the 
submarine was unable to make an impact on the situation in East Africa although 
increasing shipping losses would restrict the amount of support to that theatre. 
51 
This defensive policy would hold true for the better part of 1915. The forces in 
British East Africa suffered not only from insufficient numbers, but also widespread 
sickness from malaria and poor morale. This, and the lack of an energetic commander, 
sapped their effectiveness and the year was largely spent in static warfare, with both sides 
relying on small patrols and raids to disrupt their opponents, while simultaneously trying to 
build up their own limited forces. The one major initiative approved by Kitchener was the 
46MS Harcourtdep 583,4 January 1915, Telegram No. 2, Kidston to Sir Edward Grey; dep 507,14 April 1915, Telegram No. 4, 
Governor General of South Africa to Secretary of State for the Colonies. 
47 MS Harcourt, dep 507,14 January 1915, Telegram No. 2, Secretary of State for the Colonies to Governor Nyasaland. 
48 Schnee, Deutsch-Ostafrika, pp. 162-163; Klein-Arendt, Reinhard, Kamina ruft Nouen, Ostheim/Rhon: Wilhellm Herbst Verlag, 
1996, p. 292 and 300. 
49 Strachan, The First World War, p. 570. '0 Halpern, Paul, A Naval History of World War 1, London: UCL Press, 1994, pp. 328-329. 31 Halpern, Naval History, pp. 306-308. 
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pushing of a spur of the Uganda Railway close to the British-Gennan border, a factor that 
would be crucial in any offensive operations. 52 
By late 1915, the British Cabinet was divided into two main factions with strongly 
opposed views on strategy, the management of the war effort, and conscription. Notably, 
there was strong opposition to further offensives on the Western Front and some ministers 
sought to find alternative theatres in which to achieve strategic success. Furthermore, Lord 
Kitchener had lost the confidence of his civilian colleagues who responded by scheming to 
diminish his powers. 53 One area of contention was East Affica, where Kitchener had 
maintained his opposition to any further offensive action while keeping its reinforcements 
to the bare minimum required. 
Finally in November 1915, when he had been deliberately sent away on an 
inspection of the Dardanelles by the Cabinet, his opponents struck. Using a series of 
pessimistic and alarmist reports from the general in command in East Africa, the CIGS 
produced an appreciation that called for at least 10,000 reinforcements and a more active 
stance. 54 In this he was supported by his Director of Military Operations, who later 
admitted to using Kitchener's absence as an opportunity for going against his express 
wishes. 55 
The General Staff did this with the knowledge that there was broad support for the 
scheme. 56 Indeed, the King had taken a personal interest in the matter for some time and 
had had his Private Secretary write to Bonar Law, the Colonial Secretary, about the need to 
involve the South Africans in German East Africa. 57 He needed little convincing as he had 
long welcomed such assistance and had been carefully negotiating with the South African 
52 WO 33/858, Telegrams D 1, No. 23,6 February 1915, Telegram S 215, Wapshare to War Office; Hordem, Military Operations East 
Africa, P. 130. War Office approval was given on 16 February. " Turner, John, British Politics and the Great War: Coahtion and Conflict, 1915-1918, New Haven: Yale University Press, 1992, pp. 68-69; French, British Strategy, pp. 158-16 1. '4 WO 106/3 10, "The Military Situation in British East Afria', CIGS 8 October 1915. In this report, General Sir AJ Murray cited General Tighe's Telegram 322 of 2 August 1915, his despatch of 31 July 1915, and his Telegram 325 of 14 August 1915. 55 Callwell, Major General Sir C E, Experiences ofa Dug-Out 1914-1918, London: Constable, 1920, pp. 178-179. 56 Gilbert, Martin, Winston S Churchill, Companion III Documents, London: Heinemann, 1971, p. 1296. Cites 3 November 1916, Letter Curzon to Churchill. 
57 MS Buxton, dep 9930, File August 1915,13 August 1915, Letter Lord Stamfordham to Buxton. 
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Government through the Governor General for some time. 58 Furthermore, the victory in 
October, albeit with a reduced majority, of Botha's South African Party, had cleared the 
main obstacle to an offensive there. 
In the circumstances, the CIGS then produced a memorandum advocating an attack 
against German East Africa, using mainly South African troops, in order to enhance 
Britain's position at the end of the war. 59 On his return to Britain, Kitchener wasted little 
time before weighing into the proposal, stating: 
"This scheme for offensive operations in the centre of Africa is, in my opinion, a 
very dangerous project in the present state of the war... Me general military policy 
now advocated, may therefore, lead us to place South African troops in positions 
where they will be liable to disaster, from which we will not be able to extricate 
them, as our troops will be fully engaged elsewhere. I think that the recent example 
we have had of similar proceedings based on wrong premises in Mesopotamia 
should teach us to be cautious in undertaking similar operations of this nature... " 
60 
Nevertheless, such was Kitchener's weakened position that the War Committee 
endorsed the new offensive strategy on 28 December 1915, having gained the support of 
General Sir William Robertson, the newly-appointed CIGS a few days earlier. 61 It was a 
vast and ambitious project with the British planning to attack from British East Africa in 
the north-east and from Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland in the south-west, with the 
Belgians advancing from the Congo in the west. The prospective Commander-in-Chief, 
General Sir Horace Smith-Dorrien had identified many of the salient difficulties of 
campaigning there, but, nevertheless, it is clear that the politicians expected a quick and 
easy victory. 62 The scene was now set for a major struggle in the heart of Africa. 
so MS Buxton, dep9930, File May 1915,9 May 1915, Telegram Buxton to Harcourt; 11 May 1915, Telegram Harcourt to Buxton; 19 
May 1916, Letter Bonar Law to Buxton; File August 1915,9 August 1915, Telegram Bonar Law to Buxton. 
" CAB 22/3, "An Appreciation by the General Staff on the Situation in East Africa", 10 December 1915. It foresaw about 15,000 
reinforcements, of whom 14,000 were South Africa and 1,000 were Indian, joining the nearly 15,000 troops already in-theatre. 60 CAB 22/3, "Minute by the Secretary of State for War", appended to the General Staff Appreciation, 14 December 1915; CAB 22/3, 
War Committee Meeting of 15 December 1915. 61 CAB 22/3, War Committee Meeting of 28 December 1915. Robertson's agreement was contained in the "CIGS Note" of 23 
December 1915. 
62 WO 106/3 10, "Appreciation on the Situation in East Africa", General HL Smith-Dorrien, I December 1915, pp. 3-4. Smith- 
Dorrien put great emphasis on the need for careful and thorough preparation on account of the climate and endemic diseases. He 
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SUB-IMPERIAL INTERESTS 
The involvement of the Union of South Africa in German South-West and 
subsequently German East Africa was outwardly puzzling. In fact, the presence of a large 
South African contingent, led by one of the country's foremost politicians and a veteran of 
the Anglo-Boer War, may be considered remarkable given the traditional Afrikaner 
hostility to British imperial actions. Yet while the Union of South Africa had only been 
formed in 1910 and many remained hostile to their new overlords, it must be remembered 
that the Boer republics had been founded on expansionism, with the Great Trek being the 
best-known example. Leading politicians, most notably Louis Botha and Jan Smuts, 
viewed the neighbouring territories of German South-West Africa, British-run Rhodesia 
and Portuguese East Africa as attractive acquisitions for a Greater South Africa. Indeed 
there had been considerable ftustration at the manner in which the Boers had been 
"hemmed-in" during the colonial expansion of the late nineteenth century. 63 The outbreak 
of war had presented an unparalleled opportunity to advance these claims under the 
auspices of loyalty to Britain's cause. 
The planned attack on Gennan South-West Africa had been delayed by the 
outbreak of the Rebellion in October 1914. However, as soon as the dissident forces had 
been suppressed, the Prime Minister, Botha, took personal command of the operations, 
with Smuts' assistance from Pretoria and later in the field. 64 The threat of future risings 
and physical attack from that territory were used to justify the seizure: 
"He [Botha] added however emphatically that the cost was worth incurring, if, as he 
believed, it would make any further rising impossible for the future, and if it 
secured by annexation the German territory from becoming, as it otherwise would, 
both a military and intriguing menace against South Africa. "65 
thought that the Government believed that GEA could be completely subjugated by April 1916, but warned that no decisive result 
could occur before July or August 1916. 
63 Hyam, Ronald, South African Expansionism, pp. 23-24. " Strachan, The First World War, pp. 554-555. 65 MS Harcourt, dep 471,2 November 1914, Letter Buxton to Harcourt. This letter followed a meeting with General Botha. 
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Smuts certainly agreed with Botha and had no intention of relinqui ing any 
captured territory. 66 German East Africa was a less obvious target for South African 
ambitions, separated as it was by the masses of the Rhodesias, Mozambique and Nyasaland 
from the northern tip of the Transvaal. However, Smuts saw it as a useful bargaining tool 
with the Portuguese and hoped to swap its southern area in exchange for the southern 
portion of Portuguese East Africa: 
"The Union Govt. are of course anxious to put out a claim to some part of Port: 
E. A. and think this an opportunity to do so, and the above re-arrangement of 
territory is Smuts special pet idea. , 67 
Such an exchange would provide first class ports for an enlarged South Africa and 
remove a rival power from the scene. 68 It also had the merit of coinciding with the British 
belief that Portugal was unfit to be a colonial power and might welcome an expansion of its 
colonial interests under the South African banner. Furthermore, as the hard-pressed British 
and Indian Armies were unable to spare significant reinforcements for the campaign, a 
strong South African contingent would be welcomed on military as well as political 
grounds. Smuts already had the spoils firmly in mind: 
11 ... But they [the British Government] now practically 
intimate that in future 
German East Africa will be our destination. If that country were conquered by us, 
we could probably effect an exchange with Mozambique and so consolidate our 
49 
territories south of the Zambesi and Kunene... 
Smuts's ambitions, however, were getting ahead of themselves as the fighting in 
German South-West Africa was far from over. It was the Prime Minister, Botha, still 
66 MS Buxton, dep 9930, File September 1914,24 September 1914, Letter Buxton to Harcourt. Smuts is quoted as saying, "if the 
Union Government were successful in these operations, and conquered the territory, it would be impossible in the circumstances to 
relinquish it to Germany, " 
67 MS Harcourt, dep 472,18 May 1915, Letter Buxton to Harcourt; MS Buxton, dep 9930, File May 1915,15 May 1915, Letter 
Buxton to Harcourt. 
Hyam, South African Expansionism, pp. 26-28 
Hancock, Keith Sir, and Poel, Jean van der. Selectionsfron; the Smuts Papers Volume IIIJune 1910 - November 1918, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1966,30 August 1915, Letter Smuts to JX Meff iman, p. 3 10. 
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engaged in personally directing the campaign at the front, who was more cautious, 
prudently preferring to finish off one campaign before starting another. 
70 
Despite this, and as early as May 1915, speculation reached a point where the 
Government felt obliged to issue a press statement stating that no decision had been made 
about sending troops to Europe or elsewhere in Africa .71 Furthermore, as the campaign 
in 
South-West Africa wound down in July 1915, a new and difficult problem arose, that of 
winning the required General Election. The Botha government was under heavy pressure 
from the Nationalists and the Afrikaner population was split. 72 Ministers were seriously 
concerned about the effects of sending away so many potentially friendly voters before the 
election: 
"The next Election is the most critical this country probably will ever have to 
face. It has not been possible to prevent the First Brigade from being formed, and 
that they are leaving before the Election takes place; but the Government are 
extremely anxious to do nothing that would add further to the disenfranchisement 
of voters. 
Besides, in the uncertain state of politics they do not want to move in the 
matter of an East African Contingent until after the Election. Both the Contingent 
itself, and the financing of it might be used as points against them electorally. , 
73 
With the election set for October 1915, no outward preparations could be made 
until the last quarter of the year and it would take several months to recruit, equip and train 
any contingent. In the interim, nothing was publicly announced about South Affican 
participation in East Africa, as it would almost certainly have been a vote-loser in a close 
run contest. The British Cabinet realised the threat posed by Hertzog's Nationalists and 
wanted Botha's South African Party to be returned to power; accordingly, London heeded 
Lord Buxton's advice and refrained from public pressure. 74 
70 MS Buxton, dep 9930, File May 1915,25 May 1915, Telegram D 166 Smuts to Buxton citing 22 May 1915, Telegram B 45 Botha 
to Smuts. 
71 MS Buxton, dep 9930, File May 1915,27 May 15, Press Cutting Cape Argus. 
7' Meintjes, Johannes, General Louis Botha, London: Cassell, 1970, p. 273. 73 MS Buxton, dep 9930, File August 1915, It August 1915, Letter Buxton to Bonar Law. 
74 MS Buxton, dep 9930, File August 1915,19 August 1915, Letter Buxton to Asquith; 28 August 1915, Telegram Buxton to Bonar 
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For some time Buxton had believed that the passive, defensive strategy was failing 
to protect Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland adequately, and had been pressing the 
Colonial Secretary to take the offensive. 75 Despite War Office opposition, Bonar Law 
ageed with Buxton's assessment: 
"The position in East Africa and surrounding districts is of a nature to cause 
the greatest anxiety ... it would be of the greatest possible advantage to send a 
large 
enough force to conquer Gennan East Affica once and for all. s976 
With the victory in October, albeit with a reduced majority, of the Botha 
Government, the main obstacle in South Africa disappeared and together with the British 
Cabinet's agreement, the way for war in East Africa was clear. 
Law. 
71 WO 33/858, Telegrams D 1, No. 163,10 April 1915, Telegram 3970, War Office to Buxton, p. 39. 76 Yorke, Edmund James, A Crisis of Colonial Control: War andAuthority in Northern Rhodesia: ] 919-19, Cambridge University PhD 
thesis, 1983, p. 132. Cites Bonar Law to Buxton, 3 September 1915. 
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CHAPTER 2- THE SITUATION AT THE END OF AUGUST 1916 
SMUTS'S APPOINTMENT 
With the plan to invade German East Africa approved by the British Cabinet and 
the South African Government providing the bulk of the contingent, General Smith- 
Dorrien was expected to lead the force. However, he had fallen dangerously ill of 
pneumonia during the long sea journey and, despite a recovery, was deemed medically 
unfit to take up his command. In the circumstances, the British offered the appointment a 
second time to Smuts in February 1916. He had been approached prior to Smith-Dorrien's 
nomination, but had declined citing his parliamentary and political responsibilitieS. 77 With 
the government now re-elected, his commitments became less demanding and he agreed to 
take up the post of commander-in-chief of the East African Expeditionary Force (EAEF). 
The appointment of a colonial officer in supreme command of imperial troops received the 
assent of both Lord Kitchener and the War Committee on 3 February 1916.78 It was to be a 
fateful and far-reaching decision. 
The appointment of a politician, although a major general in the Union Defence 
Force, was extraordinary to say the least. It partly reflected political disillusionment with 
the Army's senior leadership; to Lloyd George, Bonar Law and Churchill he seemed to 
personify the great dream of the "gifted amateur" politician who was capable of showing up 
the narrow-minded and blinkered professional soldiers. 79 
Smuts had also helped manoeuvre himself into the position. As has been seen, he 
had been instrumental in instigating an aggressive policy in East Africa as well as 
pushing for a large South African contingent. Although the war in German South West 
Africa had been far from popular in some Afrikaner circles, he judged that the benefits of 
77 MS Buxton, File February 1916,1 February 1916, Telegram Buxton to Bonar Law-, 8 February, Telegram Buxton to Bonar Law; 
Hancock and van der Pocl, Selectionsfrom the Smuts Papers, 111,29 November 1915, Letter Smuts to AB Gillett, p. 326. 73 CAB 22/3, War Committee Meeting of 3 February 1916. 71 MS Long, 947/547,29 March 1917, Letter Derby to Long; MS Long, 947/602,11 May 1917, Letter Buxton to Long; Roskill, 
Stephen, Hankey: Man ofSecrets, London: Collins, 1970, p. 388; and Hughes, Matthew, Allenby andBritish Strategy in the Middle East 1917-1919, London: Frank Cass, 1999, p. 24; Gilbert, Martin, Winston S Churchill, 111, London: Heinemann, pp. 565-566, cites 12 November 1915, Letter Bonar Law to Asquith. 
21 
supporting Britain in East Africa would outweigh the unpopularity of a new campaign. 
For its part, the British Government was anxious to support the Botha government; it had 
suppressed a major rebellion before conquering one enemy territory and was now 
actively supporting the Imperial war effort in Europe as well as Africa. In the 
circumstances, Smuts' appointment, with his Cambridge education and connections, 
Anglo-Boer War service and more recent experience, seemed to be a good one. 
On the other hand, there were serious limitations to Smith-Dorrien's successor. 
80 He was not a professional soldier and he lacked experience of higher command in war. 
He had been a very successful leader of a commando in the Anglo-Boer War, but his 
troops had seldom numbered more than 300 and the fighting was in friendly and fertile 
territory. Subsequently, he had served for some time as second in command in the 
campaign to conquer German South-West Africa, leading a subsidiary column from the 
south. However, while arid, that country was reasonably favourable for the use of 
mounted troops and had few of the deadly tropical diseases that plagued the East Coast. 
Importantly, the German defenders there were not particularly well-led and conducted a 
mainly passive defence that succumbed easily to Botha's tactics (and logistical 
planning) . 
81 Now, Smuts was being called upon to lead over 50,000 soldiers of many 
nationalities and languages through extremely difficult and often unmapped terrain while 
battling a harsh climate and a host of deadly diseases. Apart from operational and tactical 
skill, his appointment also required a firm grasp of administration and supply which had 
been shown to be so important in previous African campaigns. 
Smuts's position was also not made easier by his status as a politician and leading 
government minister. It was unavoidable that politics would play an important role in his 
decision-making, be it the appointment of officers, selection of strategy or the issuance of 
communiqu6s. With Botha under heavy pressure from the Nationalist party, Smuts was 
go MS Buxton, Semi-Official Letter File, 12 February 1916, Letter Smith-Dorrien to Buxton. Despite the public announcements 
stating that he had recommended Smuts to be his replacement, he privately made it clear that this was not the case. "Concerning General Smuts' powers as an up to date General I know nothing and I certainly should not have selected him had there been time to 
get a General who had devoted His life to War from Home. " 3' Strachan, 77ze First World War, pp. 559 and 567-568. 
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acutely conscious of the dangers of a large casualty list. " He was also well aware of the 
need for success, as any setback would be used to attack and possibly weaken the 
govermnent. 
SMUTS'S AIMS AND INTENTIONS 
On taking over the chief command from Smith-Dorrien, Smuts received a copy of 
the former's instructions, which read in part: 
"is to undertake an offensive defensive with the object of expelling the enemy 
from British territory and safeguarding it from further incursion. The decision as 
to the ultimate scope of the offensive operations to be undertaken against German 
East Africa after the rainy season should be postponed until General Sir Horace 
Smith-Dorrien has reported in light of the experience gained before the rainy 
season. , 83 
However, Smuts had no intention of waiting for the dry weather and had been 
pressing for an early advance well before his appointment as commander-in-chief He 
had prevailed upon the Governor General to contest Smith-Dorrien's plans to start after 
the end of the rains in late May, claiming that delay would have deleterious effects on 
morale, recruiting and the health of the troops. 84 In this he was successful, obtaining the 
War Committee's permission to start before the rains, provided that he was confident of 
success. Accepting the appointment on 5 February 1916, he sailed for East Africa 
shortly thereafter, arriving at Mombasa on 19 February. He had a meeting with the 
incumbent General Officer Commanding, followed by a rapid reconnaissance of the areas 
likely to be involved. Despite the shortness of time for detailed consideration of the 
situation and his lack of familiarity with the region, he signalled to London on 23 
12 Hancock and van den Poel, Selectionsfrom the Smuts Papers, 13 April 1916, Letter Botha to Smuts, p. 356; Meinertzhagen, Army 
Di . ary, p. 166. 
23 Hordem, Military Operations East Africa, p. 222. " MS Buxton, File February 1916,1 February 1916, Telegram Buxton to Bonar Law. 
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February that he wished to undertake an immediate offensive, receiving approval two 
85 days later. 
This sense of over-riding haste was to be typical of Smuts's time in command. 
While it was interpreted as part of his implacable willpower and desire for success, it can 
also be seen as part of his lack of understanding of the situation. He had pressed for an 
accelerated offensive timetable before he had been given all of Smith-Dorrien's 
campaign papers or had inspected the terrain. 86 He made up his mind to attack in less 
than four days in the country, of which the better part of two were needed for travel, and 
before the all-important transport arrangements were put in place. Furthermore, his own 
troops were still in the process of arriving (one brigade would not arrive until after the 
opening of the offensive) and had had very little time for acclimatisation or 
reconnaissance. Most significantly, he had already decided that his mounted troops 
would play a leading role through a country that was known to be infestedwith the tsetse 
fly with its fatal effects on all domestic animals. 87 This was not just relevant to the 
mounted brigades, but also to the overwhelmingly animal-drawn supply system. 
Ironically, his predecessor had specifically requested that only the front line units have 
mules with the remainder equipped with motor vehicles. 88 Smuts chose not to wait or 
rectify this critical weakness. 
SMUTS'S STYLE OF COMMAND 
Furthermore, the unique combination of Smuts's previous military experience, his 
political role and territorial aspirations together with his personal characteristics, gave 
him a decided approach to campaigning. In order to achieve his ambitious ends, he 
planned to use manoeuvre as the means of defeating the Schutztruppe. He was opposed 
to fighting heavy battles and preferred to use limited frontal holding attacks supported by 
" Smuts, Lt Gen J C, Military Despatchesftom the Commander-in-Chief East Africa Force, Despatch dated 30'* April 1916, 
V, blished in the London Gazette, 'Supplement'. No. 29630,20 June 1916, p. 187. MS Buxton, File February 1916,7 February 1916, Letter Brigadier General Simpson-Baikie to Buxton. The relevant files %ere 
only despatched on that date while the request for an accelerated attack was sent to London on I February. '7 Off, Colonel G M, "Some Afterthoughts on the War in East Africa", Journal of the Royal UnitedServices Institute, LXIX, (1924), 
p. 697. 
" WO 106/310, "Appreciation on Situation in East Aftica! ', General HL Smith-Dorrien, I December 1915, p. 4. 
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wide turning movements by highly mobile mounted columns aimed at hitting the 
enemy's flanks and cutting off his escape. 89 He counted on their unexpected appearance 
in the rear areas and withdrawal routes to cause disruption and disintegration. These 
tactics had worked well on the South African veldt and in the bush of South-West Africa, 
but did not take the rather different conditions of East Africa into account. 90 
Above all, he wanted to conquer territory and, despite his pronouncements, he 
never appears to have been really interested in defeating the Germans in pitched battle. 
This was not due to physical fear, as he was personally brave and was frequently in or 
about the front line. 91 The quality of his intellect stood out and he understood manoeuvre 
very well; his difficulties came when it came to pressing the fight home and translating 
his grand intentions into attainable and sustainable orders. 
That Smuts would be unfamiliar with the British Army's methods was expected 
and an experienced officer, AR Hoskins, was supplied as his Chief of General Staff 
(CGS). However, while taking over the bulk of Smith-Dorrien's staff, Smuts had insisted 
on a number of changes in key appointments. The most important substitution was of 
Hoskins for the South African JJ Collyer as CGS. As this was by far the most influential 
staff post, Smuts was within his rights in making such a decision, but it was at the cost of 
losing a highly experienced professional officer who had been Inspector General of the 
King's African Rifles for one who had only served in South Africa. Matters were not 
helped by the relative inexperience of many of the more junior staff officers, particularly 
in the administrative branches. 92 While Collyer was able enough in purely operational 
matters, he never seemed to grasp the importance of underpinning Smuts's plans with a 
sound logistical basis. The importance of this weakness would become glaringly 
apparent in late 1916. 
19 Smuts, Lt Gen JC Military Despatchesfrom the Commander-in-Chief East African Forces, Despatch dated 28'h February 1917, 
published in the London Gazette" Supplement", No. 30020 of 18"' April 1917, pp. 121,125, and 128-129. These tactics were 
frequently used by van Deventer and other South African commanders as well. Henceforth, Smuts, Despatch III. " Strachan, The First World War, 1, p. 605. 91 Meinterzhagen, Army Diary, p. 199. 92 Crowe, General Smuts'Campaign, pp. 4 and 7. 
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The bringing together of British and Imperial forces under South African 
command was unprecedented and led to rivalry and friction particularly at the higher 
levels. While Smuts's qualities of leadership and decisiveness were appreciated, 
considerable doubts over his tactical abilities emerged, particularly from the professional 
British officers in the force. Indeed, there was some speculation about the motives of 
Smuts and the other senior South African commanders, most of whom were close 
associates in private life and were often involved in politics at home. A number of 
British officers believed that the inability to catch and defeat the Germans in pitched 
battle was due to a distinct reluctance to incur heavy casualties and therefore opprobrium 
with the electorate. 93 This sentiment lasted throughout Smut's tenure in command and 
contributed to ill-feeling between the two groups. 
Unhappiness with the commander-in-chief was not limited to British Army 
officers. Smuts had made himself deeply distrusted by a considerable segment of the 
South African population, both Afrikaners and English. 94 He was admired for his 
intellect and energy, but was also aloof and remote, lacking Botha's personal magnetism. 
He was conscious of his superior mental agility and adroitness, and this confidence often 
came across as arrogance. He was seldom at his main headquarters, preferring to be 
forward with a few, trusted officers. Smuts was not a man for discussing matters with his 
subordinates or seeking advice. 95 
Thus by the end of August 1916, Smuts had outwardly achieved a great deal 
reaching the heart of the German colony. Much further to the west, the Belgians under 
General Tombeur, and aided by a British brigade, had driven the enemy out of Ruanda 
and Urundi and were threatening Tabora. To the south-east, a brigade-sized force under 
Brigadier General Northey had advanced from the Rhodesia-Nyasaland border and had 
pushed north-west against light opposition reaching the hilltop town of Iringa. In the far 
south, the Portuguese had recently entered the war on the side of the Entente, and had 
" Meinertzhagen, Army Diary, pp. 198-200, CAB 45/44, Colonel Fendall's Diary, Entry for 29 August 1916; Crowe, General Smuts's 
Campaign, pp. 6-7 is the most tactful. " MS Harcourt, dep 474,7 May 1915, Letter Buxton to Harcourt, and 17 May 1915, Letter Buxton to Harcourt; Reitz, Deneys, 
Trekking On, London: Faber & Faber, 1933, pp. 68-69 and 105-106. 95 CAB 45/44, Colonel Fendall's Diary, Entry 12 October 1916; MS Buxton, File June 1915,6 June 1915, Letter Buxton to Bonar 
Law. 
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landed an expeditionary force preparatory to commencing offensive operations against 
the Germans. 
To Smuts, with the richest and most fertile areas of western and northern German 
East Africa in his possession and having superior numbers, the prospects of an early 
victory looked bright. 9" While he had not been able to surround and cut-off tile Germans 
as he had wished, there was the satisfaction of capturing vast amounts of territory as well 
as the majority of the population and all of the main towns. 
97 
The German situation appeared to be difficult as the main body in the cast under 
Colonel von Lettow was beginning its withdrawal south ofthe Central Railway. Several 
hundred miles of sparsely populated bush separated them from the Wesurul)I)en under 
Major General Wahle, still concentrated around Tabora. In the south-west, an 
Ahteilung, 98 now under the cornmand of Major Kraut, had been reinforced and prepared 
to present more determined resistance along the Iringa highlands. Finally, in tile south 
and along tile Indian Ocean coast, only relatively weak lorces were available with the 
majority being lines-of-communications troops. The sea and the great Affican lakes were 
firmly under the control of the Royal Navy, while the Germans had lost access to their 
main means of overland mobility, the railways. Logically. and to preserve as much of' 
their possessions as possible, it seemed to make sense for them to surrender. While many 
on the German side favoured this approach, it took no account of von Lettow's 
determination to fight to the bitter end. 99 
Yet, despite appearances and the optimistic communiques sent to the War Office, 
things were not quite as they seerned. It was true that by the standards of the Western 
front, Smuts's advances had been both speedy and lengthy. Furthermore, his battle 
casualties were relatively light, although this was offset by the disconcertingly high sick 
"' Smuts, Despulch 11, p. 132. 
,, 7 WO 33/858, Telegrams D 1, No. 1500,11 January 1917, Telegram X 1182, Smuts to Secretary of State for War, p. 412. 
9' The Germans seldom used conventional battalion and regimental organisations in Fast Africa, preferring to create ad hoc 
Abledungen (detachments). The Abteilungen (Abi), which generally ranged from two to six companies with one or two guris wcre the 
backbone of von Lettow's system. The leadership and composition oftliese detachments changed frC(jUelllly- the commandcr's nanic 
was used as the main florm ot'designation. 
1.1 Lettow, Renumsceilces, p 149, 
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rate. Despite his claims to the contrary, the Schutztruppe had neither been defeated in 
battle or nor was it demoralised. 100 It remained an effective and cohesive force, still 
numbering over 8,000.101 There were two major reasons for this situation; the first was 
von Lettow's skillful defence and the second was the unsatisfactory nature of Smuts's 
tactical methods. 
He was faced by a highly professional and determined opponent in Colonel von 
Lettow. A career soldier, he had served as a Guards officer in Germany as well as in 
colonial campaigns in China and German South-West Africa, prior to being appointed to 
command the Schutztruppe. 102 He had a very strong personality and although highly 
demanding and sometimes difficult to deal with, he commanded a great deal of respect 
amongst his soldiers. From the beginning of the war, von Lettow was of the unshakable 
belief than the colony's fate would be decided on the battlefields of Europe and that his 
duty was to tie up and divert as many allied troops as possible from the main front. 
103 
This he would do regardless of the fate of the colony and unlike his South African 
counterpart, he was a great believer in decisive battle and did not shrink from head to 
head clashes. More importantly, he was fully aware of the importance of keeping his 
army adequately maintained and his diaries bear testament to that concern. 104 
Since being turned out of the Kilimanjaro position in March 1916, he had used the 
tactics of delay and the trading of space for time to keep his force in being. In this he had 
been materially aided by the dense bush and lack of roads in the interior of the German 
colony. The difficulties in sustaining the British forward advance together with Smuts's 
reluctance to fight an all-out battle aided von Lettow in initially achieving his aims. This 
is not to say that the Germans had it all their own way as their counter-attack at Kondoa 
"0 CAB 44/9, Draft Chapter XVII, The Campaign of 1917, p. 1. Smuts was cited twice in Vie Times, the first time in South Africa on 
29 January 1917 and the second in London on 13 March 1917. In the second statement he asserted "... The campaign in German East 
Africa may said to be over ... but it is merely the remnant of an army that is left, and not a 
formidable fighting force. " 
101 WO 95/5292, War Diary GHQ, 25 January 1917, Appendix 46a, Telegram Hoskins to General Ewart 22 January - this repeats 
Telegram 28209, CIGS to Hoskins. It cites a figure of 600 whites and 6000 Askaris. The reply is in War Diary GHQ, 27 January 
1917, Appendix 54, Telegram OA 936 Genstaff to CIGS, 27 January and gives the higher figure of 7,500. See also CAB 44/9, p. 3. 
102 Lettow, Mein Leben, pp. 20-98. 
103 Lettow, Reminiscences, pp. 18-19. 
'0' MS von Lettow-Vorbeck, N 103/33-39. From mid-1916 onwards, von Lettow recorded the amount of available food supplies on 
almost a daily basis. 
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Irangi in April had been an expensive failure and they suffered heavily from sickness and 
the loss of food growing areas. 
The German commander was well known for his willingness to strike isolated 
enemy detachments and then to withdraw before becoming decisively engaged. He also 
had the substantial advantage of falling back into known and friendly territory on well- 
prepared lines of communication while his opponents had to bring all supplies and 
reinforcements long distances forward. But above all, he led a strong and well-trained 
force with good morale and the will to fight. This was an advantage that he would retain 
through all of 1916 and much of 1917. 
Smuts's tactics were influenced by his own experience in South and South-West 
Africa with only some modification for the unique conditions in German East Africa. 
That country imposed severe limitations on tactical formations and movement, ranging as 
it did from tropical jungle to forested mountains to parched scrubland. "' This, together 
with the undeveloped state of the road network meant that communication between 
columns was often impossible and units could pass within a mile of each other and 
remain undetected. 106 The sheer thickness of virgin bush often limited movement to 
narrow and unimproved tracks that wound their way through forest, bush and jungle. 
This forced the columns of fighting troops and their heavily laden carriers into single file, 
often stretched over many miles. Movement was slow and predictable as it took several 
hours just to get the leading elements sufficiently ahead of the main body for it to set off. 
Furthermore, the fighting troops were accompanied by a long line of carriers, who 
usually matched or exceeded their own numbers; frequently too, there were large 
quantities of pack and slaughter animals. Behind them, the lines of communication 
troops would be straining to maintain touch in order to push the required quantities of 
food, ammunition and equipment to the forward areas. "' 
10-1 Hordem, Military Operations East Africa, pp. 12-14. 106 Sheppard, Brig Gen S H, "Some Notes on Tactics in the East African Campaign", Journal of the United Service Institution of India, XLVIll, No. 215, (April 1919), pp. 142-143; Off, Colonel G M, "Random Recollections of East Africa 1914-1918", Army Quarterly, X1, (1928), pp. 292. "' Ridgway, Brig-Gen R T, "With No. 2 Column: German East Africa 1917", 1, Army Quarterly, V, (1922), pp. 13-17; Orr, "Afterthoughts", pp. 697-701. 
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Strong rivers, rocky outcrops and swamps caused time-consuming diversions, 
while navigation itself was extremely problematic owing to the virtually non-existent 
state of survey and consequently inaccurate maps. It was frequently necessary to march 
cross-country on compass bearings with distances measured only by human pacing and 
timing. Climate played its part, as for much of the year there was insufficient 
precipitation to support grazing, while for the remainder there was a superabundance of 
water that impeded movement, made life generally miserable and promoted sickness. 
Furthermore, dense vegetation often reduced visibility to a few metres and often even less 
when moving through bamboo thickets or elephant grass. In the dry season, dust raised 
by the marching columns enshrouded everybody, while heavy rain and mist made the wet 
season even more trying. "' 
In a land largely devoted to subsistence agriculture, it was impossible to sustain 
the indigenous inhabitants and the passing armies without long supply chains and 
magazines. Disease of both man and beast was to prove decisive; malaria, dysentery, 
pneumonia and typhoid weakened the human ranks while trypanosomiasis, horse 
sickness and rinderpest wiped out the animals. 
The emphasis on speed left little time for accurate reconnaissance and locating the 
exact position and depth of the enemy's positions was difficult. For the flanking column, 
even the initial finding of the defences was a major concern and they often relied upon 
the sounds of firing in order to close in for the fight. Liaison by telephone or runners 
between friendly columns was only possible once the objective was near, but these 
methods were hindered by the activity of the German defenders who often captured 
runners and cut communication cables. While the British deployed a wireless transceiver 
with each column, they were insufficient in number as well as being too heavy and 
unreliable to be usable in controlling a tactical battle. The strain on the advancing allied 
troops was magnified by the pressures to advance as quickly as possible in virtually 
unknown country where the first sign of the enemy was usually a short range rifle 
ambush or a devastating burst of machine gun fire from well concealed trenches. From 
108 Hordem, Military Operations East Africa, pp. 12 -14; Crowe, General Smuts'Campaign, pp. x-xiii. 
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this unpleasant opening, the battle then followed a predictable sequence, based on 
German dispositions. "' 
Despite these disadvantages, Smuts was to apply his methods repeatedly, 
seemingly regardless of the terrain, the weather or the state of his troops. "' However, at 
this point, it is important to distinguish the concept of the local flanking attack, which 
was used to great effect by both sides, and which seldom extended more than several 
thousand yards from the centre of the battle, from the extended moves favoured by 
Smuts. These wide turning moves frequently involved marches of up to 10 to 30 miles 
parallel from the enemy positions before cutting into the rear area. The results of these 
moves were frequently much less effective than desired. "' 
Throughout most of the campaign, the Germans' defences followed a familiar 
pattern; they were usually centred on the sole track in an area facing the expected 
direction of enemy approach. Carefully sited machine guns with interlocking arcs of fire 
formed the backbone of the system. These were supplemented by cleared fields of fire 
and range markers, with the guns being manned by selected German NCOs. The rest of 
the line was then built up around the guns with a series of fire trenches for riflemen 
placed on the flanks and in depth. The flanks of the entire locality were then anchored on 
some type of impassable terrain, be it swamp, hills or impenetrable undergrowth. A 
further series of depth positions were then constructed to the rear of the forward trenches, 
sometimes as many as eight deep. Finally, a strong and well motivated reserve was kept 
on the flanks, ready to fend off any breakthroughs or to infiltrate any gaps that appeared 
between the attacking forces. "' 
The difficulty of the terrain and restricted visibility made the attacker's progress 
slow and time-consuming while also masking the movement of the reserve. Once 
109 Sheppard, "Notes on Tactics", pp. 152-153, " Ridgway, "With No. 2 Column", 1, pp. 25-27. 
110 Hordem, Military Operations EastAftica, pp. 392-393; Off, Colonel G M, "The Winter Campaign of 1916 in East Afirica7, Journal 
of the United Service Institution ofIndia, LX, (1930), p. 78. ... Off, "Smuts vs Lettow: A Critical Phase in East Africa: August to September 1916", Army Quarterly, VIII, (1925), p. 296; 
Downes, Capt W D, With the Nigerians in German East Africa, London: Methuen & Co, 1919, p. 146; Lettow, Reminiscences, pp. 
202-203. 
"' Sheppard, "Notes on Tactics", pp. 150-155; Ridgway, "With No. 2 Column", L pp. 18-19 and 23; Off, ""From Rumbo to the 
Rovuma The Odyssey of 'One' Column in East Africa in 1917", Army Quarterly, V11, (1924), pp. 111-115. 
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initiated, counter-attacks were fast and furious with the aim of surprising and disrupting 
the attackers at a time when they were beginning to tire and lose formation. The 
Germans would then probe to find and, if possible, turn their opponent's flank, and break 
into the vulnerable rear area with its attendant carriers, ammunition and stores. Success 
would be reinforced by further reserves if possible. Such tactics required the British to 
deploy their own local reserves promptly and decisively. 
On the other hand, the British usually were advancing in a brigade-sized column, 
with three to four battalions in single file, of which one would form the advanced guard. 
The leading company of the advanced guard would be usually be the first to run into the 
German forward picquets. After reacting to short-range fire, the battalion would deploy 
the remaining companies forward and attempt to drive back the relatively weak security 
elements as quickly as possible while the rest of the column kept closed up behind it. 
Eventually, the main defensive position would be reached and the advanced guard 
prevented from further advance by heavy machine gun and rifle fire. As the position 
would normally be well sited and impossible to rush, the column commander would bring 
up his remaining battalions to form a firing line on either side of the advanced guard 
battalion while retaining a strong reserve. These actions were intended to enable the 
maximum number of troops to engage the defenders while simultaneously searching for 
an open flank. This process would take at least an hour as the rear units had to move 
forward and then hack through the bush to get to the flanks. The column commander 
would be careful to keep his units tightly grouped and in physical contact with each other 
while he maintained control through hand-laid telephone lines. Generally, he and his 
staff would be no more than 400 yards behind the leading troops while commanding 
officers of battalions would be immediately to the rear of the forward companies. "' 
If an open or weakly defended flank could be found, then immediately a battalion 
would be sent to turn it while the firing line continued to engage the enemy. At this time 
it was vital that the column commander retained a strong reserve under his personal 
control as the defenders would be attempting to find the end of the British line with the 
'" Ridgway, "With No. 2 Column", 1, pp. 24-25; Off, Colonel G M, "From Rumbo to the Rovuma7, pp. 111-112; Stronge, Capt HC 
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same intentions. It was not unusual for the flanking moves of both sides to collide and a 
series of hasty attacks and counter-attacks would ensue and reserves would rapidly be 
committed. Owing to the strength of the defences and their reliance on machine guns, it 
was rare for the frontally engaged troops to make significant progress until a flanking 
move succeeded or the mountain guns, and later Stokes mortars, could be brought into 
action. Indirect fire support was critical, but the artillery observers had to crawl forward 
into the firing line, telephone cable had to be laid back to the guns, whose crews in any 
case would be engaged in felling trees and clearing bush for muzzle clearance. When the 
Germans had artillery deployed, they were usually able to bring it into action much more 
quickly as they had pre-prepared fire positions, and had already laid telephone cable and 
reconnoitred the target areas. 
The fighting usually lasted until darkness when either further counter-attacks were 
launched or the Gerinans decided to withdraw into the bush. In the latter case, the 
advancing force was usually too disorganised or wom down to pursue effectively. If all 
went well, the defenders would carry away their dead and wounded; if not, they would be 
left on the field of battle for the British to treat and clear. With at least four carriers to a 
stretcher, it took relatively few casualties to deplete the mobility of a column for at least a 
day. 114 
In discussing tactics, careful distinction must be made between the advance to 
contact and the deliberate attack. In the former case, the advancing columns would be 
aware of the general presence of the enemy but his intentions and locations would be 
unknown. Accordingly, the columns had the mission of advancing as quickly as possible, 
to locate any positions and then to engage and drive off any rearguards. The details of 
the attack off the line of march would then generally follow the sequence outlined above. 
However, if the position was found to be too strong for a hasty attack or had been 
previously located through the efforts of the Intelligence Scouts, a more deliberate attack 
would become necessary. In this instance, a thorough reconnaissance of the position 
T, "Bush Warfare Against Trained Troops", Journal of the Royal United Services Institute. =I, (1927), pp. 608-610. 114 CAB 45/19, "A Record of the Doings of the Oversea Contingent Nigeria Regiment, during the Campaign in German East Africa: 
December 1916 - December 1917", [n. d. ) [E St Stobart appended in writing], pp. 35-38; Downes, "With the Nigerians", pp. 178-179. 
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would be attempted while several columns equipped with artillery and mortars would be 
brought up. A holding attack would be launched against the centre of the German 
defences with one or two column-sized flanking movements attempted from the outset. 
Such moves would often involve a march of no more than two to three miles off the 
centre of the action before striking inwards. Thereafter, the normal round of probes, 
counter-attacks and commitment of reserves would follow until either side decided to 
break off the battle. Battles would often last until past dark; their duration thereafter 
depended on the importance of the position to the German commander with a night-time 
withdrawal often the result. If not, both sides would entrench in place and try to 
reorganise for the next phase. "' 
Such tactics were effective, but at a cost in casualties. Whilst the Schutztruppe 
normally managed to use the bush and darkness to effect their escape from their pursuers, 
they suffered from steady attrition of their irreplaceable troops, particularly the German 
leaders. It was true that the British casualties were usually greater than the Germans', but 
they were normally on the attack and had much greater reserves. Furthermore, von 
Lettow's aggressive temperament and desire for decisive victories often led to heavy 
losses on his side that, on a percentage basis, equalled those of his British opponent. "' 
If the British were hampered by lack of operational originality in 1916, the 
Germans also had enormous tactical advantages. They had a huge area in which to fight 
and the terrain was uniformly difficult to traverse. If mobility was poor, at least they had 
the time and resources to plan and organise their retreats. They were on the defensive 
and could largely choose their battles. On the other hand, the advancing British forces 
were moving away from their depots on precarious lines of communication and into 
unknown territory. The urgent imperatives of finding water and trying to be able to 
supply the forward troops alternately forced and hindered the pace of advance. 
Opportunities were lost through exhaustion of the fighting force or lack of supplies; 
under-nourishment and sickness played major roles in dissipating the strength of the 
"s This occurred at Bweho Chini, Narunyu, Narungombe, and Mahiwa to list a few. 116 Despite von Lettow's claims of great victories, at Mahiwa both sides lost nearly 25 per cent of the engaged forces. Similarly, 
losses at Kibata, Narungombe and Lioma were high on both sides. 
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attackers. 117 Certainly, Lettow made the most of these advantages, which, combined with 
Smuts's reluctance to fight heavy battles, enabled him to keep his force largely intact 
throughout the year. "' 
THE OPPOSING FORCES IN SEPTEMBER 1916 
By late September 1916, the EAEF had advanced over 300 miles from its starting 
positions in the Kilimanjaro area. During the advance south, two halts had been 
necessary, the first owing to the annual monsoon in April and May and the second at the 
end of July to replenish supplies. The second %%ras particularly worrisome as the lack of 
adequate logistical preparations meant that much of the force was on the verge of 
physical collapse. By his own admission, Smuts had driven his force hard, 119 but had 
Wed to appreciate that physical endurance could only go so far and that soldiers and 
followers had to be fed, clothed, and supplied adequately if they were to be fit for ftirther 
military operations. Despite considerable advice and warnings from his staff, 120 he had 
pressed the advance without ensuring that the unglamorous but critical matters of 
transport, medical support and rear area organisation were in place beforehand. He now 
contemplated plunging into the low-lying, pestilential and totally undeveloped hinterland 
south of the railway with a force that was already suffering heavily from sickness and 
malnourishment. 121 However, the weakness of the troops and the nearing onset of the 
short rainy season made an operational pause essential. 
In the east, the Royal Navy had disembarked landing forces at Dar-es-Salaarn and 
at the remaining coastal ports bct%vccn that town and the southern border %%ith Portuguese 
East Africa. 122 The Central Railway was almost entirely in Allied hands although 
German demolitions had put it out of order for some time to come. If General Smuts's 
"7 Crowe, General &"ut, ' Ca"Wigo% pp. 9-10; Orr "From Rumbo to the Rovum&7, pp. I 10- 112; Ridgway, 'With No. 2 Columd"q pp. 15-16; R idgway. Brig-Ge, R T. 'With No. 2 Column: German Ent Africa 1917: Part 2", A mry QwHerty, VL pp. 260-2 6 1. "I Mcincrtzhagcn. Army Diary. pp 165-166. 119 Crow, General &,, "Is - CamWign. p. xI. Smuts himself said in the foreword"It maybe said dud I expected too much of my men. and that I imposed too hard a task on them under die a%ful conditions of this tropical campaigning. Idonotthinkso. lamsurcitwas to conduct this cAmPaIgn successfully in any other way. " r P: d 
VH 
Force ( 
s; ý 
4,1,,,., Y OPrrw- East Afi*v. p. 393; Off. "Rarkkxn Recollections", pp. 290-291. South African National Defence SANDF) Documentation Directorme, GSWA. Box 2k II Sq*cmber 1916. Telegram 2 Div to Smuts. licnccforth GSWA. 121 WO 95/5291, War Diary GIIQ. 22 September 1916. Appendix 32a. Telegram CIA 4 IZ Smuts to CIGS, 21 September. 123 liordern, Ulh&vy Opra, $Om raIjO$c4, pp. 381-393 and 386-389. 
35 
j, qý 
oo 
0 11-4 
ý0 
B:. 0. m 40 cr 
cn 
.9 Pý ý; am li A b-4 
_N-ý El Iý (4, 
!4 -4 Pt :4E. 
wi a ýUol- 3: 1- N. w.. 
r 7: 
-D D 
pr 0 
0. ý ft It-- 
VIL 
cor 
2.. 
II. 
_ý C. - R, ;a2. x0* --, > C: ;. X cl 
lip 
or 0 
a 4r J, 
00 rr 
N- to, I 
ý'! 
3 
.. -.. 
.... a CY 
.I- d* 
--1x C) ;ý C30 
:3 
IIa, 
2 .09 
X. a0L' In 
Cf, 
physical objectives had been reached, then so had those of the Belgians. They had 
fielded two brigades, each with six battalions, totalling about 5,000 soldiers. 123 They 
were now winding down operations as they had achieved their political aim, namely to 
gain a bargaining chip in any peace negotiations, and were keen to hold the captured 
regions of Urundi and Ruanda. 124 The Brigade Nord held the area of Tabora and the 
north, while the Brigade Sud was deployed to the south and south-east of that town, 
facing At Wahle. 125 They had been wom down during the campaign, but were still more 
than a match for Wahle's much smaller force. However, the termination of Belgian 
operations was not discouraged by Smuts and shortly thereafter he turned down the 
opportunity to seek further assistance. 126 After much disagreement, the Belgians finally 
agreed to recruit 5,000 porters for their ally and to leave an occupation force of some 
2,000 Congolese troops with the remainder being withdrawn back to their own colony. 127 
The situation along the Gennan-Portuguese border had been quiet following the 
disastrous failure of their advance in April and May of 1916. Despite the setback, they 
retained ambitions of retaking the disputed Kionga triangle and capturing the southern 
port of Mikandani. To this end, a third expeditionary force of some Portuguese 3,100 
soldiers, under Major General F Gil, had arrived in June 1916 to supplement the 19 
companies of Askaris already in the country. 128 By September, a force of about 2,700 
had crossed the River Rovuma, occupying the northern bank and seizing the swampy 
Kionga triangle that lay in the delta. 129 
123 Campagnes Coloniales Beiges, 11, p. 62-63. 
"" Campagnes Coloniales Beiges, 11, pp. 593-595. 
12' Campagnes Coloniales Belges, II, p. 532 for Brigade Nord and p. 574 for Brigade Sud 
126 WO 33/858, Telegrams D 1, No. 1257,22 September 1916, Telegram 23102, CIGS to Smuts, p. 336. "... although the Belgian 
Government has expressed reluctance to extend the operations of its troops beyond Tabora, yet it has never, categorically, refused to 
do so, and it probably could be induced to order co-operation in any way that you wished, with the object of disposing of the German 
forces retiring from Tabora. Please keep me informed of your wishes in this matter"; No. 1316,18 October 1916, Telegram F 5867, 
Smuts to CIGS, p. 356. "Even taking into account the heavy wastage of present numbers from malaria, I hope to be able to finish the 
campaign without Belgian assistance. If the Belgians press for unacceptable conditions it will be better to finish without diem. I shall 
not, however, be able in that case to release South African Infantry as I had hoped, and the formation of additional South African units 
for service in Europe will be delayed. "; No. 1320,21 October 1916, Telegram F 5880, Smuts to CIGS. 
127 Campagnes Coloniales Beiges, 11, p. 596. 12s Boell, Die Operationen, pp. 243-244. An expeditionary force of about 1500 had landed in 1914 with another of similar size 
arriving in February 1916. Both had effectively been destroyed by sickness and the bulk of the soldiers evacuated to Europe. Ile 
third expeditionary force and the existing Askari companies were split between protecting the 600 kin long frontier and preparing for 
invasion; Cann, John, "Mozambique, German East Africa and the Great War", Small Wars and Insurgencies, XII, No. 1, (200 1), pp. 
132-133. 
"9 WO 33/858, Telegrams D 1, No. 1262,26 September 1916, Telegram X 757, Smuts to CIGS, London, p. 337; Hordem, Military 
Operations East Africa, pp. 388-391. 
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The German main body had evaded encirclement in the Uluguru Mountains south 
of Morogoro and was now in the vicinity of the steamy and low-lying Mgeta River 
valley. The Westtruppen had broken clean from the Belgians and was now making their 
way eastward in an attempt to rejoin the troops in the Mahenge area. Small detachments 
watched the British coastal enclaves and a weak Ateilung was deployed on the southern 
border opposite the Portuguese. 
DETAILED DISPOSITIONS 
Looking now in more detail, the main body of the British force under General 
Smuts had pushed south of Morogoro and swept around the sides of the imposing and 
forest clad Uluguru Mountains. Major General AR Hoskins's I" East African (EA) 
Division, composed of British, Indian and African units, had moved around the eastern 
slopes to Dutumi while Major General C Brits's 3 rd EA Division, overwhelmingly South 
African in composition, had moved along the western sides to Kissaki. Further to the 
west, Major General JL van Deventer's 2 nd EA Division, again largely South African, 
had more or less ground to a halt in and south of Kilossa Station on the Central Railway. 
Much further north and west, Brigadier General Sir Charles Crewe's brigade-sized Lake 
Force was in the process of disbandment, having completed its work with its Belgian 
allies. Finally, many miles to the south and west, Brigadier General E Northey's 
Rhodesia-Nyasaland Frontier Force, or Norforce as it was usually known, was 
consolidating its positions around the hilltop town of Iringa, having advanced through 
many miles of tangled forest and mountain to get there. 
The 1" EA Division consisted of two understrength brigades, I" and 2 nd EA 
mustering four and six understrength battalions respectively. It had one mountain and 
three field batteries of artillery together with four companies of mounted infantry and 
cavalry. 130 The exertions of the previous months together with the onset of heavy rain in 
130 Perry, FW (comp), History of the Great War. - Order of Battle Divisions Part 5a: The Divisions ofAustralia, Canada and New 
Zealand and those in East Africa, Newport, Gwent: Ray Westlake Military Books, 1992, p. 85. Henceforth Perry, "Order ofBattle 
Part 5a". The V East African Brigade was composed of 2d Loyal North Lancashire (2 LNQ, 2' Rhodesia Regiment (2 RR), 130'h 
Baluchis, and a composite battalion of the Kashmir Rifles (KR). The 2"d EA Brigade had 25' Royal Fusiliers (RF), Yd KAR, 129b 
Baluchis, 40'h Pathans, 57'h Rifles, 29th Punjabis and the Gold Coast Regiment (GCR). Unbrigaded was the mixed race I" Cape Corps 
(I CC) battalion from South Afirica. 
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late September forced the division to halt on the north bank of the River Mgeta, centred 
on the village of Dutumi while patrols linked up with 3 rd Division now at Kissaki. 131 
The 2 nd EA Division was made up of two brigades, one mounted and one infantry. 
The I't South African (SA) Mounted Brigade had five weak mounted regiments together 
with a motorcycle unit and an armoured car battery. The 3 rd SA Infantry Brigade was 
based on four infantry battalions while the division had one mountain and four field 
batteries of artillery in support. 132 Divisional headquarters remained at Kilossa while the 
I" SA Mounted Brigade had been detached to 3 rd Division and a column from 3rd SA 
Infantry Brigade had been pushed south to Kidatu, just north of the Ruaha River. By its 
own reports, it was greatly weakened, with about 4,752 men capable of operations and a 
further 1,946 unfit. 133 
The 3 rd EA Division was similarly composed to the 2 nd , with a mounted and 
infantry brigade, both numbered the 2 nd . The mounted 
brigade had four regiments plus 
an armoured car battery, while the infantry brigade had four battalions under command. 
Artillery support was provided by three field and one howitzer batteries. 134 The mounted 
troops had been reinforced as mentioned above, but taken together the two brigades could 
hardly muster 1,200 soldiers. It had concentrated at Kissaki where they met up with an 
equally weakened 2 nd Infantry Brigade. 135 
Norforce was an anomaly as it was technically under the control of the Colonial 
Office, having been raised to protect the Northern Rhodesian and Nyasaland frontier 
from German incursions. As the war progressed, the pretence of independence vanished, 
as Northey, a professional officer who had seen service on the Western Front, was careful 
to liaise closely with General Smuts and to coordinate his actions with that of the main 
force. He also put a great deal of care and attention into the preparations for the advance 
"' Hordern, Military Operations East Africa, pp. 371-374. "2 Perry, Order ofBattle Part 5a, p. 90. The I' SA Mounted Brigade had V, 2", Yd, 0 and 9'h South African Horse (SAH), the SA 
Motorcycle Corps and 4hArmoured Car Battery. The 3' SA Infantry Brigade had Vh, 10", 11' and IP South African Infantry (SAI). '3' Hordem, Military Operations East Aftica, p. 374-377. Cites War Diary of 2d EA Division of 27 September 1916. 134 perry, Order ofBattle Part 5a, p. 94. The 2"d SA Mounted Brigade had 5th, 6"', 7' and 8' SAH together with 5'h Light Armoured Car Battery. The 21 SA Infantry Brigade had 5h, Vh, Th and 8" SAI. '" Hordem, Military Operations East Africa, p. 371. 
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as well as his supply lines. Consequently, he was able to make good progress as he 
advanced north-westward into the German colony. Although the opposition was 
relatively weak, the combination of methodical planning and aggressiveness led his 
troops to occupy the important hilltop town of Iringa on 29 August. 
136 His was a mixed 
formation with units drawn from South Africa, the Rhodesias and Nyasaland; in all it 
numbered about 4,700 all ranks, of whom about 3,700 were fighting troops. 
137 Tactically, 
it was split into three independent columns, with Colonel Rodger's South Africans east of 
Iringa at Hange, Colonel Murray's Rhodesians further east near Muhanga, and Colonel 
Hawthorn's KAR was south-west of Mahenge at Mkapira, a distance of over 200 miles of 
difficult mountain, forest and lowland valley. All were further dependent on another 180 
miles of vulnerable lines of communication back to Lake Nyassa and thence down the 
Zanibesi river to the coast of Mozambique. 138 
On the other side, Colonel von Lettow's troops were split into three main 
groupings: in the east and south of the Central Railway was the main body of 29 
companies, with 16 under his personal command along the Mgeta and Rufiji, with 
another 13 under Kraut around Mahenge. Several hundred miles further west and now 
trying to withdraw east from Tabora, was the WestbefehIshaber, Major General Wahle 
with 12 companies. Finally, in the far south, the newly appointed SadbefehIshaber, 
Captain Looff, was due to take over the three companies facing the Portuguese, making a 
total of 44 overall. 
The detailed dispositions were as follows: the main body had two sub-groupings 
with the bulk of troops under von Lettow near Dutumi, south-east of the Uluguru 
Mountains. Abt von Lieberman and Abt Schulz, each of three companies, were facing 1" 
Division supported by Abt Klinghardt of two companies and Abt Tafel with two 
companies and a battery in echelon behind them. Abt Stemmermann was held back with 
the equivalent of four companies. The Kommandeur kept two companies as a personal 
136 Hordem, Military Operations East Aftica, p. 484. 
137 CAB 44/4, p. 1, and Sketch 67. 
1311 Hordem, Military Operations East Africa, pp. 504-505 and Sketch 67; WO 95/5229, Norforce War Diary, September 1916, 
"Detailed State of Troops as at 30'h September 1916". 
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reserve. Further west and on the other side of the mountain range, Abt Otto with six 
companies and a gun was opposite 3 rd Division holding Kissaki. 139 
Major General Wahle was in the process of moving eastward to rejoin the main 
body near Mahenge. He had a force of about 12 companies and two guns divided into 
four groups. Two of the columns, At von Langenn and At Zingel, consisted of three 
companies and a gun; whereas At Wintgens had five companies and At Habener had 
the equivalent of a company and much of the support services. 140 
In the Mahenge-Iringa area, Major Kraut assumed command of an enlarged force 
in mid-September. He had an enormous area to cover and deployed Abt Schoenfeld with 
three and a half companies and two guns along the Ruipa River at Kidatu to prevent any 
further southward move by 2 nd Division. At Lincke was given the task of holding the 
line of the Ruipa River, midway between Mahenge and Iringa, with five and a half 
companies and two guns. Its mission was to contain Northey's columns operating out of 
Iringa. Finally, At Krager consisting of four companies, one of which was mounted, 
was placed to the south-west of Mahenge near Mkapira to guard the Schutztruppe's left 
flank against the combined columns of Hawthorn and Murray. 141 
Songea had been left virtually unoccupied, owing to lack of troops, and once it 
had been taken by Northey, a small German detachment was sent to prevent a further 
advance. Finally, in the south and north of the Rovuma River was a three-company 
strong Ateilung facing the Portuguese. 142 
139 Boell, Die Operationen, p. 23 1. t40 Boell, Die Operationen, pp. 284-285. 141 Boell, Die Operationen, pp. 251-253. 142 Beell, Die Operationen, p. 244. 
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CHAPTER 3 
THE OPERATIONS OF SEPTEMBER 1916 TO JANUARY 1917 
PRELIMINARIES TO THE REMAINING OPERATIONS OF 1916 
ýI-, As the 1916 dry season ended, General Smuts was increasingly unhappy with his 
role in East Africa and worried about the effects of the campaign on his South Africans' 
morale. As a soldier-politician and conscious of the vulnerability of his government at 
home, the huge sick-rate and difficulty in keeping his units at even half-strength made 
him anxious to complete the campaign as quickly as possible. Discontent with the 
administrative and medical arrangements was growing as it was becoming impossible to 
ignore the effects of severe under-feeding and the failure to evacuate or treat the sick 
effectively. 
Forced to halt by a combination of rain and exhaustion, the commander-in-chief 
began to consider the next phase of operations. Although the Germans had been pushed 
into as unhealthy and low-lying ground as the British, reaching them and then beating 
them in battle would be a very difficult process. Lacking the resources to advance 
further, he tried bluff, writing to Governor Schnee at the end of September and calling on 
him to surrender. However, this stratagem was never likely to tempt von Lettow and the 
letter was ignored. 143 No longer able to delude himself that his opponents would throw in 
the towel if given one more push, Smuts now had to face the reality of a prolonged 
campaign. 
The ground would also play a major role in determining the course of future 
operations as the prospective area of operations was difficult in the extreme. In the east, 
the low coastal plain extended inland to the broad and low-lying plains of the RufiJi and 
Ulanga River basins. North-west of Kilwa were the Mtumbei Hills which dominated the 
coastal and delta areas. From there, the land dipped back into the fluvial plains of the 
Mgeta, Ruf1ji and Ruaha rivers until it met the northern tip of the Utschungwe 
143 Boell, Die Operationen, pp. 233-234; Lettow, Reminiscences, p. 158. 
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Mountains, a wide spur of highland that extended from Iringa in the north to Lake Nyassa 
in the south. Almost in the centre of this broad central plain was the Mahenge plateau 
which towered above the steaming forest below. 
The lowlands were hot, humid and pestilential. There were no roads and 
movement was by the few footpaths leading from village to village. The numerous rivers 
were surrounded by dense jungle, high grass, and swamp. Owing to the combination of 
broad, flat valleys surrounded by steep escarpments and massifs, they were known to 
flood extensively during the rains. The Ruf1ji itself was over 400 metres wide during the 
dry season and during the wet, flooding could reach six miles on either side of its banks. 
The physical difficulties were compounded by the presence of vast quantities of malarial 
mosquitoes and the dangerous tropical diseases that were so prevalent throughout their 
area. 
The highlands, particularly around Iringa, were wild and thickly forested although 
the climate was much less trying than in the valleys below. If the roads were poor and 
communications also difficult, they still offered a much better approach than through the 
Rufiji basin. German-held Mahenge was known to be a population centre based on 
fertile uplands and a relatively healthy climate, but any approaches would have to cross 
either the Ulanga River from the west or the Ruaha River from the north. " 
PLANS FOR THE OFFENSIVE 
Faced with these and other difficulties, Smuts began to look at options for 
wrapping up the campaign. He wired his plans to the CIGS on 22 September, outlining 
both the difficulties and possibilities of a future advance. He noted that the Germans no 
longer appeared to be falling back onto the Mahenge plateau. They were deployed in 
three major groupings; the main body under von Lettow to the south of the Mgeta River 
running east and south toward the coast, a force under Kraut in the Mahenge area, and 
finally the western group under Wahle still in the vicinity of Tabora. 
WO 153/111, Map of East Africa; Crowe, General SmutsCampaign, Sketch 4; CAB 45n3, Sketch 74, "The Strategic Situation, I 
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While Smuts was naturally focused on dealing with von Lettow's main body in 
the east, he was becoming increasingly concerned about the progress of Wahle's force in 
the far west. Abandoning Tabora on 19 September to the Belgians, it was believed to be 
making its way eastward to rejoin von Lettow, probably via the Great Ruaha or Ulanga 
River valleys. The gap between 2 nd Division and Norforce was still more than sufficient 
to allow the Westtruppen an uninterrupted passage to the east, which in turn would 
threaten the vulnerable lines of communications including the small and isolated garrison 
in Iringa. Smuts was quite clear that his Belgian allies would not pursue the 
withdrawing force owing to severe constraints in their supply system, lack of political 
will, and indeed, he had made no effort to convince them otherwise. 145 His own troops in 
the area, the Lake Force, were unable to move further south owing to lack of sufficient 
transport and were in the process of disbandment. 
In light of the situation, and despite his tremendous difficulties with supply and 
health, Smuts proposed to keep the bulk of 2 nd Division between the Great Ruaha River 
and Kilimatinde to protect his lines of communication and to prevent Wahle from linking 
up with Kraut. The Is' and P Divisions would advance south from the Mgeta to the 
Rufiji while a brigade recently landed at Kilwa would advance north-eastwards to Utete 
on the lower Rufiji. Northey's force was expected to push east from Iringa and reach 
Mahenge within a few days. In the far south, Smuts left offensive operations to the 
newly arrived Portuguese Expeditionary Force, although he expected no practical 
assistance from them. 146 
Just five days later, his opinion had changed as the sick rate along the Mgeta rose 
alarmingly. Learning that the area between there and the Rufiji became a vast swamp 
during October and November, he pulled back Brits's 3 rd Division to Morogoro for rest 
and recuperation. Modifying his plans, he decided against a major advance on the Rufiji 
from the north and proposed to cut down the troops on the Mgeta to a brigade. Kilwa 
December 1916". 
145 WO 33/858, Telegrams D 1, No. 1248,20 September 1916, Telegram OA 411, Smuts to CIGS, p. 333. 146 WO 95/5291, War Diary GHQ, 22 September 1916, Appendix 32a, Telegram OA 412, Smuts to CIGS, 22 September. 
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would receive a second brigade and would then operate against von Lettow from the 
south-east. In light of Wahle's continued withdrawal eastwards, 2 nd Division was ordered 
to send its infantry brigade to Nyukwa's, a ford on the Ruaha River, to be followed later 
by the mounted brigade, currently supporting 3 rd Division. 147 
A personal visit to van Deventer's division in early October confirmed his worst 
fears, as the route forward from Kilossa Station to Nyukwa's: 
"... proceeds 30 miles through the area which must be swamp or lake in rainy 
season and requires heavy engineering work in other parts. Troops sent that way 
must be cut off from supplies in rainy season, now fast approaching. On same 
ground operations from KISSAKI to RIFIR [sic] are ruled out. In view of these 
facts and serious state health of troops and need for thorough rest I doubt whether 
final advance against enemy can be resumed before beginning of January. , 148 
These gloomy prognostications were confirmed shortly afterwards by a report 
from 2 nd Division that poor roads and lack of transport would prevent it from moving 
before the first week of November. 149 This unwelcome news meant that Northey would 
be on his own for the critical period when pressure from both west and east was 
beginning to develop. 
Despite having had his plans accepted in principle by London, Smuts could not 
ignore the dire physical state of his force, which urgently required rest and 
reorganisation. Optimistically, he informed Robertson that he believed that his supply 
situation could be resolved within a fortnight and that the lines of communication running 
north to British East Africa could be closed down as soon as the Central Railway was 
reopened. This was tempered by the advice that, as the rains began in late September the 
low-lying river valleys would become increasingly waterlogged and impassable for any 
" WO 95/5291, War Diary GHQ, 27 September 1916, Appendix 36a, Telegram OA 491, Smuts to CIGS, 27 September. This change 
of mind is puzzling as the facts about the climate and geography of the region had been known to his staff since early September. 141 WO 95/5292, War Diary GHQ, 8 October 16, Appendix 10a, Telegram OA 615, Smuts to CIGS, 8 October. 149 WO 95/5292, War Diary GHQ, 10 October 1916, Entry 1ý 2"d &r Dtvislons. The building of roads to Iringa would take at least 
one month while transport was barely sufficient to cover day to day needs and was completely inadequate to build up stocks. 
44 
sort of wheeled transport. In the short term, it was essential to withdraw as many troops 
as possible back to the Central Railway to ease the problems of supply in the forward 
areas. 
While the above assessment was superficially correct, it glossed over a number of 
problem areas. Smuts's desire to rest the forward formations and to develop his supply 
lines was sound, but grossly underestimated the time and resources required. The troops 
had already passed nearly 50-100 miles beyond their original destination on the Central 
Railway and there had been no opportunity to stockpile supplies. The railway itself was 
out of action and supplies had to travel over 300 miles from the railhead at Korogwe on 
the Northern Railway. It would be some time before the port and rail links would be 
fully operational, and until then it would be impossible to build up the large stockpiles 
necessary for a further offensive. The ravages of the tsetse fly and horse sickness ruled 
out any sustained use of animal transport despite the arrival of over 600 new wagons 
since June; animals could not be kept alive long enough. "' Mechanical transport, 
particularly the 300 extra light Ford Jigger cars, offered some help, but they did not reach 
the forward areas until the end of September. 151 Furthermore, there were insufficient 
drivers or vehicles to build up large forward reserves of food and ammunition. The poor 
condition of the few existing roads was likely to worsen dramatically in the nearing rains; 
in the low-lying areas they would vanish under water altogether. This left the only 
alternative of human porterage, a system already suffering under the pressures of war. If 
highly inefficient as a means of moving material, it was flexible and could cross ground 
or water that no vehicle could attempt. However, the carriers themselves were becoming 
increasingly difficult to recruit (or coerce) as the military requirements escalated and 
casualties mounted. 
It was also an unpalatable fact for the British command that, even if the railway 
could deliver supplies from the port of Dar-es-Salaam to Morogoro or Kilossa, those 
"o Blenkisopp, Maj-Gen Sir LJ and Rainey, U-Col J W, History of the Great War: Based on Official Documents: Veterinary 
Services, London: MISO, 1925, pp. 416-417. Henceforth, Veterinary Services. 
151 Crowe, General Smuts'Campaign, p. 217-218. Animals seldom lasted longer than six weeks and it generally took a month to 
break them in before they could be used to pull wagons. The Ford Cars arrived in August and it took over a month to bring them into 
full operational use. 
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railheads were still a considerable distance from the forward areas. The line from 
Mikesse on the Central Railway to the Mgeta was notoriously difficult as it had been 
carved out of mountain and virgin forest with many improvised crossings of rivers. The 
route from Kilossa to Kidete was less mountainous, but suffered from extensive patches 
of sand and black cotton soil that impeded movement substantially. Furthermore, it 
passed through a very bad "fly belt" and few animals survived for long after the passage. 
In his haste to cut off von Lettow, Smuts had ignored the fact that the landings 
and shipping needed to capture the remaining Indian Ocean ports had diverted scarce 
shipping and resources away from the critical and immediate task of clearing the port of 
Dar-es-Salaam and developing the lines of communication along the Central Railway. 
He had eliminated the risk of another blockade-runner landing supplies, but at the cost of 
delay to his own logistical build-up. This was far from academic as the fighting troops 
were in a state of semi-starvation and severely afflicted with sickness. Without a 
functional port and railway, he had absolutely no chance of bringing forward the 
quantities of food and equipment needed to stabilise, let alone improve, the situation. 
Grand plans for sweeping encirclements were fine for the map, but the enforced 
immobility of the 2 nd Division in the west and the 3 rd Division at Morogoro, together with 
the slow build up of the l't Division at Kilwa, meant that only Northey's troops were 
capable of any sort of offensive operations in the near future. 152 Given the fact that so 
many soldiers were seriously debilitated by disease, Smuts decided on medical grounds 
to reduce numbers and to repatriate the worst affected. 153 A series of medical boards 
were set up to assess the situation and the answer was bleak - some 12,000 South 
Africans were medically downgraded and ordered home. This represented some two- 
thirds of the force that had arrived only in March and April of the same year. For the 
predominantly British and Indian units of the 1" Division, arrangements were made for 
the piecemeal replacement of the worst affected units. It would be several months before 
the worst-affected units would be ordered to Egypt or India, as ongoing operations and 
152 WO 95/5292, War Diary GHQ, 10 October 1916, Entry It 2d and 3 rd Divisions. Van Deventer informed GHQ that his formation 
could not move until at least the beginning of November. 
153 WO 95/5300, War Diary DMS, 24 September 1916, Appendix V, Letter DMS to DA&QMG, 24 September. 
46 
shipping shortages delayed their withdrawal. "' It was the indigenous, but still small, 
KAR that survived the rigours of the campaign best. "' 
The first formation to be disbanded was the exiguous 3 rd Division under Major 
General Brits on 15 October. It had withered away during the final advance to the Mgeta 
and only a much reduced composite mounted brigade was left behind to reinforce van 
Deventer. The now redundant Lake Force was broken up on the following day. In the 2 nd 
Division, the weakest units were amalgamated and joined by the survivors of Brits's 
decimated force, amounting to a reduced Ist SA Mounted brigade and 3 rd SA Infantry 
Brigade. The Is' Division moved to Kilwa with the 2 nd and newly formed 3 rd EA 
Brigades while the Is' Brigade remained on the Mgeta Front. It and the Force Reserve, 
the reduced 2 nd SA Infantry Brigade, remained under the direct control of General 
SMUtS. 156 
In comparison, Norforce's losses through illness were substantial, although 
nowhere near as bad as Smuts's and large scale evacuation was not required. This 
reflected the slightly healthier climate through which it had operated, but also the great 
personal attention paid to medical and supply matters by General Northey. 
THE MGETA LINE 
While the high command was pondering its future moves, much of the force 
remained in close contact with the Germans separated by the swampy and unhealthy 
Mgeta River. Neither side relished the unpleasant living conditions nor the dense bush 
that made it ideal for raids and ambushes. In fact, it was singularly ill-chosen as a forward 
line with swamps extending for some distance on either side of the river and being 
distinctly malarious. Even by East African standards, the lines of communication were 
exceptionally difficult and the humble porters bore the main burden. Both sides had to 
1`4 WO 95/5292, War Diary GHQ, 25 January 1917, Appendix 46a, Telegram OA 846, Hoskins to Ewart 25 January; Appendix 46b, 
Telegram OA 847, Genstaff, Dutumi to Genstaff, Dar-es-Salaam, 22 January. 
155 Moyse-Bartlett, Lt-Col H, The King's African Rifles, Aldershot: Gale & Polden, 1956, pp. 332-333 and 70 1. At I July 1916, the 
KAR stood at nearly 8,300 all ranks; by I January 1917 the numbers had risen to 15,600. "6 WO 95/5292, War Diary GHQ, 15 October 1916, Entry Pý 2"d &P Divisions; 16 October 1916, Entry Lake Det. & Belgian 
Force; 24 October 1916, Appendix 29, Telegram F 5892, Smuts to CIGS, 24 October. 
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struggle to move supplies forward on narrow tracks that produced dense clouds of dust 
when dry and dissolved in rain. The Germans, too, found it very difficult to keep 
supplies moving and expended considerable effort in trying to feed the troops. 
As the rain fell, and operations wound down, much effort was expended in trying 
to disrupt the other side's supply chain by small-scale patrols. These achieved no 
decisive results, but did much to lower morale and increase the sense of isolation. The 
withdrawal of troops continued with Vt EA Brigade largely holding the Mgeta while the 
remnants of 2nd SA Inf Bde held the forward positions at Kidete further to the west. As 
the front remained static, large labour gangs of Africans were engaged in the cutting of 
roads while the engineers worked on improving the bridges across the numerous rivers 
and streams. Unfortunately for them, the continuing rain in October and November 
undid much of this valiant effort and large sections of the "road" dissolved into mud. 
157 
In October, the British sensibly abandoned attempts to hold the southern bank, 
keeping only piquets on the northern side with the main body pulled back north onto 
higher ground. The Germans responded similarly, keeping only At Otto on the forward 
line with the remainder of troops drawn back to the Rufiji. 118 Otto's force numbered 
some eight companies with 950 rifles, 14 machine guns, and two guns. 159 He concentrated 
the bulk of his troops some 20 miles south of the river, holding the track junction at Alt 
Behobeho, where he could react to any moves coming from Kissaki or Dutumi. 
160 
NORTHEY'S ADVANCE IN THE SOUTH 
Norforce was handicapped by a serious insufficiency of soldiers for the task at 
hand. It was a brigade-sized command that fielded less than 4,000 rifles, split into three 
columns, separated by 200 miles of wild and mountainous terrain. 161 Despite the high 
157 CAB 44/6, p. 8; WO 95/5329, War Diary Norforce, Entry 30 November 1916. Northey's difficulties began slightly later with the 
first rains starting on 30 November. 
"' CAB 44/6, p. 11. 
15" MS Boell, N14/30,26. Kapitel, pp. 1903-1904. 
160 MS Boell, N14/30,26. Kapitel, p. 1906. 
161 Brown, Ian Malcolm, British Logistics on the Western Front 1914-1919. By comparison, in early 1915, the BEF held 50 km of 
front with 350,000 men. A typical brigade frontage on the Western Front would have been about one mile with its lines of 
communication a maximum of five miles. 
48 
quality of his columns and their commanders, Northey was rightly concerned that his lack 
of concentration and the dangers of being defeated in detail should the Westtruppen move 
east. As well, his troops were suffering from the effects of climate and disease, although 
nowhere near as badly as the main body to the north. 
In early September, Smuts instructed Northey to advance on and occupy the 
Mahenge plateau. 162 The plan was for Norforce to move westwards through the Ulanga 
valley, then to ascend the Mahenge plateau before the withdrawing German main body 
reached that place itself. The capture of Mahenge was part of his grand plan to cut-off 
the Schutztruppe; this, coupled with the advance from Kilwa would make further retreat 
impossible and force a surrender. 
As was becoming usual, this plan was based on major assumptions that were 
quickly proven false. Apart from expecting Northey to advance another 100 miles across 
an, enormous flood plain during the short rainy season, it presupposed that the 
Westtruppen would pose no threat to his exposed lines of communication. "' The second 
wa. :s that Smuts's own troops were in absolutely no condition for further offensive 
operations and restoring the Central Railway to full capacity was going to take months 
rather than weeks. Finally, it presumed that it would be possible to prevent the Germans 
from breaking through the 75-100 mile gap that would remain between Norforce and the 
2 nd Division. 
Furthermore, the strength of Wahle's force, still some 350 miles to the west, was 
seriously under-estimated; it was deemed to be only 1,500 strong and ready to surrender. 
In fact, it exceeded 2,500 and was determined to fight its way through to Mahenge. 164 
Even taking the lower estimate of 1,500 at face value, it was still sufficiently large to 
inflict serious damage on Northey's dispersed command, not to mention his virtually 
defenceless lines of communication. The option of a continued Belgian pursuit of the 
162 WO 95/5291, War Diary GHQ, 2 September 1916, Appendix 4, Telegram F 5213, Smuts to CIGS, 2 September. 
161 WO 95/5291, War Diary GHQ, 3 September 1916, Appendix 6, Intelligence Report for 3 September 1916. smuts, s staff were 
certainly aware that the Ulanga and Ruhudje Rivers would be impassable in the rains and later evidence shows his understanding of 
the problem. How he expected Northey to survive at Mahenge is unknown. 164 MSS Afr. s. 1715 (300), Williams, Col H P, History of I KAR, p. 158; CAB 44/4, pp. 2-3; Meinertzhagen, ArmyDiary, maps 17-19; 
CAB 44/4, p. 1, Sketch 67. 
49 
p-a 
.1 
let 
.o. 
.4 Ar IaI a V. - t: t - 
U6-: v 611 . *. :a ,-ss ýz . .... .. tl IC - 't '"t . 
qlL 
ý6 Z. . -1 i! 
i Z- 
0 t' 
't ýA 
Westtruppen does not seem to have been seriously considered. Despite Northey's 
repeated representations to Smuts on this issue, the commander-in-chief continued to 
treat the threat as a minor one and provided no real assistance until it was nearly too 
late. 165 
Despite these misgivings, Northey resumed his advance in mid-September. He 
realised that there were insufficient resources at Iringa to support a major advance and 
decided to sustain operations from Lupembe, further to to the south-west. To achieve 
this, he left Rodger's small column at Iringa, and ordered Murray to march south-east to 
link up with Hawthorn at Mkapira on the Ruhudje River. Once united, the combined 
column would draw supplies from Lupembe and advance north-east through the lowlands 
towards Mahenge. "' 
ar rom Murray began his preparatory move on 16 September, moving forw df 
Iringa through Muhanga on the eastern edge of the escarpment some 5,000 feet above the 
Ulanga valley. Brushing aside minor resistance from At Braunschweig, he began the 
arduous descent into the sweltering and steamy valley. Under instructions to join 
Hawthorn as quickly as possible, he was also looking for potential crossing points along 
the river as he moved south. 
While these movements were underway, Colonel von Lettow was making 
arrangements to reinforce the Mahenge area. Realising that 2 nd Division was incapable of 
further advance for the immediate future, he despatched Major Kraut to take charge of the 
defences west of the plateau. Despite British fears that it would be a major centre of 
defence, it was in fact very weakly held and served as an administrative hub. The local 
commander disposed of no more than 80 rifles, while farther to the south Abt Songea held 
the rich area from Wiedhafen to Songea to the Portuguese border with about 30 rifles and a 
number of auxiliaries. West of Iringa on the valley floor was Abt Braunschweig with five 
"" WO 95/5329, War Diary Norforce, Entries 16 and 30 September and I October 1916; WO 95/5291, War Diary GHQ, 24 
September 1916, Appendix 33a, Telegram OA 445, Smuts to CIGS, 24 September. Smuts signalled "According to German wireless 
message intercepted the enemy have orders to retire to the ITUMBA Mountains South-East of KILIMATINDE. I have advised 
NORTHEY to keep a small force at IRINGA and have ordered VAN DEVENTER to send a force to MAHORE and NJUKWA. - 1" WO 95/5329, War Diary Norforce, Entries 28 August and 16 September 1916. Northey considered that advancing to Mahenge 
would put too great a strain on his already overstretched supply lines. 
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companies of 900 rifles and 10 machine guns, supported by 12 FK further south at 
Tanganika with another 250 rifles and 2 machine guns. 
Kraut brought important reinforcements south with him, some ten companies, 12 
machine guns and six guns, totalling about 1200 rifles; by the beginning of September, the 
total force amounted to about 17 companies of 2,450 rifles, 24 machine guns and 6 guns. 167 
The Mahenge force was now strong enough to prevent a further advance and offered the 
chance to deal a sharp blow to any isolated column. Most importantly from the 
Kommandeur's point of view, Kraut was a dependable and aggressive officer who would 
not give up ground without a fight 
Kraut's aims were twofold; the first was to block any movement eastward from 
Iringa and the second was to prevent a link up between Northey and van Deventer over the 
Ruaha River at Kidatu. He correctly recognised that the former posed the greater threat and 
decided to leave only Abt Schoenfeld as rearguard at Kidatu to hold the enfeebled 2 nd 
Division. He then began to move his powerful force southwest of Iringa and took Abt 
Braunschweig under command. As ever, the supply situation was a major concern as the 
important magazine at Ifakara on the Ruaha and his own lines of communication needed 
protection, while foodstocks were low owing to a shortage of carriers. 168 
While Kraut was moving south, A bt Braunschweig had been thinning out its forward 
positions on the escarpment and moving into the Ulanga valley owing to a fear of being cut 
off. Halting the move, Kraut decided to give Braunschweig greater support. He placed At 
Lincke in the valley to the rear of the latter's forces, while detaching three companies 
further south to block possible exit routes from the Utschungwe Mountains and 
maintaining a small reserve. 169 
This shift was detected by the British, and Northey was growing increasingly 
concerned about having to deal with Kraut in the east at the same time as Wahle was 
167 Boell, Die Operationen p. 250. 
'" Boell, Die Operationen: pp. 250-25 1. 
169 Boell, Die Operationen, p. 253. 
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moving in the west. He wanted van Deventer to push south to Iringa so in order to 
concentrate Norforce to meet the new threat, but the former could not move until his 
shrunken units were reorganised. Furthermore, Smuts remained anxious to continue the 
advance on Mahenge. " 
Hawthorn had arrived opposite the Ruhudje crossing of Mkapira on 10 
September, and discovered a strong enemy position held by Abt Kriiger on the west bank. 
After careful reconnaissance, his column forded the river and manoeuvred the Germans 
out of their defences on 27 September. The next day KrOger led a strong counter attack 
with some 500 rifles and 5 machine guns with the aim of dislodging the British. ' 71 
However, Hawthorn was an able commander and was well prepared for the move, 
holding off the assaults easily. With Murray now only 10 miles to the north-west, the 
Germans broke off the battle and withdrew further east. 
Despite this success and the imminent arrival of Murray, plans for the advance on 
Mahenge were now altered. Hawthorn had been informed van Deventer had not even 
started to move and would not be a position to so for at least a fortnight. This meant that 
he would have to face the full weight of Abt Kraut while operating from an isolated 
forward position, linked to his base at Lupembe by a very difficult bush trail. He decided 
to hold firm and withdrew to the west bank of the Ruhudje where he was joined by 
Murray on 29 September. Together they set up a strong defensive position while waiting 
for word of van Deventer's move. At the same time, they attempted to bring forward and 
stockpile as many supplies as possible from Lupembe. 172 
Much ftu-ther to the east, von Lettow was viewing these developments with 
disfavour. He was concerned with what he considered his subordinates' propensity to 
disperse their forces unwontedly and he wanted to strike a blow against what he considered 
a vulnerable forward column. Accordingly, he issued orders for Kraut to attack Hawthorn's 
170 WO 95/5329, War Diary Norforce, Entries 16,17 and 21 September 1916; GSWA, Box 26,11 September 1916, Telegram K 475, 
2 Div to Smuts. By mid-September, van Deventer was reporting that his troops were largely incapable of further effort owing to 
disease and lack of food. 
l" Boell, Die Operationen, p. 254. 172 MSS Aft. s. 1715 (300), History of I KAR, pp. 159-160. 
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column at Mkapira on I October, although the latter had only six companies in the 
immediate area, and required reinforcement from At Falkenstein. 173 Despite von Lettow's 
impatience, it was impossible to regroup so quickly in the difficult conditions of the 
Ruhudje valley and Kraut would require several weeks to make adequate preparations for 
the attack. 
While these moves were taking place, Northey was given yet another task for his 
stretched forces. The town and rich farming district of Songea was guarded by less than 
a platoon and its denial to the enemy would reduce their room for manoeuvre and help 
restrict them to the central portion of the colony. Equally importantly, its loss would 
reduce their food-producing capability considerably, although it is not clear whether 
Smuts considered this in his decision-making. Accordingly, as soon as he had been 
reinforced by a newly-raised African battalion, half of it was despatched as an 
independent column to Songea. Sailing across Lake Nyassa by steamer, it landed at 
Wiedhafen on 12 September and immediately marched inland. The tiny German garrison 
there evacuated the place on arrival of the column and it was occupied without a fight on 
20 September. 174 
I It was not until 25 September that Kraut heard of the landings and he immediately 
ordered Falkenstein to secure Songea. Learning the next day that the British had already 
taken that place, he reinforced Abt Falkenstein and agreed to its withdrawal to Likuju to 
maintain observation of the enemy. He also decided to detach two of Lincke's 
companies to the south to deal with the growing menace, only to be over-ruled by von 
Lettow on 30 September. He was concerned about the dispersion of Kraut's force as well 
as about protecting the open road to the undefended Liwale. 175 
The situation did not remain quiet as the Songea force was ordered to advance 
further east to MkuJu, reaching it on 5 October. Again, the Kommandeur was unhappy 
with the loss of initiative and he ordered Major von Grawert, the military commander of 
173 Boell, Die Operationen, p. 254. 
174 WO 95/5329, War Diary Norforce, Entry 20 September 1916. 
17-ý Boell, Die Operationen, pp. 253-254. 
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Mahenge, to attack on 12 October with three companies now moving south to reinforce 
the threatened area. Ominously, the mood of the African population was changing for the 
worse as they provided the British with information on German deployments and also 
began to attack isolated posts and their lines of communication. This region had suffered 
heavily during the Maji-Maji rebellion and had no love for the colonial regime. Von 
Grawert was well aware of the disaffection and became decidedly cautious about rear 
area security. 176 
THE SWITCH OF EMPHASIS TO KILWA 
As General Smuts had told the CIGS, the obstacles of the Mgeta line made it 
worthwhile to switch emphasis. He wanted to redeploy the bulk of I" Division to the coast 
using the seaport of Kilwa as its base. 177 Initially, this option offered the opportunity to 
strike west along the line of the Matandu River before moving on the enemy lines of 
communication as well as cutting off the main route to the south of German East Africa. 
However, while Kilwa Kisiwani had an excellent anchorage, there were absolutely no port 
facilities and it would be necessary to build up the base before any advance in strength 
could be attempted. Kilwa having been occupied on 8 September, the remainder of the 
month was spent in developing its facilities and landing troops. The first formation to be 
deployed was Brigadier General Hannyngton's newly established P EA Brigade and it 
was complete by the first week in October. 178 
Hannyngton was instructed to push rapidly inland in the hopes of cutting off the 
enemy forces further north. Hannyngton decided to act quickly. Early reconnaissances 
revealed that the village of Njinjo, some 42 miles inland along the Matandu valley, 
provided a jumping off point for either a move north towards the Rufiji, or alternatively, 
south towards the food-producing areas of Liwale. However, a second and more direct 
route was found. Instead of following the Matandu inland, it was possible to cross that 
'76 Boell, Die Operationen, p. 255. 
177 There were two places known as Kilwas; Kilwa Kivinje was at near the mouth of the Matandu River and was usually known as 
Kilwa; Kilwa Kiswani was located on a island to the south of Kilwa Kivinje and had an excellent deep water anchorage. It would be 
subsequently developed as the port. 
172 WO 95/5292, War Diary GHQ, I November 1916, Appendix 1, Telegram F 5948, Smuts to CIGS, I November. 
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river following the track north-west to the Mtumbei Hills. The key to the area was the 
junction at the hilltop station of Kibata that dominated the local region. From there, a route 
ran through the hills straight to Utete which lay on the lower Rufiji and was a major 
German supply centre. An advance through the Mtumbei Hills promised to be much 
shorter than the Matandu route, while they were also cooler and healthier than the coastal 
plain. 179 
The OstbefehIshaber, 180 Captain Looff, learned of the landings, but decided to 
concentrate at Utete, leaving the area north of the Rufiji virtually bare of forces. This order 
was countermanded by von Lettow who wanted Looff to concentrate on harvesting and 
collecting the crops in the lower Rufiji. He declined to do so and was promptly sacked. 
On. 12 September, Major von Boemken was designated as OstbefehIshaber while Looff 
was despatched to the southern border to take up the new appointment of SiOsbefehIshaber 
against the growing Portuguese threat. Captain Sternmermann took over Looff s troops 
together with responsibility for the defence of the food producing areas of the lower 
Rufiji. 181 
In order to have a more direct presence, von Boemken and his four companies were 
ordered to march for Kilwa on the evening of 12/13 September. After a lengthy journey by 
river steamer and much marching, they reached Kimbarabara, on the southern slopes of the 
Mtumbei Hills on 25 September. Only a few miles from Kilwa, von Boemken was still 
some distance from Njinjo, which apart from its key location also housed an important 
magazine. 182 
The British were also aware of Njinjo's importance and patrols had already reached 
there. Desperately trying to evacuate the valuable stocks of food to Mpotora, on 22 
September von Lettow sent an urgent telegram to von Boemken, ordering him to secure the 
magazine. However, the latter was more concerned with his own security and withdrew the 
179 Moyse-Bartlett, The King's African Rifles, p. 336. 'so Boell, Die Operationen, p. 235. The former Kommandant of Dar-es-Salaam, Looff, was given the new title of Ostbefehishaber, on 
25 June 1916. He was made responsible for the defence of the coastal region. 
Boell, Die Operationen, page 238. 
Boell, Die Operationen, p. 238. 
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bulk of his Atedung to the west, leaving Njinjo open to a raid that that destroyed most of 
the supplies and forced the evacuation of the village. Instructed to attack, a reluctant von 
Boemken launched a half-hearted assault that was easily repulsed and then returned to 
Kimbarabara. 183 
This left the Matandu Valley open and Hannyngton's troops occupied Njinjo 
without opposition on 7 October. The misfortunes were capped two days later, when 
reinforcements sent from Liwale were ambushed and scattered near Njinjo. 184 It was an 
unpromising start for the German counter-moves against Kilwa. 
Von Boemken now shifted his defensive positions to the west of Njinjo in order to 
block the road to Mpotora. Unfortunately for him, this meant that he was no longer in 
telegraphic communication with von Lettow, and messengers were now the only means of 
passing information for the next eight days. The lack of adequate communications and 
misunderstanding now led to a blunder that left the road to Kibata open to the British. 
Von Lettow had wanted to ensure that Kibata was adequately protected and had told 
von Boemken to send two companies there. However, they left with out-of-date orders, and 
neither company fell back on the critical road to Kibata and the Mtumbei Hills as intended; 
one went east towards the coast and the other withdrew to the west. This left the main route 
from Kilwa to the Rufiji River unguarded at the same time as the British decided to move 
northwards. Hannyngton sent two battalions to occupy Kibata and the surrounding hills on 
10 October, taking the unoccupied fort four days later. One battalion left to garrison Kibata 
while the other was withdrawn back to Kilwa. At the same time, the brigade pushed one of 
its units to a position four miles west of Njinjo, at Mchemera, and a screen of outposts to 
the north and west was established. 
On receipt of the news, von Lettow realised that his forces had effed and sent a 
company down the coast on 14 October to reinforce the isolated troops in the Mtumbei 
Hills. 'Another was sent to join Abt von Boemken, but like its counterpart, it arrived well after 
181 Boell, Die Operationen, p. 238-240. 
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the British and it withdrew to the north in order to guard the evacuation of food supplies 
from the magazine at Tawa. This undoubted failure led to the second command change in 
two months, as on 17 October the Kommandeur ordered Captain Schulz to take command of 
the Kibata area and sent von Boemken south to assist Abt Looff against the less capable 
Portuguese. 185 
A great deal of time was then spent on patrolling and the gathering of accurate 
infonnation on the ground, as the few maps available were poor and frequently misleading. 
Despite his concerns about the difficult situation being faced by Northey's forces much 
ftu-ther to the west, General Smuts decided to make a personal reconnaissance of Kilwa at 
the end of October. Clearly impressed by its potential, he saw the Kilwa Force as playing a 
key part in his plan to surround von Lettow, with one element moving westward along the 
Matandu and the other striking north-westwards from the Mtumbei Hills. His chances 
seemed favourable, especially as there were no indications that the Germans were moving 
from the Rufiji area. 186 He decided to send another brigade to the area and to place Major 
General Hoskins and his I st Division in command. 187 These deployments were put into 
effect shortly after Smuts' visit with I st Division assuming command of the Kilwa area on 
15 November and the units of the 2 nd EA Brigade complete by 29 November. 188 
THE FIGHT AGAINST THE WESTTRUPPEN 
VVhile both Northey's and Kraut's columns were manoeuvring for advantage, the 
Wesuruppen were moving eastward. Although telegraphic communications between the 
two main groups had been lost with the cutting of the Central Railway in August, General 
Wahle had gained important intelligence. He still had his wireless receiver and had 
intercepted a number of useful British transmissions. From these he learnt that Dar-es- 
Salaam had been lost and that the main body had been forced south of Morogoro. More 
1" CAB 44/5, p. 15. The Germans lost 18 dead and 18 wounded out of 60 present. British losses were two killed and six wounded. 
"' Boell, Die Operationen, pp. 241-242. 
'36 WO 95/5292, War Diary GHQ, I November 1916, Appendix 1, Telegram F 5948, Smuts to CIGS, I November. Smuts noted that 
some ten German companies had withdrawn from the Mgeta across the Rufiji with some reinforcement of Utete. 
'37 WO 95/5292, War Diary GHQ, 7 November 1916, Appendix 9, Telegram OA 969, Genstaff, Morogoro to Genstaff, Dar-es- 
Salaam, 7 November. 
18' Smuts Despatch III, p. 13 8. 
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appositely, these communications revealed that Iringa. was only lightly held and was 
dependent on supply lines running back to Neu Langenburg at the head of Lake Nyassa. He 
decided to march and attack Iringa. so as to disrupt the British advance and relieve the 
pressure on von Lettow's eastern flank. In order to conceal his true intentions, Wahle then 
spread rumours and false messages that his objective was Kilimatinde on the Central 
Railway: a plausible alternative. 189 
After evacuating Tabora on 19 September, the Westtruppen had withdrawn 
southwards to Sikonge where they regrouped and the companies were reorganised. While 
still largely intact, they now had the daunting task of crossing some 300 miles of largely 
undeveloped and uninhabited land to hinga. The countryside in the triangle Tabora - 
Bismarckburg - Kilimatinde was known to be virtually foodless and water was scarce. 
Despite careful preparations, the march began badly as over 5,000 locally conscripted 
carriers deserted at the onset. With 5,500 loads prepared for movement, Wahle had only 
800 carriers, 200 British askari prisoners, 350 chain-ganged African civilian prisoners and 
80 donkeys to move them. On 24 September, he decided to destroy the excess and between 
60-70,000 kg of food, plus spare clothing, tobacco, alcohol and private belongings were 
burnt. To complicate matters further, the ammunition column soon lost all 160 loads as the 
pack donkeys rapidly died from the effects of the tsetse fly. 
The loss of so much food and the need to forage widely forced Wahle to split his 
troops across three routes, each some distance apart. Abt von Langenn was given the 
northern route of Kiromo to Idodi, and was to be followed by At Zingel and Wahle's staff 
one day later. Abt Wintgens was allocated the southern route of Sikonge to Madibira, while 
Abt Hfibener was to follow Wintgens two days later, but 110bener's path was to diverge at 
Mobogo and thence followed the more central route to Idodi. It was planned that von 
Langenn and Wahle would concentrate at Idodi by 18 October with Hiffiener arriving the 
following day. Owing to the longer distances involved, Wintgens was not expected to link 
up until 22 October. Once together, the entire force would then move up to Iringa and 
deliver a converging attack four days later. 
189 Boell, Die Operationen, p. 287. 
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On 29 September, with the force largely concentrated in Kiromo, the lead elements 
began their three-week march to the east. Unimpeded by any serious follow up despite the 
presence of the main Belgian force a few miles to the north, the Westtruppen disappeared 
From view and nobody had any idea of their exact location or intentions. 190 
None of this was known by Northey, although even a cursory examination of the 
map made it clear Iringa and its small garrison was a likely objective. 191 Certainly 
Rodger's column was no match for Wahle's force and could be easily cut off and 
Northey continued to ask for assistance from 2 nd Division. Unaware of the true state ol' 
that formation, Northey had to be content with the despatch of a mounted squadron to 
Nyukwa's, which duly arrived on 27 September. In the circumstances, it was the best 
that van Deventer could do, but it still left some 70 rugged miles of forest and mountain 
between it and Iringa. In practical terms, it was too far away to be of any real use and tile 
threat to Norforce remained undiminished. 
Despite the growing dangers, Northey was unwilling to withdraw south. lie saw the 
holding ofIringa as being important in terms of local prestige and the local population had 
been very helpftil to him. It also offered a vital link to the main body, and for supply 
purposes it was closer to the Central Railway than Lake Nyassa. Smuts, too, did not want to 
lose Iringa, although he appears not to have fully appreciated the difficulties of Northey's 
situation. Apart from the slender reinforcements sent to Nyukwa's, the only advice he gave 
Northey in the event of the Gennans appearing in strength was "he should concentrate with 
transport line via LUPEMBE". 192 
Moreover, he appears to have ignored the consequences of the dual threat posed by 
Kraut and Wahle as Northey's mission of taking Mahenge at best speed remained 
unchanged. The commander-in-chief was well aware of van Deventer's inability to send a 
' 'Boell, Die Operationen, p. 286-287, 
"' WO 95/5292, War Diary GHQ, 3 October 1916, Appendix 4, 'relegram OA 569, Smuts to CIGS, 3 October. It was estimated that 
the withdrawing Germans were headed for Mahenge with Wahle's 600 rifles moving along the railwaý and then south and Wintgens 
with 900 rifics going via Iringa. 1-12 WO 95/5292, War Diary GI IQ, 13 October 1916, Entry Nya. valand Force. 
59 
significant force south to secure Iringa in order to protect Norforce's rear. WishFUl thinking 
rather than practical measures seem to have been all that he could offer. 
In summary, by the beginning of October, Northey had Rodger's column defending 
Iringa, with Hawthorn and Murray dug-in at Mkapira vainly awaiting the advance of 2d 
Division and with a half battalion in the Songea area. Apart from a single mounted 
squadron, van Deventer was still unable to move south to link up with Norforce and showed 
fiew signs of being able to do so soon. On the German side, von Lettow was pressing for 
Kraut to attack both Songea in the south and Mkapira in the centre, while Wahle was just 
beginning the long trek towards Iringa. 
The first contact with the approaching Wesuruppen came on 12 October as one of 
Rodgers's patrols was driven back across the Great Ruaha River at Kiganga by the vanguard 
company. Furthen-nore, intelligence estimated that 6-7 companies were close behind with 
the intention of taking Iringa. 193 It was impossible to ignore the threat any longer and Sinuts 
was compelled to send a large proportion of 2 nd Division's usable strength to Northey. One 
battalion and a section of mountain guns marched from Kilossa on the Central Railway to 
Iringa via Nyukwa's 194 , while another was 
despatched on a lengthy and tortuous journey to 
Nyasaland. Leaving Morogoro on 15 October, it moved by floot, rail, ship via South Africa, 
and river steamer to Wiedhafen before finally going ashore and marching forward to 
Songea. 195 It did not arrive until 27 November after an epic journey. 196 
In the meantime, the marching battalion, now only 380 strong with six machine and 
two mountain guns, was struggling southward. but could not reach Nyukwa's until 17 
October. The remainder of Northey's force, the columns under Colonels I lawthorn and 
Murray, lay well out of reach at Mkapira, over 100 miles away as the crow flies. They were 
at least a week away from Iringa, and even if either had been ordered to cancel the march on 
CAB 44/4, p. 11, 
WO 95/5292, War Diary 61 IQ, 14 October 1916, Appendix 17, Telegrarn F5 839, SMUtS to CIGS, 14 October. 7"' SAI 'A as gi% Co 
as having about 400 rilles together with 2 guns. The journey was estimated at 6 days but actuallý took closer to 9 days. "" CAB 44/4, pp. 9-9, Sketch 67. 
' m'WO 95/5329, War Diarý Norforce. Entries 14 October mid 27-29 November 1916. 
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Mahenge, they could not have made the journey, as there were insufficient supplies or 
carriers to sustain them. 197 
By 19 October, Wahle's vanguard was skirmishing against Rodger's detachment. 
As the degree of threat visibly increased, Northey ordered Rodger to concentrate around Alt 
Iringa while Baxendale's Northern Rhodesian Police were split between that place and the 
vital supply dump at Ngominyi. He had already committed his last available reserve, a halt' 
battalion of Africans, to Buhora near the southern of his lines of communication. 19' There 
was nothing to do but brace for the expected onslaught. The road network and supply 
depots en-route were absolutely essential to Norforce's survival. South ofNgonunyi lay the 
important depot of Malangall and thence Ubena. The latter place occupied a critical 
junction that linked Iringa in the north with Neu Langenburg in the south-west, while also 
joining Lupembe in the east. Should Ubena be lost, then all of the forward columns would 
be isolated from their bases and the approach to Northern Rhodesia would be left wide open. 
The attack on Norforce would take place, but not in the manner expected. The 
patrol action of II October had slowed down the advance and it was not until 17 October 
that the united columns of von Langerni and Zingel cleared the banks ofthe Rualla River 
and pushed on. Suffering the same problerns of command and control as the British, AN 
Wintgens and I-Ifibenet- had been out of touch since the beginning of the march. This was to 
have major consequences for the timetable as Wintgens, who had been entrusted with 
escorting a howitzer, had tbLind the going impossible and had dumped the gun on I Wbener. 
This in turn slowed down the latter's progress and would delay his arrival very considerably. 
Of this Wahle would remain ignorant until battle was joined. 1 99 
The whole of the Iringa garrison was dependent on the supplies held at Ngorninyi 
and Malangali, both of which were thinly held and isolated. On 21 October, reinforcements 
were sent Ngominyi, which had only a garrison of 50 together with a pair of old gulls. 
Iringa itself was defended by only 100 soldiers who anxiously awaited the arrival of 
CAB 44/4, pý 12. 
CAB 44/4, pp> 9-11. 
19 Boell, Die Operationen, p. 289. 
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reinforcements still en-route from the north. Malangali was being hastily entrenched by a 
small reserve detachment brought up from Buhora. 200 
Unfortunately for Northey. the reinforcements from Iringa were delayed for 24 
hours in their departure. This enabled the Gen-nans to close the road leading south, 
ambushing first a supply column oil 22 October and then the reinforcements themselves the 
next day, losing 37 out of 50. Successful in his efforts, Wintgens now moved north towards 
Ngominyi to rejoin Wahle's main body. 201 
Rodger arrived from Iringa on 24 October, but realised that he was completely 
outmatched. Unable to attack, he halted and dug in to await help. On the same day, tile 
further reduced reinforcing battalion from 2"d Division, now only 225 rifles strong, reached 
Iringa, plus another 70 men from another unit. On realising that the telegraph line to 
Northey had been cut, the South Africans hurried south to assist Rodger. It was evident that 
the enemy was astride the vulnerable lines of communications. 202 
The tense situation at Iringa was relieved by the unexpected arrival of a mounted 
regiment from Dodoma on 25 October. It and the newly arrived infantry had launched a 
pre-emptive attack on At von Langenn, which was in the process of moving into its attack 
positions, and disrupted its plans. Another vigorous attack on the following day Further 
hampered the German preparations. 203 Although two of his Abledungen were in position to 
attack Iringa, Wahle decided that the British were too strong and cancelled the attack 
planned for 26 October. Furthermore, as lie was still without news of Abi Hiibener, who 
was actually still far to the south, he decided to bypass Iringa and head south. A rearguard 
was left to mask the move while the main body took the road south to Ngorn inyi . 
204 
"" CAB 44/4, p, 15-16, Sketch 68ý WO 95/5329, War Diary Norl'orce, I-ntries l9and 21 October 1916. 
201 CAB 44/4, p. 17. The RNR lost 3 KIA and 22 PW, ' 
2111 WO 95/5292, War Diary G1 IQ, 26 October 1916, I: iitrv 2"" Division, However, Sinuts gave a rather difTerent account in his report 
to CIGS the same day, Appendix 33,1'elegrarn F 59 10, Smuts to CIUS. lie said "While tile enemy is apparentIN in no position to do 
any substantial damage to General NORTHEY it is also clear that the eliciriv cannot be prevented from dribbling through in small 
parties along innumerable tbotpaths in the bush. .. 
" 
2111 WO 95/5292, War Diary GHQ, 27 October 1916, Appendix 35, Telegrarn F 5917, Smuts to CIOS, 27 October 
2114 Buell, Die Operationen. pp 290-29 1, 
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A key supply depot, Ngominyi had been poorly laid out for defence and had been 
under siege since 22 October. Wahle ordered the newly arrived AN Wintgens to take 
Ngominyi, with the attack going in on 28 October. Despite a determined fight, the 
defenders were greatly outnumbered and cut off, with the post falling to a dawn assault tile 
next morning. It was a major blow to Northey as a large quantity of much-needed supplies 
was captured and the situation in fringa still appeared serious. 
The vulnerable lines of communication were now severed and Norforce had been 
cut in half The loss of further depots would seriously delay fature offensive operations as 
well as threatening the survival of the troops at Iringa. Furthermore, the week's events and 
prisoner interrogations had revealed that the Wesitruppen were stronger and more aggressive 
than previously thought. Given the withdrawal from Iringa and the loss of Ngorninyi, it 
2115 seemed certain that the base at Malangall would be their next objective . 
Reinforcements from Iringa had joined Rodgers on 29 October, too late to help at 
Ngominyi, but with a combined force of only 305 rifles it was greatly Outnumbered by the 
enemy. AbI Winigens, having taken Ngominyi, now turned to deal with this force, attacking 
heavily over the next three days. Faced with a shortage of food and concerned about the 
situation at Iringa, led to the battered column's withdrawal on the night of 1/2 November, 
ending all pressure from the north. 206 For his part, Wahle continued to move south as an 
expanse of barren mountains prevented an immediate move to the east. As predicted, 
Malangali was his next obýjective. 
Belatedly, Smuts realised the true threat posed by Wahle. Norforce was in danger of 
being overwhelmed, its supplies were threatened and 2 nd Division was in no position to 
provide further assistance. Poor communications and distance meant that the fight was out 
of his hands while Northey was out of touch with a number of his own troops. Instead of 
the early capture of Mahenge, he faced the prospect of a major defeat in the weSt. 207 
2111 CAB 44/4, pp, 17-20ý WO 95/5329, War Diary Norforce, Entries 2 and 3-4 November 1916. 206 CA13 44/4, pp 19-20, The 7"' SAI suffered three dead, sixteen wounded and six missing. 2111 WO 95/5292. War Diary GHQ, I November 1916, Appendix 1, Telegrain F 5948, Smuts to CIGS, I November. 
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Events elsewhere were also taking a turn for the worse. On 21 October, further 
south, Kraut's advanced guard revealed itself opposite Hawthorn's and Murray's combined 
position on the Ruhuqje. The next day he started to encircle the British, driving in outposts 
and seizing and fortifying a feature to the west of their position. The envelopment was 
completed on 2' ) October and the track leading to Lupembe was cut. 
Kraut had a sizeable force, equivalent to the defenders', and was under firrn orders to attack 
the British . 
208 However, as the enemy was cut off and isolated from the rest of Norforce, 
Kraut considered that there was no immediate need to attack as he intended to starve tile 
British into submission. He trusted to the strength of his encirclement ofthe position and to 
his belief that the swamps to the north of their defences were impassable. 209 What he did 
not know was that Hawthorn had stockpiled a large quantity of supplies and was in wireless 
communication with General Northey at Neu Langenburg. 
After a week of isolation, with food running short and hearing of the WesurIII)I)e1l's 
approach to Ngominyi, Hawthorn decided to break the Gen-nan siege. He realised that it 
would be impossible to escape with his baggage column and precious wireless set without 
driving the enemy off completely. Laborious reconnaissances had I-ound several routes 
through the swamps and a plan was devised. Surprise was of the essence, and lie 
determined that the Germans would be unprepared for a simultaneous attack from north and 
south. 
The night of 28/29 October was chosen for the break-out; the Rhodesians were to 
strike the enemy to the SOLIth-east while Hawthorn's troops attacked to the north-west. They 
struck with considerable violence at dawn on 29 October, having infiltrated through tile 
swamps to within 400 yards of the Germans, breaking-in and capturing a gull. The centre of 
the German position was reached by 0830 hours followed shortly by the precipitate retreat 
of the besiegers to the eastern bank of the Ruhudje. 210 The action was a triumph for 
Hawthorn and, apart frorn inflicting some sharp casualties at relatively low cost, at 21 
British to I 18 Germans, it freed up Norforce's only sizeable reserve. The victory and 
2"' Boell, Die Operationen, pp. 256-257. 
MSS Afr. s. 1715 (300), Ilistory off KAR, pp. 160-161. 
WO 95/5329, War Diary Norforce, Entry 30 October 1916; Boell, Die Operationen, p. 257. 
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Kraut's subsequent withdrawal to the north-west now allowed Northey to concentrate his 
forces around Lupembe in order to deal with the growing threat there. 
211 
While Norforce was struggling to regain its balance, van Deventer's 2 nd Division 
was fmally able to move southward in some strength. Having shifted his headquarters to 
Dodoma, van Deventer took command of the Iringa area on 30 October and was ordered to 
reinforce it as quickly as possible. 212 The much reduced 
P SA Infantry Brigade was a shell 
of its former self, having suffered from the prolonged periods of half rations. Nearly 75 per 
cent of the troops had gone down with sickness and the four battalions were amalgamated 
into a single unit. 213 The mounted troops were little better, as I" SA Mounted Brigade could 
musterjust 705 men and 245 horses in early October; only by pooling horses and equipment 
could a single mounted regiment be organised. Joining that unit with the remnants of the 2 nd 
SA Mounted Brigade, a total strength of about 900 rifles could be raised. This was to 
diminish even more drastically as they marched through the tsetse fly-infested bush towards 
Iringa, losing over 500 horses. 214 In the meantime, a column under Colonel Taylor prepared 
to follow up shortly from Dodoma. The much-reduced infantry Brigade held Nyukwa's and 
the ground to the east at Kidodi, thereby securing the routes to Kilosa. 
215 
Now that he had handed over Iringa and Kraut had been defeated near Mkapira, 
Northey was able to concentrate significant forces. Although he had lost telegraphic 
communications, he had the great advantage of possessing a wireless link to his columns. 
This enabled him to instruct Murray to march for Lupembe as soon as he had heard of the 
victory over Kraut. Leaving on 2 November, Murray's Column marched up the Mynera 
Valley and thence up the escarpment to Lupembe arriving a few days later. One company 
was immediately sent forward to reinforce the 100 recruits holding Malangali while the rest 
of the battalion was sent forward on 8 November by motor cars to defend Lupembe. 216 
Apart from being a major road junction, with one route leading north to Iringa. and another 
211 WO 95/5329, War Diary Norforce, Entry 2 November 1916. 
212 WO 95/5292, War Diary GHQ, I November 1916, Entry General Headquarters. 
211 CAB 44/4, pp. 39-40. 
214 CAB 44/4, pp. 41-42; GSWA, Box 27,12 October 1916, Telegram K 651,2 Div to BGGS. Yd SA Infantry Brigade could muster 
799 effectives while V SA Mounted Brigade had 604. Another 1,500 troops from P Division were proceeding as reinforcements. 
2'5 WO 95/5292, War Diary GHQ, 7 November 1916, Appendix 9, Telegram OA 969, Genstaff to CIGS, 7 November. 
216 CAB 44/4, p. 27; WO 95/5329, War Diary Norforce, Entries 2,7 and 8 November 1916. 
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going east towards Mkapira, Lupembe was a key supply base. It was the road-head for 
supplies being delivered north by motor vehicles coming from Lake Nyassa and functioned 
as the advanced base for conduct of the operations against Mahenge. 
217 It was vital for the 
support of current and future operations. 
The Germans surrounded the garrison at Malangali on 8 November, cutting the 
telegraph wires connecting it to the outside world. The next day, their numbers increased by 
the arrival of At von Langenn, they launched a total of three bayonet attacks. Unable to 
break into the camp, their artillery inflicted a great deal of damage and destroyed much of 
the precious food supplies. Considerably outnumbered, the defenders held, but the situation 
was very precarious. 
However, prior to the arrival of the Westtruppen, Northey had placed considerable 
emphasis on the improvement of tracks into motor roads. This paid off in the crisis, as 
Northey decided to risk 50 of his precious light cars in a daring relief move. Late on 8 
November, he ordered Murray to take 130 men and 4 machine guns by vehicle to Malangali 
via Ubena. The remaining 125 men and 6 machine guns marched off cross country with the 
aim of linking up there subsequently. At the same time, receiving word that At Wintgens 
was headed south-west towards Lupembe, Northey told Hawthorn to be ready to march 
back there. 218 
Murray and his troops arrived to within two miles of Malangali unmolested, having 
travelled 120 miles over some of the roughest roads possible. Debussing safely, Murray 
sent the vehicles back to Buhora for supplies. A reconnaissance on the morning of 10 
November showed that the Germans were too strong for him to attack and he decided to 
keep his position and maintain contact. Wahle's efforts against Malangali had cost him 
heavily and the arrival of the Rhodesians coincided with news of Kraut's defeat finther 
south . 
219 He decided to lift the siege and move off south-east towards the Lupembe road to 
217 MSS Mr. s. 1715 (300), History of I KAR, pp. 161-162. 212 WO 95/5329, War Diary Norforce, Entries 8 and 9 November 1916; CAB 44/4, pp. 29-30. 
219 WO 95/5292, War Diary GHQ, 17 November 1916, Appendix 23, Telegram NF 1498, Norforce to Genstaff, 16 November. 
Norforce suffered one killed and five wounded while reporting that the Germans lost eleven dead, 26 wounded plus 40 cases of 
ammunition and stores. 
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join Wintgens. A two-company rearguard was detailed to maintain the blockade of 
Malangali and to link up with HUbener's detachment, still not yet arrived from the west. As 
the Wesuruppen slipped away on the night of 11/12 November, Murray took the advantage 
to attack and overwhelm Us force, causing it serious casualties. 220 
While these events were taking place, Wintgens had reached Lupembe and had put 
in an attack on 13 November, sending a detachment to cut the road to Ubena. This 
effectively cut off the garrison of 250 KAR recruits, 50 South Africans, 4 machine guns and 
several antiquated field pieces. It was well stocked with food and ammunition, but it also 
had the drawback of having some 300 wives and children of the KAR recruits, whose depot 
it was. 22 1 An outwork was taken, the wireless masts destroyed, but the garrison grimly held 
on. Heavy firing was kept up throughout the day and another determined, but ultimately 
unsuccessful attack, was put in at 0400 hours on 14 November. Following a ceasefire to deal 
with the wounded, no further attacks were pressed and Wintgens withdrew the next day. 222 
In the meantime, with Hawthorn still some distance to the east, Northey decided to 
redeploy Murray by vehicle. His column drove back to Ubena on 14 November from where 
foot patrols were sent out. They located the enemy roadblock about 30 miles west of 
Lupembe and the column moved forward for action, spending the better part of two days in 
reconnaissance. Striking on the evening of 16 November, he overwhelmed the two- 
company block, clearing the road to Lupembe ý23 
The beleaguered garrison was relieved by the arrival of Hawthorn's column on IS 
November, sometime after Wintgens's departure, and following a slow and difficult j ourney 
from Mkapira. This was timely for Wahle's main body appeared from the north-east the 
next day. Knowing that Kraut had been moving westward, the British feared that he would 
220 CAB 44/4, pp. 28-30; WO 95/5329, War Diary Norforce, Entries II and 12 November 1916. The British losses were four wounded 
and the Germans suffered eleven dead and twenty-six taken prisoner as well as losing one machine gun, 72 carriers, 15 mules and donkeys and 50 cattle; Boell, Die Operationen, pp. 293-294. 221 CAB 44/4, pp. 31-32; MSS Afr. s. 1715, History of I KAP, p. 163. m WO 95/5329, War Diary Norforce, Entries 13,14 and 18 November 1916. 223 WO 95/5329, War Diary Norforce, Entry 17 November 1916. The British lost one killed and four wounded to the Germans' 13 dead and seven taken prisoner. 
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combine with Wahle for an attack on Lupembe. Now that Ubena appeared to be safe, 
Northey ordered Murray to move forward and rejoin Hawthorn at Lupembe. 
The link-up duly took place on 18 November, with the two columns united for the 
first time since the end of October. Together they mustered an effective marching force of 
about 1100 rifles and had shown themselves well able to give the enemy a sharp blow. 
224 
However, Wahle had no intention of lingering near Lupernbe, as, after the failure of 
Wintgens's siege, he realised that the British would reinforce it strongly and he decided to 
bypass it altogether. His main body moved unopposed to the north of Lupembe from 17 to 
19 November, moving via the Mynera Valley for the Ulanga lowlands. The march of the 
Wesuruppen was finally completed on 22 November, when Wahle met up with Kraut and 
assumed control of all forces on Us front with headquarters at Tanganika. 
225 
Freed from the main command, Kraut ultimately advanced up the eastern edge of the 
plateau, seizing the village of Mfrika, six miles east of Lupembe, and standing at an altitude 
of 6,000 feet, with the Mahenge plains at 1500 feet above sea level. Too weak to attack, he 
constructed a strong forward position there, with a second being built some six miles west at 
Msalala. These fortifications, together with the thick bush and broken ground, made a 
British attack a difficult proposition. "' Furthermore, both sides were exhausted after the 
arduous marching of the past few months and neither had sufficient supplies or carriers to 
sustain further offensive operations, particularly in light of the coming rains. An operational 
pause ensued and reorganisation was set in train. 
Almost unnoticed under the strain of the battle was the loss of Northey's 
independence as a field force commander on 14 November. General Smuts had requested 
that Norforce be placed under his operational command (although without responsibility for 
supply) on 7 November, citing the need to co-ordinate the fighting in the Iringa-Mahenge 
area. 227 The change made good sense as it finally united all the British forces in East Affica 
224 WO 95/5329, War Diary Norforce, Entry 18 November 1916. 
225 Boell, Die Operationen, p. 294; CAB 44/4, p. 48. 
n6 WO 95/5329, War Diary Norforce, Entries 27-29 November 1916; MSS Mr. s. 1715, History of I K44R, p. 163. 227 WO 95/5292, War Diary GHQ, 7 November 1916, Appendix 9, Telegram OA 969, Genstaff, Morogoro to CIGS, London 7 
November and WO 95/5292, War Diary GHQ, 14 November 1916, Appendix 18, Telegram OA 24, Genstaff, Morogoro to Norforce 
and Genstaff, Dar-es-Salaam, 13 November. 
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under a single commander and it also removed the absurdity of having the Colonial Office, 
with no military staff or resources, controlling one part of the campaign and the War Office 
the other. The move was welcomed by Northey on military grounds, although it seems that 
he had no high opinion of Smuts's tactical abilities. 
While these actions were taking place in the north, von Grawert had been prodded 
by von Lettow to deal with the enemy around Songea on 23 October. Advancing on 31 
October, he sent orders to Falkenstein to advance on Songea and join him in the attack on 5 
November. However, owing to delays and confusion he did not join up with von Grawert 
until 11 November. Finally, with time short, Falkenstein moved on the British force early on 
12 November and without von Grawert's troops, part of whom had been left behind as 
security detachments, a consequence of the growing hostility of the African population to 
the Germans. 228 Despite a promising start, Falkenstein was killed leading the attack and 
ammunition began to run short. Unable to make further progress, the Germans broke off the 
battle, retiring to a position about three kilometres northeast of the boma. By 17 November 
more reinforcements were marching forward to reinforce the threatened position. 229 TES 
force was too strong for von Grawert who then prudently retired to the village of 
Njamabengo. 230 
While these events were underway, the almost forgotten rearguard under Lieutenant 
Colonel HUbener remained at large. With some 300 rifles and a howitzer, it had made very 
slow eastward progress. It was located at Ilembule on 20 November, and, with Lupembe 
secure and Wahle safely to the cast, Northey decided to eliminate this last threat to his 
colunins. Again, using his superior wireless communications and mobility, he sent Murray 
with 450 men to Ubena by vehicle, whence it marched off to deal with HUbener the next 
day. The German officer was not a great tactician nor overly energetic and allowed the 
British to surround his position and secure the vital waterholes by 26 November. Despite 
heavy firing by the howitzer, British casualties were slight and the lack of water made 
22' Boell, Die Operationen, p. 255. At von Grawert and Falkenstein had about 500 men in total. During the battle only 18 Germans 
and 271 askaris with 2 machine guns were deployed against 26 British and 223 askaris. The German losses were six killed, 13 
wounded and three missing. 
229 WO 95/5292, War Diary GHQ 19 November 1916, Entry Nyasaland Force. Half of 5 SAI had arrived and were immediately 
pushed on to Songea; WO 95/5329, War Diary Norforce, Entry 17 November 1916. 
'» Boell, Die Operationen, p. 256. 
69 
further defence hopeless. He duly surrendered, with seven officers, 48 Germans and 249 
Askaris going into captivity together with one 10.5 cm. howitzer and 3 machine guns. " 
There were now no German forces west of the line Neu Langenburg-Iringa. Despite 
the local superiority of numbers, Wahle had failed to inflict any significant damage on 
Norforce and had himself lost over 500 soldiers although he had successfully brought his 
force across 300 miles of desolate territory. Both Murray and Hawthorn had shown 
themselves to be determined and effective leaders who had given Wahle's troops some 
rough handling. Indeed, much more could have been achieved had 2 nd Division exerted any 
sort of pressure from the north, but the opportunity was missed. The threat to General 
Northey's force had passed. Indeed, a relieved General Smuts reported to London that some 
71 German and 370 Askaris had been killed or captured during the withdrawal of the 
Westtruppen. 232 
OPERATIONS NORTH OF THE LOWER RUFIJI 
The capture of Dar-es-Salaarn on 4 September led to a break in contact in the coastal 
region. It was not until the end of September that the British command learned of the 
presence of an enemy company in the lower Rufiji administrative centre of Kissangire. 
Smuts decided to delegate the clearance of the area to his Inspector General of 
Communications (IGC), a rather unusual choice given the severe administrative problems 
that the force was undergoing. As the IGC had neither an operational headquarters nor much 
in the way of fighting troops, an attempt to clear the area on 4 October failed miserably 
some five days later and he returned with heavy losses. 233 
This setback spurred Smuts to send reinforcements which were in position by 21 
October. 234 But, they arrived too late to be of use as Abt Stemmermann had reinforced the 
defences with four companies. While Smuts was concerned about the possibility of raids 
231 WO 95/5292, War Diary GHQ, 29 November 1916, Entry Nyasaland Force. 
232 WO 95/5292, War Diary GHQ, 25 November 1916, Appendix 35, Telegram X. 945, Smuts to CIGS, 25 November. 
233 CAB 44/5, pp. 4-6. The British lost 13 killed, 27 wounded and 8 missing while the German losses were cited as being slight See 
von Lettow, Reminiscences, p. 160. He states that the defenders were only the inexperienced company of the Kftgsberg crew. 234 CAB 44/5, pp. 6-7. 
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against the railway, he does not seem to have realised that the Germans were there for a very 
different purpose. "' They urgently required food, and the lower Ruf1ji region provided rich 
and plentiful maize crops. The garrison was there to protect the crop until it ripened, the 
earliest date for which was March 1917, and then to oversee its harvest. Von Lettow had 
sent Sternmermann there with explicit instructions on the value of his task. However, it 
appears that Smuts failed to appreciated his opponent's real aims and left the situation 
unresolved for another two months. 
KIBATA - THE PRELUDE AND BATTLE 
As operations on the Mgeta wound down, von Lettow reconsidered his options. 
Apart from remaining on the defensive, he had the option of attacking the now static enemy 
forces to his north. However, the ground was difficult and the British were now well dug in. 
Any attack was likely to result in heavy casualties and high levels of ammunition 
expenditure, neither of which could be afforded. On the other hand, Northey's advance in 
the west was being dealt with by Kraut and the troops north of the Rufiji were protecting the 
ripening harvest. It was the growing lodgement at Kilwa that caused him the greatest 
concem. 
As soon as he had learned of the fall of Kibata on 14 October, von Lettow resolved 
to recover the situation. He ordered the bulk of his troops to move there on the following 
day, with At Schulz being despatched on 17 October. In all, he took eight companies plus 
the bulk of his artillery south, leaving nine companies and a gun to hold the line of the 
Mgeta under the command of Captain Otto. Von Lettow himself left the Mgeta front two 
days later before moving to join his main body of troops opposite Kibata. 236 However, 
owing to the distance and state of the tracks, this reinforcement would take about two to 
three weeks. This delay, unavoidable as it was, enabled the British to continue the build-up 
of their troops unimpeded. 
235 WO 95/5292, War Diary GHQ, I November 1916, Appendix 1. Telegram F 5948, Smuts to CIGS, I November. He stated "Enemy 
holds KISSENGIRE and MKAMBA on roads from RUFUI to DAR ES SALAAM and is patrolling very actively further North 
apparently in expectation of attack from DAR ES SALAAM or as a threat to our railway communications. " 216 Boell, Die Operationen, p. 242; von Lettow, Reminiscences, pp. 161-163; He states that he left Tafel in command, but Boell and 
the course of subsequent operations makes it clear that Otto remained in charge of the Mgeta line. 
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The Kilwa force was increasingly aware of the growing threat to its advanced 
positions and took a number of measures to reduce Germans supplies in the region. A series 
of fighting patrols went out against the German lines of communication and inflicted some 
important setbacks; the magazine at Mpotora, on the Liwale road, fell on 29 October and 
another at Ngararnbi Chini was destroyed on 2 November. The outcome of these raids was 
to force the Germans away from the coast and ffirther north. 237 
In the meantime, reinforcement of Hannyngton took some time as the 2 nd 
Brigade was in the process of reconstitution under Brigadier General O'Grady. 
Reinforced by two newly raised KAR battalions and two more experienced units, the 
brigade arrived in Kilwa over the last two weeks of November. The divisional commander, 
Hoskins, realised that it would be very difficult to bottle up the Germans in such wild and 
mountainous country and that he needed strong forces forward. Accordingly, he divided 
his area of operations into two; in the north, Hannyngton's 3 rd EA Brigade held Kibata and 
forward positions in the Mtumbei Hills. To the south and west, he deployed O'Grady's 
force in the Matandu Valley. A small reserve, consisting chiefly of the immobile artillery, 
was held at Kilwa. 238 
British intelligence assessed, fairly accurately, that the Germans had about 10 
companies moving towards Kibata. This increase in strength was confirmed by the capture 
of documents and the interrogation of prisoners in November. 239 The first probe on Kibata 
was launched on 7 November, with a two company reconnaissance-in-force led by Captain 
Schulz. It was repulsed by the British by 9 November and served to increase the volume of 
their defensive measures. Despite the rebuff, Schulz informed the Kommandeur that, with 
artillery, Kibata could be taken without heavy losseS. 240 His forecast of casualties was later 
to prove sadly inaccurate. 
237 Boell, Die Operationen, p. 246. 
238 CAB 44/5, p. 2 1. 
239 WO 95/5292, War Diary GHQ, 7 November 1916, Appendix 9. Telegram OA 969, General Staff Morogoro to General Staf& Dar-es- 
Salaam, 7 November. 
240 Boell, Die Operationen, p. 246; Moyse-Bartletý The King's African Rifles, p. 338. 
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The position at Kibata, although strong, was far from an ideal defensive position 
and the fort itself, with high walls on a prominent hilltop, was obsolete for modem warfare. 
It was almost completely surrounded by a ring of small hills about one thousand yards 
distant with prominent river valleys running to the west and east. The most important was 
Picquet Hill, a long and narrow ridge to the north-west of the fort. Originally covered with 
thom bush, it had been cleared by the defenders to improve the fields of fire. It was 
actually higher than the fort and, in recognition of its importance, it had two major 
positions, known as No I and No 2 Redoubts - although they lacked dug-outs and sufficient 
depth . 
24 1 These features were in turn dominated from the north by a large ridge running 
west to east. 242 The loss of any of that high ground would make the possession of Kibata 
fort difficult, but the retention of Picquet Hill was vital as it commanded the roads leading 
in and out of Kibata as well as two of the three water sources. 
243 
In the first week of December, the British garrison consisted of about a battalion 
with the fort and a series of lesser hills were held by one company, as were each of the two 
redoubts on Picquet Hill. The nearest reserve battalion was some 36 miles away, with the 
rest of the brigade further to the southwest. It was on the afternoon of 6 December that the 
defenders first sighted columns advancing from the north, with the outposts driven in 
shortly thereafter; the battle now commenced in earnest. Having secured the first line of 
defences, von Lettow used the night to bring his artillery and machine guns into position. 
Using the same huge gangs of African labourers who had dragged the guns all the way 
from the Rufiji, he deployed one of the 4.1" K6nigsberg guns, a field howitzer and two 
mountain guns onto a commanding feature. 244 
With excellent gun positions ready, von Lettow then pushed two Atedungen 
forward while a company was ordered to infiltrate around the defenders to cut the track 
leading back to Kilwa. The Germans now numbered nine companies against the defenders' 
241 Thatcher, W S, 7he Fourth Battalion, Duke of Connaught's Own 10' Baluch Regiment in the Great War, Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, pp. 144-145. This history covers the 129'b Baluchis. 
242 CAB 44/5, p. 22. 
243 WO 106/273, History of3 KAR, Plan of Kibata, p. 58a; WO 95/5330, History of 1`12"d KM pp. 5-6. 
244 CAB 44/5, pp. 23-27; Moyse-Bartlett, The King's African Rifles, p. 339. 
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six and were ready to move on the main defences. 245 Significantly, their artillery group 
outranged the defenders' mountain guns by a wide margin. 
The next morning, the battle was began with a severe artillery bombardment of 
Picquet Hill. No 2 Redoubt suffered the worst and was nearly destroyed during the 
morning although the garrison managed to hold on. A dusk assault byAbt Schulz gained a 
lodgement about 80 yards from No 2 Redoubt. This now seriously threatened the British 
hold on Picquet Hill and prevented the use of one of the water sources. 246 With the 
defenders unable to expel the Germans, the night of 7/8 December passed with both sides 
in close proximity to each other. The British had suffered heavily from the accurate enemy 
artillery fire and poor camouflage. 
On receiving news of the onslaught, Hannyngton committed his reserve battalion 
and two mountain guns to the battle. A gruelling forced march of some 36 miles in 34 
hours over razor-back ridges separated by deep gullies conducted in pouring rain brought 
the relievers into Kibata at 0200 hours on 9 December. On the same day, General Hoskins 
also released another battalion from 2 nd EA Brigade, but it too would require some hard 
marching to reach the hard-pressed defenders. 
Von Lettow resumed the attack in the morning of 8 December. Supported by 
artillery, the troops in the lodgement attempted to rush the redoubts which came close to 
succeeding. The attack having failed, the Germans took the rest of the day to isolate the 
hill from reinforcement. The heavy rain which marked the day obscured observation, with 
the Kbnigsberg gun alternating its deadly fire between positions. 247 More shelling 
following the next day, but the Germans were unable to launch a further infantry attack 
owing to the arrival of the British reserves. In turn, an attack on the lodgement failed and a 
deadly stalemate ensued. Hoskins was now seriously concerned about the situation, 
sending more mountain guns on 9 December and remainder of P EA Brigade the 
245 Lettow, Reminiscences, pp. 168-169. 246 Boell, Die Operationen, p. 247. Von Lettow had about 900 rifles and 15 machine guns versus Hannyngton's 930 rifles and 7 
machine guns. However, the 4.1" Kbnigsberg gun, the howitzer and mountain guns outranged the two British mountain guns. 
Thatcher, IOh Baluch Reginwnt, p. 146; 247 CAB 44/5, pp. 25-26; WO 95/5330, History of I"12"d KAR, p. 6. 
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following day. Finally, on II December he placed General O'Grady in command of the 
battle. 
In the meantime, von Lettow had lost his initial superiority of numbers as the 
British rapidly built up their strength. After three days of relative quiet, they made an 
attempt to drive the Germans back. The plan was simple; to seize a rocky and bare feature, 
later known as Gold Coast Hill, some 3,000 yards to the west of the German right flank and 
separated from Kibata by a deep valley nearly. This feature provided a covered approach 
from which a flanking attack could be launched onto the German positions. 
The two new battalions began their flanking move on 15 December, but quickly 
came under fire from an enemy outpost. Now secure on Gold Coast Hill, they were hit by 
heavy artillery fire that was closely followed by a strong infantry attack. A series of heavy 
attacks ensued and the defenders' situation became desperate. With heavy casualties, 
248 extrication rather than further advance became essential . 
While this maelstrom was raging to the west, the newly-arrived General O'Grady 
was preparing to restore the situation at Kibata. With him came two more mountain guns, 
ammunition, including Mills bombs (heretofore unknown in East Africa), and food. He 
planned to eliminate the lodgement on Piquet Hill as a pre-requisite for the turning of the 
German position. A battalion was given the task of a night attack using the new Mills 
bombs for shock action while the artillery spent most of 15 December registering the 
German positions. 249 After dark, a silent night attack drove the Germans out of their 
trenches, and regained Picquet Hill. At small cost, they had won an important victory and 
eliminated the most dangerous salient. Ironically, it was von Lettow's earlier decision to 
use his reserves for the attack onto Gold Coast Hill that left the main sector so 
vulnerable. 250 With it went his chances for victory at Kibata. 
Clifford, Sir H C, Ae Gold Coast Regiment in the East Africa Campaign, pp. 51-55. The Regiment suffered 146 casualties out of the 340 
s 
`reC 
SeL 
44/5, pp. 33-34; WO 9515330, History of 1'012*dKAR, p-7- 250 Thatcher, I Ok Baluch Regiment, pp. 154-155. The Baluchis lost 15 killed or wounded and took 13 German prisoners; CAB 44/5, p. 35. 
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Neither side now had sufficient infantry to renew the offensive and activity was 
reduced to patrol encounters and intermittent shelling. Both sides needed to regroup and 
the situation remained largely unchanged until the end of the year. 
The battle had drawn in the bulk of lst Division's fighting troops, while a large 
portion of von Lettows force was also engaged. The battle was tactically inconclusive, 
with both sides suffering heavy casualties for limited gains. Von Lettow had certainly 
blocked a British advance towards Utete, but he had failed to gain the decisive victory that 
he sought and had expended large quantities of ammunition. In the circumstances, and 
given his initial superiority, it is puzzling that he did not try cut off the position entirely. 
The defenders were on very short rations for over six weeks and their water supply was 
very vulnerable. He appears to have gone for set-piece assaults rather than more subtle 
encirclement and starvation. However, the battle also revealed to both sides that the newly 
raised KAR battalions, although full of potential, were still too inexperienced to meet the 
Schutztruppe head on in battle. 
THE FINAL PUSH TO THE RUFIJI 
As the rains continued and he struggled to reorganise his force, Smuts now had to 
deal with serious dissent both in South Africa and in his own troops. In late October, one 
of his own battalion commanding officers lodged a formal complaint, making strong 
allegations of incompetence, indifference to soldiers' welfare and general negligence. 
Matters were not helped by the harrowing stories beginning to emerge in the South 
African press, notably the Rand Daily Mail and the Sunday Times. In mid-November, the 
latter paper made accusations of serious shortcomings and lack of planning (these are 
covered in Chapter Six). A court of enquiry was established to deal with the military 
allegations, while both the Governor General and Prime Minister were forced into 
political damage limitation. 251 
251 Brown, King and Kaiser, pp. 301-302; W033/858, Telegrams D 1, No. 1388,17 November 1916, Telegram OA84, Smuts to 
CIGS. 
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Doubtless these matters added to the urgency of ending the campaign. Smuts, too, 
retained his perennial optimism about the chances of a German surrender. On taking 
Norforce under formal command on 14 November, he laid out his plans to Northey at some 
length. Viewing the Germans as operating in two discrete groups under the command of 
von Lettow in the east and KrautfWahle in the west, he wanted to keep them apart and 
defeat each in turn. 252 
These thoughts were formalised on 30 November, when General Smuts reported his 
intentions to the CIGS. He began by estimating that von Lettow had about 4,000 rifles on 
the Rufiji, while Kraut's 2,000 men had been joined by a maximum of 500 or 600 of 
Wahle's force. With the Schuatruppe having a maximum of 7,000 effectives, he proposed 
to add the newly arriving Nigerian Brigade: 
"while on arrival of NIGERLANS at front I shall endeavour to cut off retreat of VON 
LETTOW'S force and obtain decision on LOWER RUFIJI. Should enemy escape 
,, 253 Southward from RUFIJI it will be reduced in numbers and morale... 
To van Deventer, he was blunter, giving his aim as follows: 
"to drive the enemy everywhere over the Ulanga (Kilombero) before the end of 
January, then to leave the Indian and African battalions to hold the line of the river 
, 254 during the rainy season, and to move the white troops back to the railway' . 
He believed that the combined forces of van Deventer and Northey would be able to 
deal with Kraut and Wahle separately. He was optimistic enough to believe that Belgian 
assistance would probably not be required as their preparations would take too long and they 
would be a burden on his supply system. Finally, he considered that the expanded KAR 
would be capable of dealing with any forces beyond February 1917.255 
212 WO 95/5292, War Diary GHQ, 14 November 1916, Appendix IS. Telegram OA 24, Genstaff to Norforce, 13 November. 
211 WO 95/5292, War Diary GHQ, 30 November 1916, Appendix 42, Telegram OA 198, Smuts to CIGS, 30 November. 
11 CAB 44n, pp 1-2. 
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On 22 December, General Smuts considered that preparations for an advance on all 
fronts were complete and he and his advanced GHQ left Morogoro on the same day, moving 
to Dutumi. While it was clear that the British situation was difficult, it did not seem 
impossible; in the east 1" Division had stabilised the dangerous situation at Kibata and 
von Lettow had pulled back to the Rufiji. While Hoskins's troops were tired and had 
suffered a number of casualties, they were still capable of offensive effort, although 
limited by lack of transport. On the Mgeta front, Sheppard's weakened I't EA Brigade 
was readying for the move as the first elements of the Nigerian Brigade began to arrive 
from Dar-es-Salaam. Echeloned to his rear, on the Ruwu-Tulo road, Beves's Force 
Reserve was making similar preparations. In the west, van Deventer's 2nd Division was 
halted at Iringa, its fighting power largely dissipated through disease, under-feeding and 
overwork. Lacking sufficient porters or vehicles to advance in any strength, it was 
capable of only limited forward movement. In the far west and south, Norforce force was 
in relatively good condition although it was still recovering from the exertions and losses 
during the recent operations against the Wesuruppen. 
In order to force a decision on the Rufiji, Smuts planned a three-pronged 
operation. Intelligence had ascertained that the German positions on the Mgeta River 
were fairly light, not numbering more than 1,000. The main body had withdrawn to the 
Rufiji River area with the principal concentrations at Kibambawe in the west and Utete 
further east. Smuts's plan was to outflank and cut off the weak forces on the Mgeta by 
sending a column to the Rufiji at Mkalinso coupled with a rapid flanking march to seize a 
crossing of the Rufiji at Kibambawe. Once the river had been crossed, the re-united force 
would turn eastwards and push along its southern banks to Utete. This advance would be 
supported by a flank column under Colonel Burne moving south from Kissangire to clear 
the area north of the Rufiji, while Hoskins's I't Division pressed north-west from Kibata 
to Utete. Indeed, Smuts hoped his moves would compel von Lettow to surrender there. 256 
215 WO 95/5292, War Diary GHQ, 30 November 1916, Appendix 42, Telegram OA 198, Smuts to CIGS, 30 November. 
236 CAB 44/6, pp. 12-13; WO 95/5292, War Diary GHQ, 22 December 1916, Appendix 33, Telegram OA 355, Smuts to CIGS, 21 
December. "If the enemy's retreat is delayed until we have crossed the RUFIJI near KIAGOBAWE [sic] and moved East so as to 
effect junction with HOSKINS this line of retreat will be closed and enemy may be compelled to end on the LOWER RUFIJI. " 
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The details were typically Smutsian - light frontal holding attacks in the centre 
were to be coupled with outflanking marches in an attempt to encircle his foes. However, 
even after the pause and build-up of the past several months the lack of stockpiled 
supplies in the forward areas, the poor health of the troops, and, above all, the 
insufficiency of the transport were severely limiting factors in the execution of the plan. 
It was a race, and in many ways a gamble, with fighting troops trying to cut off their 
opponents, before the weather could do the same to them. 
The details of the advance were as follows. Preliminary operations in the west 
would be launched to draw off the German reserves. Van Deventer's 2nd Division was 
ordered to clear the high escarpment east of Iringa and push eastwards to Ifakara along 
the Ruaha River, helping to close the trap from the west. Northey was to move east, 
taking the position at Mfrika and driving Kraut's troops behind the Ulanga River. 257 On 
the Mgeta front, a total of four columns would operate against the forward positions. The 
newly arrived Nigerian Brigade was ordered to launch a holding attack from Dutumi into 
the centre of the Mgeta line, while Sheppard's Is' EA Infantry Brigade would turn its 
flank by moving from Dakawa to Wiransi in the west. Concurrently, a small, two- 
battalion column would make a similar march from Tulo to Tshimbe in east. Sheppard 
would also detach a single battalion to conduct a deep flanking move against the enemy's 
lines of communication stretching south-eastwards to Behobeho. Key to the plan, 
however, would be Beves's Force Reserve. It would start from Kissaki in the west, 
making a wide sweep around all known enemy concentrations to emerge on the north 
bank of the Rufiji, near the village of Mkalinso. From there, it would march cross- 
country to Luhembero, south of the river and astride the road running south from 
Kimbambawe. Once the defenders had been rounded up, the columns would unite and 
start the second-stage move on Utete. At the same time, Hoskins's I" Division was to 
prevent the eastward or southward move of the German main body, should it try to 
escape in those directions. 258 
257 WO 95/5292, War Diary GHQ, I January 1917, Telegram OA 443, Smuts to Adminstaff, 31 December. 
25' CAB 44/6, pp. 13-15. 
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Even if his army had not recovered from its previous exertions and the weather was 
bad, Smuts was determined to push on. Rain, although widely expected, was to upset his 
optimistic calculations. He had planned on Northey's troops moving on 23 December and 
the remainder 2-3 days later, but his report of 20 December was hardly encouraging: 
"Very heavy rain has fallen on all fronts and country South of MGETA has assumed 
appearance of lakes. Weather now improving in RUFIJI area but heavy rains 
continue to fall in areas covered by General NORTHEY and VAN 
,, 259 DEVENTER... 
These optimistic prognostications were soon upset by experience; on 23 December, 
2 nd Division reported that rain had stopped all transport for 10 days, forcing its troops again 
onto half rations, and that modifications to its operations would be essential . 
260 
Nevertheless, despite the continuing rain and mounting difficulties in movement, both 
Northey and van Deventer began their advance as planned on 23 and 24 December 
respectively. However, conditions were less favourable on the Mgeta and north of Kilwa. It 
was not until 29-31 December that the weather cleared and not until New Year's Day 1917 
that the main advance set to start. 
FIGHTING ON THE MIDDLE RUFIJI FRONT 
Facing Smuts on the Rufiji, the main defence force, Abt Otto, with five companies 
in the forward area, was supported by Abt von Chappuis, with another three companies 
along the lines of communication that followed the Kissaki-Behobeho route. 261 No other 
local reserves were known to exist within the proposed battle area. 
On the RufiJi front, there were two major problems for the British commander. The 
first was the absolute necessity of seizing and maintaining a crossing over the River Rufiji in 
259 WO 95/5292, War Diary GHQ, 20 December 1916, Appendix 30, Telegram OA 341, Genstaff to CIGS, 20 December. 
'" GSWA, Box 29,18 December 1916, Telegram P32,2 Div to BGGS. Van Deventer signalled "Have carefully reviewed supply 
situation which is presenting grave difficulties ... Only way out of 
difficulty is to move part of division back to railway 
immediately... "; WO 95/5292, War Diary GHQ, 23 Dee 16, Entry 2d Division. 
'6' MS Boell, N 14/30,26. Kapitel, p. 1904. Otto had eight companies with von Chappuis as a subordinate; CA13 44/6, p. 11. 
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the face of strong defences. Assault craft were non-existent and a limited number of 
vulnerable three-man Berthon boats were his main crossing asset. These had to contend 
with continually rising river waters and a strong current. A daylight attempt to cross against 
organised opposition would almost certainly be disastrous. Any bridgehead would have to 
be reinforced quickly against the inevitable counter-attacks, while ammunition and food 
would also have to cross regularly. This meant that it would be essential to widen the 
lodgement as quickly as possible and to build a substantial bridge as soon as possible 
thereafter. 
The second constraint was the need to contain and destroy the enemy force before it 
could slip off to the south. This would be best achieved by achieving an undetected crossing 
on the western flank in conjunction with a move north-westward by I" Division from the 
Mturnbei Hills toward the Rufiji. If executed promptly and vigorously enough, it offered 
the chance of cutting off von Lettow's main force from Kraut and Wahle in the west, and so 
forcing him to end the campaign. 262 Failure to achieve both of these goals would leave a 
weakened British force in the depths of the some of the wildest and most difficult country in 
the world at the height of the tropical monsoon. 
General Beves's crossing of the Rufiji River at Mkalinso, some 20 miles southwest 
of Kibambawe, was critical to success. Starting on 31 December and operating some 10 
miles to the west of the main body, he made good progress, crossing the Mgeta on I 
January and having covered some 22 miles by nightfall on 2 January. Undetected, the 
lead unit made the precarious crossing of the Rufiji near Mkalinso, with the far bank 
secured by the morning of 3 January. Building rafts, Beves then brought his second 
battalion over on the next day and was strongly positioned to move on his next objective, 
Kibambawe, the nexus of the German lines of communication. This had been achieved 
after a 30 hours' continuous march through virgin bush and had put the South Africans about 
24 hours ahead of the planned timetable. Furthermore, the sole enemy company holding the 
Mkalinso post remained unaware of the imminent danger to their position. 
262 Smuts, DesPatch 111, p. 148. 
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Early on 4 January, the leading battalion seized Mkalinso, dispersing the garrison 
and capturing the telephone equipment. Otto received his first information about this 
force at midday and immediately despatched another company there. However, further 
reports of the strength of the enemy advance and fears of being outflanked from the west 
led Otto to withdraw his entire Ateilung to the south bank of the Rufiji and to destroy 
the crossing site at Kimbambawe. 263 
Having achieved a major success and having turned the Mgeta position, the Force 
Reserve inexplicably halted. It was true that the troops were exhausted by their 
formidable exertions, but the urgency of the situation was well known and the chief 
scout, Major Pretorious, had personally located all enemy positions in the area. Claiming 
a lack of explicit orders from GHQ, Beves now did little, squandering his advantage. 
264 
Finally, on 6 January Smuts ordered him to attack north-east of Mkalinso, which he did 
on the following day. The attack was not pressed hard and the garrison escaped through 
the thick bush. Unknown to Beves, Otto had been forced to divide his force to protect the 
line of communication running from Njakissiku - Luhembero - Maba on 5 January with 
only one company to the east. Furthermore, the depredations of Pretorious had already 
captured the entire German medical reserve, as well as the munitions and food supplies in 
the process of being evacuated south . 
265 A very real chance of catching Otto out at 
Kibambawe was lost through inaction and insufficient initiative. 266 
On 31 December, Lyall's column was marching 12 miles east of the main force on 
the route Tulo to Kiruru. There, he crossed the Mgeta and turned south to occupy Tshimbe 
on the Kiderengwa-Behobeho road. His task was to block the road in order to prevent the 
Germans from escaping south; his patrols were also to link up with the troops of Sheppard's 
I st Brigade, ffirther to the west. 267 By early on I January, he was south of the Mgeta and 
reached his objective by early afternoon. Trenches were dug just as a strong enemy 
force ran into the column. Successfully pushing the Germans north and capturing a 
263MSBoell, N14/30,26. Kapitel, pp. 1919-1919; W095/5292, War Diary GHQ, 4 January 1917, Appendix 4, Telegram OA518, 
Smuts to CIGS, 3 January. 
2" CAB 44/6, pp. 38-39. 
265 NIS Boell, N14/30,26. Kapitel, p. 1920. 2" CAB 44/6, pp. 36-39. 
267 Smuts, Despatch III, p. 147. 
82 
THE 
' - ,E TO TFM 
RLJFIJI ADVAN'% . 
31s, t December 1916 -1-5th January 1917 
d -. 92 MIAM Inch 
/-. KITOHQ. 
N_ ý Fre 
3Q, = KLsaki 
5iý 
. 4f r 
L 
"KIPEN10 
PC" 
2, '1 
FUCAIr-, 
/ 
II-k<:. 
/ 2il , 2,11 
311 
HATAMSULO( 
KIPAL(iý_ 
2. ) 
Lake 
Mhoulbi 
MTUNDUSi, 
sh 
Sli 
.... ... ýX b K l m" i aw Rapdxý: 
iapcuw LUHVAaER0 
4r, 
REFERENCF- 
i Gcr-aý Z. d. N, . Shdpvard - ----- 40- 
*Glh saluchAs 0. L, Os of ;; ýtraj, 
eeve-s Do I 
Lyad 
Cýrhffi 
ez., 
howitzer, Lyall then faced a strong counter-attack. Holding firm, he awaited the arrival of 
the Nigerian Brigade, unaware that Otto's troops had bypassed him, having marched off 
into the bush the night before. 268 
In the centre, the Nigerian Brigade made its holding attack on the forward 
positions north of the Mgeta. Heavily supported by artillery and aerial observation a 
battalion cleared south of Dutumi, finding a ford in the afternoon and reaching the 
southern bank by early evening. The brigade consolidated its position throughout the 
night, and resumed the move south on the morning of 2 January, when it linked up with 
Lyall. The acute lack of carriers meant that the Nigerians could take no further part in the 
advance, and with the enemy now much farther south, they were recalled to their former 
positions along the Mgeta where they could be fed much more easily. 269 
Sheppard's flanking battalion, about five miles west of the main body, had had a 
more difficult time. Starting on 31 December from Kissaki, it crossed the Mgeta on the 
same day and reached the Behobeho road the next morning. Then turning to the north- 
west, it took up position to block the expected German withdrawal. It was not long in 
coming, with the lead picquets encountered at 0730 hours followed by the advance guard 
of At von Chappuis. A first attack was held but then followed by a second, and much 
heavier, effort. A desperate hand-to-hand fight ensued and the Indians were nearly 
overcome. However, steady defence and the sound of Sheppard's brigade forced the 
Germans to break off the battle. 270 
The remainder of I" EA Brigade had marched south facing only light rearguards 
covering the German withdrawal south. Linking up with the lead battalion on the 
afternoon of I January, Sheppard decided to send his main body south to the junction at 
Behobeho Chogwali in an attempt to cut off the enemy known to be further north while 
also sending off another unit to take the village of Wiransi. The main body reached 
26' CAB 44/6, pp. 22-24; 
269 CAB 44/6, pp. 25-27; Downes, With the Nigerians, pp. 66-67. 270 CAB 44/6, pp. 29-30. The 130'b only started 454 all ranks and suffered some 36 dead and 29 wounded, totalling 65. The Germans 
had 12 killed and two taken prisoner. 
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Wiransi'on 2 January, but was unable to reach its objective of Behobeho Chogwali the 
next day owing to intense heat and difficult terrain. 
In the meantime, Sheppard sent a battalion and a battery of guns to support Lyall 
further to the east in the area of Behobeho kwa Mahinda (north of Chogwali). Reaching 
that place on 3 January, they linked up with Lyall's two battalions that night and the 
combined force moved south on the morning of 4 January, linking up with Sheppard's I't 
EA Brigade on the main track in mid-afternoon. The next morning the advance on 
Kibarnbawe was resumed, with Abt von Chappuis giving battle at about 1030 hours. 
After driving off their opponents into the thick bush, Sheppard decided to push on to the 
Rufiji at best speed. 271 
On 5 January, Is' EA Brigade, now with all its units back, reached its objective, the 
Kibambawe bridge. Despite their fatigue and exertions, Otto had beaten them there and the 
crossing had been destroyed. The failure of Beves to move on 4 January now became 
doubly important Not to be deterred, Smuts ordered Sheppard to make a crossing during 
the night of 5/6 January. As the river was between 400 and 700 yards wide with a swift 
current and unfordable, he was faced with a major problem. Patrols found a narrow 
point, some 400 yards in width, about one and half miles from the bridge site and out of 
direct enemy observation. Severely limited in his crossing capability, Sheppard had only 
seven Berthon boats capable of carrying three men at a time. Despite the inadequacy of 
his means, he began ferrying troops across the river during the night of 5/6 January. Only 
one company with two machine guns managed to cross before daylight and it had to spend 
the entire day of 6 January hiding amongst reeds and suffering intensely from the heat and 
lack of food. Through good discipline and camouflage, it managed to remain undetected 
despite German patrols. With darkness, Sheppard was able to send across the remainder 
of the battalion plus another company, giving him 400 rifles and 4 machine guns on the 
south bank by first light on 7 January. 272 
271 WO 95/5292, War Diary GHQ, 5 January 1917, Appendix 8, Telegram X 1133, Smuts to CIGS 4 January; CAB 44/6, pp. 32-35. 
The British suffered 16 KIA and 45 WIA including the famous FW Selous. 272 WO 95/5292, War Diary GHQ, 7 January 1917, Telegram OA 567, Genstaff to CIGS, 7 January; CAB 44/6, pp. 4244. 
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The British lodgement was detected a by patrol early that morning and, believing 
them to be a weak detachment, a single company attacked it but was firmly repulsed. 
The appearance of the enemy on the south bank spurred Otto to move up a company to 
Kunglio as reinforcements while also recalling two others from Mpanga. 273 Four boats 
attempting to land supplies during daylight were damaged by shrapnel and the resupply 
effort was ended. A attack was then launched from the bridgehead, first with one, and 
then two companies, but it was countered by strong German reinforcements. Facing 
severe shortages by afternoon, ammunition was rowed across the river at great risk and 
the British bridgehead was stabilised. 274 
The Germans did not counter-attack further, having lost heavily in Europeans. 275 
Sheppard used the night of 7/8 January to ferry across the rest of the second battalion and 
an additional company, giving him a total strength of 600 rifles and 10 machine guns 
across the river. Early on 8 January another attempt was made on the British lodgement, 
but it was easily held off with the support of the mountain guns firing across the river. 
The arrival of two long-range naval guns on the north bank of the Rufiji assisted the 
forward troops and helped to suppress the German guns. However, the combination of 
insufficient strength and the high ground dominating the bridgehead meant that a 
stalemate ensued over the next week. 
On 7 January, the German positions were as follows: one company was at 
Njakissiku, three were around Kunglio-Sud, two more at Mpanga, and one each at 
Mkalinso and Mkindu. Otto was now faced with a threat from the west via Mkindu while 
also having to prevent further expansion of the British bridgehead. Keeping three 
companies on the river, he reinforced Mpanga back to three, with two in reserve, ready to 
react to further initiatives. 276 
In the meantime, on 8 January Smuts had arrived at the Mkalinso crossing and 
ordered Beves to re-concentrate his force at his original crossing site. Two battalions of the 
m MS Boell, N 14/30,26. Kapitel, pp. 1923-1924. M WO 95/5292, War Diary GHQ, 7 January 1917, Appendix 11, Telegram OA567, Genstaff to CIGS, 7 January. 275 MS Boell, N14/30,26. Kapitel, pp. 1923-1924. The Germans lost two kiled and six wounded. 
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Nigerian Brigade were ordered from Dutumi, to move west then south and pass through 
Beves's exhausted column. 
The loss of 3,000 kg of supplies at Maba through aerial bombing was a blow and 
convinced Otto to prepare for a ftu-ther withdrawal south. The German command was 
also becoming increasingly apprehensive about the safety of the main line of 
communication running from the Rufiji to Luwegu and thence to Mahenge. Protected by 
only a weak detachment, the main ammunition reserve lay at the former place and was 
now hurriedly evacuated. The headquarters of the lines of communication was ordered to 
move from Madaba to Mlembwe on 17 January in an attempt to re-align the lines out of 
range of the British advance. 277 
While the fighting forces had made surprisingly good progress despite their weak 
condition, behind them the basis of their survival, the British transport system had 
collapsed. There had never been much of a margin of safety and now the administrative 
staff warned the commander-in-chief that he would have to reduce the numbers in 
forward areas substantially if actual starvation was to be avoided. During the previous 
two weeks, with the combination of sickness amongst the drivers and the breakdown of 
vehicles, the force had received about 10 per cent of its essential supplies. Full rations 
could only be maintained until 20 January and a reduction to half rations would be 
necessary by the end of the month, even sooner if the rains came. 278 Faced with this 
unmistakable warning, Smuts had to amend his plans 
On 15 January 1917, on the eve of his departure from East Africa, he gave the 
Nigerian Brigade a new role. Believing the enemy to be in small numbers at Kibambawe 
and Mpanga's, a few miles to the east, he ordered Cunliffe to trace Beves's route to 
Mkalinso, then to strike east towards Mkindu and Luhembero. Beves was to march 
276 MS Boell, N14/30,26. Kapitel, pp. 1924, CAB 44/6, pp. 4445. 
2"MSBoell, N14/30,26. Kapitel, pp. 1925-1927. 273 CAB 44/6, pp. 108-110. Reproduces Memorandum "Supply and Transport Situation", by AQMG 9 January 1917; GSWA, Box 29, 
2 January 1917, Telegram P 71,2 Div to Genstaff. 2d Division had been on half rations since 24 December. 
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north-east, attacking the enemy grouping around Mpanga's and linking- up with 
Sheppard who was to break out south at Kibambawe. 279 
It is noteworthy that his communiqu6s to the War Office were far more bland and 
sanguine than those of his staff. On 9 January, he stated merely that Sheppard had 
crossed the RufiJi at Kibambawe, while Beves had reached Mkalinso and was also across 
the river, with Cunliffe marching to join him. No mention of the poor weather or 
enormous supply difficulties was made; interestingly, this was to be his last official report 
on operations for another nine days, just prior to his handover of command. His final 
report was broadly positive and noted that the Rufiji south of Kibambawe had been 
cleared and that Hoskins's forces had reached the eastern part of the river from the Kibata 
area. Again, no mention of the weather or other problems was made. 280 
It was now clear to the Germans that the main force at the Ruaha mouth was 
pushing east - during the pause they had detected the preparations for the next British 
move, notably the build-up around Mkalinso. Otto became concerned and telegraphed 
Lettow for instructions, being told that his main task was the protection of the lines of 
communication between Maba and Madaba. In the circumstances, he decided to weaken 
his force along the Rufiji to only two companies, marching himself with four others to 
Mkindu to face the main enemy threat. 
After a clever feint operation, assisted by massed gunfire, l't EA Brigade was able 
to break out of its perimeter in the early hours of 18 January. Kibambawe was cleared 
the next day, the rearguard putting up only light resistance, while Beves's force made 
slow, if unimpeded, progress towards Mpanga's. The Nigerians operating to the south 
had left the Mkalinso crossing site on 17 January and promptly turned out the defenders 
from Mkindu the next day. This left Otto with four companies in Mkindu Sud with one at 
Maba with two further north, falling back from Nyakissiku. 281 
279 CAB 44/6, p. 50; CAB 45/19, Nigeria Regiment Record, p. 11. ' 280 WO 95/5292, War Diary GHQ, 9 January 1917, Appendix 15, Telegram, OA 594, Smuts to CIGS, 9 January. The next telegram 
was 18 January 1917, Appendix 18, Telegram F 6339, Smuts to CIGS, 18 January. 
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However, the advance south across the Rufiji was now stalled; Sheppard had 
increased the size of his bridgehead, but lacked the offensive power to break-out. It was 
also becoming apparent that von Lettow's forces were dinning out of the lower Rufiji area. 
The gap between the western limit of 1" Division's advance near Ngarambi and Beves' 
position at Mpanga's was more than wide enough to permit the escape of the Rufiji force. 
On 20 January, the Nigerian Brigade attacked Otto's positions. Unable to deal with such 
strength, he had planned a fighting withdrawal to new positions further south near 
Mkwembe. Deployed in depth around the important waterholes there, he faced renewed 
attacks on 24 January. Heavy fighting with repeated counter-attacks by both sides 
continued through the next day, with panics by the carriers resulting in the loss of much 
equipment and supplies by the attackers. It was a heavy battle and a fine performance by 
Otto who had held off much superior forces in difficult conditions. 282 
FIGHTING NORTH OF THE LOWER RUFIJI 
The situation north of the lower Rufiji was largely unchanged by the end of 
December 1916. The defenders were estimated to have no more than 800 rifles and 10 
machine guns against the attackers' 1,100 rifles, 7 machine guns and 2 guns. Smuts 
expected the lGC and his scratch force to push the Germans south of the river. Given the 
inadequate resources, an attack on 3 January failed to take Kibesa. 283 Finally, an 
experienced infantry officer was placed in command. An attack on Mkamba on 9 January 
fell on empty positions, as did a second on Kibesa. With only the major post of Kissengire 
left, a flanking march was launched. The main column marched south, linking up with 300 
rifles who had been landed by the navy on the coast on 8 January. This move was eventually 
successful and by 18 January the Germans had been forced out of Kissengire, withdrawing 
across the Rufiji. There was no further opposition since the river was in full flood and all 
boats had been removed to the far bank. The ill-effects of the now heavy rainfall were also 
becoming very apparent, as flooding impeded the march and the sickness rate rose. 284 
211 MSBoell, N14/30,26. Kapitel, pp. 1928-1931. 282 MS Boell, N14/30,26. Kapitcl, pp. 1936-1938. The Germans lost nine killed, 13 wounded and three missing out of some 472 
soldiers, making some 5 per cent of strength. The British had 76 killed, 16 wounded and 15 taken prisoner out of about 1,000 soldiers, 
making some II per cent of strength. 233 CAB 44/6, pp. 85-86. This comprised 129 Germans, 630 Askaris, 10 machine guns and 3 guns. 2" CAB 44/6, pp. 87-91. 
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FIGHTING ON THE KILWA FRONT 
Since the loss of their lodgement on Picquet Hill in mid-December, the Gen-nans 
had remained on the defensive in the Kibata area. Abt Schulz remained in the area with 
four companies and one 10.5cm. gun. Its orders were to mask the movement of the main 
body back to the Ruf1ji and to prevent any follow up by the enemy. 
Smuts was keen for 1" Division to advance towards Utete, but the German 
positions were too strong to assault without artillery, 'which in turn lacked the transport 
needed to reach Kibata. until early January. By year end, I" Division had detected the 
thinning out of the German position, and on 5 January it ordered P EA Brigade to advance 
with the aim of clearing the Mtumbei Hills and linking up with the Nigerian Brigade on the 
Rufiji. 2nd EA Brigade was held back in reserve, partially owing to a severe shortage of 
carriers. 
Using heavy artillery fire and aerial bombardment, the British were able to dislodge 
the now-weakened opposition with a series of limited flanking moves. On 7 January, 
P 
EA Brigade began the clearance of the area around Kibata, followed by subsequent moves 
and minor actions over the next week. Concerned about his flank, von Lettow ordered 
Schulz to hold the area of Mbindia and to conduct a vigorous opposition. 285 
This was not easy in the circumstances, and Schulz continued to fall back slowly, 
destroying the Kbnigsberg gun owing to the lack of ammunition and the utter exhaustion 
of its carriers and crew. The British pressure continued with the capture of a magazine 
and threatening the supplies stockpiled at Pungutini. Now concerned about the situation, 
286 
von Lettow despatched a reinforcing company to Utete. 
'3'MS Boell, N14/30,26. Kapitel, pp. 1941-1942. 2'6 MS Boell, N14/30,26. Kapitel, pp. 1948-1952; WO 95/5292, War Diary GHQ, 7 January 1917, Appendix 11, Telegram OA 567, 
Smuts to CIGS, 7 January-, WO 95/5330, History of 1'12"d KAR, pp. 8-9. 
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His headquarters had moved to Lake Utungi on 7 January with Abt von 
Haxthausen and von Lieberman following behind. After an exhausting march, the 
reinforcements were concentrated at Ungwara, an important depot south of the lake, five 
days later. Immediately on arrival, von Haxthausen was pushed east to defend Ngarambi 
Chini on 13 January to block the enemy advance. It was successfully occupied, but the 
troops ran into the 3 rd EA Brigade at Ngarambi Juu later the same day. 287 The British 
now moved on Ungwara on 17 January, so forcing the deployment of the sole reserve 
company to support von Haxthausen. At the same time, Schulz was encountering severe 
supply difficulties and his reserve rations ran for another four days. 
From the fighting, it was becoming clear that the British were heading for the 
Lake Utungi and Rufiji River. The earlier attack on Kibambawe and north of the river, 
indicated that they were make a large convergent movement. 288 The German supply 
situation in the area was becoming increasingly severe as the area north of the river was 
now lost, with only 7,000 kg of food left in Koge. The main stocks of food, some 
175,000 kg, were in transit around the junction of Mpanganja - Logeloge - Lake Utungi 
and it was vital that they were safely moved south. Apart from the physical difficulties 
in holding the British pincers apart, the supply situation made it imperative to move some 
of the forward forces south of the river. Abt Tafel was ordered south of the Ruf1ji, with 
Ungwara ordered to be evacuated on 12 January. The main body of troops, including Abt 
von Lieberman was concentrated around Lake UWngi. 289 
Further concentration of the Germans around Lake Utungi and Utete was set in 
train on 21 January. At the same time, the I" Division resumed its pressure on Ngarambi 
Juu, while Schulz received further reinforcements. Lack of water forced him to abandon 
Kiwambe on 23 January, despite von Lettow ordering a stiff resistance. The use of KAR 
mounted infantry to destroy ripening crops on 27 and 28 January was another blow to the 
Germans. 290 
2"7 MS Boell, N 14/30,26. Kapitel, pp. 1953-1956. 23$MSBoell, N14/30,26. Kapitel, pp. 1959-60; LettowReminiscences, pp. 174-175. 28') MS Boell, NI4/30,26. Kapitel, p. 1960. 
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The Is' Division continued to press hard, with O'Grady pushed up to the Rufiji, 
capturing Mohoro on 18 January while Hannyngton cleared the country west of the 
Mtumbei Hills, north of Ngarambi. 291 Further west along the river, Utete was taken on 31 
January and the north bank of the Rufiji was clear by the beginning of February. 292 
To the Germans, it appeared that British main effort was in the Kilwa area and 
thatAbt Rothe needed reinforcements from the north. 293 The worsening of the weather 
on 25 January hindered both the attackers and defenders. On 1 February, von 
Haxthausen fell ill and G6ring took command of his Abteilung. The deployment of the 
forces in the east was as follows. Abt Tafel with five companies was in the area of 
Mpanganja along the Rufiji river. Abt G6ring also with five companies was securing 
Ungwara and its approahes. Headquarters was on the Utungi-See with Abt Willman's 
two companies at Nanguwe. Further to the south, holding 2 nd EA Brigade at bay, was 
Abt Rothe with three companies at Mpotora. 294 
The British held the general line Njinjo - Ngarambi Chini - Kiwambe - Utete. 
3 rd EA Brigade occupied the centre with two battalions forward, while 2 nd EA Brigade 
spread its three battalions between Utete and Kibata. The increasing rains had made 
motor supply to the forward areas impossible and two of the bridges over the River 
Matandu were washed away; Hannyngton was forced to move his troops back to Kibata, 
while O'Grady also began to pull back towards Kilwa. 295 The rations for the forward 
troops were of the meagrest. 296 
FIGHTING IN THE WEST 
The plan to draw off German strength through a diversion in the west was bedevilled 
by difficulties before it even started. Van Deventer's lines of conununication back to Kilossa 
2' MS Boell, N14/30,26. Kapitel, pp. 1966-1971. 2" WO 95/5292, War Diary GHQ, 18 January 1917, Appendix 3 1, Telegram F 6339, Smuts to CIGS, 18 January. 
292 WO 95/5292, War Diary GHQ, 31 January 1917, Appendix 63, Telegram OA 27, Genstaff Dutumi to Genstaff, Dar-es-Salaam, 31 
January; WO 106/273, History of 3 KAR, pp. 60-61. 293 MS Boell, N 14/30,26. Kapitel, p. 1986. 2" MS Boell, N14/30,26. Kapitel, pp. 1977-1980. 2" WO 95/5292, War Diary GHQ, 18 February 1917, Appendix D, Telegram GO 687,1' Division to Genstaff, 18 February. 
296 Thatcher, Tenth Baluch Regiment, pp. 169-170. 
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and Dodoma had started disintegrating in mid-December when the Ruaha River had begun 
to flood. By 19 December, the bridge over that river had been washed away and the roads 
were beginning to dissolve into thick mud. With over half his MT fleet continually in 
workshops, food supplies became even more precarious and it was impossible to build up 
any substantive stocks. 297 Any remaining offensive potential was seriously weakened by 
the necessity of placing the troops on half rations from 23 December. Further south, 
General Northey had similar problems and, as early as 13 December, he estimated that only 
45 out of the 350 miles of motor roads were usable. All supplies now had to be carried by 
porter from Lake Nyassa over the Livingstone Mountains before going forward. 298 
Regardless of the determination of the troops, both forces began the operations under 
immense handicaps. 
On the German side, their forces remained spread through an arc based on Mahenge. 
General Wahle, now the Westbefehlshaber, was based there with a single company in 
reserve, while six detachments were deployed to the north and west against the likely British 
lines of approach. Abt Schoenfeld, with 3 companies, was based on Ifakara and faced 
generally north, holding the area between the Ruaha crossing at Kidatu. Abt Lincke, with 
two companies, was deployed in the highlands about 30 miles south-east of Iringa and 
blocking the track from Dabaga to Muhangu. hmediately to his south was Abt Wintgens, 
with four companies and a battery of guns at Makua's. He was centrally positioned and 
poised to reinforce either to the north or south. Next was Abt von Langenn which had four 
companies around Mfirika. Abt Kraut was opposite Northey's main force at Ifinga, some 20 
miles distant. He was actually down in the valley of the Ruhuje River although still above 
the flood plain. Finally, Abt Grawert was deployed opposite Colonel Byron's garrison at 
Songea much farther to the south. 299 
Food stocks were as much a problem as they were for the British. Mahenge was the 
centre of the supply system for the forward troops. However, two disastrously dry years and 
lack of co-ordination meant that this formerly fertile area was unable to maintain these 
2" WO 95/5292, War Diary GHQ, 19 December 1916, Telegram P 32, GOC 2 Div to Genstaff, IS December. 
2" WO 95/5329, War Diary Norforce, 13 December 1916. The mountains reached 9,000 feet in altitude and caused considerable 
sickness and death amongst his porters. 
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forces. 300 This was confirmed by Wahle's order that directed all Ateilungen, other than 
those of Lincke and Schoenfeld, to make the north Songea district the source of their 
rations. 301 This would cause major restrictions on the tactical freedom of the commanders. 
On the British side, the 2 nd Division was a shell of its former self and represented 
nothing like a division's strength. Its mounted troops were almost all without horses and 
were required to act as infantry. The I" SA Mounted Brigade had incorporated the 
remnants of the now-departed 2 nd SA Mounted Brigade as well as its own integral units. 
However, Us still only provided four regiments, each fielding a single mounted troop; 
overall, the total fighting strength of this formation numbered no more than 1,500. As for 
the infantry, the 2 nd SA Infantry Brigade was reduced to two battalions totalling about 800 
soldiers. They were joined by the composite I O'h SAI, the remnants of the disbanded 3 rd SA 
Infantry Brigade, now only 550 strong. Somewhat stronger was an Indian battalion with 
800, as well as a KAR unit with nearly 500 rifles. The artillery was limited to four 13- 
pounders and eight mountain guns, but, owing to the difficult conditions for movement and 
a lack of horses and mules, there were only sufficient animals to move two of the latter. "' 
General van Deventer's pleas having been ignored by Smuts, he now made 
arrangements to fulfil his role. He divided his force into three columns, lettered A to C, with 
approximate strengths of 1,450,1,150 and 790 respectively. He planned a series of flanking 
marches against At Lincke, while Column A under General Nussey leading the mounted 
troops on a southern Rank march and Column C under Colonel Taylor making a similar 
envelopment from the north. The aim was for the flanking columns to converge on 
Muhanga and cut off Lincke on the Magomi Ridge before Column B under General 
Berrangd launched a frontal attack from Dabaga on 25 December. 303 Little was known 
about the terrain to be traversed except that it was mountainous and difficult. 
'" CAB 44n, footnote to p. 4; CAB 45/72, Sketches 74,83 and 84. 
3' Schnee, Deutsch-Ostafrika, p. 274. 3" CAB 44n, p. 30. It was captured by Hawthorn's troops on 5 January 1917. 
302 GSWA, Box 29,18 December 1916, Telegram P 32,2 Div to BGGS, for lack of supplies and strength. 
"3 CAB 44/7, pp. 7-9. A Column had 1450 soldiers and eight machine guns; B Column had 1150 soldiers and eight machine guns; C 
Column had 790 soldiers and eight machine guns and two mountain guns for a grand total of 3,390 soldiers, 24 machine guns and two 
mountain guns; GSWA, Box 29,22 December 1916, Operation Order 24. 
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Good, sunny weather on 20 and 21 December deteriorated into rain as the advance 
began. Column C suffered terribly from the heavy rain and cold, particularly the nearly 
naked carriers brought up from the plains. A combination of sickness and desertion rapidly 
reduced the carrying capacity of the column and all tents and heavy stores had to be left 
behind. The driving rain and slippery conditions soon exhausted the column and on 25 
December, Colonel Taylor with a battalion pushed on alone to Muhanga. A short fight 
drove out the small German detachment there and the road from Dabaga was effectively 
closed. During the day the remainder of the column made its way forward and prepared its 
defences. 304 
On the southern flank, A Column concentrated on the eastern bank of the Little 
Ruaha River. On 22 December, the flanking move was seriously delayed by heavy rain 
with two units unable to arrive there until the next day. After two days of climbing 
mountains and crossing thick swamps, A Column had reached its intermediate objective 
south on the Magomi ridge and prepared to set up its block. Two regiments were ordered to 
press on to the north and east to link up with Taylor's column, with one holding 
Makungwa's and the fourth in reserve. This plan required the whole brigade, not more than 
1,200 strong, to be spread out over a frontage of some 10 miles of the worst country 
possible, with tracks so difficult that passage on foot was almost impossible. 305 
Lack of accurate maps and guides reduced this plan to confusion as the link-up force 
spent much of 25 December in a fruitless march looking for Muhanga, not arriving there 
until the following day. Brigade Headquarters was established on the high ground between 
that place and Makungwa's, but communications were limited to runners owing to the rain. 
By 26 December, the trap appeared to be shut. 306 
In the meantime, the frontal attack planned for Berrangd's B Column was underway 
on 25 December. Despite the lack of guns, which had been delayed by flooding rivers, the 
attack was reasonably successful and the troops dug-in within 250 yards of the German line 
3" CAB 44/7, pp. 12- 14. 
305 CAB 44n, pp. 16-17; GSWA, Box 29,24 December 1916, Telegram D 1484, Brigzar [I SA Mounted Brigade] to 2 Div. The 
brigade commander considered it "almost physically impossible cover distances in time allowed. " 
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with few losses. The next day was spent in an intensive fire-fight between the two forces 
and was followed by a night infiltration, but when patrols went forward early on 27 
December, the trenches were empty, with the defenders having withdrawn to the south- 
east. 307 
Van Deventer had hoped to capture Lincke at Muhanga. Unfortunately for him, the 
German commander chose to escape via the village of Makungwa's, moving towards Abt 
Wintgens. The defenders were now well dug-in, but the shifting of the reserve to Muhanga 
Mission meant that the whole of Lincke's force, still nearly 500 strong, was able to 
concentrate against about a third of A Column. Owing to the weather, the reserve only 
arrived at midday 28 December, by which time they were too tired to launch a night attack 
against an unreconnoitred enemy and waited until the next morning. It was too late, as Abt 
Lincke had hacked a path through the bush and escaped to the SoUth. 308 
Although Muhanga had been captured, Abt Lincke had escaped largely unscathed. 
Orders for a further advance were countermanded as the transport system had nearly 
collapsed under the strain of submerged roads and swollen rivers. By 30 December, 2 nd 
Division had just four days' rations for the European troops and none for the Indians. Either 
a rapid evacuation would took place or starvation would follow. "' Accordingly, van 
Deventer ordered most of his South Africans back to the railway while leaving two 
battalions, one Indian and one African, to hold the line. 310 On 2 January 1917, van Deventer 
informed the Commander-in-Chief of the desperation of his situation and that he was forced 
to abandon the advance through lack of rations. 31 1 This was virtually the last action of that 
formation, for five days later GHQ announced that owing to the supply situation it would be 
withdrawing it to Dodoma as a preliminary to returning van Deventer and his South African 
whites back to the Union. 312 
306 CAB 44n, P. 18; GSWA, Box 29,28 December 1916, Telegram D 1491, Brigzar to 2 Div. 
307 CAB 44n, pp. 14-15. 
"' CAB 44n, P. 19; GSWA, Box 29,28 December 1916, Telegram KT 422, Col Taylor to 2 Div; Telegram [n. ref, ] Col Kirsten to 2 
Div. 
'O'GSWA, Box 29,27 December 1916, Letter ADMS to GOC 2 Div. Over 40 cases of pneumonia had been reported in three days 
and much more was feared. This outbreak was put down to "(I) exposure (2) totally inadequate food. " 3'0 CAB 44n, p. 22. 
311 WO 95/5202, War Diary GHQ, 2 January 1917, Appendix 3, Telegram P71, GOC 2 Div to GHQ, 2 January. 
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Colonel Taylor was left in command of the remaining two battalions and took up 
positions on the high ground opposite Lincke's force. The hinga highland overlooked the 
flooded valleys of the Ulanga valley that stretched for many miles below. As the month ran 
on, decreasing patrol encounters and skirmishes soon made it clear that the enemy had 
begun to thin out their forward positions in this area and were transferring troops to the still 
313 militarily active areas ftirther south. 
HOSKINS ASSUMES COMMAND 
With General Smuts' departure for the Imperial War Conference on 23 January, 
Lieutenant General Hoskins now assumed chief command. Leaving Is' Division in the 
midst of an offensive, he had little choice but to carry on the plans of his predecessor. His 
forces were too widely spread and communications were too poor for him to make major 
changes and in any event the troops were in no condition to do so. He faced the following 
situation. 
In the middle Rufiji, Sheppard's I't EA Brigade and Beves's 2 nd SA Infantry Brigade 
held both banks of the river around Kibambawe while Cunliffe's Nigerian Brigade had 
pushed south and east to Mkindu. On the lower part of the river, Hannyngton, now 
commanding the I't Division, had his 2nd EA Brigade at Mohoro on the edge of the delta, 
with P EA Brigade at Ngarambi on the fringe of the Mtumbei Hills. Both groups were 
trying to link up and trap von Lettow's main body, which was currently located between 
Mkindu in the west and Utete in the east. 314 
In the west, van Deventer's attack had fizzled out several weeks earlier and his 
division was strung out between Muhanga and the Central Railway. Further southwest, 
Northey had cleared the high ground and had driven Kraut east of the Ruhudje River. 
Songea was secure, although a further advance there was temporarily out of the question 
312 WO 95/5292, War Diary GHQ, 7 January 1917, Appendix 11. Telegram OA 567, General Staff CIGS, 7 January. 
"' cAB 44n, pp. 22-23. 
314 Hoskins, Lt Gen A R, Despatchfrom the General Officer Commanding-In-ChiefEast Africa Relating to Operations in East Africa 20* 
January to 31, w May 1917, dated 30 May 1917, published in the London Gazette 'Supplement', No. 30447,27 December 1917, pp. 156-157. 
Henceforth, Hoskins, Despatch. 
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owing to the flooding. Wahle retained strong reserves ftirther east and his position was 
secure for the time being. 
None of this reflected the disastrous supply situation and Smuts's optimism had 
persuaded London that the campaign was in its final stages. After a mere three days in 
command, Hoskins was instructed by the CIGS to reduce his British and Indian forces 
significantly in order to release shipping and manpower resources for other theatres. 315 
Having just come from the front himself, Hoskins knew only too well the exhausted and 
worn-out state of his command. He was dealt a further blow on 25 January when the 
rains struck even harder and the entire area became a swamp. He recognised the 
dangerous state of affairs, as he later stated: 
"But the supply and transport situation was not all satisfactory. There was no 
reserve in the advanced depots; the number of porters was insufficient; the 
animals in transport units were dying and the drivers of the mechanical transport 
were falling sick so rapidly that the numbers of troops in the front line could not 
be maintained there [the Ruf1ji]. ý, 316 
By early February 1917, the end could be put off no further and Hoskins was forced 
to signal Robertson that the offensive was over. 317 In that telegram, he outlined that the 
German supply position was weak but that he simply lacked the transport and means of 
mobility to do anything about it. Northey in the south-west was still able to operate as he 
was on much higher ground, but nonetheless the rainfall there was still substantial. Beaten 
by the weather and the lack of adequate preparations, the campaign would have to wait 
until May. 
3" WO 95/5292, War Diary GHQ, 25 January 1917, Appendix 46a, Repeat of Telegram OA 846, CIGS to Hoskins, 22 January. 3'6 Hoskins, Despatch, p, 157. 317 WO 95/5292, War Diary GHQ, 14 February 1917, Appendices, Telegram OA 261, Hoskins to CIGS, 14 February. 
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OPERATIONS IN THE FAR SOUTH AGAINST THE PORTUGUESE 
Anglo-Portuguese co-operation proved to be more difficult in practice than in 
theory. General Smuts feared the worst of their military abilities and wished the 
Portuguese to do no more than move up to the line of the Rovuma in order to block a 
German withdrawal south, although he later envisaged a limited advance towards 
Liwale. 318 Despite the British intention to control the coastline themselves, and under 
pressure from his own government, General Gil had already decided to march on the 
small coastal port of Mikindani. 319 Seeking revenge for the defeat inflicted by the 
Germans earlier in the year, his troops set out from the port of Palmas on 10 September. 
The news of the British occupation of that place changed his mind and he altered his 
objective to the undefended Kionga Triangle, a parcel of land in the Rovuma delta. This 
was occupied on 19 September and honour was satisfied. He now had the choice of 
advancing over the and and harsh Makonde Plateau, or moving to Newala which lay just 
to the south-west of that upland, or remaining along the north bank of the Rovuma. In 
the end, he chose to maintain his position along the river, just inside German territory. 320 
Although Smuts and the British had a very low opinion of their allies, diplomacy 
forced a degree of dialogue. The Portuguese Government believed, from British sources, 
that the campaign would be over in two to three months and wanted to obtain a 
bargaining chip for the peace negotiations. This, together with Smuts's own 
recommendation, made Gil march inland towards the nodal village of Newala. 321 
However, a rebellion against Portuguese rule broke out along the Zambezi and a number 
of his troops were withdrawn from the southern end of Lake Nyassa. This limited Gil's 
capabilities further, although Smuts expressed the hope that they could be used to deny 
German foraging parties access to the southern part of the German colony. 322 
31"W033/858, Telegrams D 1, No 1262,26 September 1916, Telegram X757, Smuts to CIGS, p. 337. 311 Cann, John, "Mozambique and German East Africa7, pp. 131-132. 320 Hordem, Military Operations East Africa, pp. 390-39 1. 311 Ptlissier, Naissance de Mozambique, 11, p. 692; Cann, "Mozambique", p. 133. 322 WO 95/5292, War Diary GHQ, 22 October 1916, Entry Portuguese Force. 
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This activity caused the Germans a degree of alarm as the Portuguese posed a 
potential threat to their southern food-growing areas. While they too had a low opinion 
of their fighting abilities, the sheer lack of military resources in the region was worrying. 
Captain Looff, the newly appointed SadsbefehIshaber, had only meagre forces, consisting 
mainly of three companies of young recruits. As this force was also responsible for the 
containment of the British enclave at Lindi, it was clear that reinforcements were necessary. 
Assessing the situation, von Lettow decided to send him 4bt Rothe consisting of two 
companies and a K6nigsberg gun, and instructions to deal the Portuguese a strong blow. 323 
While these reinforcements were marching south, the Portuguese launched a 
probe towards Newala in mid-October. This was blocked, but a renewed attack forced 
the weak defenders out and Gil had reached his objective. German security was also 
threatened by an uprising of the African population of the nearby Makonde Plateau. 
Looff was now under orders first to eliminate the Portuguese and second to 
restore colonial authority on the plateau. As soon as Abt Rothe reached Lindi, it was sent 
out to attack the Portuguese at Newala. His small detachment of 50 Germans and 300 
Askaris faced nearly 800 Portuguese, who were dug in at Newala, as well as another 750 
holding Kivambo. Rothe reached Newala on 19 November and, after a few days in 
reconnaissance, he surrounded the garrison on 23 November, cutting off the vital water 
supply. Despite their superiority of numbers, the Portuguese remained besieged for five 
more days, when they decided a break out was essential. This took place on 28 
November and a disorganised force made its way south to the Rovuma, losing four 
mountain guns, seven machine guns and a large quantity of supplies. 324 
While not a complete rout, the retreat was humiliating and all of the earlier 
territorial gains were lost within two days. Captain Looff followed up in due course and 
eliminated all Portuguese posts north of the Rovuma; indeed, using his K6n! gsberg guns, 
he shelled the border post at Nangade on I December, causing a major panic and 
abandonment of the position. Gil himself was unwell, and lost his nerve completely, 
323 Lettow, Reminiscences, pp. 165-166. 
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claiming that some 2,000 Germans had concentrated around Massassi before attacking 
Newala. 325 Ironically, the British had sent a warning several days beforehand, that Abt 
Rothe, comprising one or two companies, was about to attack Newala, but word either 
never got through or was disregarded. 326 
Having Red in disorder south of the Rovuma, rumours then abounded that the 
Germans were advancing on Palma. This was completely groundless as Looff s troops 
remained some 60 miles to the north, unwilling to be trapped by the now rising waters of 
the Rovuma. 327 Nevertheless, a British warship and a marine detachment were diverted 
from their blockade duties to reassure their allies. After these panics, any remaining 
Portuguese credibility was destroyed. Considering that a well-armed and equipped force 
of nearly 2,000 had been overwhelmed by less than 400 Germans, Smuts now sought the 
War Office's permission to help defend PEA if required. 328 Although a sensible 
precaution, the combination of offensive operations and the coming monsoon meant that 
activity died down on the southern front. By mid-December, the British ship had 
returned to its normal duties and, 4bt Rothe had moved back to Mpotora. 329 
324 Pdlissier, Naissance de Mozambique, II, pp. 692 -693. 325 WO 95/5292, War Diary GHQ, 5 December 1916, Entry Portuguese Force. 
326 WO 95/5292. War Diary GHQ, 7 December 1916, Entry Portuguese Force. Smuts noted "Above proves how little reliance must 
be placed on fighting efficiency of GILS army as he grossly over estimates enemy force. " '27 P61issier, Naissance de Mozambique, IL pp. 693-694. 328 WO 95/5292, War Diary GHQ, 12 December 1916, Appendix 17, Telegram OA 267, Smuts to War Office, II December. 
329 WO 95/5292, War Diary GHQ, 14 December 1916, Appendix 21, Telegram F 6187, Smuts to CIGS, 14 December; Lettow, 
Reminiscences, p. 166. 
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CHAPTER 4 
REORGANISATION AND THE OPERATIONS OF JANUARY - MAY 1917 
STRATEGY OF THE SECOND COALITION GOVERNMENT 
As General Smuts had been making the final preparations for his offensive, greater 
political events were underway in London. December had witnessed a major crisis in the 
British government that had resulted in the fall of the Asquith administration. Although 
long-standing in cause, it had been precipitated by violent disagreement over conscription, 
Ireland and the conduct of the war. 330 The result was a new coalition, under David Lloyd 
George, who quickly instituted a smaller and more vigorous War Cabinet to direct the policy 
of the war. 331 
The new government retained its predecessor's broad strategic goals of retaining 
Britain's status as a great power together with enhanced security at the end of the war. More 
than anything else it realised the need for continued public support if these ambitious aims 
were to be achieved. This meant achieving real victories, not the bloody and inconclusive 
fighting that the Western Front seemed to offer. In practical terms, this led Lloyd George 
and others to support operations on the strategic periphery that offered a chance of success 
and hence a real boost to public morale. 332 While East Affica ranked some way below Italy, 
Palestine and Mesopotamia in order of strategic importance, it did show considerable 
promise as the EAEF seemed on the verge of victory. 
From a political viewpoint, Smuts had conducted a rare campaign of genius 
advancing more in a day than the BEF had managed in months. Apart from capturing large 
swathes of enemy territory and the major centres of population, he appeared to be a daring 
and decisive leader. 333 This impression had been reinforced by Smuts's own upbeat 
330 Turner, British Politics, pp. 112-116. 33 1 Turner, British Politics, p. 153; French, Lloyd George Coalition, p. 17. 332 French, Lloyd George Coalition, pp. 6-7. 333 Riddell, Lord, Lord Riddell's War Dimy, 1914-1918, London: Ivor Nicholson & Watson, 1933, Entry 19 March 1917, p. 166. 
"... particularly Smuts, of whom L. O. spoke very highly. He said that Asquith held a very moderate opinion of Smuts at the time of 
the South African War. Asquith did not appreciate what a remarkable man he was"; MS Long, 947/547.29 March 1917, Letter Derby 
to Long; MS Long, 947/602, It May 1917, Letter Buxton to Long; Roskill, Hankey, p. 388; Hughes, British Stratev in the Middle 
East, p. 24. Lord Derby was so impressed with Smuts that he wanted to offer him a high command in France but was dissuaded on 
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communiquds that emphasized his successes and gave little hint that the achievements had 
been attained at a huge cost in disease and suffering. 
Although his fmal offensive can only be described as a military failure, it was not 
initially viewed as such in London. On the surface, it appeared to have driven the Germans 
into an increasingly tight position, trapped in the wild and undeveloped centre of their 
colony by converging forces from all sides. In reality, this effort represented the last gasp 
of an exhausted and gravely weakened EAEF that was incapable of ftirther offensive efforts 
without both substantial rest and reinforcement. However, this would not begin to emerge 
until Hoskins began to pick up the many pieces. 
This unsatisfactory situation was worsened by Botha's and Smuts's public 
pronouncements that the campaign was more or less finished with only mopping up left. 334 
In fact, nothing could have been further from the truth as the Gerinans had yet to be 
defeated in a defensive battle and they had plenty of fight left in them. The damage from 
Smuts's untrue assertions was to be considerable, as to politicians and senior generals, it 
appeared that East Africa could be removed from the list of theatres requiring resources and 
manpower. 335 Unfortunately, these were precisely what Hoskins required if the fighting 
was truly to be brought to a successful end. It also caused a great deal of anger and dismay 
amongst his former troops and many South Africans. 336 
It seems that Smuts was aware that the campaign had not gone as smoothly as 
publicly presented. In many ways, the summons to the Imperial Conference was a 
the grounds that he could not be spared from South African service. The War Cabinet had subsequently offered him command of the 
forces in Egypt and Palestine before Allenby, but that too had been declined. 
334 WO 33/858, Telegrams D 1, No. 1313,17 October 1917, Telegram D 280/1973, General Botha to War Office, p. 355; Fendall, The 
East African Force, pp. 87-88; CAB 44/9, p. 13, cites telegram Hoskins to CIGS 4 May 1917. It quotes a speech in Pretoria on 26 
January 1917 in a Times article of 29 January. Smuts is also quoted as saying on 12 March 1917 "The campaign in German East 
Africa may said to be over. What is delaying the absolute end is the fact that March and April are the heavy rainy season. After April 
the Germans will have to surrender or go into Portuguese territory. They cannot hold out in East Africa, and the Portuguese are quite 
prepared to deal with them. The German Governor and his staff, the Commiander-in-Chieý and other officers are still doing their best 
to keep things going, but it is merely the remnant of an army that is left, and not a formidable fighting force". ... WO 33/858, Telegrams D 1, No. 1516,20 January 1917, Telegram 28209, CIGS to Hoskins, p. 419. This telegram specified 
considerable reductions in East Africa, largely based on the information provided by General Smuts; CO 691/19, Pike, Surg-Gen WW 
and Balfour, Col Andrew, Report ofMedical & Sanitary Matters in German East A#ica 1917, Nairobi: Swift Press, 1918, p. 6. 
Henceforth, Pike Report. 
316 MS Long, 947/545,22 April 1917, Letter Sir Charles Crewe to Long; WO 95/5329, War Diary Norforce, Entry 28 February 1917; 
Downes, With the Nigerians, p. 267. 
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convenient and honourable escape from East Africa. 337 Smuts himself felt it necessary to 
draft a press statement, justifying his recall in terms of a military success: 
"... The military situation in East Africa, is fortunately, such as to make a change in 
command, and some reorganisation comparatively simple, and indeed the steps that 
are now contemplated in consequence of the sudden demand for General Smuts' 
services elsewhere are those which would have been taken in any case very 
shortly ... His [enemy] forces in consequence of casualties and 
desertion are much 
reduced in strength arid morale"338 
BRITISH REORGANISATION 
The failure of the late offensive left Hoskins in a very difficult position, both on the 
ground and in dealing with London. While the rains had forced a pause in operations, 
giving a respite for rest and recuperation, they also increased the pressure on the medical 
and transport systems. The health of the troops deteriorated even more rapidly, while the 
transport network dissolved into mud or was submerged under water. Drastic action was 
required to avoid a disaster, as he faced three distinct, but related problems. The first and 
most pressing was the need to reduce the numbers of the troops in the forward areas to 
levels that could be physically sustained while concurrently stemming the rising losses 
caused by disease and ill-health. In short, he had to maintain his army in being. 
The second challenge was then to rest and reorganise the entire force so that it was 
strong enough to resume the offensive in the next dry season. This included a complete 
overhaul of the supply, transport and medical services together with full replacement of 
previous losses. Hoskins also recognised that far-reaching changes in the system of 
$37 WO 33/858, Telegrams D 1, No. 1313,17 October 1916, Telegram 280/1973, General Botha to War Off ice, p. 355. ".. -The 
progress of the East African campaign to its inevitable end is continuing satisfactorily though, as was expected, the campaign has 
arrived at a stage at which time is necessary to effect certain regrouping and redistribution of forces"; MS Smuts, Box 100,17 
January 1917, Letter Buxton to Mrs Smuts; "But to do this [hand-over command] voluntarily and without any obvious moment or 
reason was not easy, nor perhaps expedient and might possibly have given rise to some (quite unjustified) criticism. But this 'call' to 
England disposes absolutely and complimentarily of any possible criticisms on that score". 338 WO 33/858, Telegrams D 1, No. 1500,11 January 1917, Telegram X 1182, Smuts to Secretary of State for War, p. 412. In his 
private preamble to the statement Smuts also states "I submit for consideration following draft of statement for Press in connection 
with my retirement, as it should be made clear that military results which has been accomplished here justify the change in command. " 
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command and control, both tactical and administrative, were essential as most of the 
previous year's failures were linked to deficiencies in this area. "' 
The third, and from London's point of view the most important, question was the 
need to devise and put into place a strategy that would wrap up the campaign as quickly as 
possible in 1917. This called for a decisive and well-executed plan based on sufficient 
numbers of fit and well supplied troops. Hoskins understood this very clearly, but it could 
only be achieved once the first two objectives had been achieved and neither was attainable 
in the short term. 
The situation was not helped by one of the wettest seasons known in East Africa for 
many years. If December and early January had been bad, the seasonal monsoon would 
make things unimaginably worse. Roads everywhere ceased to exist and porters were often 
the only alternative, sometimes having to wade through waist-deep water for miles. As the 
wet season progressed, the water rose everywhere in the Rufiji-Ulanga-Ruaha basin. For 
example, a level gauge had been established on the normal dry season high water mark at 
Kibambawe on the River Ruf1ji. By I April, the river was 147 inches (12.3 feet) over the 
mark, nine days later the excess had risen to 175 inches (14.4 feet), with the peak of 201 
inches (16.8 feet) being reached on 14 April. Thereafter, the level stayed around 180 
inches (15 feet) above the gauge until the end of the month, when it again peaked at 201 
inches before diminishing in May. Considering that the valleys were generally broad and 
shallow, the volume of extra water was simply enormous. 340 
Further west, the Dodoma-Iringa line of communications crossed the Great Ruaha 
River by an easy ford in dry weather. During the wet season, there was not just a flooded 
river to cross but a swamp six feet deep and six miles beyond either bank. Elsewhere 
Kilwa and the lower Rufiji suffered heavily from flooding and raging torrents. Only in 
the Iringa highlands, so far above the river basins, was movement possible, but even then 
it was made very difficult by the heavy rain and the loss of most roads. Everywhere, 
sickness levels escalated rapidly, with malaria being particularly acute for Europeans 
3'9 WO 95/5292, War Diary GHQ, 24 February 1917, Entry P Division. 
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while Africans suffered more from dysentery and pneurnonia. Animals could only 
survive a few weeks and their condition deteriorated badly before death. 341 In the 
circumstances, there was no escape from the misery for either side. 
THE REDUCTION IN FORWARD FORCES 
The problem of reducing the forward forces to a manageable level was Hoskins's 
first priority. Once 2 nd Division had ground to a halt in early January owing to lack of food 
and ill health, it had been withdrawn to the Central Railway and disbandment commenced 
on 13 January. 342 In its place was a small two-battalion column of Indians and KAR under 
Colonel Taylor. 343 
The thinning out of the forward areas began in earnest on 14 February. 344 1 st 
Division had pulled its two brigades back, with the 2 nd EA Brigade ordered from Kitambi 
back to Kibata by 19 February and 3 rd EA Brigade also drawn back to the Ngarambi- 
Namatewa area. 345 The 0 EA Brigade, however, retained the unpleasant task of holding 
the Ruf1ji line until the now complete Nigerian Brigade could move forward to relieve it. 
The commander-in-chief still retained hope that the main supply route between Mikesse 
and the Rufiji would remain in reasonable condition throughout the rainy season, otherwise 
the forward positions would be untenable. In the west, the planned concentration of 
Norforce around Lupembe and Songea was taking place, but was soon to be disrupted by 
the appearance ofAbt Wintgens. 346 
The Germans were also forced to make a number of changes to their dispositions. 
On the middle Rufiji, the forward troops were thinned out considerably, leaving only 
major concentrations opposite the Nigerian Brigade at Mkindu and at Utenge. Even then, 
conditions were dangerous; the British took the surrender of a hospital containing 200 
30 WO 95/ 5293, War Diary GHQ, Entries 1-30 April 1917. 
34 1 Hoskins Despatch, p. 159. 
'2 WO 95/5292, War Diary GHQ, 2 January 1917, Appendix 3, Telegram P71, GOC Div to BGGS, 2 January; War Diary GHQ, 13 
January 1917, Entry 2"d Division. 
343 WO 95/5292, War Diary GHQ, 26 February 1917, Entry Nyasaland Force. 2nd Division had left only the 17, h Infantry and the 
I"A"' KAR at Iringa under the command of Colonel Taylor. 30 WO 95/5292, War Diary GHQ, 14 February 1917, Appendix of Communiques, Telegram OA 261, Hoskins to CIGS, 14 February. 
345 CAB 44/9, p. 17. 
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soldiers that had been cut off by the rising waters and were threatened with either 
starvation or drowning. In the west, the rise of the Ulanga River forced an evacuation of 
the west bank and a climb to drier ground. Sickness there was tremendous; Abt 
Braunschweig reported that over 75 per cent of the Europeans were unfit for duty. 
347 On 
the lower Rufiji, life was equally miserable. 
Although these reductions prevented starvation, conditions remained deplorable. 
Rations remained grossly insufficient owing to a severe lack of transport. For example, 
the Nigerian Brigade was put on half rations on 30 January as all of their porters were 
required to keep the lines of communication open. This rendered the brigade virtually 
immobile and dependent on the vulnerable lifeline to the north. Remaining in the area into 
early February, its sick rate duly mounted, aggravated by the paucity of rations. This was 
reflected in the casualties from disease; the Brigade had 28 officers and 500 men unfit for 
duty, or approximately 22 per cent of the officers and 21 per cent of the African ranks that 
had started at the end of December. "' These sufferings were not unique to the Nigerian 
Brigade, as others endured similar shortages. The Gold Coast Regiment, serving in I" 
Division and stationed south of Utete, had the misfortune not only to be on half rations for 
most of the period January-February, but also a great deal of the supplies that arrived had 
rotted and were unfit for human consumption. Many of the soldiers were very emaciated 
and 80 had to be hospitalised for starvation. 349 
Despite a brief improvement in the food situation in early March, it was decided to 
withdraw the remainder of I" EA Brigade for rest and recuperation. This left only the 
Nigerian Brigade along the middle Rufiji position, and by 17 March it held a line of nearly 
50 miles, running from Nyangandu to Nyakisiku. However, the Rufiji continued to rise 
and the supply situation worsened appreciably. From 28 March to 1 May all ranks were on 
half rations, supplemented only by shooting of game. However, even this source became 
depleted through flooding and constant depredations by hungry soldiers. To cap things off, 
346 WO 9515292, War Diary GHQ, 22 February 1917, Appendix of Communiques, Telegram G218, Hoskins to CIGS, 22 February. 
347 Boell, Die Operationen, p. 253. 348 CAB 45/19, Nigeria Regiment Record, pp. 3 and 18. The brigade started with 125 British Officers, 70 British NCOs and 2402 African 
NCOs and privates, WO 106/273, History of3 KAR, p. 55.3 KAR had been on half rations from leaving Mbuyuni on 22 May until 18 
September 1916. 
349 Clifford, Vie Gold Coast Regiment, pp. 68-69. 
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the flying bridge was swept away and the entire force was cut off for three complete 
days. 350 
Finally, despite all human efforts, on 8 April the Nigerian Brigade was compelled 
to send half its troops back to the railway line owing to lack of food and clothing. General 
Cunliffe's words underlined the need for more of everything: 
"... lack of supplies in addition to nullifying all possible military initiative is 
gradually sapping stamina of officers and men who by transfer to healthier 
051 
conditions would return recuperated for eventual advance. 
By mid-April, the food situation was getting worse even with half the brigade back 
to Morogoro. The returning units were so weakened with hunger that during the 10 day 
march to Mikesse, large numbers fell out, incapable of completing the trek. The road was a 
loose description as in many places it was waist deep in water, and littered with the bodies 
of dead animals and even porters as well as broken down vehicles and carts. It was a 
depressing sight - even the patrols had to be conducted in canoes. Finally, in mid-May the 
rains began to abate and the supply situation improved slowly, although active operations 
would not be possible until the Mikesse Road had been made fit for use by MT. 352 
REST AND REORGANISATION 
The worn-out and weakened forward troops required much more than simple 
withdrawal to the Central Railway, itself far from healthy or comfortable. They needed 
complete rest in a dry climate with a proper diet and replacement of their ragged uniforms. 
This system had already been instigated in early 1916, when a British battalion had been 
sent to South Africa in an attempt to restore its health and fighting efficiency. One of the 
assumptions behind the evacuation of most of the South Africans was that a smaller, fitter 
contingent would return after appropriate rest and recovery. To this end, General Hoskins 
3" CAB 45/19, Nigeria Regiment Record, p. 19. 351 WO 95/5293, War Diary GHQ, 8 April 1917, Appendix 66, Telegram N 715, General Cunliffe to BGGS, 8 April. 
352 CAB 45/19, Nigeria Regiment Record, p. 20-22. 
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was counting on seeing three SAI battalions back in time for the next offensive. Another 
British unit was then sent to South Africa for recovery, while the four longest serving 
Indian units were rotated to India in exchange for fresh units as shipping became available. 
Obtaining and maintaining sufficient fit soldiers was always one of the biggest 
problems facing the EAEF. Matters were worsened by the dramatic reduction in infantry 
manpower that began with the repatriations of October 1916. By the end of December, the 
loss of nearly 12,000 South Africans had only been partially offset by the arrival of the 
Nigerian Brigade, some 4,500 strong. On the other hand, the indigenous King's African 
Rifles had proven their effectiveness in battle as well their resistance to disease, but with 
only eight battalions, two of them brand new, they were too small a force to be decisive at 
the operational level. Although an expansion programme had been agreed some months 
before, the recruiting, equipping and training of these new units would take many months. 
Hoskins took a particular interest in the KAR, but his efforts were hampered by the lack of 
suitably trained personnel, while it was particularly difficult to get British officers and 
NCOs who could actually speak the local languages. 353 
The CIGS's unexpected order to withdraw eight infantry battalions on top of the 
departing South Africans, as well as five artillery batteries, three armoured car batteries, the 
RFC squadron and various smaller units to join the forces in Egypt was a major blow. 354 
The loss of these units seriously weakened Hoskins's offensive capability and would 
impede plans to wind up the campaign in 1917. Hoskins replied the same day, citing that 
the already planned loss of 3,500 infantry from 2 nd Division plus the 4,000 extras required 
from his other formations would reduce his numbers to below the bare minimum needed to 
conduct operations. In its stead, he offered to release his South African field batteries in 
return for the retention of two Indian infantry battalions, the net decrease being reduced 
from 7,500 to 6,1 00.355 Robertson was quickly won over and on 25 January agreed to let 
Hoskins keep as many troops as he considered essential to fight the campaign. Indeed, it 
353 Hoskins, Despatch, p 163; Moyse-BartlM King's African Rifles, p. 70 1. On I July 1916, the regiment was over 8,000 strong; six months 
later on I January 1917, it numbered over 15,000. 354 WO 33/858, Telegrams D 1, No. 1516,20 January 1917, Telegram 28209, CIGS to Hoskins, p. 419 gives the reductions; WO 
95/5292, War Diary GHQ, 25 January 1917, Appendix 46a, Telegram OA 846, Hoskins to General Ewart, 22 January, gives 
Hoskins's response. 
355 WO 95/5292, War Diary GHQ, 25 January 1917, Appendix 46b, Telegram OA 847, Hoskins to CIGS, 22 January, 
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was the reduction in shipping rather than an urgent need for reinforcements in the Middle 
East that inspired the transfers. 
It emerged that one of the reasons for the scale of the reductions was that London 
believed that the Germans were considerably weaker than did Hoskins. The War Office 
estimated that von Lettow had a maximum of 600 whites and 6,000 askaris lacking either 
organised bases or communications. 356 This was countered by Hoskins's assertion that the 
Germans actually had about 1,500 whites, of whom 1,150 were considered effective, 
together with some 7,300 askaris, making a total of 8,450 - the difference was 1850 men or 
28 per cent more than the War Office estimate. Ammunition was plentiful, although food 
was in short supply especially following the loss of Mohoro and Utete. However, the 
357 
districts of Lindi, Rovuma and Mahenge all promised to yield good levels of food. 
Although London accepted the larger figure and the misunderstanding seems to have arisen 
from Smuts's own over-optimistic reports of only 6-7000 remaining effectives, it was not 
an auspicious start. 358 
Robertson calculated that with the re-entry of the Belgians into the campaign, the 
rotation of worn-out Indian Army units, and the return of units recuperating in South 
Africa, Hoskins would have a significant advantage over the Germans, with some 50,000 
troops to counter 8 '000.359 This was 
followed several days later by confirmation of 
renewed South African support in the form of two newly raised infantry battalions, plus 
replacements for the MT and other specialist units. 360 These were welcome additions, 
although most of the soldiers would be new recruits. Furthermore, Hoskins disputed the 
figures and placed his "effective" infantry currently at 16,000, with the rotation of tired 
units and the new South Africans adding another 3,700 and the Belgians a further 3,000. 
He calculated his effectives at being 23,000, of whom at least 20 per cent would be unable 
356 WO 95/5292, War Diary GHQ, 25 January 1917, Appendix 46a. Telegram OA 846, Hoskins to General Ewart, 22 January. 
357 WO 95/5292, War Diary GHQ, 27 January 1917, Appendix 54, Telegram OA 936, Genstaff to CIGS, 27 January. 
338 Meinertzhagen, Army Diary, p. 193, diary entry for 20 July 1916. As far back as July 1916, Meinertzhagen was noting that Smuts 
believed the Germans to be weaker than his Intelligence estimates and that the Askaris had lost their morale. This trait appears to have 
coloured his reports to CIGS. 
359 WO 95/5293, War Diary GHQ, 19 April 1917, Appendix A120, Telegram 32999, CIGS to Hoskins, IS April. 
360 WO 95/5293, War Diary GHQ, 28 April 1917, Appendix A200, Telegram H 3875, CSO Pretoria to Hoskins, 27 April. 
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to participate owing to sickness. The new KAR battalions promised to bring another 2,500 
men, but the quality of these units would be low for many months to come. 361 
SUPPLY AND TRANSPORT 
Smuts's failure adequately to consider supply and transport when making his 
operational plans had led to many of the problems that Hoskins was now trying to resolve. 
The first and most obvious weakness had been the failure to brief or consult his 
administrative staff; as a divisional commander, Hoskins had seen and experienced the 
limitations of GHQ's planning. However, on his assuming the chief command, formal 
evidence of the problem was supplied in a memorandum by the Director of Supply and 
Transport to the principal administrative officer. It was an indirect, but withering, critique 
of Smuts's methods as it depicted the gap between the staff branches: 
"Without any desire to critisize [sic] the methods of direction of the [campaign], the 
first difficulty I as D. of T. had to contend with was the absence of information as to 
the plans of operations, which should normally in my opinion be conveyed in 
sufficient time to allow of preparation of reserves in animal and mechanical 
transport. 
Had this information been available to me, some opportunity would have 
been afforded to point out most of the salient transport difficulties regarding these 
plans and to suggest to you means of meeting such difficulties where they could be 
overcome. 
Speaking generally of the conduct of the campaign, I must with due 
deference insist that from a transport point of view my resources were overstrained 
from the fact that long advances were carried out without halts at suitable intervals 
in order to allow transport to catch with the troops and enable supplies to be 
accumulated before the next move forward [author's footnote: Two halts were 
361 WO 95/5293, War Diary GHQ, 27 April 1917, Appendix B21, Telegram G 165, Hoskins to CIGS, 27 April. 
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promised, one at Same and one on the Central Railway, which never were 
given]. ý9362 
The reasons for short feeding were due to beginning the advance without any 
transport reserves, the continual and unexpected changes in forward troop strengths, new 
units arriving without any integral transport, and the long lead-time for replacement 
vehicles. The note ended with a plaintive plea: 
"... Finally that an opportunity be given to all Administrative Services to discuss the 
proposals of the General Staff. 063 
For a commander of the right temperament and training, the problem of co- 
ordination was relatively easy to solve. However, the resolution of supply and transport 
difficulties posed much more of a challenge. Food, ammunition and equipment could 
generally be shipped to the sea ports of Dar-es-Salaam, Mombasa and Kilwa without major 
problems; it was moving them to the forward troops in a timely and efficient manner that 
had proven to be such a nightmare. 
Ports were a major bottleneck and it took time to clear Dar-es-Salaarn harbour of 
the sunken floating dock and scuttled ships. In the meantime, an engineer company was 
employed full-time on the building of wharves and installing steam cranes for the 
unloading of ships there. 364 Furthermore, as the expeditionary force's main base, it 
required the construction of extensive vehicle workshops and storage facilities. Further 
south, Kilwa had an excellent natural anchorage, but ships were unable to come close to 
shore and unloading had to be carried out with lighters. It was almost totally undeveloped 
when the British occupied it in September and a great deal of further development was 
required there. Finally, Lindi which was destined to take on a key role in 1917, had only 
362 WO 95/5293, War Diary GHQ, April 1917. The War Diary enclosed "Printed Notes from War Diaries, Part CCLXXXV, EAEF 
Force "B", General Staff, Army Headquarters, India, April 1917, Confidential Print ofKey Extractsfor Army Departments. See 
Director Supply and Transport, East African Force, 18 to 31 January 1917, Appendix A to DA&QMG, General Headquarters, No. ST 
34 dated 18 January 1917, p. 15. Although not addressed to Hoskins personally, the existence of a printed note by Army Headquarters 
India, and subsequently circulated to all staff branches means that it would have almost certainly come to his attention. Given the 
embarrassing nature of ale contents, it seems unlikely to have been reprinted without his permission. '63 WO 95/5292, War Diary GHQ, April 1917, Confidential Print ofKey Extractsfor Army Departments, p. 16. 3" Woodhouse, Capt H L, "Notes on Railway Work in East Africa, 1914 - 1918", The Royal Engineers Journal, XXK (1923), pp. 
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the most basic dock facilities which would require significant enhancement in the coming 
months. The main problems faced by Hoskins were a shortage of trained technical troops 
and the time between ordering and receiving the necessary machinery and materials to 
East Africa. 
The most efficient means of moving personnel and stores forward remained the 
Central Railway. German demolitions had been makeshift and were not particularly 
difficult to overcome, but they did take time to repair. Despite Smuts's claims that it would 
take only a couple of weeks to restore operations, it took the in-theatre railway battalion 
two months of flat-out work just to restore the line to a basic level of function between the 
coast and Tabora. The destruction of locomotives and rolling stock was another major 
handicap that was solved by resourcefulness and improvisation. Engineers first opened the 
tracks to hand-operated trolleys followed by 30 hundredweight lorries mounted on railway 
wheels. However, the first such motor tractor arriving in Dodoma only on 6 October and 
this service could only meet a fraction of the daily requirements, let alone build up 
reserves. It was not until early December before a full service of locomotives drawing 
railway freight cars could be restored. 
Hoskins had attempted to use the Rufiji to move supplies and the navy conducted a 
survey in late January. 365 An innovative attempt to off-load supplies from ships to motor 
boats was defeated by the strength of the flooding river's current which simply outmatched 
the power of the small engines. This meant that the maintenance of troops in the area 
would have to rely on less efficient means. 366 
The biggest challenge was to create an effective transport system forward of the 
ports and railheads. The traditional animal transport (AT) system was not a feasible option 
as the mortality of horses and other draught animals had already been proven. However, 
despite these major limitations, it still represented a large proportion of the overall effort, if 
only because of lack of alternatives. The best solution was clearly the developing system 
42-44. 
'63 WO 95/5292, War Diary GHQ, 22 January 1917, Appendix 38, Telegram OA 835, Hoskins to CIGS, 21 January. 
'" WO 95/5292, War Diary GHQ, 27 January 1917, Appendix 52, Telegram OA 947, Hoskins to CIGS, 27 January, 
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of MT; in one day a single Ford car of 300 lbs cargo capacity could match the efforts of 
300 carriers. However, the almost complete lack of roads in the southern part of the colony 
coupled with insufficient numbers of vehicles and their vulnerability to bad weather 
precluded MT from becoming the main form of transport. This meant that considerable 
reliance on human transport would be essential particularly in areas of difficult terrain or 
where roads had not yet been constructed. 
Hoskins and his staff put considerable effort into calculating the minimum levels of 
transport resources required to support an offensive. The numbers were huge; plans 
worked out in February called for 160,000 carriers together with provision of 16,000 
replacements per month. By mid-1916, the neglect and poor working conditions had made 
service in the Carrier Corps extremely unattractive regardless of the rates of pay, and 
recruiting was becoming very difficult. Even with coercion and the subsequent passing of 
a Compulsory Service Act in March 1917, in which the mass conscription of Africans for 
carrier or labour service was authorised, it was impossible to reach anything like the levels 
required. Special appeals were sent to the various colonial governments for more African 
manpower, but the pool of healthy labour was insufficient. "' 
The Commander-in-Chief launched his first plea for help on 6 February with 
368 
requests to the Governors of Uganda and Nigeria for 5,000 additional carriers each. The 
Governor of British East Africa was also approached and demurred on the need to sustain 
recruiting. 369 Both territories were heavily pressed, but, caught between the need to 
support the war effort and the anxiety to prevent a popular revolt, by July 1917 they had 
only supplied 67,799 and 10,934 men respectively. Even West Africa was approached for 
some 5,000 carriers, which were eventually provided . 
370 The Belgians and Portuguese 
came under considerable pressure to open up their colonies to British recruiters, but these 
efforts came to little. 
367 Hodges, 77ie Carrier Corps, pp. 99-102; Hodges, "Military Labour in East Africa7, in Page, Melvin (ed), Africa and the First 
World War, London: Macmillan Press, 1987, p. 139. 36' WO 95/5292, War Diary GHQ, 6 February 1917, Appendix A, Telegram OA 109, Hoskins to Genstaff covering OA 56 Hoskins to 
Governor Uganda, 5 February; WO 95/5292, War Diary GHQ, 6 February 1917, Appendix B, Telegram OA 110, Hoskins to Genstaff 
covering OA 54 Hoskins to Governor Nigeria, 5 February. 
369 WO 95/5292, War Diary GHQ, 9 February 1917, Appendix D. Telegram Governor, Nairobi to Hoskins, 9 February covering 
Telegram Governor, Nigeria to Hoskins. 
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Carriers, although important, were far from the only demand on civil manpower. 
The existing lines of communication had to be maintained, new roads had to be cut and 
improved, while defensive positions and camps had to be built along their length. Ports 
and bases needed labourers, while many worked as personal servants to the military and 
civil adminstrations. 371 In a region that had already provided large numbers of soldiers 
followed by regular trawls for labourers and carriers, first by the Germans and now by the 
British, the pool of manpower had begun to run dry. 
Realising the urgency of his requirements, General Hoskins bombarded the War 
Office with requests for more materiel and specialist manpower. Despite its lack of 
strategic importance, Robertson did his best to remedy the deficiencies in transport, 
armaments and personnel. By early April, a total of 484 light lorries from British sources 
together with 607 drivers and artificers were underway at sea while a fin-ther 563 men 
awaited berths. Included with these drafts were an additional 300 signals personnel, 400 
Lewis guns, twelve of the new 2.75" mountain gun, and twenty Stokes mortars. 372 Perhaps 
tiny by Western Front standards, these shipments added substantially to East Africa's 
technical resources. 
MEDICINE 
The medical services had been in a poor state of organisation prior to the advance 
south from Morogoro. Despite the overwhelming importance of health in the campaign, 
the General Staff failed to appreciate the need to treat and evacuate casualties. 
Unfortunately, the principal defects of insufficient transport, lack of considered planning, 
and non-existent briefings to the staffs and units concerned remained uncorrected. 373 One 
Journal ofAfrican Studies, XIII, No. 1, (1979), pp. 8-11. By 1918,9,391had been supplied with the majority employed as carriers. 
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December 1919. This covers Report by Lt Col 0F Watkins CUG, CBE, DSO, Director of Military Labour to the BEA Expeditionary 
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example was the evacuation of the 12,000 South Africans on medical grounds in late 1916. 
Smuts made the decision suddenly on 25 September, but before an evacuation plan had 
been drawn up or the various staff branches consulted. The result was a muddle and it took 
some time for the organisation of routes, transport and camps to be organised. 374 
The medical services were severely overstretched. Already lacking sufficient 
transport for true tactical mobility, the rains halted the movement of the motor ambulance 
convoys (MAC). This meant that the sick and wounded had to be evacuated by carriers 
which was naturally much slower. It also caused casualties to remain away from treatment 
for longer, placing more work on the remaining fit men, and sapped the vitality of the 
carriers themselves. Furthermore, in those areas where MT was still feasible, sickness 
amongst the drivers, particularly the newly-arrived, was a major problem. Seldom could 
all usable vehicles be driven owing to sickness. The case of a section of a field ambulance 
at Kilossa is instructive: equipped for a maximum of 50 patients, it had to hold, treat and 
375 feed 300 for a considerable time in November 1916. 
Reorganisation of the medical services was brought about with equipment being 
made easier to carry and stretcher-bearers added to establishments. Two extra field 
ambulances were brought out from India, and the system of evacuation and treatment was 
rationalised. Individual columns were now allocated their own field ambulance sections as 
well as elements of the bearer companies and sanitary sections. Forward clearing hospitals 
were set up on each line of advance linked by rest stations and supported by a forward field 
depot of medical supplies. Behind them were the stationary hospitals which then fed back 
patients to the general hospitals in Dar-es-Salaam. Greater use of vehicles in the MACs 
was made and they delivered the casualties back to the railway where special ambulance 
trains made the final journey to Dar-es-Salaam. The system of convalescent camps was 
extended further forward; previously clustered around Nairobi, new builds were erected at 
Morogoro and Dodoma. In the case of those considered as being too serious to recover in 
74 Macpherson and Mitchell, Medical Services Volume 4, pp. 458459. 75 Macpherson and Mitchell, Medical Services Volume 4, p. 468. 
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East Africa, three hospital ships were employed in the transport of patients to India, Egypt 
and South Africa. 376 
The carriers, on whom so much depended, received much more attention than 
previously. Numbering over 150,000 strong, they were allocated the use of some 28 mixed 
rest stations, five casualty clearing hospitals and seven carrier hospitals. 377 However, these 
changes, overdue as they were, were too late to ease the immediate problems caused by the 
tropical monsoon. In the period 8 January to 5 May, over 38,000 were admitted to hospital 
with an admission rate of 206 per thousand per month. Of these, some 23,000 were due to 
malaria, making an admission rate of 126 per thousand, while dysentery accounted for 
2,800 cases and 7.5 per cent respectively. 'Mese two diseases represented the bulk of 
hospital admissions, with malaria accounting for over 60 per cent and dysentery for 7.5 per 
cent of all admissions. Equally important they respectively caused 26 per cent and 23 per 
cent of all hospital deaths. Kilwa had the unhappy record for sickness with admissions 
reaching 41.3 per cent monthly. 
The levels of sickness were not just a temporary concern as many of the cases were 
permanently lost to the campaign. Of the 38,333 soldiers admitted during this four month 
period, some 10,436 were invalided overseas, 43 were discharged from military service, 
and 642 died - this represented a permanent loss rate of 5.9 per cent. The carriers also 
suffered heavily too, as 33,169 were admitted to hospital, with 4,168 dying compared to the 
642 soldiers who succumbed. The sick rate reached 7.1 per cent per month, with malaria 
accounting for 9,629 or 2.0 per cent and pneumonia 2,342 or 0.5 per cent monthly. Malaria 
represented 29 per cent, dysentery 18 per cent and pneumonia. 7 per cent of all admissions. 
Permanent losses were also high, with 15,845 being invalided out of service, 4,435 
deserting and 4,168 dying. 378 Sadly, matters did not improve in the subsequent period, 
with a peak of 7,500 troops and 2,000 followers in hospital by the first week of December. 
376 Macpherson and Mitchell, Medical Services Volume 4, pp. 475-477. 377 Macpherson and Mitchell, Medical Services Volume 4, p. 477. 378 Macpherson and Mitchell, Medical Services Volume 4, pp. 478-479 
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COMMAND AND CONTROL 
The previous year had exposed a number of weaknesses in the system of 
operational command and control. While the divisional structure was well proven 
elsewhere, it required the constituent brigades to operate relatively closely to one another. 
This enabled the commander to support his fighting formations with artillery and engineers 
as required, while divisional supply and transport units maintained the link between them 
and the lines of communication troops. The system ran best with the combination of a 
centralised rear area supporting a number of similarly organised formations, all backed up 
by an efficient rail and road network. To be really effective, it also required a large and 
well-trained administrative staff under the control of a single officer. Unfortunately, none 
of these conditions was present in East Africa. 
Reorganisation had left only the I" Division, plus a number of independent 
formations directly under the control of the commander-in-chief. By early 1917 it was 
clear that the divisional system was not working well in the difficult conditions of the 
African bush. Quite simply, the system could not cope with the problems of supplying 
widely spread brigades at great distances from their railheads together with insufficient 
transport. The answer was the expanded use of the independent column. Thiswasnothing 
new, as it had been the mainstay of past colonial operations, and had been used most 
successfully by Norforce. In this system, each column was based on a varying number of 
fighting troops, usually about 3-4 battalions strong, depending on the task. 
Transport units had been designed to support a brigade of fixed composition and 
could not easily cope with increases. The solution was centralise all resources and then 
allocate them to the columns as necessary. By pooling junior commanders as well as 
vehicles, the system could become much more flexible. A force headquarters, its size also 
dependent on the mission at hand, supported a varying number of columns and maintained 
the lines of communications. The system was more flexible and could be adjusted 
according to the supply or tactical situation. While it could not resolve the problems of 
acquiring sufficient transport or moving supplies over difficult terrain, it did give tactical 
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commanders greater operational freedom. It also made it easier to ensure that the number 
of troops sent forward were equivalent to the local supply capability; the haunting 
memories of semi-starved divisions littered around the Rufiji were not forgotten. However, 
it was not possible to overhaul the entire command apparatus at once and the decision to 
move to columns, taken in late February, would not be fully implemented for several 
months to come. 379 
PLANNING FOR THE DRY SEASON OFFENSIVE IN 1917 
The halt imposed by the rains also provided an opportunity to formulate the 
operational plans for the dry season of 1917 which would not begin before late June. The 
difficulties of trying to advance and sustain operations across the Mgeta and Rufiji rivers 
had already been amply demonstrated. Fighting at the end of elongated lines of 
communication in primeval jungle magnified the British weakness in transport while 
giving few tangible advantages in return. However, by using Kilwa as a base of operations, 
the British could utilize their maritime supremacy to much better advantage while also 
shortening the overland supply lines. Movement by ship also made possible the rapid and 
large scale redeployment of troops, if only along the littoral. 
These factors, coupled with the realisation that von Lettow was likely to retreat into 
southern German East Africa, led Hoskins to select Lindi as a future base of operations. 
However, the landings in September had left only the immediate area of the town and 
anchorage in British hands, with the enemy holding the dominating high ground to the 
west. Before any serious development of the port and base could take place, it would be 
necessary to clear the area from direct observation and to establish secure forward 
positions. To ensure this vital task was carried out, Hoskins selected Brigadier General 
O'Grady, an aggressive and energetic officer, to assume the command there. He and his 
brigade were to reinforce the small garrison with the initial task of removing the threat to 
Lindi and then preparing for a subsequent advance. 380 
379 WO 95/5292, War Diary GHQ, 24 February 1917, Entry P Dtvision, Telegram Hoskins to Hannyngton, 24 February. 
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Hoskins set out his thoughts to the CIGS at the beginning of March. He envisaged 
a four pronged advance from widely separated positions converging into the heartland of 
the German colony. In the north, a column would push south from the Rufiji River towards 
Madaba and Luwegu, supported in the west by another column advancing from Iringa to 
Mahenge; from the coast, a third column would move westwards from Kilwa towards 
Liwale and a fourth would move north-westwards from Lindi in an attempt to cut off any 
escape to the south. Norforce was to move east, blocking any German attempts to move 
into either Rhodesia or Nyasaland. Fundamental to the success of this plan was the 
provision of substantial replacements, particularly signallers and drivers, as well as many 
more porters. Hoskins stated: 
"the speedy provision of light lorries and porters is the crux of the whole question; 
without these operations cannot commence and unless numbers are adequate and 
increased progressing as the advance is made hostilities cannot be brought to a 
conclusion. " 381 
The difficult question of numbers also arose. Of the some 24,000 infantry in the 
main command, and deducting 1,200 for the lines of communications, only 8,600 were 
assessed as being efficient for operations. Northey had some 4000 rifles, of whom about 
1,900 could be placed in the field making a total striking force of 10,500; provided that the 
promised three South African infantry battalions, due to return after rest at home, arrived, 
Hoskins believed he had sufficient troops to make his plan work. However, he emphasized 
the need for frequent drafts of reinforcements for all troops, especially his West Africans. 
The commander-in-chief also informed the War Office that he considered it 
impossible to stop the Germans from entering Portuguese East Africa if they wished to do 
so. More ominously, he noted that should he be required to continue the campaign in 
Portuguese territory, then operations would be very lengthy. It was to be a prescient, if 
unwelcome, forecast. 382 
320 WO 95/5292, War Diary GHQ, 22 February 1917, Telegram G 218, Hoskins to CIGS, 22 February. 
3" WO 95/5292, War Diary GHQ, I March 1917, Appendix A, Telegram, G 337, Hoskins to CIGS, I March. 
382 WO 95/5292, War Diary GHQ, I March 1917, Appendix A. Telegram, G 337, Hoskins to CIGS, I March. 
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General Robertson took only a few days to make a decision, informing Hoskins on 
6 March that he agreed with the latter's assessment of German intentions. He also stated 
that should it be impossible to surround von Lettow owing to a combination of insufficient 
forces and size of the country, the EAEF should concentrate on the most dangerous or 
vulnerable enemy columns first, defeating them one at a time. The threat to Nyasaland via 
PEA was seen as less serious since British control of Lake Nyassa would allow the 
switching of forces by steamer before any German thrust could be made effective. On a 
less positive note, he deemed Northey's forces to be overly dispersed and suggested that 
they be concentrated promptly. On the vexed question of supplying more carriers, 
negotiations were being conducted with the Belgians and Portuguese, with the former 
having promised to supply some 5,000 recruits from their occupied territory. The CIGS 
also announced that the War Cabinet had considered the potential for a campaign in 
Portuguese East Africa and had decided that if the Germans were to break into that colony 
383 in force, then they were to be pursued until they surrendered or were defeated. 
Given the go-ahead in principle, Hoskins quickly ran into problems with his 
assumptions about South African manpower. Based on prior assurances of renewed 
support after a suitable period of refitting and convalescence, his plans assumed the 
provision of an infantry brigade. The first sign of trouble was the inability to provide 
replacements for the units still in East Africa. 384 This was followed by the unwelcome 
news that the promised battalions would not now return owing to recruiting problems. The 
Prime Minister, Botha, became personally involved in the decision: 
"... General BOTHA greatly regrets that his apprehension already conveyed to you 
are confirmed and it is now clear that one months leave is quite insufficient for the 
bulk of the men who have come back, and that it is impracticable by any means to 
make those battalions up to any respectable strength of trained and fit men. ', 385 
... WO 95/5292, War Diary GHQ, 7 March 1917, Appendix A4, Telegram 30514, CIGS to Hoskins, 6 March. 
3M WO 95/5292, War Diary GHQ, 9 March 1917, Appendix A7, Telegram G 447 Genstaff to Norforce, 9 March. This telegram 
quotes the signal to UNECA (South Africa) on 26 February and the reply (no date given). 
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Hoskins promptly made London aware of the magnitude of the shortfall with the 
corollary that the campaign would be prolonged even further if the shortage of troops 
persisted. 386 
While this dispute was underway, Hoskins was discussing his plans with Northey 
telegraphically, having been prevented by the weather from a personal visit. In response, 
Northey demurred, stating that there were insufficient troops to round up the enemy over 
such a vast area. He also thought that Wintgens was making for Tabora and that the 
follow-up would be difficult owing to the country and the lack of supplies in his wake. 
Given the German foraging parties already in Portuguese territory, he expected to have to 
commence operations around the southern end of Lake Nyassa before long. In response to 
a comment, Northey replied that he had been unaware that the Belgian forces had ceased 
active operations some months before. 387 Hoskins was astonished to learn that Northey had 
not been informed of such major developments and briefed him on the latest situation. He 
went on to outline his strategy that boiled down to two essentials: beating the Germans in 
the field and depriving them of their food centres. Envisaging a commencement of the 
advance in early May as the ground began to dry out, he reiterated his plans for a 
converging attack by all his columns towards the centre of the south-eastern portion of the 
colony. 388 
As March continued, relations between Hoskins and Robertson began to 
deteriorate, with the CIGS's request for more detailed plans receiving a rather vague reply. 
The commander-in-chief countered that he would be unable to formulate his exact plans 
until he received details of the transport that would be available and merely reiterated his 
idea of a concentric advance, albeit with reduced effectiveness and range. 389 This, and the 
unco-ordinated nature of his requests, irritated Robertson considerably and he ordered 
Hoskins to submit a single consolidated and up-to-date list of requirements for the future. 
395 W095/5292, War Diary GHQ, 11 March 1917, Appendix A12, Telegram H3359, UNECA, Pretoria to Hoskins, 10March. 
386 WO 95/5292, War Diary GHQ, II March 1917, Appendix A13, Telegram G 487, Hoskins to CIGS, II March. 
317 WO 95/5292, War Diary GHQ, 18 March 1917, Appendix A28, Telegram NF 2541, Norforce to Hoskins, 17 March. 
3111 WO 95/5292, War Diary GHQ, 19 March 1917, Appendix A34, Telegram G 601 General Hoskins to Norforce, 19 March. 
319 WO 33/85 8, European War Telegrams, Series D, Volume 2,1' March, 1917, to 14' April, 1919, London: War Office, 1919, p. 27, 
No. 1696,21 March 1917, Telegram 31391, CIGS to Hoskins. Henceforth, Telegrams D 2; WO 95/5292, War Diary GHQ, 29 March 
1917, Appendix A41, Telegram G 702, Hoskins to CIGS, 29 March. 
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Once this had been received, the War Office would inform him of what personnel and 
material could be supplied and as well as arrival dates. Hoskins would then have to make 
his plans around the available resources. 390 
Confirmation of additional transport and specialist support for East Africa came in 
early April . 
391 Now armed with firmer details, Hoskins signalled his final plans at the end 
of the month. In terms of enemy forces, the Germans were assessed as having thinned out 
their troops in the Rufiji area, with detachments near Mpotora, Makangaga, Ukuli and 
Lindi. Kraut's main body was in the Tunduru area with Wintgens still moving west and 
north. Hoskins then issued a disclaimer by stating that the plans were dependent on the 
weather, the arrival of reinforcements, the supply of porters and MT vehicles, and the 
preparations of the Belgians. However, he remained committed to the multi-column 
concentric advance, with the Nigerian Brigade advancing south from the River Ruf1ji 
towards Madaba, with the Kilwa force of two brigades moving south-west to Liwale, and 
the Lindi brigade moving either westwards toward Massassi or north-cast to the Mbemkuru 
River as necessary. The Iringa Column would clear the area between the Ruaha and 
Ulanga Rivers while the newly arriving Belgians would take on responsibility for 
containing any attempted breakouts to the west and moving on Mahenge. This would 
enable Northey to concentrate further south and to be prepared to move on either Liwale or 
Tunduru or both as required. Finally, a general reserve would be kept back at Morogoro. 
The Portuguese forces were considered valueless and were more likely to provide supplies 
to the enemy than effective opposition. 392 
ANGLO-DELGIAN OPERATIONS 
The re-entry of the Belgians into the campaign was spurred by the urgency of 
rounding up AN Wintgens and the need for more troops in the main area of operations. 
With political agreement reached in London, Hoskins and his Belgian opposite number, 
Colonel Huyghd, met in Ujiji from 18 - 19 April, and modified the troop levels to a total 
390 WO 95/5293, War Diary GHQ, I April 1917, Appendix A6, Telegram 31916, CIGS to Hoskins, I April. 
391 WO 95/5293, War Diary GHQ, 9 April 1917, Appendix A78, Telegram 32324, CIGS to Hoskins, 8 April. 
392 WO 95/5293, War Diary GHQ, 27 April 1917, Appendix B21, Telegram G 165, Hoskins to CIGS, 27 April. 
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force of 3,000 soldiers divided into two mobile columns of 1,200 rifles, each supported 
by an operational reserve battalion of 600 rifles, plus a further two battalions of 500 men 
each to provide individual replacements for casualties. 
The first Belgian column was to be ready immediately to take up the pursuit of 
Wintgens while the second was to be organised and equipped for the main offensive. 
Once the raiders were dealt with, the two columns were to unite in the Iringa area 
preparatory for an advance across the Ulanga River towards Mahenge. They would 
operate between Norforce in the Songea-Ubena area and the British detachment at Iringa. 
Liaison officers were exchanged at both general headquarters as well as with the various 
column headquarters, while the Belgian base was fixed at Dodoma on the Central 
Railway. 393 
A major consideration for both officers was time; for if the conquest of East 
Africa were to be made before the start of the rainy season (mid-November to early 
December), it was vital that the offensive commenced by the end of July or mid-August 
at the latest. Failing that, a new campaign in 1918 would be necessary under even less 
favourable conditions. It would expose the pursuers to all the problems encountered in 
the past rainy season and would allow the Germans a chance to regroup and, more 
importantly, cultivate new food supplies. 394 
Fortunately, Colonel Huygh6 had taken a number of precautions beforehand that 
were now to pay useful dividends. Despite not being required to raise extra forces in the 
April agreement, he had ordered the re-mobilisation of three additional battalions in case 
they were needed in the new circumstances. In May, he had organised his available 
forces into two major columns, one based on the old Brigade Sud, armed with the Mauser 
rifle and the other based on the Brigade Nord, armed with the Gras rifle. Each brigade 
also had a battalion dedicated to the provision of battle casualty replacements as well as a 
battery of six 70mm St Chamond mountain guns and a pioneer-bridging company. An 
393 Campagnes Coloniales Belges, 111, pp. 34-35. 394 Campagnes Coloniales Belges, 111, p. 13 1. 
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operational reserve (Reserve d'Operation or RO) of two battalions strength was formed 
while two others provided security for the lines of communication. 
As dealing with. 4bt Naumann was the first priority, Belgian troops were launched 
in pursuit early in May. Three battalion-sized columns were formed with the aim of 
preventing interference with the vital Central Railway. Since the allies were unable to 
prevent Naumann from breaking north of that line, the Belgian columns were launched 
north in hot pursuit, following the raiders all the way to Lake Victoria. Their task then 
became one of preventing an incursion into British East Africa. "' 
The regrouping of Belgian troops took place throughout June and July. GHQ 
moved from Ujiji to Dodoma on 29 June, while the various battalions made the 
preliminary moves noted above. Thereafter, further time would be needed for 
concentration and preparation in the forward areas before all was in readiness. On the 
eve of the operations, the Brigade Sud, less one battalion still in Katanga, was 
concentrated at the Lake Tanganyika port of Kigoma. The organisation of the Brigade 
Nord was less satisfactory as it had two battalions still involved in the pursuit of Abt 
Naumann, with another still guarding the rear areas south-west of Tabora and the fourth 
en-route for Iringa. 396 The artillery was moving forward to join the brigades while the 
pioneers were preparing to start work on the new base at Dodoma. The rear services 
operated on the existing line Stanleyville-Albertville with new stages of Dodoma-Iringa 
and Kilosa-Ruaha. By the end of June, the Belgians were slowly moving into position 
for the next phase of the campaign. 397 
ANGLO-PORTUGUESE OPERATIONS 
Relations between the British and Portuguese were not so easily resolved 
although both sides did make efforts to work together. With the recall of General Gil in 
1916, and the planned sending of another expeditionary force in early 1917, the Governor 
39sCampagmsColonialesBelges, 111, pp 132 and 309-310. Orders are given at Annexe No. 16, Tabora, 30 May 1917. 396 Campagnes Coloniales Belges, III, pp. 133-134. 397 Campagnes Coloniales Belges, III, pp. 135-136. 
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General, Dr Alvaro de Castro, assumed the role of Commander-in-Chief. Conscious of 
the weakness of his position, he had asked for a meeting with General Smuts late in 1916. 
However, this was not possible for a number of reasons and it was not until 25 January, 
two days after he had relinquished command in East Africa, that Smuts met with de 
Castro in Portuguese East Africa. It seems highly likely that General Hoskins was too 
busy with taking over his new command and conducting the offensive to make the 
journey and Smuts was conveniently passing by. 
If the renewed Belgian assistance was welcomed, General Northey faced further 
problems in the south on the Nyasaland-Portuguese border. Apart from being weakened by 
the pursuit of Wintgens, he also needed trained troops to deal with the developing German 
threat posed there by Abt von Stuemer. Although the Portuguese were held in generally 
low regard, General Hoskins did try to involve them in support of both his and Northey's 
operations. "' 
At the meeting with de Castro on 9 May the subject of military cooperation was 
high on the agenda. The Portuguese were always slightly suspicious of British intentions 
and were very reluctant to allow their forces into Portuguese territory. To Hoskins's 
dismay, de Castro proposed to send a force of over 700 rifles from the coast to Chinde, 
thence up the Zambezi River into southern Nyasaland and Lake Nyasa, where it would 
land at Mtengula which was believed to be von Stuemer's objective. He suggested that 
this movement would take place between 15 and 20 May, but this was hopelessly 
optimistic given Portuguese transport facilities. Although received diplomatically, the 
suggestion was considered most unwelcome as it was seen as likely to get in Northey's 
way and would cause major supply problems. From the British perspective, it would be 
far more useful for the Portuguese to establish a strong blocking force along the Rovuma 
as well as protecting the vulnerable line of communication running up the Zambesi River. 
Hoskins put his suggestions as tactfully as possible, but, unable to change da Silva's 
mind, he left the matter unresolved. 399 
WO 95/5293, War Diary GHQ, 27 April 1917, Appendix B21, Telegram G 165, Hoskins to CIGS, 27 April. 
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This was as well, for the Portuguese troops only reached Chinde, at the head of 
the Zambezi, on 25 May and von Stuemer's move on Mtengula forestalled their further 
advance. Instead, it was agreed that the local Portuguese commander would meet 
Northey in Zomba to arrange a revised deployment. This was ultimately decided as the 
reinforcement of the existing Portuguese boma at Mlanje, on the other side of the British- 
Portuguese border, and was forward of both the railway line and River Zambezi. It 
provided much-needed protection of each force's lines of communications and, as the 
British desired, kept the two annies separated. 400 With the outbreak of a major anti- 
Portuguese revolt in the districts of Tete and Barue, to the south of the area of operations, 
and the need to reinforce the beleaguered garrisons there, it was probably as much as 
could be obtained. This would remain a ma or consideration for the Portuguese until the j 
rebellion came under control at the beginning of June. 401 
GERMAN REORGANISATION 
The Schutztruppe faced similar problems to their opponents, particularly from 
insufficient transport, food and medical supplies. However, they did have the advantages 
of being on interior lines in friendly country and could retire on routes of their own 
choosing. They were also able to live off the country, having few scruples about clearing 
out local food stocks. 
On 1 April 1917, the total strength of the 0suruppen was some 6,534, consisting 
of 1,423 Germans and 5,111 Askaris, of whom 4,419 were considered able to fight. 402 
The numbers for the Westtruppen were 2,854, with 535 Germans and 2,319 Askari (Abt 
Wintgens had another 554 soldiers). 403 With a total of over 9,000 mouths to feed and the 
loss of the lower Rufiji, the question of food supply was increasingly severe. Stocks had 
been consumed far faster than expected, with levels held on the lines of communication 
some 125,000 kg less than the forecast 300,000. As the forward force consumed over 
3" CAB 44/9, pp. 39-40. 
400 CAB 44/9, pp. 40-41. 
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404 10,000 kg daily, this was a significant shortfaJI. The struggle to provide adequate 
nourishment required drastic measures and rations were reduced to minimal levels. As 
the historian of the campaign pointed out: 
"Nevertheless the German forces found themselves in a more critical situation 
than the British, the most critical that troops can face, that of existence or non- 
existence. The spectre of starvation threatened for the second time and it would 
not be easily overcome by the reoccupation of the southern portion of the Dar-es- 
Salaam district. "405 
OPERATIONS ON THE RUFTJI AND THE FAST 
Operations on the middle and lower Rufiji during the period February to May 
1917 largely consisted of thinning out the forward positions and patrol actions owing to 
the rain and flooding of the countryside. Sporadic fighting and occasional raids took 
place, although, with both sides seriously weakened by sickness and insufficient food, 
such encounters were usually indecisive. 
The Germans had noted the British redeployment and the reductions on the Rufiji 
line. Suffering from similar problems to his opponents, von Lettow decided to reduce his 
forward forces and to begin the slow withdrawal to the south. He wanted to be ready to 
fend off any subsequent British moves against his lines of communication as well as 
reinforce his troops along the coast. 406 Concerns about rear area security and the loyalty 
of the African population were also apparent, especially in the area of the Makonde 
highlands. The British had been trying to induce the inhabitants to rebel against German 
rule since the previous autumn and had provided some material support. The disaffected 
tribes began to disrupt food gathering and made the links to the west much more 
dangerous than previously. 
MS Boelt NI4/30,26. Kapitct p. 1990. MS Boell, N 14/30,26. Kapilci. p. 1987. 80c11, Die OPerationen. p. 319. 
127 
If the main force was suffering badly from the climate, Norforce, although better 
off, needed a rest after the long advance to Iringa and the subsequent fight against the 
Westtruppen. The columns were tired and required reorganisation while the long lines of 
communication were now struggling to function in the wet weather. However, further 
unexpected events would shortly make this requirement even more troublesome. 
Although the heavy rains had brought operations in the Rufiji area to a complete 
halt, the precipitation further south %N-as not as severe, at least initially. As has already 
been described, the bulk of the lVesttruppen had broken through Northey's slender forced 
and had linked up with AN Kraut in the Ulanga valley. Although they had suffered a 
significant number of casualties, the now-united force was much stronger than Norforce. 
While the low ground was flooding heavily, two enemy groups remained on the edge of 
the great escarpment and in close proximity to Northey's troops. AN Kraut remained in 
its strong defensive position at Mfrika watched by Hawthorn's column, but AN Wintgens 
was not fixed. From captured documents, Northey was aware of the supply problems 
faced by the Germans in the Mahenge area as well as Wahle's instructions ordering both 
Kraut and Wintgens to operate in the Wiedhafen-Songea area for as long as possible. 407 
The threat to Norforce was very real, for on 3 February both Ateilungen arrived 
at Gumbiro and surrounded its garrison. On receiving Wahle's orders of 29 January, the 
two commanders had a major dispute. Kraut, the senior officer, insisted that they move 
south in accordance with their instructions, but Wintgens, a strong-willed and difficult 
personality, wanted to go north. It is unclear why he disobeyed such explicit orders, 
although it has been suggested that his askaris wanted to return home to Tabora and that 
he did not get on well with von Lettow. Whatever the reason, on 6 February he lifted the 
408 unsuccessful siege and moved north while Kraut took his troops south . It was to be the 
start of an epic movement that would only end some eight months and many thousands of 
miles later. 
Boell, Die OPerationen. P. 31S. At Schoenkk Li"cke and von Langenn were drawing on the Mahenge while At Kraut and Wintgens were ordered to move by Wahle on 29 January. 408 Boell, Die OPErationen. p. 325,16ISS Aft. c. 1713 (300), HWopy of I X4P, p. 165. 
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Norforce was widely stretched over a vast area of country; the distance from his 
headquarters in Ubena to the forward troops was 130 miles alone. The columns were 
split between Likuyu, Songea, Kitanda, Alt-Langenburg and Lupembe. As the month 
progressed, the rains became increasingly heavy and the broad lowlands east of the 
escarpment continued to flood. Although on higher and healthier ground than Hoskins's 
main body, the troops of Norforce were still suffering from the climate and disease. 
Numbers had been reduced to less than half normal strength and the South African units 
were particularly hard-hit from sickness. 409 
On 8 February, intelligence indicated that Kraut was moving southwards; this was 
confirmed two days later when he appeared on the Wiedhafen-Songea road making 
several unsuccessful attacks on isolated British posts. He then continued south the next 
day with Hawthorn now in hot pursuit. Reportedly in a discontented state from lack of 
supplies, Kraut's askaris moved quickly and, despite some heavy knocks by Hawthorn's 
column, they managed to make the Portuguese border. On 24 February, Northey was 
informed that a large enemy force was assembling at Likuyu and he recalled Hawthorn 
back to Songea. 410 No longer being pursued, Kraut was now to forage in the southern 
portion of German East Africa and posed a potential threat to the Portuguese. 
Wintgens was concerned about the increasingly constricted area of operations and 
the need to obtain food. In order to regain his freedom of movement, he intended to 
conduct minor operations on the line Songea-Lupembe and then to break north- 
westwards towards the northern end of Lake Nyassa, to Tandala. Leaving his sick and 
wounded behind at Milow Mission on 15 February, he ran into a combined South African 
and KAR column the next day. The British column was forced back that night, having 
lost its commander and a number of others killed. This fight confirmed the renewed 
threat to Northey's lines of communication running between Alt-Langenburg and Ubena, 
while his forces were too small to prevent a breakthrough to the west. Acting rapidly, he 
recalled Murray's Column from the Ruhudje, and it promptly marched back to Tandala, 
at the northern head of Lake Nyassa. 
40 CAB 44/9, p. 33, Sketch 96. 
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Two days later, a KAR company near Tandala was nearly surrounded and cut off 
by the Germans who then besieged the garrison. Murray's Column timely arrival on 22 
February forced Wintgens to abandon the siege, leaving behind a destroyed 3.7 cm gun. 
Heading northwards, Wintgens had about 520 soldiers, II machine guns and two field 
guns . 
41 1 As soon as the relieved garrison was sorted out, Murray set off in hot pursuit on 
25 February. 412 
Now faced by serious opposition, Wintgens intended to use his head start and 
superior mobility to best advantage. He planned to make a series of short marches in a 
north-westerly direction until he reached the old British lines of communication leading 
from Neu Langenburg to Iringa. From there, he would feint towards the Rhodesian 
border while actually moving towards Lake Rukwa. He expected to find more food in 
that region, which so far had been largely undisturbed by the war, while shaking off his 
pursuers. These measures were successful and direct ground contact was lost as he 
turned south-west near Neu Utengule. British aerial reconnaissance subsequently located 
his camp and then successfully bombed it on 26 February. However, it was not until II 
March, when the Abteilung had reached the Igale Pass, south of Alt Utengule, that 
Murray's patrols were first able to restore contact. The continued pursuit convinced 
Wintgens to move away from that area and to make for St Moritz further north. 413 
Murray was a determined and capable officer who could be thoroughly relied 
upon. However, even his best efforts could not force Wintgens into pitched battle, 
chiefly for reasons of supply. The countryside was lightly cultivated and the Germans 
stripped all available food in their wake, while Murray had to have his food brought 
forward by carriers with all the inefficiencies and delays that this method brought. As 
well, there was considerable uncertainty as to Wintgens's intentions; and arrangements 
had to be made to cover moves either to the south or west. 414 
4 '0 Hoskins, Despatch, pp. 159-160. 
41 1 Boell, Die Operationen, p. 325. The Germans lost two killed and seven wounded, while the British suffered nine dead and 13 taken 
. soner. Wintgens left Gumbiro with 59 Europeans, 464 Askaris, II machine guns and two guns. F-r"Hoskins, 
Despatch, p. 160. 
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Murray's Column had reached Alt-Utengule on 13 March and St Moritz Mission 
five days later. He had also tried to secure the Northern Rhodesian frontier by sending a 
battalion to garrison Bismarckburg, while another, detached from Hawthorn, was ordered 
to protect Alt Utengule. A further patrol action took place on 17 March with the 
Germans being scattered. Murray now decided to move on St Moritz, believing that he 
had Wintgens trapped against the swollen Lupa and Songwe Rivers, which were only 
crossable by bridges. 415 
However, the patrol victory was reversed on 20 March, when Wintgens launched 
his main body in an attack. The battalion suffered heavy casualties and was forced from 
the battlefield, moving to a position some 6 krn to the south-west. They were not left at 
rest, for two days later, their camp was surrounded by the enemy and they were cut-off. 
A breakout attempt on 25 March was rebuffed by the besiegers, but again Murray 
marched to the rescue, arriving on 26 March. Once again, Abt Wintgens broke off the 
siege and headed for St Moritz where a strong bridgehead position was taken up. 
After some reorganisation the bulk of Murray's troops continued the pursuit 
towards St Moritz. During this time, Wintgens had been busy devising an escape over 
the rivers hemming his troops in. Constructing some improvised rafts out of crates and 
local material, the first crossing of the Lupa began on I April with the entire Abteilung 
being evacuated by the P. Murray, delayed by supply problems, arrived just as the 
enemy completed its escape. Lacking rafting or bridging material and suffering from a 
severe lack of food, he was unable to cross the river and the follow-up was again broken 
off. 416 
The emergence of these five companies into the previously secure rear areas 
caused disruption out of proportion to their fighting strength. The thickness of the bush, 
the sheer size of the country being traversed and the lack of any infrastructure meant that 
substantial pursuing forces were required. In order to support Murray, at the end of 
4's Boell, Die Operationen, p. 326. 
131 
March Hoskins sent an Indian battalion to take over as the garrison of Bismarkburg, 
while a still-forming KAR battalion was diverted from training and sent to block any 
approaches on Tabora . 4" The shortage of British troops and the problems of keeping 
them supplied now led to a formal request for the resumption of hostilities by the Belgian 
Force Publique. As this would entail the re-mobilisation and re-deployment of the bulk 
of this force, under similar supply difficulties as the British faced, it would be not be fast 
enough to catch Wintgens quickly. 
Wintgens's plans on crossing the Lupa River were to make for Kipembawe, 
moving in the opposite direction on the route he had used the previous October. He too, 
was concerned about the ration situation and split off a column to relieve the pressure in 
the local area as well as to set a false scent by marching in various directions, with orders 
to rejoin him at Mdabulo. He launched a feint move on Bismarckburg and spent the 
remainder of the time collecting supplies. 418 
In the meantime, the KAR battalion had reached Tabora by rail and moved south 
on foot to Kitunda Mission, reaching it on 5 April and remaining there for a number of 
days. The Germans, having rested for five days, began the move north again, this time 
towards Kipembawe. In late April after a clash of patrols, the British commander, who 
was outnumbered, took the prudent course and withdrew back to Sikonge. This left 
Kitunda Mission open, and it was occupied by the Gennans on 4 May. Here Wintgens 
decided on a major halt as he and many of the Europeans were suffering from typhus. 
However, Murray was once more in pursuit and his leading elements came into contact 
from the south on 6 May. It took a number of days for the main body to catch up and it 
was not until 14 May that the column was close to Kitunda, by which time the enemy had 
moved north. 
By 21 May, Wintgens's condition had worsened seriously and he determined to 
surrender to the enemy. Command passed to Lieutenant Naumann, who was enjoined to 
416 Boell, Die Operationen, p. 326. WO 95/5329, War Diary Norforce, Entries 22-26 March 1917. 417 WO 33/953, Telegrams D 2, No. 1727,31 March 1917, Telegram G 738, Hoskins to CIGS, p. 38. 418 Boell, Die Operationen, p. 326; WO 95/5329, War Diary Norforce, 24 May 1917. 
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link up with the Wesuruppen, back in the Mahenge area. In the circumstances, with 
Murray pressing from the south, this was impossible, and Naumann decided to march 
north-east to the Central Railway and to cross it at Mkalama. 4 19 Despite the pressure, the 
askaris'morale remained good and they remained full of fight. 
In the meantime, the Allies were gathering further forces to deal with the raiders. 
The Belgians had taken over responsibility for Bismarkburg and Sikonge while the 
British moved reinforcements up the Central Railway to co-operate with Murray. 
Brigadier General Edwards, the Inspector General of Communications, was placed in 
charge of the operations and was now had a total of three and a half battalions and one 
squadron to deal with Naumann. 420 
The withdrawal of the main body of the Osttruppe began in early March as soon 
as it became clear that the I" Division had pulled back from its forward positions towards 
Kibata and Kilwa. Leaving only a relatively weak force on the Rufiji, von Lettow moved 
south on 12 March, establishing his new headquarters at Mpotora five days later. In the 
meantime, he also strengthened the forces of the Sfidbefehlshaber in order to meet the 
increasing enemy strength in Sudi and Lindi. At Rothe, with three companies, arrived 
there in mid-March, strengthening the defending forces considerably. 421 
South of the Rufiji, the Germans still held Lake Utungi and the Ligonya River 
valley which was now a formidable obstacle to movement. A number of small battalion- 
level operations in the second half of April near Utete resulted in local British successes, 
but fighting petered out by early May as both sides were now in the process of shifting 
422 
their forces southward towards Kilwa and Lindi . 
These moves enabled I" Division to move both its brigades south to the Matandu 
River. The brigade structure was now dropped, and on 2 April Colonel Grant (the 
419 Boell, Die Operationen, p. 327. Naumann took over 48 Europeans, 42IAskaris, II machine guns and two guns. 
420 WO 95/5293, War Diary GHQ, 9 May 1917, Appendix A62, Telegram P 19, Edforce to Genstaff, 9 May. The new force was 
entitled "Edforce". 
421 Boell, Die Operationen, pp. 319-320. Looff had 65 Germans, 500 Askaris, nine machine guns and two guns. There were also 100 
auxiliaries who had been enrolled as recruits. 
422 CAB 44/9, pp. 23-34. 
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former 2 nd EA Brigade) was given command of all troops north of the Matandu and 
Colonel Rose (the former P EA Brigade) was given command of all troops south of the 
river. 423 In early April, patrols noted activity in the area of Kimamba Hill and Rumbo. 
A camp was set-up in the bush around Makangaga; on 12 April it was estimated that 
some eight to ten companies were coming up the main road with a Rirther three 
companies moving further east towards Kimamba via Mchakama. 424 General 
Hannyngton, the GOC 1" Division, was concerned that the presence of this force would 
disrupt his preparations for the general advance and decided to take pre-emptive 
action. 425 In mid-April, he instructed Rose to drive the enemy out of its positions. 
Accordingly, a column consisting of a reinforced battalion, numbering some 540 rifles, 
left Rumbo on the morning of 18 April to attack Abt von Lieberman, which was over 300 
strong. 
The journey was not easy as the column had to cross the steeply-sided and 
swollen Ngaura River before reaching the enemy defences, and it poured with rain 
throughout the day. 426 The going was slow and difficult with the column soon running 
into heavy fire. Faced by three companies in good positions surrounded by tall elephant 
grass and dense bush, visibility was very poor and communications difficult for the 
attackers. A flanking move was unable to make sufficient progress and it was decided 
that the enemy was too strong to defeat and a withdrawal was ordered. However, von 
Lieberman reacted vigorously and threw in a strong counter-attack that nearly 
overwhelmed the column's rear guard, losing three machine guns after their teams had 
been killed. Furthermore, a panic amongst the carriers resulted in the loss of a great deal 
of ammunition and baggage. The situation was saved by a courageous and determined 
effort by the rear guard, but it was a stinging defeat that did little to improve morale. 427 
123 CAB 44/9, p. 18. Mnasi was 22 miles WSW of Kilwa Kivinje, near the main road to Liwale. 424 CAB 44/9, pp. 19-20. 
425 Moyse-Bartlett, The King's. 4frican Rifles, pp. 360-361. On the surface this action seems unwise as the column mustered a 
maximum of 5 companies with the aim of locating and beating a dug-in enemy of superior numbers. There was no general reserve to 
back up the column. 
426 CAB 44/9, p. 20. The 4e Pathans supplied 400 rifles and V/2"d KAR 140 men. 
427 Clifford, Gold Coast Regiment, pp. 82-86; CAB 44/9, pp. 20-22. Faced by the At von Debermann with 300 rifles and four 
machine guns, the Germans lost three dead and 22 wounded as compared to the British who were much more heavily hit with 36 
killed, 70 wounded and 43 wounded, totalling 152. 
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Hoskins later tried to put a positive gloss on the failure, 428 but it was unlikely to 
have worried the Germans. Indeed, the whole point of the raid was highly questionable 
from the outset, as the sending of the equivalent of five companies against a detachment 
estimated to have 8-13 companies, with at least 300 in the forward defences, was almost 
certain to fail. As it was, the attack merely re-emphasized the dangers of sending weak 
and unsupported columns against unreconnoitred defences. 
This event marked the end of serious offensive efforts by 1" Division for the 
remainder of the rainy season. The heavy losses, particularly in British officers, and the 
drop in morale were serious, but the lack of carriers really precluded any resumption of 
the offensive. 429 It also showed that the new KAR battalions still had a long way to go in 
terms of training and tactics before they were able to take on the more experienced 
Schutztruppe on equal terms. 
It was the combination of the Makonde rising and the British build-up at Lindi 
that was now the main concern for von Lettow. In mid-March, he ordered At Krfiger, 
three companies strong, to leave Tunduru for the port of Mikandini. Initially given orders 
to crush the rebellion in the Makonde plateau, KrUger was soon drawn into Looff s 
operations against the lodgement in Lindi. Indeed, the Kommandeur believed it was time 
to strike before the British could reinforce further and to drive them "out of the 
continent". 430 
Meanwhile, O'Grady's brigade launched an attack on At Rothe, taking a forward 
company position at Njangwani, some 12 km north-west of the town. Eager to redress 
the loss and to use his newly arrived reinforcements, Looff decided to strike a week later. 
Leaving At Krager opposite Lindi, he sent At Hinrichs, with three companies, to take 
the small port of Sudi. The position was a strong one, with the defenders protected by 
'28 Hoskins, Despatch, p. 166. "Although this attack failed in its immediate object, it had the effect of relieving the Kilwa force of any 
further pressure from this direction. " 
429 WO 95/5293, War Diary GHQ, 19 April 1917, Appendix Al 15. Telegram 0 402,1 Div to Hoskins, 18 April; War Diary GHQ, 19 
April, Appendix 116, Telegram 0405,1 Div to Genstaff, 19 April. In this signal, the enemy was estimated at being between I-2,000 
strong. 
4'OBoell, DIeCperafionen, p. 32l. AbtKraut had been broken up and the bulk of his troops had passed to Kroger. Krautwasordered 
to move to Lindi and to assume the appointment of SadbefehIshaber from Looff. He assumed command on 5 May. 
135 
wire and stake obstacles. Launched on 24 April, the attackers, who lacked artillery, were 
unable to break through the defences and suffered a number of casualties. The battle was 
broken off and a single company was left to contain the British. 
43 1 The next day Abt 
Rothe gained its revenge for its earlier setback and seized the lost forward position, 
driving the Indian defenders back into Lindi. 432 
Despite von Lettow's stated aim of destroying the British coastal enclaves, the 
attack at Sudi was an expensive waste of scarce soldiers on an operationally and tactically 
unimportant enclave. A few days later, on 3 May, he declared that the time for decisive 
measures at Lindi had run out and he ordered two companies to march north to face the 
growing threat from Kilwa. Dissatisfied with the conduct of operations there and 
having clashed repeatedly with Captain Looff, he dismissed him as SadbefehIshaber on 5 
May, leaving him in command of an Ateilung. Major Kraut took his place and quickly 
reorganised the defences with four companies placed in the strong Ngurumahamba 
position west of Lindi; and with another two positioned to the south and west at Majani. 
On 5 May, the Germans caused consternation when they opened fire with a 
captured Portuguese mountain gun at the ships lying off Kilwa Kisiwani harbour from the 
mangrove swamps to the west. This achieved little result other than for a minor clearance 
operation and renewed vigilance in the rear areas. Further north, near Kilwa Kivinje the 
Germans continued to pull back from the Matandu river and reinforce their existing 
positions on the Ngaura River. By 20 May, Mpotora had been completely evacuated with 
the garrison splitting between Liwale and Likawage. 
The move of the I" Division south of the Matandu was marked by the end of its 
formal existence. It became known as Hanforce after the name of its commander, Major 
General Hannyngton, despite repeated changes due to illness. The changes in structure 
were also reflected at brigade level which was now formally abolished. The new No I 
Column, now led by Colonel GM Orr, arose from the old 3 rd EA Brigade, and No 2 
41 1 Boell, Die Operalionen, pp. 320-321. The Germans had a total of 333 soldiers and eight machine guns. Hinrichs lost II killed and 
29 wounded out of his detachment of 265 men and six machine guns. 
412 Boell, Die Operalionen, p. 321. Rothe had 3 companies totalling 280 men and 6 machine guns, losing four killed, 20 wounded as 
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Column, led by Col HFL Grant, was formed from the old 2 nd EA Brigade. The troops 
were deployed as follows; No I Column was deployed in an approximately 25 mile long 
arc, covering the approaches to Kilwa port. Its front followed the line of the River 
Ngaura to the deep inlet known as Beaver Haven, with a total of five forward posts being 
held. No 2 Column was more concentrated and occupied Mchemera, on the Matandu 
River, less a few detachments to the north. 433 It was poised on the main route leading 
west from Kilwa towards Mpotora and the interior. However, heavy rain continued in the 
coastal areas until the middle of May and it then required a drying out period followed by 
intensive repairs on damaged roads and tracks before the supply system could become 
fAilly operational and effective. 434 
OPERATIONS IN THE SOUTH AND WEST 
Northey could do little during the wettest months of March and April save hold 
the defensive and recover. From his headquarters in Ubena, on the junction of the roads 
leading north and east, his force was strung out south-eastwards on the line Likuyu- 
Kitanda-Lupembe, roughly paralleling Lake Nyasa. With the loss of Murray's column, 
his forces had been reduced by over three battalions; if At Wintgens had passed out of 
his immediate area, . 4bt Kraut posed another threat 
further to the south either around 
Songea or in Portuguese East Africa. 435 One welcome piece of news in March was 
Hoskins's decision to send a KAR battalion south from Iringa as reinforcements for 
Northey's weakened columns. 
At von Langenn which was on the Ruhuje to the east of Lupembe and At Lincke 
at Likuyu. (the crossing of the Likuyu. River on the Songea-Liwale road) were worrisome, 
especially the latter which was about 50 miles north-east of Songea. Colonel Hawthorn 
was sent from Songea in March to drive Lincke away. He arrived near the Likuyu River 
on 7 April and, after an inconclusive skirmish four days later, he attempted to cross the 
flooded river. This took some time and Hawthorn's force was successfully over the 
compared to British losses of 22 killed and one wounded. 
433 CAB 44/9, p. 70, Sketch 94; Off, "From Rumbo to the Rovurna", pp 109-110.. 
434 Hoskins, Despatch, p. 167. 
435 WO 95/5329, War Diary Norforce, Entry 31 March 1917, "Summary of Situation at End of March"; CAB 44/9, pp. 33-34. 
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obstacle on 23 April and was some six miles north of the suspected German encampment. 
He occupied it unopposed on 27 April, with Lincke having evacuated some days 
beforehand and moved further east. 436 
While Hawthorn was struggling through the sodden bush, Kraut's force had 
reached Tunduru. and was believed to be making enquiries about access to the Rovuma 
River and the areas to its south. There was considerable doubt as to the veracity of these 
reports, but these were dispelled on 20 April, when a captured document revealed that 
Kraut had split his force into two columns, one under himself and the other under Major 
von Stuemer who had the mission of raiding Portuguese territory. 437 This was unpleasant 
news for Northey, who now faced yet another demand on his much diminished force. 
A week later, reports confirmed that von Stuemer, who had left in advance of 
Kraut, had reached the area of Mwembe, some 80 miles south of the Rovuma River in a 
fertile tract of land between the Lujenda River and Lake Nyassa. His force was estimated 
to contain 37 Europeans, 200 Askaris and a large number of ruga-ruga (armed African 
auxiliaries). It appeared that the local Portuguese authorities had been taken completely 
by surprise and that a large amount of food had been seized. 438 Kraut's force was still on 
the move and unlocated, but it was presumed to be heading south for the Rovuma. 
Whilst Portuguese East Africa had relatively little strategic value in itself, the 
presence of a German force there was important. Firstly, it could plunder the relatively 
rich food areas for the supplies so badly needed by the main force further north more or 
less at will. Secondly, the extreme antipathy felt by the indigenous Africans for their 
Portuguese colonial overlords meant that recruiting for the German force was both 
possible and likely. Thirdly, Northey's long and vulnerable lines of communication 
along the Zambezi River to the Indian Ocean would be at serious risk from such a move. 
If these were interrupted, then his entire force would no longer be capable of serious 
436 WO 95/5329, War Diary Norforce, Entrics II and 27 April 1917; CAB 44/9, pp. 34-35. 437 WO 95/5329, War Diary Norforce, Entry 22 April 1917. 
432 CAB 44/9, pp. 35-36. 
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offensive operations as the land links through the Rhodesias were too undeveloped to be 
of practical use. 
Northey reacted at once and sent his only available troops, a South African 
battalion, to Fort Johnston on 30 April. This unit, which had been badly affected by 
illness and had been were recuperating while carrying out lines of communication 
protection duties between Wiedhafen and Songea, was his only formed reserve. Even so, 
it was far from fully trained and barely equalled the numbers of Germans in the area; it 
could only be supplemented by KAR recruits diverted from essential training in 
Zomba. 439 
The situation was becoming critical as, with the pursuit of Wintgens, Northey's 
brigade-sized force was spread out over 450 miles of wild bush, mountain and swamp. 
He now risked being defeated in detail whilst his reliance on lengthy supply lines meant 
that he could not respond as quickly as he would have wished. On I May, he telegraphed 
General Hoskins asking for the return of the detached troops in order to rest and refit 
them prior to future operations. This request was turned down in light of the pressure to 
hunt down Wintgens and Northey was instructed to keep Hawthorn from going too far 
east. Accordingly, Hawthorn was told to stay in the vicinity of Likuyu where he had so 
recently occupied the camp and crossing site. 440 
While these deliberations were taking place, the threat to Northey's southern flank 
continued to increase. Von Stuemer was now known to have over 400 soldiers plus a 
substantial ruga-ruga contingent. Furthermore, it was clear that the local population 
welcomed the German presence and were actively supporting their activities. An 
advance party from his column had already reached as far south as Mtonia, a village only 
15 miles from Lake Nyassa and the British border. His main body was believed to be 
heading for Mtengula which lay north-west of Mtonia on the lake shore. Abt Kraut was 
also identified in Portuguese territory, about 70-80 miles to the east of von Stuemer, and 
in Mwiriti on the Msalu River. Apart from the above mentioned supply and recruiting 
439 CAB 44/9, pp. 35-36; CAB 45n3, Sketch 98 "The Strategic Situation V June 1917". 
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opportunities that this offered, Mwiriti lay on a motorable road (with telegraph line) that 
led to the coast and Port Amelia. 441 
Having been denied the return of Murray's column, General Northey made 
several changes to counter the mounting threat to Nyasaland. On 6 May, he moved his 
new KAR battalion to Fort Johnston while one of the detached battalions was marching 
back to rejoin the main body. At the same time, he shifted his headquarters from Ubena 
(north and east of Lake Nyasa) to Zomba (south of Lake Nyasa and Fort Johnston) in 
order to be near the greatest threat. 442 
Whilst these further deployments were getting underway, the South Africans had 
arrived at Fort Johnston with barely 270 effective soldiers. Promptly reinforced by 
several hundred KAR soldiers from the depot, the unit left immediately for Mangoche, a 
few miles to the north and east, where they arrived on 8 May. Their speed was needed, 
for on the same evening an advanced detachment of von Stuemer's force took, the 
Portuguese boma at Mandimba, only 6 miles from the border and close to Mangoche. 
The Germans actually crossed into Nyasaland the next day, but were deterred from a 
further advance by the presence of the newly arrived battalion and withdrew to 
Mandimba. The British force then shifted to Namwera, a few miles north-east of 
Mangoche, where it commanded the main road between Nyasaland and Portuguese East 
Africa. Neither side was strong enough to force the other and a local stalemate 
prevailed. 443 
Events continued to move rapidly. General Northey reached Zomba on 14 May 
and on the same day half of the KAR battalion arrived in Fort Johnston. Given the 
seriousness of the situation in the south and the fact that the Songea operations were now 
halted owing to rain, Northey decided to bring Colonel Hawthorn down to command the 
force in Nyasaland. Three days later, on 17 May, the Germans occupied Mtengula on 
Lake Nyassa while intelligence showed that they might shift their attentions further to the 
440 WO 95/5329, War Diary Norforce, Entry 2 May 1917. "' CAB 44/9, pp. 36-37. 
442 WO 95/5329, War Diary Norforce, Entry 6 May 1917. 
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south and towards the key port of Quelimane. This would be a direct threat to Portuguese 
operations as well as Northey's communications, and needed to be neutralised. 444 
However, it soon appeared that von Stuemer had encountered more opposition 
than he had expected and was unlikely to press into Nyasaland, given the relative balance 
of forces. A detachment occupied Mtonia on 26 May, but patrols and scouts were unable 
to locate any Germans south of that place. However, presence of any enemy was both a 
threat and a drain on available resources. Accordingly, Northey resolved to drive them 
out of Portuguese territory and north of the Rovuma into the developing envelopment 
being led by the main forces. 445 
On 25 May, the remaining half of the KAR arrived at Fort Johnston, giving 
Northey a local numerical advantage. This enabled him to order patrols into Mtonia the 
next day, followed by its capture on I June. The Germans appeared to be thinning out 
and it was decided to reinforce the advantage south of Lake Nyasa. On 3 June, Northey 
moved his KAR battalion forward to support the South Africans, while withdrawing his 
details of trained KAR soldiers back to Zomba where they resumed the vital task of 
training the new recruits for the forthcoming operations. 446 
HOSKINS'S DISMISSAL 
General Hoskins had expended a great deal of effort in the reorganisation and 
refurbishment of the EAEF. He had taken over a force in the worst of condition and had 
done much to restore its fighting effectiveness. Much remained to be done, but in the 
circumstances of an exceptionally wet season, the prevalence of disease and the physical 
weakness of the troops under his command, he had been successful. However, 
unbeknownst to him, problems loomed on the home front. Although, he was clearly an 
energetic and efficient officer, his communications with the War Office had not met with 
the CIGS's favour. He had issued a large number of Piecemeal and sometimes 
44'WO 95/5329, War Diary Norforce, Entry 9 May 1917; CAB 44/9, pp. 38-39. 44' WO 95/5329, War Diary Norforce, Entries 14 and 18 May 1917; CAB 44/9, p. 40. "s CAB 44/9, pp. 41-42. 
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uncoordinated requests while not always answering General Robertson's questions in 
sufficient detail. Perhaps more importantly, his efforts belied his predecessor's 
pronouncements of the campaign's imminent end, while Wintgens's breakout to the west 
looked preventable on a large-scale map. 
The CIGS began to entertain doubts about Hoskins's suitability to carry out the 
duties of an independent commander-in-chief, While the matter remains shrouded in 
mystery and the views of the War Cabinet, of which Smuts was a member, are not known, 
Robertson did consult Smuts on the Hoskins's performance. A glimpse of this comes in a 
personal letter written to the CIGS by the South African in mid-April: 
feel confident that the steps which you have taken to supply Hoskins with 
personnel and material, should when completed, enable him to bring the campaign 
to an early conclusion... ""' 
Despite this, discussions in the War Cabinet led to the decision to replace Hoskins 
in late April. His replacement was a surprise. General van Deventer, formerly 
commanding the 2 nd Division, was chosen despite the fact that the EAEF was now largely 
an Imperial rather than a South African force. Smuts supported his selection strongly and 
provided the necessary political backing to the appointment. Whatever the background 
negotiations, the change was agreed by the War Cabinet on 23 April with the following 
comments: 
"The Chief of the Imperial General Staff stated that for some time he had not felt 
that the British operations in East Africa were being carried out as satisfactorily as 
could be desired. He had discussed the matter on more than one occasion with 
General Smuts, who while holding a high opinion of the Officer in Command, 
Major-General A. R. Hoskins, had agreed that apparently he had lost grip of the 
operations and perhaps had become tired. """ 
4" WO 95/5329, War Diary Norforce, Entry I June 1917; CAB 44/9, p. 42. 
MS Smuts, Box 100,13 April 1917, Letter Smuts to Robertson. 
CAB 23/2, War Cabinet Meeting 124,23 April 1917, paragraph 4. 
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The reason for the decision is unclear, and certainly by early May, Smuts had changed his 
opinion of Hoskins sharply: 
"The progress of Wintgens in the direction of Tabora makes it clear to me that there 
, A49 is no firm handling of the situation at present in that theatre. 
While he may well have had genuine doubts about Hoskins's performance, personal 
animosity may also have played a part. As will be seen in Chapter Six, the results of a 
Court of Enquiry set up by Smuts in November 1916 were forwarded by Hoskins to the 
War Office. "" The findings reflected adversely on van Deventer, but also implicitly 
criticised the entire administration of the force under Smuts's command. There is little 
doubt that Smuts was aggrieved by the findings while the whole tenor of Hoskins's various 
requests directly undermined the former's claim to have finished off the campaign 
successfully. He later claimed: 
"Further, in my opinion, the report is one-sided and does not sufficiently consider 
the campaign as a whole and the unforeseen physical difficulties encountered nor 
, A51 is there any allowance given for the results achieved by forced marches... 
Hoskins himself received official notification in late April. After the manifold, but 
as yet largely unpublicized, failures of Smuts's tenure and his own hard work, it was a very 
bitter blow. While Hoskins accepted his supercession professionally, the change was 
widely resented in East Africa, and many felt that an unsavoury political deal had been 
behind it. As one senior officer put it: 
"This seems a more probable explanation - that it was the work of the politicians 
and that the War Office was merely the conveyor of the order. Surely it can only 
449 MS Robertson, 1133/4 8,2 May 1917, Letter Smuts to Robertson. 
4" CO 551/101, Union of South Africa, 1917, Volume 8, Folio 38195,31 July 1917, p. 473. The report was formally signed off on 17 
May 1917, but the outline conclusions were telegraphed to the War Office on 2 May 1917; CAB 23/2,2 May 1917, War Cabinet 
Meeting128. The CIGS announced that they were still awaiting the findings of the board. Smuts was formally approached at the end 
of July, but it is not known whether there was any early and unofficial knowledge of the findings. 431 CO 5511101,9 August 1917, Letter Smuts to Sir George Fiddes, p. 234. 
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have been so, for such an action might well seem as nothing to the politician when 
out to please one of their own kind, though a grave injustice to a regular soldier. "452 
Interestingly, even the German historian of the campaign sympathised with 
Hoskins's ill-fortune. 453 
452 Fendall, The East African Force, p. 10 1. 453 MS Boell, N 14/32,28. Kapitel, p. 2245. 
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CHAPTER 5- SUPPLY AND TRANSPORTATION 
GENERAL 
If there was one consideration that influenced the conduct of the East African 
campaign above all others it was supply and transport, part of what is now called 
logistics. The need to keep the troops, followers and animals of the respective forces 
adequately watered, fed, armed and equipped was paramount. Yet, while the tribulations 
of each are amply described in the various memoirs and the official accounts, the 
secondary literature tends to ignore this unglamorous but essential facet of warfare. 
Indeed, many of the tactical and operational movements can only be understood when 
supply is considered; it was often the desperate desire to prevent thirst or hunger and, in a 
number of instances, to hold starvation at bay, that led to commanders' decisions. 
Ironically, despite having the full support of the respective civil governments and the 
settler populations, both sides suffered tremendously from insufficient diet and lack of 
water. Hunger was constant and malnutrition was commonplace for much of the 
campaign, while the suffering was probably worst amongst the followers of both sides. 
Certainly, the health of many of those who participated in the fighting was adversely 
affected by the conditions under which they served. 
Supply and transportation in East Africa were extremely difficult compared to 
other theatres. The first factor was that the areas of conflict were largely undeveloped 
and often thinly populated. The farming was limited to subsistence level for most of the 
African population, while the relatively few European-owned plantations were geared 
towards producing cash crops suitable for export. It was not possible to support the pre- 
war settler population without imports, especially of European goods, and the influx of a 
large number of soldiers, together with the disruption and destruction caused by the war, 
reduced this ability even further. This was exacerbated by the need to concentrate large 
forces, often in areas of little food production, and to maintain them for extended periods. 
The armies and followers literally ate all of the local areas' food in short order and a 
system of supply depots and magazines was necessary; operations were frequently based 
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on the numbers of days' marches the force would be from the depot. 
454 It was a problem 
very different from the Western Front and one that any eighteenth century commander 
would have instantly recognized. 
With a number of notable exceptions, the land being fought over was not 
particularly rich or fertile. The lack of machinery to cultivate crops coupled with the 
primitive network of roads meant that food could often only be moved from farms to the 
depots on the heads of porters. Even then, this took considerable time and wastage was 
considerable, especially in the rainy seasons. From the depots, the move to the forward 
troops had to be organised and more porters would be required. To compound the 
problem, the porters carrying the food and those troops on the lines of communications 
had to live off the supplies being brought forward for the fighting units. The strength of 
the front line was based on a careful balance between having sufficient supply staff to 
bring up the food and not having too many non-combatants forward and consuming the 
same stocks. 
The situation was worsened by rinderpest and the encroachment of the tsetse fly 
throughout large portions of the German colony. This vector, and the tryponasmiasis that 
it carried, quickly caused the death of all domestic farm animals, especially the cattle so 
important to local wealth . 
455 This influx had been taking place over a considerable period 
of time and many of the inhabitants of such affected areas had migrated away to less 
hostile places and their farms quickly reverted to bush. Depopulation also had a more 
human cause as large numbers of the indigenous locals had been killed or starved during 
the Maji-Maji rebellion of 1905-06 and its aftermath. German ferocity in suppressing the 
uprising and the subsequent destruction of many farms and villages, particularly in the 
south of the colony, had seen the death or migration of at least 75,000 people; certainly 
10 years later the many of the affected areas had not recovered in any meaningful way. 456 
"4 Lettow, Reminiscences, makes frequent references to these considerations. Similar quotations can be found throughout the 
unpublished British war diaries in the narrative chapters. 
455 Blenkinsop and Rainey, Veterinary Services, pp. 407-408. 
4 -4 Koponen, Developmentfor Exploitation, pp. 597-599. Some estimates go as high as 250,000 to 300,000. 
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If lack of sufficient food supplies was a major problem, then obtaining sufficient 
water was often an even greater nightmare. Despite having a high average rainfall, most 
of German East Africa was very dry for much of the time; torrential rainfall in the wet 
seasons is followed by marked aridity in the dry. While major rivers could supply the 
needs of large forces, problems arose as soon as they moved away. Water holes suitable 
for villages of 50 people or so were quickly exhausted when a force of 1,000 or more 
together with pack animals descended upon them. These troops would generally be 
parched from many hours hard physical labour in the hot sun; desperate was often the 
best way of describing their condition. Animals required even larger quantities of water 
and had to be looked after before the troops; frequently supplies were unpalatable or 
brackish which did little for health. 457 Furthermore, lack of specialist personnel for the 
treatment and purification of water added to the problem . 
458 All could and did survive on 
reduced rations for considerable periods, but the lack of water was invariably fatal within 
a very short time. 
In contrast, on the Western Front, the forces were highly concentrated and 
supported by an intricate network of road and rail links. There, an army was seldom more 
than ten miles distant from the nearest railhead, and light railways were frequently 
pushed up to forward gun positions. "9 Corps, divisions and brigades fought in close 
proximity to each other and were seldom spread out over more than thirty miles. Being 
in the main theatre, they also received the highest priority for stores and equipment while 
460 
administrative failings in 1915 and 1916 where dealt with at the highest political level. 
Even in a campaign not noted for its standard of administration, such as Mesopotamia, 
the advance followed a navigable river back to a seaport. In Egypt and Palestine, the 
advance was based on the Suez Canal and Port Said and an enormous effort was made to 
build the water pipelines and railways necessary to support a large force in the desert. 461 
'" Blenkinsop and Rainey, Veterinary Services, p. 4 10. 
4511 CO 691/19, Pike Report, p. 49. 
459 Brown, Logistics on the Western Front, pp. 158-159 and 162. 
460 Adams, RJQ, Arms and the Wizard Lloyd George andthe Ministry ofMunitions 1915-1916, London: Cassell & Co, 1978, pp. 35- 
37; Brown, Logistics on the Western Front, p. 142. Lloyd George's appointment of Sir Eric Geddes to run the BEF's supply system 
testifies to this. 
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SUPPLY 
All armies of the period had distinct supply problems related to the race or 
background of the forces involved. The bulk of soldiers and followers were Africans 
who were used to diets particular to their homes, while the officers, NCOs and civil 
government were largely European. This meant that separate food was essential, as 
neither group would eat the other's unless absolutely necessary. European style food 
was almost all imported so the Germans were the first to suffer from shortfalls, but 
shipping restrictions meant that the British also went short on a regular basis. There was 
also the complication of outside forces that needed feeding: the British had to supply 
Indian troops with food appropriate to their religion and caste, West Africans were 
different from East Africans, and the South Africans were used to different things. The 
followers presented especial problems as they were often pressed men, unused to travel 
and unable to adapt to changed conditions. The men drawn from the tropical areas of 
Uganda and around the Lake Victoria area lived largely on a banana-based diet and 
suffered gastro-intestinal disorders from a maize or millet-based diet. 462 Understanding 
of diet was frequently poor and the British, in particular, made a number of major errors 
in setting up the rations of those who fought for them. Settler prejudice and ignorance 
played a significant role in the poor diet of some of the African troops while inability to 
supply the correct types of food or in sufficient quantities was linked to the weak system 
of supply. 463 However, there were deeper problems, as Surgeon General Pike pointed out 
in his report: 
"Let it be clearly understood that we are not now speaking of the failure of food to 
reach the troops or carriers, or any shortcomings due to transport, but to the initial 
error in laying down scales physiologically faulty or deficient ... the Supply 
Department should not operate without scientific advice. If this were the rule 
scale would not be issued showing substitutes which physiologically are not 
461 Murray, Lieutenant General Sir A J, Sir Archibald Murray's Despatches, London: JM Dent& Sons, 1920, pp. 188-205. These 
annexes detail the huge logistical effort, for example, on the Kantara East line alone, over 1,300 engines and waggons were supplied 
by Britain and Egypt. 
462 CO 691/19, Pike Report, pp 56-57. 
46' Hodges, The Carrier Corps, pp. 119-123. 
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substitutes at all, nor would dietaries be drawn up from which are excluded 
substances essential to life and health... 9,464 
Specific points included the issue of variable quality meal to the carriers coupled with the 
fact that it was frequently impossible for them to carry both their full load and their 
authorised rations. It was also noted that the Cape "Boy" (mixed race) rations had no fats 
and insufficient vegetables while the West African and West Indian Regiment rations had 
no vegetables at all. 465 
TRANSPORTATION - GENERAL 
The poor state of tracks and roads made the problems of supply much more 
difficult when the campaign moved into the more remote areas. The British had solved 
much of the water problem through the construction of pipelines and railway cars whilst 
still back in their own colony, but this was never a realistic option once the advance 
began. Shortages of materials, trained labourers and the means of moving heavy 
materials precluded such construction in all but the most developed bases. Even where 
this was attempted, such as at Kilwa or Lindi, the movement of the columns quickly 
outstripped their means of transporting goods. The Germans, cut off from the outside 
world, never had that alternative and relied on mobility and an extensive supply system to 
keep forces in the field. However, it is also clear that they suffered heavily from the 
same problems as the British and their allies. 466 
Colonel Orr, formerly Hoskins's DA&QMG at Vt Division, and subsequently a 
column commander of some success, later wrote: 
"... The transport had broken down by the end of May. Throughout the June 
advance and the August advance and even during the July halt, except for a few 
days, the transport had not been able to deliver more than half the needs of the 
4" CO 691/19, Pike Report, p. 56. 
463 CO 691/19, Pike Report, pp 59-60. 
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troops ... The transport had lost any elasticity 
it may have had long before the troops 
reached the Central Railway. A67 
This was not an isolated view and variants were widespread amongst the GHQ staff 
and the fighting formations. The Assistant Adjutant General, Colonel CP Fendall, noted in 
his diary that: 
"... In the conduct of the campaign the fault has been movement without sufficient 
preparation. The administrative staff has not been much to blame. They were 
constantly faced with new conditions which invariably called for more transport 
than they had been able to anticipate from previous information. There had been 
serious breakdowns, causing great privations to the men both by keeping them for 
long periods on reduced rations, and depriving them of proper hospital 
accommodation because there was no transport to take it up to them. A68 
SHIPPING 
The Allied forces did have one major advantage in that the sea lines of 
communication were open to them throughout the latter part of the campaign. This 
meant that troops, food, vehicles and stores could be moved from Europe, India or South 
Africa relatively quickly and in bulk. Importantly, shipping could move unimpeded to 
East Africa from either the Cape of Good Hope or the Suez Canal routes; external 
resupply was largely denied to the Germans apart from two small blockade runners. The 
chief limiting factors were the shortage of ships, particularly from January 1917 onward, 
and insufficient developed ports at which to unload. Dar-es-Salaarn was the principal 
base and by far the most developed, while Lindi and Kilwa were both relatively primitive 
at the time of their capture by the British. Furthermore, the ports were often some 
distance from the fighting and resupply had to be conducted over the difficult conditions 
' MS Boell, N14/32,26. Kapitel, pp. 1990-1997; Boell, Die Operationen, pp. 294,299,318; Schnee, Deutch 0staftika, pp. 238 and 
268-280; and Lettow, Reminiscences, pp. 173-179. 
467 Orr, Colonel G M. "Smuts v. Lettow: A Critical Phase in East Africa: August to September 1916", The ArnW Quarterly, LXX, 
(1925), p. 294. 
4" CAB 45/44, Diary of Colonel CP Fendall, Entry for 4 February 1917, p. 70. 
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described above. Still, despite all these handicaps, the possession of sea communications 
by the Allies and the corresponding lack of external sources of resupply for the Germans 
made the ultimate capture of the colony possible. 
RAILWAYS 
The railways, both British and German, were the most efficient means of moving 
men and materials within the theatre of war. The Northern Railway connected the 
Kilimanjaro area with the port of Tanga while the Central Railway linked the capital of 
Dar-es-Salaam with the interior right up to Lake Tanganyika. "' While small and having 
limited rolling stock, these lines made the conduct of large-scale operations possible. 
Unfortunately, the paucity of connecting communications limited the supply value to a 
few miles' radius from the major stations. Furthermore, while both made good use of 
this medium in the early stages, the Germans lost theirs to the British advance by the 
summer of 1916 and General Smuts never appeared to have understood fully their 
importance. Obsessed with surrounding and cutting off his foe, he failed to appreciate 
the need to restore first the Northern and later the Central Railways as a objective of the 
utmost urgency after capturing their termini. His troops remained reliant for too long on 
lengthy, slow and inefficient lines of communication rather than switching to a more 
flexible system of rail linked to sea travel. While it is true that the subsequent operations 
south of the Central Railway were also dependent on porter and light vehicular traffic, the 
establishment of a fully operational and effective railway would have greatly assisted the 
building up of the stocks essential to a successful offensive. On other hand, van Deventer 
extended light railways from Kilwa and Lindi as far as his resources would permit. 
ANIMAL TRANSPORT 
Like their medical counterparts, the veterinary services encountered significant 
problems through lack of planning and general ignorance of animal management 
procedures. The South African mounted regiments came in for particular criticism as they 
"9 Woodhouse, Capt H I, "East Africa", Journal of the UniledService Institution oflndia, XLVL (1917), pp. 330 and 334. 
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lacked centralised procedures and paid little heed to the veterinary officers and their advice. 
This resulted in enormous wastage rates: for the period March 1916 to January 1917 nearly 
100% of animals employed died. One cause was similar to that faced by humans; lack of 
sufficient food in the forward areas. But, the overwhelming reason was trypanosomiasis as 
carried by the notorious tsetse fly. VvUle generally fatal to animals, the infection and 
effects of this disease could be ameliorated by careful procedures and attention to local 
conditions. However, this good advice was frequently ignored at great cost to subsequent 
military operations. One example illustrates the consequences of good care: 
"During October, 1916,1,720 horses and mules were taken over at remount depots 
and conducted forward by regimental personnel. The distance was approximately 
200 miles. One hundred and fifty-five animals were lost en route. [9 per cent] 
During the same period, 2,528 horses and mules were conducted forward by 
remount personnel over the same route without the loss of a single animal. 9A70 
The losses with the mounted troops were enormous - in the period August to 
October 1916,2 nd Division was issued with 4,470 horses and 1,831 mules while P 
Division was given 2,168 horses and 1,032 mules. 47 1 Totalling some 9,501 animals, all 
would perish before the end of the year. )While nothing could be done to cure 
trypanosomiasis, proper management and feeding could have extended the working lives of 
the animals by as much as 50 per cent. As with the other administrative services, the 
veterinary corps had little influence at General Headquarters with most of its advice being 
ignored: 
"during this period of campaign [March 1916 to January 1917] ... the commander- 
in-chief and general staff were not in intimate touch with the Veterinary Services. 
There was no veterinary staff officer in the field with general 
headquarters ... combating disease was only half the battle. Bad animal management 
47' Blenkinsop and Rainey, Veterinary Services, p. 412. 471 Blenkinsop and Rainey, Veterinary Services, pp. 417-419 and 425. 
152 
and starvation could be represented but were out of the power of the Veterinary 
Service to remedy. -A72 
MECHANICAL TRANSPORT 
Owing to their physical isolation from the homeland, mechanization was never an 
option for the Germans. However, the British used the earliest cars and trucks to good 
advantage whenever possible. Ford light cars, capable of carrying 300 pounds of cargo, 
had an immense advantage over porters as they required only a driver and were capable 
of much greater effort. The cars did require petrol, were subject to breakdown on the 
very difficult tracks, and the drivers were as vulnerable to disease and fatigue as the 
porters. Furthermore, in the rainy season the vehicles were incapable of negotiating the 
flooded swamps or the surrounding mud and in the dry season the collapse of the roads 
into fine dust caused considerable difficulties. However, the sheer efficiency of 
mechanical versus human transport soon made the motor vehicle an essential part of the 
British supply system; it has been estimated that one lorry was the equivalent of 30 
porters. 473 The limits on their use were the speed at which usable tracks could be cut, the 
provision of sufficient vehicles and drivers, and keeping the system working under the 
baleful influence of the climate and pestilence. In the final analysis, the motor vehicle 
was a significant factor in keeping the British advance going, particularly when the 
supply of porters withered in late 1917.474 
As with the other areas of administration, there is considerable evidence that the 
British did not make best use of the available resources. From the onset of the advance in 
early 1916, out of six MT companies provided to the EAEF, one was allocated to a naval 
kite balloon section, four were attached to the artillery and only one was actually under 
the control of the Director of Supply and Transport. The problem of ever-expanding 
lines of communications also impacted heavily on the MT, as divisional or column 
472 Blenkinsop and Rainey, Veterinary Services, pp. 417418. The figure of 50 per cent was an estimate given by veterinary officers. 
473 Hodges, The Carrier Corps, p. 57. 
474 WO 106/1490, MTHistory, Part III, Section IV, p. 6. At least eight supply routes in excess of 100 miles were serviced by MT; 
CAB 44/9, p. 67, footnote 1. By 20 May 1917, over 900 vehicles were in use in East Africa with a further 555 on order. 
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transport generally had a fixed operating radius with the difference having to be met by 
the support transport. 475 This was a major problem as the distances were frequently huge: 
Route Distance 
Voi - Morogoro 500 miles 
Korogwe - Morogoro 150 miles 
Kondoa Irangi - Kaijado 300 miles 
Dodoma - Dabaga 170 miles 
Kilossa - Mahenge 130 miles 
Lindi - Newala 150 miles 
Lindi - Maundi 150 miles 
Kilwa - Liwale 150 miles 
.f 10 
It was not until Hoskins assumed command that a thorough reorganisation of the 
MT was undertaken. Recognising the inflexibility of the system, all vehicles were 
gradually placed under central control and allocated according to the size of the column 
to be supported. By Augus 1917, there was a single MT unit that supplied all aspects of 
the East African force and it was to be the mainstay of the organisation for the remainder 
of the war. "" 
CARRIERS 
If the railways provided the best means of transport, local conditions dictated that 
the armies had to depend on the least efficient method, human porterage. It was the 
adaptation of a long-standing tradition in certain tribes of hiring out men to carry food 
and stores on their heads for safaris. The urgency of the war and the problems of moving 
food and ammunition saw a radical and ruthless expansion of the labour force that was 
unprecedented. Initially supplied with volunteers, the conditions of service, the length of 
absence and the horrors of the unknown led to large-scale compulsion. The problem with 
475 WO 106/1490, MT History Part 111, Section IV, pp. 29-30 and p. 39. These routes were not all in use simultaneously. 
'76 WO 106/1490, UT History Part III, Section IV, pp. 6-7. 
477 WO 106/1490, MTHislory Part Iff, Section IV, pp. 28-30. 
154 
porterage was that it involved very hard physical labour in arduous conditions, the food 
was often insufficient, diseases were rife and there was a very real chance of being a 
battle casualty. The same diseases and maladies that affected the soldiers were several 
times more likely for the followers through a combination of poor diet, overwork, lack of 
basic hygiene and ignorance. 478 The question of porters became a dominating factor for 
the British and Belgians while it never lost its importance with the Germans. 
If getting the correct amount of manpower was essential, then keeping it fit and 
healthy was equally important. By the end of 1916, it was calculated 160,000 men had 
been recruited in the northern British territories as well as in the German colony, of 
whom only some 63,000 remained working in the field. 479 Some 5,349 had died while an 
astonishing 26,318 were counted as deserters or missing. - the remaining 30,000 had been 
discharged in line with their engagement . 
480 However, on taking stock of the situation 
after assuming the chief command, General Hoskins and his staff calculated that 160,000 
carriers would be needed to keep the force going on the road; in recruiting terms this 
meant an extra 16,000 carriers per month to keep up with the estimated wastage rate of 
15 per cent; 481 These enormous numbers also had to be found in direct competition for 
carriers with the Belgians who needed 18,000, as well as recruits for the rapidly 
expanding King's African Rifles. Despite the best efforts of the colonial officials, who 
exerted considerable pressure on the African chieftains backed by a fair degree of 
coercion, it was never possible to get sufficient numbers in time for the planned move 
south. At the end of March 1917, the authorities had managed to come up with another 
50,345 men and even by the end of June 1917 the total recruitment since the turning of 
the year only reached 124,83 0.482 
It should also be remembered that these figures only include the manpower 
necessary to keep a unit mobile with its own limited reserves, usually one day worth for 
ammunition and two to three days' worth for food. The bringing forward of supplies 
478 CO 691/19, Pike Report, p. 6; CO 533/216, Watkins Report, pp. 5-8 and 20-22; Hodges The Carrier Corps, pp. 126-128. 
479 CO 533/216, Watkins Report, Appendix I to Table 2 (rotal Recruitments) and Appendix I to Table 3 (Numbers in the Field). 
480 CO 533/216, Watkins Report, Appendix I to Table 4 (Deaths by Periods) and Appendix to Table 7 Crotal Deserted and Missing). 
491 CO 533/216, Watkins Report, p6 and Hodges, p 54. 
482 CO 5331216, Watkins Report, Appendix I to Table 2 (Total Recruitments). 
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from the rear required an elaborate system of its own that had to be independent of the 
forward troops; the Belgians estimated that some 260,000 people were employed on war- 
related transported work in their colony. 483 
To give an example of the desperation of the situation, in late 1916 1" Division 
demanded substantial increases in carriers in order to maintain the growing force at 
Kilwa, while van Deventer's 2 nd Division needed an additional 4,000 just to increase the 
rations above half the entitlement that the troops were barely subsisting on. Despite the 
seriousness of the situation, neither demand could be met as the main effort was directed 
at keeping the forward troops on the River Mgeta supplied. 484 A later staff paper 
estimated the first and second line requirements as follows: 
Campagnes Coloniales Belges, 1, p. 34. 4" CAB 44/6, pp. 6-7. 
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Formation Battalions Mouths 
to Feed 
Daily 
Weight of 
Food (lbs) 
Number of 
Carriers Needed 
Iringa 3 4,865 9,370 10,568 
Ruflj 1 3 4,534 9,066 10,568 
Kilwa 7 16,851 33,702 16,851 
Lindi 4V2 10,374 20,748 8385 
Force Reserve 4 ? ? 7540 
Total 21V2 50,297 
The third line requirements meant that another 10,000 men had to be added: 
Force Carriers 
Iringa Force 3,244 
Rufiji Force 2,500 
Kilwa Force 1,800 
Lindi Force 2,500 
Total 10,044 
THE LINES OF COMMUNICATION 
If logistics appear an unglamorous subject, then its chief means of action, the 
lines of communication, may be even less so. All forces require the means of collecting 
people, food, and material from their place of production to the theatre of war. From 
there, it is necessary to have a system that can hold and sustain them and then move them 
forward to the required area of operations at the appropriate time. These functions must 
be carried out regularly regardless of the posture of the fighting forces, although pressure 
usually increases during times of battle and its aftermath - people require feeding, 
weapons need ammunition, vehicles need fuel, and equipment may have to be replaced in 
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full or part more or less continuously. Add to this the need to bring in individual 
replacements for the sick and casualties of battle, while evacuating those same cases 
rearward for care as well as prisoners of war, plus the moving forward of reinforcing 
units and keeping those who operate the lines of communication fully supplied, and a 
huge responsibility emerges. For all of the combatants, these questions were hugely 
magnified by the poor infrastructure in the areas of movement and fighting, the difficult 
and pestilential climate, and the generally insufficient material means of carrying out the 
desired military operations. Improvisation and flexibility were the hallmarks of the 
period, although not without considerable suffering by military and civilians alike. 
BRITISH CASE 
It may be useful to use illustrative examples from each of the major combatants to 
highlight the problems that faced the opposing sides at a similar point in time, that of 
September 1916. For the British, the 2 nd Division had struggled to reach the thickly 
vegetated area around Kidodi by 7 September in accordance with the direction of General 
Smuts. This much reduced formation, which could barely muster 4,700 effectives, had 
never recovered from the vicissitudes of its earlier advance to Kondoa Irangi and the 
breakdown of supply that it entailed. However, by the time the short rains forced it to 
halt opposite Abt Otto in September, it was really at the end of its tether. "" Sketch No A 
shows graphically the distances involved in keeping the forward troops going. What is 
striking is the huge distance to the railhead at Moshi; the Official History cites 410 miles 
while from the map it measures closer to 450 miles. Apart from the difficulties of 
carrying food, ammunition, fuel and supplies all this way and in primitive conditions, it 
should be noted that the need to change the types of transport at various points made for 
inefficiency and invariably slowed down the flow of supplies, particularly when human 
porterage was required. This was not necessarily a criticism of the supply system as it 
also had to contend with local road conditions; it just illustrates how precarious the 
margin of existence was. It also shows how critical the reopening of the Central Railway 
'" Hodges, The Carrier Corps, p. 209. See Appendix 2 which cites General Staff plan of 25 February 1917 in the Watkins Papers. "6 GSWA, Box 26,17 September 1916, Operation Report 2' Division, van Deventer to Smuts. 
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was and why the British needed to get Dar-es-Salaam functioning as a port as quickly as 
possible. 
If the plan of operation seemed familiar, then so did the logistical situation. The 
allocation of motor transport, after the needs of the main force further east had been met, 
was inadequate for the situation. The poor and now deteriorating state of the roads caused 
the breakdown rate to soar while local African impressed carriers continued to desert as 
quickly as they could. The divisional staff had made every effort to maximise its resources 
and had broken down the lines of communication into five stages, each relatively suited to 
the mode of transport available and the ground. The stages were organised as follows: 
Start Point Finish Point Distance 
(miles) 
Method of Transport 
Dodoma (Railhead) Kisomache 12 Carriers and Divisional 
NIT 
Kisomache Temagwe 66 Heavy MT 
Temagwe Sadala (via Ruaha) 23 Light Cars 
Sadala 16 Mile Post 17 Carriers 
16 Mile Post nga 16 Light Cars 
This meant that the total line of communication from the railhead, which represented 
the most economic method of transport, to the forward base at Iringa was some 134 miles 
and required the crossing of numerous rivers. Furthermore, the need to exchange loads at 
five different points, while operationally essential, was wasteful and time-consuming. 
Finally, it needs to be remembered that hinga was about 20 miles north-west of the start 
point at Dabaga, with the main objectives another 20 miles ftuther on; for the flanking 
columns the movement of supplies was probably doubled by the long approach marches. 487 
Despite the hard work by the logistical staff and the supply units, there was no 
possible way of building up adequate stocks of food prior to the advance. Indeed, it was 
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very difficult to maintain full rations as the situation stood and it would be impossible to 
provide such during an advance. Van Deventer was forced to launch his move in full 
knowledge that half rations for all troops would be the best that could be provided; he 
acknowledged this and infortned his command accordingly. If the troops could not be fed 
properly, then it was a certainty that the followers would be even worse off. It is instructive 
to note that, although van Deventer's division totalled about 5,000 fighting troops, the 
carriers supporting it reached over 13,600. The poor weather conditions, the hard work and 
the inadequate diet convinced many to desert and they could not be replaced fast enough. 488 
BELGIAN CASE 
The Belgians suffered from similar problems to the British, and in some ways had 
a more difficult task in maintaining their forces. The greatest disadvantage was that 
Belgium was largely occupied and most items had to be procured in either Britain or 
France prior to being shipped to Africa. There were three sea routes: one leading from 
La Pallice to the river port of Matadi on the River Congo, another leading from 
Marseilles to Mombasa and thence through British East Africa, and a third running from 
London to Cape Town . 
489 The first route was naturally preferable as its land portion ran 
through Belgian territory, but it was far from ideal. Arriving material had to be offloaded 
the ocean-going transport at Matadi and transferred to the railway. The next stop was 
Ldopoldville where the rail line ended and a further transshipment to boats took place. 
The cargo then proceeded up the River Congo to Stanleyville where it was separated 
according to its type and ultimate destination. There, the river had two large unnavigable 
stretches that were served by railway lines, which of course entailed further loading and 
unloading. Once on Lake Tanganyika, steamers could be used to move stores to Ujiji, the 
western terminus of the Central Railway. From there the rail line ran to the main base at 
Dodoma, where everything was offloaded and moved to the front by MT and carriers. 
'27 CAB 44n, P. 10 and footnote. "a GSWA, Box 29,7 December 1916, Telegram P 13,2 Div to BGGS; 10 December 1916, Telegram AA & QMG to GSO 1; CAB 
44/7, pp. 11-12 and footnote. Some 800 porters deserted in the first 10 days of December, leaving a shortfall of over 3,000. 489 Campagnes Colonjales Belges, I, p. 29. See Map I for overview and Map 2 for more detailed routes. 
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The chief difficulty in the forward areas was that they were largely uncultivated 
or infertile and that they had been systematically emptied by the Germans. The British 
had agreed to supply food up to the railhead at Dodoma, but the Belgians were 
responsible for moving it forward to the front line troops. The Belgian Commander-in- 
Chief estimated that some 18,000 carriers would be needed, of which 5,000 had been 
loaned to the British but were due for return. 
Given the practical difficulties of identifying, moving and organising these 
dispersed individuals, the Belgians agreed to recruit a similar number in British occupied 
territory. From 27 May to the end of July, this 5,865 carriers, leaving a further 13,000 
outstanding. Only 10,000 could be produced from the Belgian-occupied territory and in 
June authorisation was given to recruit 3,000 carriers from Katanga. These measures 
were vitiated by the fact that many of the 4,000 carriers being used to support the hunt for 
Naumann were now incapable of further effort. Originally from the mountainous areas, 
they found the differing climatic conditions of the plains difficult to cope with and were 
susceptible to disease. This, plus desertion, led to numerous shortfalls and also to marked 
losses of clothing and equipment. 490 
Representations by Huyghd to the Belgian Goverment were answered by 
permission to enlist a further 10,000 carriers from the Belgian Congo. Again this was 
only accomplished with great difficulty over the following five months. He had even 
more problems in obtaining European personnel and the combat units were so under- 
manned by Belgians that it was impossible to provide supervisors for the carriers. In the 
end, the British were forced to supply officers to run the most of the Belgian columns' 
carriers. It was to mean a difficult campaign with the supply of food always perilous. 
GERMAN CASE 
From the German point of view, the problems of supply were quite different, but 
equally as challenging. While they did not have to worry about ever lengthening lines of 
490 Campagnes Coloniaks Belges, 111, pp. 136-137. 
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communication, indeed theirs were shrinking, their means of transport were very much 
more limited. Apart from a few areas few of tsetse fly, and with few pack animals, they 
were essentially limited to human muscle power. Although the British failed to close 
with and destroy the fighting power of the Schuatruppe, their rapid advance often forced 
the Germans to abandon vital stocks of food as they simply not could be carried away in 
time. Insufficient porters hampered their efforts and there was a constant tension 
between keeping the various Abteilungen fully mobile and keeping the all-important lines 
of communication functioning. On a number of occasions this caused a great deal of 
friction between the civil and military authorities. The Germans also had the particular 
problem of growing sufficient food, harvesting it and then moving it from the farming 
areas to the lines of communication. This put additional strain on their system. "" 
The Germans operated a series of depots, known as magazines, under the 
command of an Etappenleiter, whose job it was to make sure that the correct supplies 
went to the right location. This task was made more difficult by the poor 
communications between theAteilungen, particularly once the Central Railway and its 
telegraph system had been lost. In September 1916, the system was naturally focused on 
the main force which was operating on the line of the Mgeta River; a significant 
detachment was further to the east in the area of the lower Rufiji valley and moving south 
from Dar-es-Salaam. The system was based on the magazine at Kunglio on the Rufiji 
which kept the forward troops supplied. The river could be used only with great 
difficulty and certainly not in the rainy season as the currents were simply too strong, but 
it did provide a link to the other major supply centre at Utete, further downstream. The 
remainder of the links were based on improved tracks; the main route ran southwards to 
Maba, it branched north and westward to Luwegu and thence to Mahenge; the main 
routed continued south to Liwale. Liwale was a major centre of food production and 
tracks radiated in all directions, connecting Songea in the west, Tunduru in the south, and 
Massassi in the south-east, with Lindi and Kilwa in the west. The route was by no means 
easy to traverse, although a number of improvements had been made and the journey 
from Lindi to the Rufiji took several weeks. Nevertheless, the possession of interior lines 
491 Lettow, Reminiscences, pp. 174-178 and 234-235. 
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of communication made von Lettow's task significantly easier and he took great pains to 
ensure that it remained intact for as long as possible. 
After sowing crops on the lower Rufiji in November 1916, the potential for 
reasonably adequate food supplies existed. "" This would be a vital source as it enabled a 
large element of the force to avoid drawing on the Etappenleitung for several months 
while producing an extra 300 000 kg for the stocks. An example of the tensions in the 
system comes from the Lindi-Bezirk in early November, in which the Etappenkommando 
Liwale reported the movement of 450 - 500 tons of food as well as expecting to extract at 
least 150 tons from native supplies during the January harvest. In contrast, the local 
commander, Looff, signalled on 9 December that the removal of food from his area was 
causing severe supply problems. 493 In reply, he was told to live off the land and that the 
expected 150 tons must be kept in reserve. 
The replacement of food was a constant concern as the Rufiji force alone 
consumed about 10,000 kg of cereals per day supplemented by local foraging and 
hunting. With the harvest of corn in March 1917, the next available crop would be the 
mtarna in June; until then at least 900,000 kg would be needed. But there was a 
significant shortfall in stocks with only 600 000 kg held; the magazines along the Rufiji 
had 150 000 kg, the Etappenleitung held another 150 000 kg, the magazines in Liwale- 
Nangano stored another 150 000 kg, leaving 150 000 kg in Lindi. 494 
Von Lettow kept almost daily records of his supply situation. Despite his care, he 
had the unpleasant surprise of discovering that the Etappenleitung held only 175 000 kg 
of the expected 300 000 kg in its stores. This shortfall was due to wastage and having to 
feed 20 000 rather than the planned 15 000 people. 495 In order to survive, on 26 January, 
von Lettow ordered drastic cuts, with the daily ration being reduced from 750g to 600g 
(rice from 500g to 400g) and meat being produced by hunting. Several days later, he 
decided on large reductions in numbers, with over 8,000 Africans followers being 
492 MS Boell, N14/30,26. Kapitel, pp. 1967 and 1981-1983. 493 MS Boell, N 14/30,26. Kapitel, p. 1988. 494 MS Boell, N14/30,26. Kapitel, p. 1990. 
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dismissed while formations were ordered not to feed the 500 wives and boys any further. 
The cuts fell on both the Feldtruppe and the Etappenleitung who were ordered to shed 
some 2,500 and 4,000 posts respectively. Henceforth, companies were capped at 
maximum of 165 carriers each. 496 
Owing to a favourable harvest, conditions eased in early 1917 and rations were 
raised to 700g meal and 5OOg rice, but they could never be described as more than 
adequate given the conditions and hard physical labour that all were enduring. 497 
INFLUENCE OF SUPPLY AND TRANSPORT ON OPERATIONAL DECISION- 
MAKING 
There is no doubt that the limitations of supply greatly influenced the decisions of 
the commanders of both sides. The Germans as much as the Entente suffered from 
severe food and water shortages. Although Smuts had tried to overcome the problems of 
supply through force of willpower, it was an impossible task and his troops suffered 
heavily. After his departure, many of both sides' tactical and operational deployments 
were largely based on considerations of food and water. The need for adequate resources 
was behind Lettow's decision to hold the lower Rufiji River area in late 1916 and early 
1917. Smuts failed to realise this and ignored the area, enabling the Germans to replenish 
their food stocks at a critical period . 
498 Another example of the far-ranging effect of 
supply on operations was the decision to hold the southern portion of the German colony 
and to range into Portuguese East Africa. In Lettow's own words: 
"The operations of the last few months had narrowed the area from which 
supplies for the troops could be obtained. The productive areas of Lupembe, 
Iringa, Kissaki and the lower Rufiji had been lost, and the newly-occupied 
districts included wide stretches of barren land. The productivity of the more 
fertile areas was for the most part unknown ... At that time I only had a general 
493 MSBoell, N14/30,26. Kapitel, p. 1991. Some 6,800 belonged to the Etappenleitung and 2,200 to the Feldintendantur. 
496 MS Bocll, N 14/30,26. Kapitel, pp. 1995-1996. 
497MSBoell, N14/30,26. Kapitel, p. 2001; Lettow. Reminiscences, pp. 176-178. 
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idea that the eastern part of the Lindi area was very fertile and known as the 
granary of the colony. 9A99 
This understanding led to the despatch of Abt von Stuemer into Portuguese 
territory in early 1917 to harvest its food resources while shortages at Mahenge led to the 
dispersal of several detachments to the south in order to lessen the strain on the hard 
pressed lines of communication. 
On the other side, van Deventer's advance on the Lukuledi had to stop on several 
occasions owing to lack of food, while Norforce's clearance of Portuguese East Africa in 
early 1917 was specifically intended to deny the enemy resources. Similarly, the 
withdrawal of the Belgians from Mahenge in late 1917 was aimed at preventing 
starvation and needless suffering. All had learnt the vital importance of maintaining a 
functional supply and transport system in place. 
4" Lettow, Reminiscences, pp, 160 and 178. '" Lettow, Reminiscences, p. 190. 
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CHAPTER 6- DISEASE AND MEDICINE 
INTRODUCTION 
The East African campaign was quite unlike its contemporaries in the First World 
War in many ways, but the one factor that made it notably so was sickness. Armies have 
always suffered from the depredations of disease, particularly in the tropics with their 
debilitating effects of sun, heat, and indigenous pestilence. The nineteenth century 
campaigns of imperial conquest in Africa had demonstrated the dangers of soldiering in 
such unhealthy climates through consistently high mortality and sick rates. However, by 
the turn of the century, advances in medicine and sanitation had reduced the perils of the 
continent to much more acceptable levels. Soo 
If much progress had been made in the application of medical science to military 
affairs, a great deal remained to be done as East Africa, particularly in its low-lying and 
swampy regions, was host to a wide variety of tropical diseases and afflictions. The 
exigencies of war and the difficulties of resupply made a complex medical situation even 
worse and added to the problems of the field campaign for both sides. To this must be 
added the weakening effects of inadequate diet, prolonged exposure to the elements, 
insufficient protective clothing and a shortage of effective medicines. Furthermore, many 
on both sides failed to understand the importance of proper hygienic and sanitary 
measures with hugely detrimental effects to the well-being of soldiers and followers 
alike. In such circumstances, the high rates of malaria, dysentery, typhoid, pneumonia, 
blackwater fever, and tuberculosis were unsurprising. Similarly, the less dangerous, but 
equally unpleasant, effects of leeches, fleas, ticks, flies, ants and bees did little to help 
either morale or health. 501 
-" Curtin, Philip. Disease and Empire 71e Health ofEuropean Troops in the Conquest ofAftica, Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1998, pp. ix-xi. Henceforth, Curtin, Disease and Empire. '0' CO 55 1/101, Union of South Africa, 1917, Volume 8, Folio 38195,31 July 1917, Court of Enquiry, Findings of the Courtý pp. 474- 
475. The entire text of the Court together with the evidence submitted in contained in this folio - it is a bulky document of over 200 
page; Henceforth, CO 55 1/10 1, Court ofEnquiry; CO 69 1/10, Pike Report, pp 87-88; 
166 
While the transmission of tropical diseases through such vectors as the anopheles 
mosquito and the tsetse fly could not be prevented, there were a number of prophylactic 
measures that could be implemented to reduce the scale and level of suffering. The 
regular administration of quinine, the use of mosquito nets, the correct siting of camps, 
spraying and other measures had been proven effective in the past. 502 However, the 
implementation of preventative actions under difficult wartime conditions required firm 
discipline and material support. Discipline was required to ensure that medical 
precautions and other preventative measures were followed by exhausted, hungry and 
debilitated troops. Efficient organisation was essential in providing the necessary 
medicines and material for the successful fight against disease. In a difficult and long 
drawn-out campaign, fought in virgin bush many miles away from the nearest supply 
bases, both of these requirements were frequently either ignored or simply impossible to 
carry out. 503 
The vicissitudes of the British forces are by far the best documented in both the 
popular and scholarly literature. While they clearly suffered from a number of failings, it 
is also apparent that the other protagonists had an equally tough time in coping with the 
climate. The evidence is still fragmentary, but the Germans and Portuguese seem to have 
had even higher levels of sickness than the British. As well, there appear to have been 
marked differences between the types and rates of morbidity of Africans and Europeans 
as well as soldiers and followers. Certainly all participants, military and civilian, suffered 
immensely and many left the conflict with their health permanently impaired. 
THE BRITISH EXPERIENCE 
The British medical experience in East Africa was not a happy one, as it was 
marked by significant failures in both administration and command. Overall, it proved to 
be the most unhealthy theatre of the war and sickness, particularly of malaria, reached 
50' Harrison, Mark, "Medicine and the Culture of Command: the Case of Malaria Control in the British Army during the two World 
Wars", Medical History, X1, (1996), pp. 441-442. 
'0' GG/9/96/18,21 January 1916, Letter Bonar Law to Buxton. This letter enclosed an article in the British Medical Journal by Sir P 
Manson on the measures required to ensure health in East Africa, especially precautions against malaria. A copy was almost certainly 
passed to Botha and Smuts; Secretary ofDefence, Group 2, Box 839. Copies ofthe articles were also sent to the Defence Department. 
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very high levels. While mortality rates never approached the levels of the campaigns of 
the early and mid-nineteenth century, the wastage of manpower was enormous and was, 
in many ways, excessive. The main reasons were the high command's lack of 
understanding of the need to enforce prophylactic and sanitary measures together with a 
sidelining of the medical service's own chain of command. However, the medical 
services cannot escape a share of the responsibility, as a more energetic and determined 
approach to the problems encountered could well have brought better results. In the end, 
it was this substantial failure that led to widespread suffering and death. 
BRITISH MEDICAL ORGANISATION 
The medical services in the East African Expeditionary Force followed standard 
British Army organisation and structures. At its head was the Director of Medical Services 
(DMS), usually a surgeon general, supported by one or more Assistant DMS (ADMS). 
Next in the hierarchy was the Deputy DMS (DDMS), a title given to the doctors running 
hospitals and the line of communication medical staff. At division level, the principal 
medical officer used the title of ADMS. 504 Coming under the Adjutant General, these 
officers were responsible for the efficient running of medical units, treatment of the sick 
and wounded and advice to their respective operational commanders on all aspects of 
medical matters. 
The system was based on a hierarchy of units designed to treat casualties, sick or 
wounded, at the appropriate level. This began with the regimental medical officer, a 
505 
qualified doctor, and a number of stretcher bearers who were trained in first aid. 
Wounded soldiers were usually given first aid by their comrades, before being carried back 
to the regimental aid post (RAP) by the stretcher bearers. There, they would be assessed by 
the medical officer and given limited treatment before being sent back to the field 
ambulance. 
5" Macpherson, Maj Gen Sir W 0, History of the Great War Based on Official Documents - Medical Services General History 
Volume 1. Medical Services in the United Kingdom; in British Garrisons Overseas; and during Operations against Isingtau, in 
Togolan4 the Cameroons. and South-West Aftica, London: HMSO, 192 1, p. 3. Henceforth Macpherson, Official Histo? y Medical 
Services Volume 1. 
"5 Whitehead, Doctors in the Great War, London: Leo Cooper, 1999, p. 181. 
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The field ambulance was meant to be a mobile medical formation and there were 
supposed to be three per division, usually meaning one per brigade. It was divided into two 
groups; the bearer division and the tent division. The former provided stretcher-bearers 
who collected the wounded while the latter had the advanced dressing station and ten 
ambulances for their treatment. Operationally, the field ambulance broke down into three 
sections, each with a third of the bearer and tent divisions' resources, that could operate 
behind the forward units. A section could treat up to 50 wounded or sick, giving the field 
ambulance a total of 150 places. 506 
The field ambulance had three major roles; the first was to relieve the RAPs of their 
sick and wounded; the second was to assist the regimental personnel in clearing the 
wounded from the battlefield, usually during pauses or at night; and the third was to 
provide sufficient treatment to casualties so that they were able to be evacuated for more 
extensive treatment away from the battlefield. 507 The next stage in the medical chain was 
the clearing hospital which was meant to bridge the gap between the field divisions and the 
lines of communication. The clearing hospital was meant to have 200 modified stretcher 
beds, but began the war established for neither ambulances nor nurses. 508 This, and their 
lack of a significant surgical capability were major limitations in their effectiveness, 
although as elsewhere these hospitals evolved into the better-known casualty clearing 
stations (CCS). Unlike the Western Front, where the static nature of fighting and 
widespread presence of rail lines helped to overcome their limited mobility, the CCS in 
East Africa had a much more difficult task owing to insufficient transport. 
Two other types of unit supported the forward troops; the stationary and general 
hospitals. The latter was intended to be a light, mobile hospital capable of treating 200 
patients and as a link between the clearing hospitals and the base. However, improved 
methods of evacuation, notably the motor ambulance convoy, made this role redundant and 
over time the stationary hospital had its capacity increased to 500 cases and assumed the 
same functions as the general hospital. Finally, on the lines of communication, was the 
5'6 Macpherson, Official History Medical Services Volume 1. pp. 8-9. 
Whitehead, Doctors in the Great War, p. 189. 
Macpherson, Official History Medical Services Volume 1, pp. 10-11. 
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general hospital. This unit was designed to deal with all likely types of sickness and 
wounds in the army and was split between medical and surgical divisions capable of 
treating up to 500 casualties. 509 
One unit that came to particular prominence during the war was the motor 
ambulance convoy (MAC). As the name implied, this mobile unit was used to move 
patients between treatment units in specialised vehicles. While the MACs were a great 
advance on animal-drawn ambulances and stretcher-bearers, they were in short supply and 
were limited by the road and weather conditions 
EFFECTS OF DISEASE AND MISMANAGEMENT 
There is little doubt about the debilitating and often fatal effects of tropical 
illnesses as they figure prominently throughout accounts of the campaign. General Smuts 
himself was well aware of the unhealthiness, of the country and its effect on the escalating 
sick rate, particularly as he contemplated plunging south of the River Mgeta: 
"... According to Medical report about 70% of VAN DEVENTERS Division are 
unfit for work owing to combined effect of Malaria, Dysentery and Debility. 
Position in two other Divisions not much better ... Above numbers totalling 8000 
are none too large to catch 4000 or 5000 of the enemy and will be further reduced 
by sickness in deadly RUFIJI area... "510 
Operations in some of the most unhealthy regions of the world could never be free 
from high rates of sickness, given the state of medicine at the time, but Smuts's telegrams 
to the War Office always rested on the implicit assumption that the climate was solely to 
blame. Unsurprisingly, they never touched on the manifold weaknesses of his own 
administrative arrangements that exacerbated the problems. It does not seem to be a 
question of awareness of the number of casualties, which were well known, but rather the 
inability to prevent them. As the previous chapter has pointed out, the lack of thorough 
" Whitehead, Doctors in the Great War, pp. 208-209. 
310 WO 95/5291, War Diary GHQ, 22 September 1916, Appendix 32a, Telegram OA 412, Smuts to CIGS, 22 September. 
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and well thought out plans for supporting the advancing troops with sufficient food, 
clothing, protective equipment contributed materially to the poor state of health by 
September 1916. 
In the desire to wrap up the campaign quickly, Smuts and his staff ignored the 
obvious consequences of driving an already exhausted and fever-ridden force well 
beyond the existing, inadequate supply lines into a primeval wilderness. The Rufiji 
Valley was well known to be both dangerous to health and difficult to move through, yet 
the advance south was continued in September and October. The onset of the short rainy 
season in the latter month forced a halt to operations, but with the troops in low-lying, 
swampy and highly malarious areas. The result was to increase the level of sick 
casualties until many units ceased to exist as fighting entities and the remaining troops 
were incapable of any serious effort. Concerned about the disappearance of much of his 
force, particularly the South Africans, in October Smuts ordered a medical board to 
assess the worst-affected sick cases. The results were dire, as over 12,000 soldiers were 
considered unfit and invalided home on medical grounds. The problem was amplified by 
the inability of the services to evacuate many of the cases in a timely or efficient matter; 
the collapse of the transport and the effects of the rains on the primitive road network 
caused chaos. 
His principal staff officer sent an urgent telegram to the administrative staff in 
early November about the need for efficient evacuation and treatment, but there was little 
that could be done in the circumstances. 511 It took considerable effort and time to move 
the sick back to the railway, which still was not operating at anything like its capacity. In 
the meantime, the remaining soldiers, many of whom should have been hospitalised 
themselves, had to shoulder the absent troops' workload, making for a particularly 
unpleasant and vicious circle. 
It is worth considering the factors that allowed this to happen. While sickness had 
been a significant concern during the first year and a half of the campaign, it had never 
511 WO 95/5300, War Diary DMS, 3 November 1916, Appendix 111, Telegram QC 14, BGGS to Adminstaff. 
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grown out of control owing to the relatively static nature of the fighting and a reasonable 
system of administration. However, with the launching of mobile warfare in March 1916 
and the advance out of the and steppes of British East Africa into the heavily vegetated 
and well-watered lowlands of the German colony, the force entered the habitat of the 
malarial mosquito and tsetse fly. Second, the pace of advance coupled with an inability 
to organise the supply services effectively meant that troops were usually underfed and 
without essential protective equipment. Third, the medical services had insufficient staff 
and resources to deal with the scale of the problem. Finally, through a combination of 
operational pressure, poor discipline and ignorance, personal and group sanitary measures 
were often neglected at great cost to the troops and followers. 
Given this potent combination of problems, the health situation worsened 
significantly as the advance progressed. If the South Africans suffered heavily, 512 the 
British and Indian troops were also much depleted by sickness and overwork resulting in 
the need to rotate long serving battalions. 5 13 The state of the followers was also poor 
although they tended to suffer much more from pneumonia and dysentery [check] than 
malaria. By early 1917, matters had reached such a stage that the senior medical officer 
was recommending that only Africans and a minimum number of Europeans be 
employed in the Rufiji area and that much higher standards of shelter, food and clothing 
514 be applied. 
The War Office began to become alarmed as the casualties began to mount in late 
1916. While it had always expected a higher than normal sick rate in the campaign, the 
levels suffered by the East African Force seemed abnormally high. Coupled to this were 
persistent stories, principally emanating from South Africa, that mismanagement and 
incompetence had led to much unnecessary suffering and illness. 515 This unease was 
-'12 WO 95/5292, War Diary GHQ, 15 October 1916, Entry 1, e& Yd Divisions. The 31d Division was abolished and the two 
mounted brigades amalgamated. War Diary GHQ, 16 October 1916, Entry Lake Det. & Belgian Force. The Lake Force was 
abolished and its commander and staff returned to South Africa. WO 95/5292, War Diary GHQ, 23 January 1917, Entry e Division. 
The 2d Division was abolished early in 1917. 
513 WO 95/5300, War Diary DMS, 31 January 1917, Memorandum Surgeon General Hunter to [CinC ? ]. The Surgeon General 
recommended that the bulk of non-African troops be given rotated while the Africans remaining be well house, sheltered and amply 
fcd. Hordcm, Military Operations East Africa, pp. 520-522, gives further details. 
514 WO 95/5300, War Diary DMS, II February 1917, Letter DMS to DA & QMG. 
... WO 33/858, Telegrams D 1, No. 1313,17 October 1916, Telegram D 280/1973, General Botha to War Office, p. 355. "... 1 am 
especially anxious to explain situation frankly to South African public, in view of political conditions here and quite unfounded 
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strengthened by the return of so many emaciated and fever-wracked soldiers, some of 
whom had been away for as little as six months, that it became a political matter. Finally, 
towards the conclusion of General Smuts's time in command, one of his battalion 
commanding officers, Lieutenant Colonel Kirkpatrick, laid a formal complaint to his 
brigade commander which was quickly passed up to GHQ. 5 16 The language was blunt 
and forthright: 
"... The total strength of this Regiment, with reinforcements was over 1200, so 
that the percentage of EFFECTIVES is approximately 9%, leaving 91% as 
INEFFECTIVES. 
This, I submit Sir, is an appalling state of affairs and in view of the 
medical reports and representations which have been made from time to time, it is 
quite clear that a very grave charge must lie against some person or persons who 
must be responsible for the existing state of affairs ... Among other things, 
Starvation, bad and insufficient Clothing and Equipment, dearth of Hospital 
Drugs, comforts and accommodation, are given as reasons for the present debacle, 
and these cannot but be accepted by every Unit Commander and other persons in 
similar responsible positions. This state of affairs is not due to any sudden 
difficulty arising, but has existed and continued, at any rate since the entry into 
Kondoa-Irangi, some 5 1/2months ago, and though repeated representations have 
been made to you there has been no improvement in the situation... " 
A-Wart from the seriousness of the charges, the explicit threat in the letter to take P 
subsequent action should the matter be ignored left the high command little option but to 
convene a formal court of inquiry. 
"... I venture to say that if the question of an enquiry is not adopted that things 
will be brought to light in a very disagreeable manner after the campaign is over, 
rumours concerning Brits which have gained credence here last July... "; No. 1388,17 November 1916, Telegram OA 84, Smuts to 
CIGS, p. 377. "... General Botha telegraphed me that complaints which are appearing in South African newspapers are having 
disturbing effect. The complaints are to the effect that owing mismanagement troops here have been starved and insufficiently 
clothed... ". 
516 CO 55 1/101, Court ofEnquiry, 26 October 1916, Letter Lt Col Kirkpatrick, Commanding 9' Regiment South African Infantry to 
General Officer Commanding 3' South African Infantry Brigade, pp. 248-250. 
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as there are many men of substance, standing and intelligence, in the ranks who 
are not likely to remain quiet when freed from the restrictions of the Service. I 
have only fringed on the whole question, but in support of what I say, would call 
all O's. C. Units, Medical Officers, Supply Officers, Quartermasters, Transport 
Officers, etc... " 
Faced with an umnistakable challenge, the court was established by order of 13 
November 1916, some two weeks after the allegations were lodged, and ran until May 
1917.5 17 The complaints which alleged that one unit suffered from starvation, inadequate 
medical arrangements and exposure arising from insufficient clothing and equipment 
were based largely on the 2 nd Division's advance to the Central Railway. A lengthy and 
detailed enquiry by officers of General Headquarters followed, in which a number of 
witnesses were interviewed and statements taken at length. 5 18 The evidence was 
devastating as the other commanding officers in the brigade substantiated Kirkpatrick's 
claims. In the I lth SAL 
"... I left the remnant of my regiment there [KIKUMIJ. I had to point out that I 
was losing men sick at such a pace - 16 men a day was the average. There were 
70 men sick in camp and 170 in the field ambulance ... The condition of the men 
became very bad at KIDODL They had been gradually going back for a long 
time, due, as I had already pointed out, to their having been drawing on the 
stamina all the time ... The Brigadier 
knew all about these conditions. I discussed 
it with him more than once and he expressed his concern to me... "519 
Things were little better in the 12ý' SAL 
"I attribute the present exhaustion of the men of my regiment to constant exposure 
to rain and tropical heat without proper cover. Secondly, to shortness of rations 
and shortness of drugs ... In my opinion the absence of proper and constant 
doses 
517 CO 551/101, Court of Enquiry, "Instructions of Authority Assembling the Courr, 13 November 1916, p. 238. 
51' CO 5511101, Court ofEnquiry, 17 May 1917, pp. . 
238-485. 
519 CO 551/101, Court ofEnquiry, "Statement ofCoIN. H. M. Burn", Commanding I I'h South African Infantry, [n. d. ], pp. 329-333. 
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of quinine, though ordered by the medical authorities, has been one of the greatest 
scandals of the campaign ... The Brigade 
Commander was told all about the 
condition of the men and the inadequacy and unsuitability of the rations as issued, 
frequently and used to tell me he had done best to improve matters for them ... On 
the march to Mpapua the 2 nd in Command of the 10h S. A. I. told my 2 nd in 
Command that 50% of his regiment had fallen out and that my regiment was in 
,, 520 much the same state.. 
Even the medical evidence was damning. The Deputy Assistant Director of 
Medical Services for the 2 nd Division stated: 
"To sum up, the troops never had full Army rations. They performed miracles on 
mealie pap and flour and water ... the 
Division has been put out of action as 
effectively as if it had been done by the enemy ... Drugs 
have been incredibly short 
from MASHOTI (Feb. l7t) comforts, cornflour, arrowroot, stimulants, etc., 
practically non-existent even from the commencement of the campaign. 
Prophylactic doses of quinine were ordered but not available and so on with every 
,, 521 individual item... 
In light of this, and much more, the Court found in favour of Colonel Kirkpatrick 
although it was unable to find any one person or specific organisation to blame. It stated: 
"... The only conclusion possible is that all the conditions complained of were 
brought about by want of facilities for transportation. The shortness of food and 
clothing would not have occurred had it been possible to carry these things 
forward ... The responsibility for the want of 
facilities for transportation cannot be 
fixed on any individual or set of individuals. The exigencies of the campaign 
520 CO 551/101, Court ofEnquiry, "Statement of LtCol Bottornley", Commanding Officer lVh South African Infantry, [n. d. ], pp. 335- 
339. 
521 CO 5511101, Court ofEnquiry, "Statement of Capt W CC Pakes", Deputy Assistant Director Medical Services, 2 nd Division, [n. d. ], 
pp. 331-335. 
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necessitated a much longer line of communications than had been contemplated 
95522 or allowed for at the time the line was so extended... 
While 2 nd Division had clearly failed to respond adequately to very trying 
circumstances, the question of why GHQ had not taken any remedial action remained 
unasked. The crisis in health had been apparent since mid- to late- 1916. For example, 
the chief medical officer of the 2nd Division had submitted a report stating that the 
majority of the fighting troops were in need of rest and were being debilitated by 
continuous marching, road-making, drift-making, fighting and lack of food, and by 
malaria and dysentery. 523 This was echoed by reports from medical officers in the 
forward units as well as the Director of Medical Services himself. 524 For example, on 15 
September, 12th SAI reported that 75 per cent of its men were unfit for duty "owing 
shortage rations weakened by fever and dysentery ... 
3V2 biscuits per day not sufficient 
525 ration" while 1" SAH could only muster 5 per cent of its effectives. 
The problems were amply reflected in the hospital figures; in September 1916, lt 
Division had a total strength (including porters) of 10,598, of whom 1,362 sick and 193 
wounded were admitted to hospital, and of these some 1,224 had to be evacuated 
rearwards. Medical officers found that some 17 per cent of the troops had enlarged 
spleens and anaernia while 30 per cent were unfit for hard work owing to underfeeding 
and heavy exertions. 526 There is no evidence of either the commander-in-chief or the 
general staff initiating a sustained effort to sort out the serious problems in supply, 
transport or health, apart from ordering more evacuations. 
The choice of the principal administrative staff officers from GHQ as court 
members no doubt influenced the outcome, but even the most generous interpretation 
522 CO 5511101, Court ofEnquiry, "General Conclusion", pp. 476477. '23 Macpherson and Mitchell, Official History Medical Services, Volume 4, p. 450. '24 WO 95/5300, War Diary DMS, 9 November 1916, Letter DMS to DA & QMG attaching letters 28 November 1916, Senior 
Medical Officer, 2' South African Field Ambulance, attached 2" Division; 28 November 1916, Assistant Director Medical Services, 
2"d Division; WO 95/5292, War Diary GHQ, 10 October 1916, Entry P, 2"d & Jrd Divisions; and 22 October 1916, Entry 
P, 2"d & 31 
Divisions; and 23 December 1916, Entry 2d Division. To be fair to van Deventer, he had been reporting the seriousness of his supply 
and manpower situation throughout this period; GSWA, Box 26, It September 1916, Telegram K 475,2 Div to Smuts. 5's GSWA, Box 26,15 September 1916, Telegram SC 548, Thirbrig to 2 Div; Box 29,16 December 1916, Telegram T 63, OC 
Composite Regiment [I Ob SAI] to 2 Div. 
$26 Macpherson and Mitchell, Official Histo? y Medical Services, Volume 4, p. 457. 
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could not hide the substantial failings within the administrative and medical services. 
The matter was referred back to London where it quickly became a political hot potato 
between the War and Colonial Offices. General Smuts was shown a copy of the report 
and asked for his advice on whether to publish it or not. No doubt conscious of his 
political position at home, he advised its suppression until after the campaign was over. 
He was also unhappy with the findings of the court: 
"After reading the report I have come to the conclusion that, instead of 
allaying the feeling and agitation [in Johannesburg], its publication might have the 
opposite effect and I am averse to publishing the report until the campaign is over 
as it deals very largely with the administration of a Division commanded by 
General Van de Venter and its publication might seriously weaken his position. 
Further, in my opinion, the report is one-sided and does not sufficiently consider 
the campaign as a whole and the unforeseen physical difficulties encountered nor 
,, 527 is there any allowance given for the results achieved by forced marches... 
The official War Office line to the South African Government was a whitewash 
that justified Smuts' conduct of the campaign while admitting that 2 nd Division suffered 
from a lack of experience in novel and unexpectedly difficult conditions. 528 It was a 
lame reply to a very serious matter that deserved closer attention. Doubtless, it was 
hoped that the matter would now die quietly. 
If Whitehall was prepared to brush off a colonial government with a vague and 
unsatisfactory answer, it was also concerned with the findings of the Court. Despite all 
of Smuts' reassurances about the unavoidable nature of the administrative problems 
endured by his forces, it was evident that the medical situation was very unsatisfactory 
and that independent investigation was necessary. Accordingly, in July 1917 the War 
Office instructed Surgeon General WW Pike to go out to East Africa and to report on the 
517 C0551/101, Union of South Africa, 1917, Volume 8, Folio 38195,31 July 1917, Letter JC Smuts to Sir George Fiddes, 9 August 
1917, p. 234. 
523 CO 5511101, Union of South Africa, 1917, Volume 8, Folio 44918,10 September 1917, Letter 0165/8468 (MO 2) Secretary, War 
Office to Under-Secretary of State, Colonial Office, 9 September 1917, pp. 570-571. 
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medical situation there. 529 His study took four months with a large number of units being 
visited and numerous personnel interviewed. The team was able to gain a first-hand 
impression of conditions and in particular the difficulties under which the force operated. 
The report covered all aspects of medicine and health, coming to a large number of 
findings. One of the earliest comments was the damage done to morale and efficiency by 
Smuts's ill-advised pronouncements: 
"... A public statement made in England early in 1917 that the war was over in 
East Africa did incalculable harm as it caused a general feeling of "Oh! The war 
is over here, why trouble to increase units, get things out from home for camps 
and build bandas, etc., etc. " The war was not over or anything like over; and all 
precautions against disease were required with greater urgency than before; but, in 
spite of the fact that every thinking man out here knew the statement was not 
correct, it inevitably led to a curtailing of initiative, for the thought could not but 
intrude itself when a suggestion was made or a requisition sent forward, 'Is this 
necessary as the war is said to be practically at an end? 919530 
Some areas, such as the work of the field ambulances and hospitals together with 
methods of casualty evacuation were found to be satisfactory. However, the scientific 
and sanitary aspects of the medical services came in for most scathing and damning 
criticism although the failure of the command to take note of medical advice was also 
531 
noted. Of particular note was the failure to supply the microscopes essential to the 
correct diagnosis of tropical diseases despite repeated requests by medical officers. 
There were also substantial criticisms of the discipline of the force, particularly 
concerning malaria. It had proven to be the biggest medical problem throughout the 
campaign causing much suffering and disability. Yet, despite its seriousness and well- 
known effects, GHQ and the medical services had failed to tackle its causes robustly 
529 CO 691/19, Pike Report, pp. 1-89. 5'0 CO 691/19, Pike Report, p. 6. 531 CO 691/19, Pike Report, pp. 87-88. 
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enough. Much of the problem related to poor treatment of the initial attack as well as 
inadequate measures taken to prevent infection. In the words of the report: 
"Neither quinine prophylaxis nor the issue of Proper mosquito nets, nor what may 
be termed "malaria discipline" was enforced as should have been the case. No 
proper anti-malarial organisation was put in force and apparently we entered 
lightly on a campaign in one of the most malarious regions of Africa without 
,, 532 much idea of the seriousness of the undertaking. 
It went on to point out that the use of the former German capital, Dar-es-Salaarn, 
as the primary base after September 1916 had led to many of the problems. It was known 
to be extremely malarious yet no serious anti-malarial measures were put into place until 
the Board arrived. It was generally the first landing place of all reinforcements and the 
transit camps in the vicinity of the town were highly exposed to malarial mosquitoes. It 
was unsurprising when the bulk of newly arrived troops contracted malaria there and 
began the vicious circle of repeated attacks that led to a marked decline in health. Once 
started, it was extremely difficult to break the cycle. 533 
The post-war Official History was less restrained in its language: 
"Dar-es-Salaam was probably the most malarious locality within the area of 
operations and the danger of its incidence existed throughout the whole year ... Anti- 
malaria work was not taken up seriously till the later phases of the military 
operations, and when it was commenced the troops had already largely been 
affected to a large extent. Malaria, in fact, practically ran riot in the early stages of 
the campaign, before adequate arrangements had been made for the protection of 
new arrivals from the moment they disembarked. Had such arrangements been 
possible the incidence of malaria in this campaign would undoubtedly have been 
materially less. "' 
112 CO 691/19, Pike Report, p. 26. 
533 CO 691/19, Pike Report, p. 27. 
534 Macpherson, Major General Sir W G, Herringham, Major General Sir W P, Elliott, Colonel T R, and Balfour, Lieutenant Colonel 
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The Pike Report went on for considerable length and produced considerable 
evidence for its findings. Nowhere could it be said to be a ringing endorsement of the 
conduct of the medical aspects of the campaign. Finally, it concluded: 
"When, however, all is said and done, and every allowance made for these and 
other drawbacks, we cannot but feel that there is much to regret in the medical 
history of this campaign and that a great many difficulties were due to a lack of 
035 forethought, of driving power, and of expert knowledge and assistance. 
From this and other evidence it was clear that the link between the general and 
administrative staffs was inadequate. For example, during the advance south of the 
Central Railway, there was a lack of detailed planning and poor liaison between the key 
departments: 
"The above outline of the operations shows that they were complicated ... There 
is 
no evidence, however, that any well-considered scheme was evolved or that 
medical units were instructed regarding the part they would play during the 
operations. The medical arrangements appear to have been haphazard, and 
sections of field ambulances were apparently attached to any formation that 
happened to be at hand. 11536 
The Official History also highlighted the major shortcomings in the overall 
organisation of the force: 
"No doubt the abnormal sick-rate was in part due to the failure on the part of the 
responsible military staff to recognize the importance of preventative measures 
against disease. The D. M. S. of the force had his headquarters too far away. He 
was not always in direct communication with General Headquarters nor with the 
A, eds History ofthe Great War Based on Official Documents Medical Services Diseases of War, Volume 1, London: HMSO, (n. d. ], 
pp. 254-25 5. Henceforth, Macpherson et al, Official History Medical Services Diseases of War Volume 1. 5'5 CO 691/19, Pike Report, p. 87. 
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Army Commander, and most of his recommendations had to be made by 
correspondence. Further, rations and equipment were generally inadequate, and 
there can be no doubt that men who are under-fed, exposed to hard fighting and 
unsuitably protected against weather conditions fall easy victims to 
disease ... There were not sufficient medical units, and when the medical staff 
became depleted the reinforcements sent out consisted of young and 
inexperienced medical officers with little knowledge of tropical medicine or 
sanitation, and only able to communicate with the troops under their charge by 
, 537 means of inefficient interpreters. 
Matters began to change in early 1917, when the new commander-in-chief took 
steps to reduce the still-rising sick rate. A complete and comprehensive reorganisation of 
the medical services was undertaken with emphasis being placed on making the field 
ambulances more mobile and having a coordinated system of evacuation and treatment. 
Extra staff was recruited and more effort was directed towards the medical support for the 
much-neglected carriers. 538 Nevertheless, the critical area of sanitation lacked proper 
organisation and was inadequately supervised until after the visit of Surgeon General 
Pike in August 1917.539 
The general advance that began in mid- 1917 benefited greatly from the improved 
system of medical support although at one stage the rapid advance of the fighting troops 
outran the medical system and delays in the evacuation of the sick and wounded 
occurred. Despite the bitterly won lessons of the previous year, this factor does not seem 
540 to have figured in the Staff s calculations and nor was it ever reported to the DMS . 
Even at the end of October 1917, during the pause to regroup prior to the final clearance 
of GEA, the medical staff failed to make the necessary casualty evacuation plan despite 
being briefed on the overall intentions. The fact that the DMS still remained in 
536 Macpherson and Mitchell, Official History Medical Services, Volume 4, p. 453. 537 Macpherson and Mitchell, Official History Medical Services, Volume 4, p. 467. 532 Macpherson and Mitchell, Official History Medical Services, Volume 4, pp. 475-477. 339 Macpherson and Mitchell, Official History Medical Services, Volume 4, p. 499. The post was upgraded from DADMS to ADMS 
(rank range. ) 
'40 Macpherson and Mitchell, Official History Medical Services, Volume 4, p. 485. 
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Dar-es-Salaam while the commander-in-chief was far away to the south can only have 
contributed to the inefficiencies of the system. 541 
One area of the administrative system that seems to have been consistently 
ignored throughout 1916 and 1917 was the motor transport. Given the inefficiencies and 
weaknesses of human portage, the effectiveness and throughput of the logistical system 
was dependent on motor transport moving supplies as far forward as possible. However, 
it required both machines and drivers to operate it and the machines seem to have 
received the better support. The feeding, welfare and health of the drivers were largely 
left to chance and they suffered as badly from illness as those in the front line. Again, the 
reasons are not difficult to determine: 
"... These men had been overworked and had driven their cars from early morning 
till late at night over roads that were never good and often dangerous. They were 
exposed to great extremes of heat and cold, while their messing and sleeping 
arrangements were haphazard and the sanitation of their camps defective. No 
attempt had been made to provide them with a system of rest camps having tent or 
'banda' accommodation ... 
but it is evident, too, that very little attention was paid 
99542 to the welfare and comfort of mechanical transport personnel... 
By 1917, opinion both within and outside of East Africa was coming to the 
conclusion that it was unsuitable for European or Indian troops. With the publication of 
the Pike Report and the reports of returning officers, the War Office came to share this 
view, and by the end of that year, all the British, South African and Indian fighting troops 
had withdrawn to other theatres, leaving behind mainly specialist units. The fighting in 
1918 was largely conducted by African troops on the grounds that only they had 
sufficient resistance to disease and acclimatisation to be effective there although the need 
to find reinforcements for the Middle East and shipping shortages also played an 
important role. 
'541 Macpherson and Mitchell, Official History Medical Services, Volume 4, p. 487. 
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East Africa never fared well in medical matters, although it was far from being 
alone in, causing concern. The Medical Research Council expressed its concerns about 
the Army's inability to replicate the success of the medical system in France elsewhere, 
particularly in the eastern theatres, as well as the failures in disseminating effective 
measures of preventative medicine. 543 In contrast to this unsatisfactory situation, there 
was both high level support and effectiveness in implementing sanitary measures in the 
BEF in France. The same staff system prevailed as in East Africa, but the chief 
difference in Europe was that the officer in command of troops took responsibility for 
their health and the advice of senior medical staff appears to have been heeded. 544 As Ian 
Whitehead has concluded: 
"The combatant branch contributed to these achievements by adopting a generally 
sympathetic attitude towards the work of the RAMC. The latter proved to be a 
critical factor as was evident from the disastrous lack of consideration given to 
medicine on other fronts, such as Gallipoli, Mesopotamia, and East Africa. 545 
By the end of the war, there was little doubt that much unnecessary and 
preventable suffering had occurred amongst troops and followers, due to poor planning 
and coordination. The true numbers of casualties will never be known, but they were 
excessive by the standards of the day and, most particularly, of the state of scientific and 
medical knowledge. Perhaps the most telling epitaph was the minute of the Adjutant 
General on the Pike Report: 
"Had this particular campaign been more in the public eye, a very grave scandal 
would have resulted, owing to the want of supervision on the part of the 
Commanders-in-Chief over the departments of their staff concerned. ti546 
M2 Macpherson and Mitchell, Official History Medical Services, Volume 4, p. 474. 543 Whitehead, Ian K Doctors in the Great War, pp. 144-145. 544 Whitehead, Ian R. Doctors in the Great War, pp. 219-22 1. 545 Whitehead, Ian R. Doctors in the Great War, p. 254. 5" CAB 103/94, WO File 0 165/985 1, Minute by General Sir Nevil Macready on Pike ReporL [check details here] 
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ANALYSIS OF SICKNESS 
While there was little contemporary question that the rate of sickness in East Africa 
was excessively high, apart from the post-war Medical Services' OJJIcial History, there was 
almost no serious coverage of the true scale of the problem. Even the official work, 
diligent as it was in highlighting the failings of the campaign and providing reams of 
statistics, only put a limited effort into comparison of the levels of morbidity and mortality 
across the theatres. Yet, without an objective look at the levels of casualties suffered, it is 
difficult to come to an accurate assessment of the successes and failures of EAEF's medical 
effort. Fortunately, the final volume of the Medical Services' Official History provides an 
excellent source of statistical evidence from which a preliminary assessment can be 
formed. The only drawback is that it relates solely to the British forces and only a rough 
estimate of German casualties can be compiled from other sources. 
Table I compares the proportion of battle to non-battle casualties across selected 
theatres and in the South African War of 1899-1902. It is noteworthy that East Africa had 
by far the highest proportion of non-battle to battle casualties, over 1.5 times that of the 
next nearest theatre, Macedonia, and nearly 24 times that of France and Flanders. It is 
nearly twice the earlier campaign in South-West Affica and the South African War. Even 
compared to unhealthy theatres such as Macedonia and Mesopotamia, the ratio is 
extremely high. 
184 
TABLE I 
PROPORTION OF NON-BATTLE TO BATTLE CASUALTIES IN SELECTED 
BRITISH EXPEDITIONARY FORCES547 
-THEATRE PERIOD BATTLE 
CASUALTIES 
NON-BATTLE 
CASUALTIES 
RATIO NON-BATTLE 
TO BATTLE 
East Africa 1916-1918 10,717 336,540 31.40x 
Macedonia 1915-1918 23,762 481,262 20.25x 
South-West 
Africa 
1914-1915 1,588 24,746 15.58x 
South African 
War 
1899-1902 26,750 404,126 15.10X 
Egypt and 
Palestine 
1915-1918 51,451 503,377 9.78x 
Mesopotamia 1914-1918 85,207 820,148 9.63x 
France and 
Flanders 
1914-1918 
I 
2,690,054 
I 
3,528,486 
I 
1.31x 
I 
'7 Mitchell , Major TJ and Smith, Miss GK History of the Great War Based on Oricial Documents Medical Services Casualties 
and Medical Statistics of the Great War, London: HMSO, 193 1, reprinted Nashville, Tennessee: Battery Press, 1997, p. 56, Table 1. 
"Proportion of Battle to Non-Battle Casualties in the British Expeditionary Forces during the Great War". Henceforth, Mitchell and 
Smith, Official History Medical Services - Casualties and Medical Statistics. It should be noted that all figures for the South African War are for other ranks only. All other figures are for British and Imperial troops and exclude followers. 
185 
Table 2 shows the proportion of killed to wounded and total permanent losses to 
temporary losses. East Africa had the second highest ratio of killed to wounded and of 
permanent to temporary losses. In other words, battle casualties there were more likely to 
die, but that overall casualties were much more likely to return to service after treatment. 
TABLE2 
PROPORTION OF CASUALTIES IN SELECTED BRITISH EXPEDITIONARY 
FORCES549 
'THEATRE PERIOD KILLED TO PERMANENT 
WOUNDED LOSSES TO 
TEMPORARY 
LOSSES 
East Africa 1916-1918 1: 3.70 1 : 33.72 
Macedonia 1915-1918 1: 6.50 1: 46.60 
South-West 1914-1915 1: 3.36 1: 20.78 
Africa 
South African 1899-1902 1: 4.50 1: 19.50 
War 
Egyptand 1915-1918 1: 5.43 1: 26.41 
Palestine 
Mesopotamia 1914-1918 1: 5.36 17.78 
France and 1914-1918 1: 7.80 1: 5.60 
Flanders 
541 Mitchell and Smith, Official History Medical Services - Casualties and Medical Statistics, drawn from p. 169, Table 6, "Proportions" (France and Flanders); p. 189 Table 7 "Proportions" (Macedonia); p. 226 Table 8(c), "Proportions - Whole Force (Mesopotamia); p. 211, Table 6 "Proportions" (Egypt and Palestine); p. 256, Table 7, "Proportions" (East Africa); p. 264, Table 6 
"Proportions" (South-West Africa); and p. 270, Table 6, "Proportions" (South African War). 
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Table 3 shows the absolute number of casualties suffered in selected theatres, 
showing in East Africa's case how important losses to sickness or injury were relative to 
those incurred in battle. In terrns of troops, the sick reached 86 per cent of those suffered 
in the much larger South African War; together with the followers, overall sickness levels 
were 48 per cent higher than those of the previous conflict. 
TABLE3 
APPROXIMATE TOTAL CASUALTIES IN SELECTED BRITISH 
EXPEDITIONARY FORCES549 
THEATRE KILLED DIED OF DIED OF MISSING WOUND- SICK OR TOTAL 
WOUNDS DISEASE AND PW ED INJURED 
OR 
INJURY 
East Africa 2,689 754 6,558 10301 7,777 330,232 349,311 
(Troops) 
East Africa 376 44,911 635 1,333 241,688 288,943 
(Followers) 
Macedonia 2,797 1,299 3,744 2,778 16,888 477,518 505,024 
South-West 185 61 181 - 782 560 23,565 26,334 
Africa 
South African 5,774 2,018 14,048 202 19,457 390,444 430,876 
War 
Egypt and 7,394 2,993 5,981 3,871 37,193 497,396 554,828 
Palestine 
Mesopotamia 11,008 5,281 16,712 15,221 53p697 803,706 905,625 
France and 381,261 151,356 32,098 319,824 1,837,613 3,496,388 6,218,540 
Flanders 
United - - - - - 1,965,646 1,965,646 
Kingdom 
I I 
TOTALS 418,361 167,172 113,173 352,458 2,00,4,976 1 6,074,552 1 11,096,3381 
549 Mitchell and Smith, Official History Medical Services - Casualties and Medical Statistics, p. 12, Table 1, "Approximate Total Casualties in the British Expeditionary Forces during the Great War; the numbers of South African War casualties have been drawn 
from p. 269, Table 3, Not all theatres are shown in the table, but their numbers have been included in the overall totals. For East 
Africa troops, the totals of sick and injured relate to 1916-1918 only - all other figures cover the entire war. For followers, the totals 
of killed and died of wounds have been combined under the killed column. 
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Hca's casualties were significant From the foregoing statistics it is clear that East Af 
as compared to other theatres and that sickness was of overwhelming importance. It is now 
useful to examine the breakdown of casualties by disease type - Table 4 shows the 
incidence of malaria: 
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TABLE4 
INCIDENCE OF MALARIA IN SELECTED BRITISH EXPEDITIONARY 
FORCES 
(DEATHS AND RATIOS PER 1,000 OF RATION STRENGTH) 
Campaign Period Admissions Deaths Ratio per 1,000 
Admissions Deaths 
East Africa 1916 
(Jun-Dec) 
50,768 263 
1 
1,039.11 5.38 
1917 72,141 499 1,422.84 9.84 
1918 22,941 69 559.09 1.68 
Macedonia 1916 32,018 287 259.48 2.33 
1917 71,412 228 391.12 1.25 
1918 59,087 272 458.94 2.11 
South-West 
Africa 
1914-1915 518 2 15.70 0.06 
South African 
War 
1899-1902 25,156 85 45.30 0.15 
Egyptand 
Palestine 
1916 1,423 8 7.57 0.04 
1917 8,480 73 45.46 0.39 
1918 30,241 773 130.86 3.35 
Mesopotamia 1916 16,957 - 102.54 
1917 16,063 118 52.24 0.38 
1918 21,447 166 52.10 0.40 
France and 
Flanders 
1916 58 - 0.04 - 
1917 781 2 0.41 0.00 
1918 2,739 4 1.47 0.00 
This table shows how truly significant the malaria problem was in 1916 and 1917; 
in the former year every soldier was admitted to hospital at least once, while in the latter 
year the admission rate was over 1.4 times. This rate was halved in 1918, but was still 
"0 Mitchell and Smith, official History Medical Services - Casualties and Medical Statistics, p. 80, Table 19. 
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1.2 times the highest rate suffered anywhere else (Macedonia 1918). Overall, notoriously 
malarious theatres such as Mesopotamia, Macedonia and Egypt/Palestine compare very 
favorably with East Africa, especially in the death rates. 
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Table 5 shows the incidence of dysentery, including both the bacillary and 
amoebic varieties. 
TABLE5 
INCIDENCE OF DYSENTERY IN SELECTED BRITISH EXPEDITIONARY 
FORCES 
(DEATHS AND RATIOS PER 1,000 OF RATION STRENGTH)"' 
Campaign Period Admissions Deaths Ratio per 1,000 
Admissions Deaths 
East Africa 1916 
(Jun-Dec) 
8902 306 182.21 6.26 
1917 14,045 429 277.01 8.46 
1918 3,294 86 80.28 2.10 
Macedonia 1916 8,204 169 66.49 1.37 
1917 5,792 124 31.72 0.68 
1918 9,438 173 73.31 1.34 
South-West 
Africa 
1914-1915 715 13 21.67 0.39 
South African 
War 
1899-1902 38,108 1,343 68.60 2.42 
Egypt and 
Palestine 
1916 5,597 81 29.78 0.43 
1917 4,431 139 23.27 0.75 
1918 4,906 264 21.23 1.14 
Mesopotamia 1916 15,270 - 92.34 - 
1917 11,959 286 38.89 0.93 
1918 12,290 303 29.86 0.74 
France and 
Flanders 
1916 5,776 40 2.64 0.04 
1917 6,025 46 3.18 0.02 
1918 12,211 46 6.58 0.02 
551 Mitchell and Smith, Official History Medical Services - Casualties and Medical Statistics, p. 81, Table 20. 
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The East African figures for dysentery are much lower than for malaria, but were 
still the highest by far. In 1917 the rate was 6.2x the peak incidence in Macedonia and 3.5x 
that of the South African War. 
Table 6 has been derived from Tables 4 and 5 above. It shows the ratio of 
admission rates for East Africa against those of selected theatres for both malaria and 
dysentery. 
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TABLE6 
.. COMPARISON OF EAST AFRICAN TROOP CASUALTIES TO SELECTED 
THEATRES 
(BASED ON COMPARING ADMISSION RATES PER 1,000 RATION 
STRENGTM552 
Campaign Period Ratio of East African Troop 
Casualties to Selected Theatre 
(Malaria) 
Ratio of East African Troop 
Casualties to Selected Theatre 
(Dysentery) 
Admissions Deaths Admissions Deaths 
Macedonia 1916 4. Ox 2.3x 2.7x 4.6x 
1917 3.6x 7.9x 8.7x 12.4x 
1918 1.2x 0.8x LIX 1.6x 
South-West 
Africa 
1914-1915 64. lx 93.3x 8.3x 39.5x 
South African 
War 
1899-1902 22.2x 37.3x 2.6x 6.4x 
Egyptand 
Palestine 
1916 137.3x 134.5x 6. lx 14.6x 
1917 31.3x 25.2x 1 1.9x 11.3x 
1918 4.3x 0.5x 3.8x 1.8x 
Mesopotamia 1916 10. lx 00 2. Ox 00 
1917 27.2x 25.9x 7. lx 9. lx 
1918 10.7x 4.2x 2.7x 2.8x 
France and 
Flanders 
1916 25977.8x 00 69. Ox 156.5x 
1917 3470.3x 00 89.4x 423. Ox 
1918 380.3x 00 12.2x 105. Ox 
With regard to malaria, East Africa had admission rates that were generally much 
higher than Macedonia, Mesopotamia and Egypt/Palestine - all known for their malarial 
problems. The relative differences in death rates for malaria were quite considerable. 
The enormous differences of ratios as compared to France and Flanders can be 
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disregarded owing to the very small number of cases suffered there. Dysentery was less 
of a problem in absolute numbers than malaria, but nevertheless it was relatively bad as 
compared with Macedonia, Egypt/Palestine and France & Flanders. The death rate for 
dysentery was markedly than greater in all other theatres, with the difference between 
East Africa and France and Flanders being exceptional. 
552 The figures for East Africa in 1916 are for Jun - Dec only. The comparisons with South-West African and South African Wars have been calculated against the average East African casualties for 1916-1918. 
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Table 7 shows the incidence of the enteric group of fevers, including typhoid and 
paratyphoid fevers. 
TABLE7 
INCIDENCE OF THE ENTERIC GROUP OF FEVERS IN SELECTED BRITISH 
EXPEDITIONARY FORCES 
(DEATHS AND RATIOS PER 1,000 OF RATION STRENGTH) 
Campaign Period Admissions Deaths Ratio per 1,000 
Admissions Deaths 
East Africa 1916 
(Jun-Dec) 
142 33 2.91 . 68 
1917 124 24 2.45 . 47 
1918 69 13 1.68 . 32 
Macedonia 1916 1,105 40 8.96 . 32 
1917 529 19 2.90 . 10 
1918 135 6 1.05 . 05 
South-West 
Africa 
1914-1915 230 26 6.97 . 79 
South African 
War 
1899-1902 57,684 8,022 103.88 14.45 
Egyptand 
Palestine 
1916 3,108 70 16.54 . 37 
1917 573 27 3.07 . 14 
1918 1,071 148 2.60 . 36 
Mesopotamia 1916 3,060 - 18.50 - 
1917 1,535 157 4.99 . 51 
1918 1,071 148 2.60 . 36 
France and 
Flanders 
1916 2,738 30 2.07 . 02 
1917 1,275 24 . 67 . 01 
1918 376 22 - 20 . 01 
5"' Mitchell and Smith, Official History Medical Services -Casualties and Medical Statistics, p. 66, Table 7, "Incidence of the Enteric Group of Fevers during the Great War, with Deaths and Ratios per 1,000 of Ration Strength. " 
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The figures for East Africa compare very favourably with Macedonia, Egypt and 
Palestine and Mesopotamia although they are less good than those for France and Flanders. 
The difference with the South African War, in which typhoid was a major killer, is 
enormous. 
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Table 8 shows the incidence of pneumonia: 
TABLE8 
INCIDENCE OF PNEUMONIA IN SELECTED BRITISH EXPEDITIONARY 
FORCES 
(DEATHS AND RATIOS PER 1,000 OF RATION STRENGTID554 
Campaign Period Admissions Deaths Ratio per 1,000 
Admissions Deaths 
1 
East Africa 1916 
(Jun-Dec) 
463 119 9.48 2.44 
1917 1,653 444 32.60 8.76 
1918 2,023 516 49.30 12.58 
Macedonia 1916 73 10 . 59 . 08 
1917 279 43 1.53 . 24 
1918 48 - . 37 
South-West 
Africa 
1914-1915 124 12 3.76 . 36 
South African 
War 
1899-1902 2,591 466 4.57 . 85 
Egyptand 
Palestine 1916 1,080 115 5.75 . 61 
1917 228 55 1.22 . 29 
1918 1,510 1,027 6.53 4.44 
United 
Kingdom 1916 4,104 - 2.57 - 
1917 4,924 2.89 
1918 9,484 - 5.88 - 
France and 
Flanders 
1916 1,497 135 1.13 . 10 
1917 2,157 193 1.14 . 10 
1918 1,921 352 1.03 . 19 
"Mitchell and Smith, Official History MedicalServices- Casualties and Medical Statistics, p. 71, Table I I, "Incidence of 
Pneumonia in the British Expeditionary Forces during the Great War, with Deaths and Ratios per 1,000 of Ration Strength. " Note that 
there are no statistics given for Mesopotamia and that figures for the United Kingdom have been inserted instead. 
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'The table shows how serious a problem that pneumonia proved in East Africa. 
The death rate was particularly alarming and was quite disproportionate to other theatres. 
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TABLE9 
COMPARISON OF EAST AFRICAN TROOP CASUALTIES TO SELECTED 
THEATRES 
(BASED ON COMPARING ADMISSION RATES PER 1,000 SRENL. 'Tll)` 
Campaign Period Ratio of East African Troop 
Casualties to Selected Theatre 
(Enteric Fevers) 
Ratio of East African Troop 
Casualties to Selected Theatre 
(Pneumonia) 
Admissions Deaths Admissions Deaths 
Macedonia 1916 0.32x 2.1 3x 16.07x 3.05x 
1917 0.84x 4.70x 2 1.3 1x 36.50x 
1918 1.60x 6.40x 133.24x J, 
South-West 
Africa 
1914-1915 0.42x 0.86x 2.52x 6.78x 
South African 
War 
1899-1902 0.03x 0.05x 2.07x '-. 87x 
Egypt and 
Palestine 
1916 0.1 8x 1.84x 1.65x 4.00x 
1917 0.80x 3.36x 26.72x 30.2 1x 
1918 0.65x 0.89x 7.55x 2.81X 
Mesopotamia 1916 0.16x f) 
1917 0.49x 0.92X 
1918 0.65x 0.89x 
France and 
Flanders 
1916 1.4 1x 34.00x X 
1917 3.66x 47.00x 28.6x 87.60x 
1918 8.40x ', 2.0ox 48.86x 66.2 1x 
United 
Kingdom 
1916 3.69x 
1917 1 1.28x 
1918 8.38x 
... Note figures tor East Africa in 1916 are for Jun - Dec only. The comparisons NN ith South-West African and South African Wars 
have been calculated against the average East African casualties tor 1916-1918. There is no data for pneumonia cases in 
Mesopotamia and figurcs tor (lie United Kingdom have been used in its place. The reverse is true ofenteric fevers 
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,, Table 9 has been derived from Tables 7 and 8 above. It shows the ratio of 
admission rates for East Africa against those of selected theatres for both enteric fevers 
and pneumonia. 
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THE FOLLOWERS'HEALTH 
-, The foregoing has compared the fighting forces in various theatres with East 
Africa. However, casualties among the civilian followers, most notably the carriers, was 
very high and it is instructive to compare their losses with those of the troops. Table 10 
shows the incidence of malaria and dysentery amongst the followers: 
TABLE 10 
INCIDENCE OF MALARIA AND DYSENTERY AMONGST FOLLOWERS IN 
EAST AFRICA 
(DEATHS AND RATIOS PER 1,000 OF RATION STRENGTH) 
, 
Disease Period Admissions Deaths Ratio per 1,000 
Admissions Deaths 
Malaria 1916 
(Jun-Dec) 
7,127 187 90.33 2.37 
1917 40,527 2,291 281.52 15.91 
1918 21,260 361 242.63 4.12 
Dysentery 1916 
(Jun-Dec) 
3,795 1,008 48.10 12.78 
1917 26,607 7,277 184.82 50.55 
1918 3,740 681 42.68 7.77 
Enteric Fevers 1916 
(Jun-Dec) 
9 1 0.11 . 01 
1917 40 5 . 28 . 03 
1918 42 7 . 48 . 08 
Pneumonia 1916 
(Jun-Dec) 
1,957 372 24.80 4.72 
1917 10,009 3,013 281.52 15.91 
1918 3,116 873 35.56 9.96 
556 Mitchell and Smith, Official History Medical Services - Casualties and Medical Statistics, pp. 259-260, Table 13 "Principal Causes of Admission to Hospital in the East African Expeditionary Force, June to December 1916, with Deaths and Ratios per 1,000 
of Ration StrenW, Table 14 "Principal Causes of Admission to Hospital in the East African Expeditionary Force, 1917, with Deaths 
and Ratios per 1,000 of Ration Strength" and Table 15 "Principal Causes of Admission to Hospital in the East African Expeditionary 
Force, 1918, with Deaths and Ratios per 1,000 of Ration Strength". 
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Table 11 is derived from Tables 4,5, and 10 to produce a ratio of casualties between troops 
and followers for malaria and dysentery: 
TABLE 11 
COMPARISON OF MALARIA AND DYSENTERY RATES BETNATEN TROOPS 
AND FOLLOWERS IN EAST AFRICA... 
Period Ratio of Troops/Followers 
Malaria 
Ratio of Troops/Followers 
Dysentery 
Admissions Deaths Admissions Deaths 
1916 
(Jun-Dec) 1 
11.5x 2.3x 3.8x 0.5x 
1917 5. lx 0.6x 1.5x 0.2x 
1918 2.3x 0.4x 1.9x 0.3x 
The figures show that troops were much more likely to contract malaria than 
followers although the latter had a much higher chance of succumbing to the disease if 
contracted. The same situation prevails for dysentery, except that the death rate for followers 
is even higher than for malaria. 
117 Mitchell and Smith, Official History Medical Services - Casualties and Medical Statistics, pp. 80-8 1, derived from Tables 19 and 20. 
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Table 12 is derived from Tables 6,7 and 10 to produce a ratio of casualties between troops 
and followers for enteric fevers and pneumonia: 
TABLE 12 
COMPARISON OF ENTERIC FEVER AND PNEUMONIA RATES BETWEEN 
TROOPS AND FOLLOWERS IN EAST AFRICA"' 
Period Ratio of Troops/Followers 
Enteric Fever 
Ratio of Troops/Followers 
Pneumonia 
Admissions Deaths Admissions Deaths 
1916 
(Jun-Dec) 
26.45x 68.00x 0.3 8x 0.52x 
1917 8.75x 15.67x 0.62x 0.55x 
3.50x 4.00x 1.39x 1.26x 
COMPARISON WITH PREVIOUS TROPICAL CAMPAIGNS 
Previous campaigns in tropical Africa had suffered heavily from disease although 
the advances in medical and sanitary science in the 19'h century meant that morbidity and 
mortality had been decreasing over time. While the statistics have been drawn from a 
number of sources and are not entirely consistent, it is instructive to compare previous 
campaigns wi that fought in East Africa. Table 13 shows the deaths by typhoid (enteric 
fever) by British soldiers in South Africa in the period preceding the First World War. 
"$Mitchell and Smith, Official History Medical Services - Casualties andMedical Statistics, pp. 80-81, derived from Tables 19 and 20. 
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TABLE 13 
TYPHOID DEATHS AMONG BRITISH SOLDIERS IN SOUTH AFRICA, 
1879-1913 
(DEATHS PER 1,000 PER YEAR) 
PERIOD TYPHOID 
DEATHS 
DEATHS 
FROM ALL 
DISEASES 
1879-84 9.61 18.52 
1886-97 1.87 6.56 
1899-1902 18.11 24.53 
1905-09 0.80 2.58 
1909-13 0.33 3.84 
TABLE 14 
TYPHOID DEATHS AMONG BRITISH SOLDIERS IN EAST AFRICA 1916-1918 
(DEATHS PER 1,000 PER YEAR) 560 
PERIOD TYPHOID 
DEATHS 
1916 0.68 
1917 0.47 
1918 
1 
0.32 
From Table 14 above, the East African death rates for 1916-17-18 were 0.68, 
0.47, and 0.32 per thousand respectively. These are much lower than those of the South 
African War period and reasonably close to those caused in the inter-war period. 
However, 1905 to 1913 were not spent on major campaigns so the East African figures 
5" Curtin, Disease and Empire, p. 206, Table 8.1, "Typhoid Deaths Among British Soldiers in South Africa, 1813-1913". 560 Tables above 
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seem reasonable given the conditions of fighting. It seems that typhoid was no longer the 
deadly threat it had been in past years. 
205 
TABLE 15 
COMPARISON OF ANNUAL DEATH RATES BY DISEASE IN 
SELECTED THEATRES 1886-1918 
(DEATH RATES PER THOUSANDf"' 
DISEASE PERIOD BRITAIN INDIA ALGERIA EGYPT PERIOD 
Malaria 1886-1894 0.74 0.75 1916 
1909-1914 0.1 X 
Dysentery 1886-1894 0.37 2.52 So 1916 
1909-1914 0,10 1.01 0.50 0.47 1917 
1 7' 
1918 
- .... ...... ......... .... . X 'S 0-IN 1) 1 ... 
. .......... 5.11 3.66 8.94 1916 
1909-1914 - 
tO. 
06 0.62 1.50 0.36 1917 
1918 
Pneumonia 1886-1894 1.31 0.96 1 01 0.96 1916 
EAST 
AFRIC 
A 
5.38 
9.84 
1.68 
6.26 
8.46 
2.10 
0.68 
0.47 
0.32 
2.44 
o. 11 0 ', 7 1 0,77 1 o,. l 1 1917 8.76 
1918 12.58 
Table 15 show how effectively typhoid, formerly the biggest threat to military 
health, had been brought under control in the East African campaign. The greatly 
reduced mortality rates may be attributed to vaccination, as in all respects water supplies 
and sanitation in East Africa were generally of a low standard. What is also remarkable 
is the sharp rise in the lethality of malaria, dysentery and pneumonia which were many 
times higher that in previous campaigns. Interestingly, deaths from malaria declined 
sharply in 1918, possibly as a consequence of the increased use of indigenous African 
soldiers, but pneumonia skyrocketed. Apart from typhoid, the British seem to have 
""Curl in, Disease and Emjwre, p. 141, Table 5.2, "European Troops in Algeria, Egypt, India and Great Britain Changing Mortal itN 
1'rom Major Diseases 1890s to 1909-1913. It should be noted that the figure for dysentery includes all gastrointestinal diseases while 
those for pneurnonia similarly encompass all respiratory afflictions. 'rhe figures for East Africa have been drawn from Tables 7,8,10 
and II above. 
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applied few of the lessons of previous African campaigns or Mesopotamia. Malaria was 
especially disastrous. 
Table 16 deals with the disease mortality suffered by the French Madagascar 
campaign of 1895. That country is fairly close to East Africa and was covered in dense 
bush and forest with a large number of indigenous diseases. 
TABLE 16 
DISEASE MORTALITY FOR THE FRENCH MADAGASCAR EXPEDITION, 
1895 
(DEATHS PER 1,000 STRENCTH)562 
DISEASE DEATH DEATH PERCENT PERIOD EAST 
RATE RATE OF ALL AFRICA 
(monthly) (annualised) DISEASE 
DEATHS 
Malaria 32.16 24.12 72.00 1916--1918 5.38 9.84 
1.68 
Dysentery 3.57 2.68 8.00 1916- 1918 6.26 8.46 
2.10 
Typhoid 5.36 4.02 12.00 1916-- 1918 0.68 0.47 
0.32 
Other 3.58 2.69 8.00 1916- 1916 2.44 8.76 
12.59 
Total 44.67 33.50 100.00 
Notes 
I. The campaign lasted 9 months - the figures have been annualised for comparative purposes. 
2. The average ration strength was 15,000. "Other" figures for East Africa are for pneumonia only. 
When compared to East Africa, it can been seen that the annualised malaria death 
rate in Madagascar was several times higher, while the dysentery rates were generally 
""Curtin, Disease and Empire, p. 188, Table 7.1, "Disease Mortality for the Madagascar I ýxpeclition, 1895". 
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lower there. The French suffered from typhoid deaths more than 5.9x more than the peak 
British rate, but they seemed to have ignored established prophylactic measures. 563 
THE GERMAN EXPERIENCE 
It is more difficult to come up with a comprehensive description of German 
medical experiences as communications between Atellungen were often poor while 
paper was in short supply and the majority of documents did not survive the war. From 
the memoir literature, and despite bold statements to the contrary, it is clear that they had 
their fair share of problems. 
They began with a relatively good supply of doctors trained in tropical medicine 
as a number of specialists had been sent out to study sleeping sickness shortly before the 
war. There was a modem and well-funded research institute at Amani that was far in 
advance of its counterparts in the British colonies. But the flow of medical supplies was 
quickly curtailed by the Royal Navy's blockade and it became necessary to manufacture 
local substitutes from the outset. While ersatz goods could help in a number of areas, the 
medical establishment faced major shortfalls in the stocks of medication, bandages, 
surgical tools and even reference books. 
Isolation was damaging, but the major weakness was in transport. Apart from the 
two railways, the Germans began the war with only three motor vehicles. By September 
1916, all of these mechanical means had been lost and they were almost completely 
reliant on porters. This meant that the medical system was burdened by the same major 
limitations as the British while lacking even the inadequate motor transport resources 
possessed by their adversaries. This imposed tremendous obstacles in the provision of 
adequate hospital and treatment facilities once the campaign moved into the wilds of the 
Rufiji and Kilombero valleys. These unfavourable conditions led to widespread sickness, 
with the hospitals usually full. There were repeated outbreaks of typhoid and virtually 
nobody escaped serious illness. 564 
563 Curtin, Diseases and Empire, pp. 189-190. '64 Schnee, Deutsch-ostafrika im Wellkrieg, p. 230. 
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I, The year 1917 was little better as the combination of 
insufficient food, exposure, 
inadequate clothing and severe exertion led to the same results as experienced by the 
British: widespread sickness and the collapse of many individuals. Given their lack of 
transport and medical resources, the German response was simply to leave such cases for 
the enemy to capture, and thus to be forced to assume responsibility for their care and 
evacuation. During the course of the year, from the retreat to the River Rufiji to crossing 
into Portuguese territory, the number of unfit Europeans rose constantly and large 
numbers had to be left behind. Just prior to the evacuation of the German colony, 669 
Germans, or two-thirds of the available strength, and a large number of Askaris 
surrendered to the British from field hospitals. 565 
Hospitals and their staffs suffered as much from the rigours of the campaign as 
the fighting troops. As the withdrawal into the heart of the colony continued, more and 
more equipment had to be abandoned for lack of transport or due to enemy action. 1916 
had seen a total of 10 field hospitals, 2 base hospitals and 2 convalescent homes in 
operation, but by the end of 1917 this had been reduced to 3 field hospitals operating on 
much reduced scales of equipment. The later march into Portuguese East Africa saw 
numbers reduced to 2 hospitals, with one being lost at the end of August 1918. The 
combination of a dwindling number of trained staff and severe shortfalls of critical 
supplies made the treatment of the sick and wounded increasingly difficult. Only those 
incapable of walking or requiring serious treatment were admitted to hospital while 
malarial cases were treated in the ranks. 566 Losses during the campaign also hurt the 
medical establishment's ability to treat its sick and wounded; the number of doctors 
declined from 63 at the outbreak of war to 13 by the end of 1917. During the latter stages 
of the fighting in Portuguese East Africa, medical officers were reduced to a scant 6.567 
Staff-Surgeon Taute noted the difficulties engendered by the long marches 
characteristic of the latter year and a half of the war. First by early 1917, owing to food 
565 Schnee, Deutsch-Ostaftika im Welikrieg, pp. 257-258. 5'6 Taute, "A German Account of the Medical Side of the War in East Africa, 1914-1918", Tanganyika Notes andRecords, pp. 7-8. 
Henceforth, Taute, "A German Account". 
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shortages, the African daily ration had been reduced to 600 g of flour or 400 g of rice. 
This meagre portion, which also had to provide for the soldiers' wives and servants, had 
to provide sufficient nourishment for marches that averaging 25 krn per day with only 
one rest day in seven. An extreme example followed the seizure of Ngomano on the 
Rovuma River on 25 November 1917. Desperate for food, the columns marched for 28 
straight days, halting only on 22 December. While this exertion was difficult enough for 
the fit, the wounded, many suffering from severe gunshot fractures, had to be carried on 
hammocks throughout - including the crossing of a number of rivers. 
568 
The marching was especially difficult for the medical personnel who had to take 
their place in the column all day long with their real work only beginning once a halt was 
made and camp pitched. Frequently, they had to treat patients through the night, working 
only by candle or firelight and very short of bandages and medicines. Regardless of their 
tiredness, they had to be ready to resume the march before dawn the next morning. 569 
The campaign in Portuguese East Africa was only slightly less difficult with 
regard to medical supplies as the Germans were able to capture large amounts of 
material, notably quinine, from the Portuguese although they lost a great deal to British 
action. The reduction in strength meant that there was less pressure on quinine stocks, 
particularly from the Europeans who always suffered more from malaria than Africans. 570 
However, the increasing toll on endurance through overwork and underfeeding 
undermined health, while malaria, dysentery and blackwater fever remained constant 
companions. Typhoid made repeated visits and numerous deaths through exhaustion 
were noted. 571 
From these accounts, it is apparent that sickness was an overwhelming aspect of 
the campaign. Coming up with an accurate set of casualty figures is more problematic as 
the Germans were widely scattered and often in small detachments while usually 
M7 Taute, "A German Account", p. 3. 5" Taute, "A German Account", p. 9. 5" Taute, "A German Account", p. 8. 570 Schnee, Deutsche Ostafrika, p. 357. 571 Schnee, Deutsche Ostafrika, pp. 374-375. 
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withdrawing under pressure. The overall health situation in 1917 was very bad with 
Africans and Europeans suffering heavily from malaria, increasingly of the tertian 
variety. Dr Taute estimated that, in the worst affected areas, up to 80 per cent of the 
Europeans were sick from a variety of causes, with blackwater fever (64.2 per cent of 
deaths) being the greatest non-battle killer. Dysentery proved to be a bigger problem 
with the African soldiers and carriers being particularly afflicted. 572 
Dr Ludwig Deppe, one of the more accurate and precise observers of the East 
African campaign, claimed that von Lettow had overturned the existing rules of tropical 
hygiene and behaviour. Noting the ability of the force to march for up to 12 hours per day, 
including during the hottest hours, as well as the apparent lack of problems resulting from a 
lack of mosquito nets or from drinking untreated water, he proclaimed that von Lettow had 
"eine neue Tropenhygiene begrundef'. "' While the achievements of the Schutztruppe did 
demonstrate the resilience and toughness of the human body in very adverse conditions, 
such a pronouncement must reviewed in light of the available evidence. His claims of the 
generally good health of the German troops by the armistice seems to be based on an 
unfavourable comparison with that of the British, who were by then suffering from the 
ravages of the Spanish influenza epidemic. He did admit that tropical diseases were 
unavoidable in such a place as East Africa although no figures were given to support these 
statements. 574 Schnee also made a similar comment, noting that the Germans who had lived 
in the tropics for some time did hold up much better than the South Africans . 
57' There is 
probably a degree of truth in both statements, in that the Germans showed more stamina, but 
the British also noticed that younger men, who were more numerous in their ranks, often 
had difficulty standing up to the climate. Nonetheless, an analysis of the available statistics 
shows that the German whites suffered from disease on a massive scale. 
Interestingly, Deppe did provide casualty figures, for Europeans only, although he 
made no attempt to analyse or compare them with others. When examined, his own 
numbers undermine his assertion as they show that disease was an important factor. The 
572 Taute, "A German Accounf', pp. 11 - 14. 373 Deppe, Durch Afrika, p. 149. 374 Deppe, Durch Afrika pp. 149-152- 
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* breakdown was as below: 
TABLE 17 - GERMAN EUROPEAN CASUALTIES 1914-1918 576 
Nature of Casualty Numbers of 
Casualties 
% of Total 
Casualties 
% of Total 
Served 3600 
Killed in action 285 7.9 7.9 
Wounded in action 875 24.1 24.3 
Of whom died of wounds 51 1.4 1.4 
Died of disease/injury 190 5.2 5.3 
Prisoners of War 1742 48.0 48.4 
Missing in action 486 13.4 13.5 
Total 3629 100 100.8 
If the numbers are broken down further, it can be seen that deaths from disease (190) 
represent some 36 per cent out of the total deaths (526). It is not known how many of those 
listed as prisoners of war or missing in action died as a result of either wounds or disease, 
but even if these categories of losses are assumed to have suffered total death rates of, say 
10 per cent and 25 per cent respectively, then the extra losses would amount to 
(174+122=296). This would give a new mortality figure of 822; disease would still 
represent 23 per cent of this increased figure. 
The most authoritative figures available, given by Major Boell in his semi-official 
Die Operationen in Ostaftika, present the following casualties over the entire campaign: 
s"3 Schnee, Deutsch-Ostafrika, p. 230. 576 Deppe, Durch Afrika, p. 156. 
212 
TABLE 18 - GERMAN CASUALTIES 1914 - 1918 
577 
Nature of Casualty Europeans % of Total 
Casualties 
(E) 
Askari % of Total 
Casualties 
(A) 
Porters/ 
Boys 
Killed in action 354 7.4 1200 7.1 1000 
Wounded in action - 874 18.4 3669 21.6 ? 
Of whom died of wounds 80 1.7 ? ? 
Died by accident 23 0.5 ? ? 
Died of disease 277 5.8 508 3.0 5000-6000 
Prisoners of War 2718 57.1 4275 25.1 ? 
Missing in action ? ? 4510 26.5 ? 
Deserted 2 0.00 2847 16.7 7 
Total 4762 100 17009 100 6000-7000 
Using Boell's figures, it can be seen that total deaths by disease (277 Europeans and 
508 Askaris) represent 37.74 per cent and 29.74 per cent (734 and 1708) respectively. 
These should be examined in relation to the approximately 3,600 European and 14,600 
Askaris who served in the Schutztruppe over the course of the war. "' The best that can be 
said of the mortality of the porters is that they were huge in comparison to both types of 
soldier. Clearly, their sufferings were many times greater than their fighting comrades. 
Both sets of figures are broadly comparable and point to the severe health problems faced by 
all participants, European and African. 
By way of comparison, the representative figures for the major participants is shown 
in the table below: 
577 Boell, Die Operationen, p. 427. Boell's calculation of the total Askari casualties has omitted the wounded, hence the revision from 
13,430 to 17,009. 
3" Boell, Die Operationen, p. 429. 
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COMPARISON OF BRITISH AND GERMAN CASUALTIES 
TABLE 19 - COMPARISON OF BRITISH AND GERMAN CASUALTIES579 
British 
(Total Force) 
German 
(Europeans) 
Ratio 
German 
(Europeans) 
British 
German 
(Askaris) 
Ratio 
German 
(Askaris) 
British 
% Killed in action 0.60 9.87 16.5x 8.22 13.7x 
% Wounded in action 2.02 24.28 12. Ox 25.13 12.4x 
% Died of wounds 0.20 2.22 1 LIX 
% Died of disease/injury 1.82 8.33 4.6x 3.48 1.9x 
% Prisoners of war 0.06 75.50 1258. Ox 29.28 488. Ox 
- % Missing in action 0.20 - 30.89 154.3x 
% Deserted - 0.06 19.38 -I 
From Table 19, it can be seen that German Europeans were 4.6x and Askaris were 
1.9x as likely as the British to die from disease or accident. This may be attributed to the 
reduced quantities of drugs and medications available to the Germans as well as to their 
difficulties in evacuating the sick and wounded. It may also represent the continued 
attrition suffered in trained medical personnel that worsened as the campaign wore on. 
It is notable that the German casualties were much more likely to have been 
maimed in battle than the British, which may have been a result of the more limited 
manpower pool. Interestingly, the loss rates suffered by German Europeans and Askaris 
were broadly similar, apart from desertion, indicating that the risk was evenly shared. 
SUMMARY 
Disease and ill-health were factors of overwhelming importance to both sides 
'" Mitchell and Smith, Official History Medical Services - Casualties and Medical StatislicOH, Medical Services - Casualties and Medical Statistics, p. 254, Table 4, "Classification and Percentages of Casualties 1916-1918", p. 254. The table in the text has been 
calculated with casualties being shown as a percentage of the total strength deployed during the period 1914-1918 for the Germans 
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throughout the campaign. The levels of malaria, dysentery and pneumonia were well 
above those suffered in previous or other concurrent campaigns, while, for the British at 
least, the menace of typhoid had been largely solved. The high levels of sickness suffered 
by followers as compared to troops is notable and were a result of their poor diet and much 
more limited health care. 
Claims the Germans had founded a "new tropical hygiene" must be taken with 
caution as the high levels of sickness indicate otherwise. Finally, it is clear that significant 
failures in administration and the medical services occurred during General Smuts's term 
of command and these contributed to the alarmingly high levels of morbidity suffered by 
the troops and followers. 
and 1916-1918 for the British. The German figures have been derived from Boell, Die Operationen, pp. 427 and 429. 
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CHAPTER 7- THE OPERATIONS OF JUNE - DECEMBER 1917 
VAN DEVENTER'S APPOINTMENT 
VAiile Smuts's involvement in Hoskins's sacking remains unclear, it is certain 
that he played a major role in nominating van Deventer as his replacement. 580 The 
decision was taken quickly by the War Cabinet and he was confirmed as commander-in- 
chief in early May. 581 Initially, it was not popular amongst the British officers who 
believed it to be another political appointment that unfairly deprived Hoskins of his 
command. 
Nevertheless, van Deventer appears to have had little involvement in these 
machinations. Although he owed much to Smuts and had served with him a number of 
times from the Anglo-Boer War onward, they were very different in outlook and 
temperament. He had much more of the professional soldier's outlook and was not 
known for his politics. Van Deventer had begun his military career as a gunner in the 
Transvaal Artillery in 1896, rising rapidly through the ranks. A battery commander by 
the outbreak of war in 1899, he had served under Smuts's command during the last year 
of the war before retiring to his farm after the peace settlement. He was recalled to 
service as a colonel in 1914 to participate in the South West Africa expedition, but was 
given the task of suppressing Maritz's troops when the Rebellion broke out in late 1914. 
Having completed that mission, he was promoted brigadier in command of the Upington 
column in the advance against German South-West Africa, finishing as a divisional 
commander. 582 
After a brief period in South Africa, he was called upon to lead a mounted brigade 
in East Africa under Smuts. He was rapidly promoted to command the newly-formed 2 nd 
5sOMS Robertson, 1133/4611,23 April 1917. Letter Robertson to Smuts; 1/33/47/2,23 April 1917, Telegram Smuts to Botha; MS 
Smuts, Box 100,9 April 1917, Letter Robertson to Smuts. 
-"' CAB 23/2,1 May 1917, War Cabinet Meeting 128. 
-"2 Beyers, CJ and Basson, JL (eds), Dictionary ofSouth Aftican Biography, Volume V, Pretoria: Human Sciences Research Council, 
1987, pp. 809-8 10; South African National Defence Force, Personnel Archive and Reserves, AG(l) (A)PI/4139 1/1, Record ofService 
ofLieutenant General Sir Jacob Louis van Deventer in the Union Defence Force. 
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Division in April 1916 which he then commanded until January 1917, when he and his 
troops were withdrawn to South Africa on medical grounds. After journeying back with 
Smuts, he had barely a month at home, before being asked to assume command of the 
East Africa Expeditionary Force as a lieutenant general. 
Van Deventer had learned a great deal about the need for efficient organisation 
and administration during his time as a divisional commander in 1916. Although he was 
most at home leading mounted columns, he had learned that the difficult conditions in 
East Africa demanded different solutions. He was much more of a fighter than Smuts 
and did not shrink from battle. His methods were direct and while he could not be 
described as an administrator, he did use his staff more effectively. One British officer 
described him: 
"Van Deventer is calm and collected, divulging his plans to none, not even his 
staff. He is cunning as an old fox and does not make up his mind till the last 
moment. Then he acts like lightning; up to that moment he appears dense and 
slow. To him a decision is final; there is no swerving, no delay, no alteration of 
plan. 11583 
He believed in using mounted and irregular troops whenever possible although he 
recognised the limitations imposed by the tsetse fly. He had realised the futility of trying 
to out-manoeuvre the Germans in such difficult terrain and that they had to be defeated 
militarily. Also important was his recognition that their chief vulnerabilities were lack of 
replacement manpower together with low stocks of food and munitions. Disease 
remained the deadliest foe, but better planning and support for the troops could help 
reduce its ill-effects. 
These factors led van Deventer to adopt his predecessor's aggressive approach 
together with greater tactical ingenuity. While the power of the machine gun and the 
strength of defensive works meant that the casualties would generally be higher for the 
... Meinertzhagen, Army Diary, p. 180. 
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attacker than the defender, he also realised that attrition could be an effective option. 
However restricted his manpower and equipment reserves were, they were still vastly 
superior to those of von Lettow, particularly in European officers and NCOs. 
Accordingly, this led to a new strategy of hard-hitting wherever possible, with the aim of 
inflicting the maximum casualties while lowering morale and the will to continue. It was 
combined with a campaign against the German lines of communication, and in particular 
eliminating their food growing areas. 584 
On arriving in East Africa on 29 May, the new commander-in-chief was given 
very explicit instructions. 585 The CIGS came immediately to the point: 
"In view of requirements other theatres and of the fact that it is essential to release 
at earliest possible moment vessels absorbed by supply and maintenance of your 
force, His Majesty's Government attach great importance to early termination of 
campaign. I must also impress upon you importance during remainder of 
086 
campaign of limiting demands for tonnage to minimum. 
The attitude of the British Government had changed considerably since it had so 
lightly sent Smuts off to take the whole of German East Africa. There was now the 
realisation that von Lettow had to be defeated militarily and that simple occupation of 
ground was not sufficient for victory. Furthermore, with the growing pressures of the U- 
Boat campaign and the war in Europe, it recognised that the campaign had to be wound 
up as quickly as possible in order to release both shipping and manpower. 
Van Deventer was authorised, if necessary, to conduct operations in Portuguese 
East Africa, although the Portuguese themselves could be expected to give little useful 
assistance. Van Deventer was instructed to try to prevent the enemy from leaving 
German East Africa for the south as it would prolong the campaign. There was no 
WO 33/953, Telegrams D 2, No. 1901,11 June 1917, Telegram G 843, van Deventer to CIGS, p. 97. 
WO 33/953, Telegrams D 2, No. 1868,29 May 1917, Telegram 0 666, Hoskins to CIGS, p. 85. 5'6 WO 33/953, Telegrams D 2, No. 1852,22 May 1917, Telegram 340907, CIGS to van Deventer, p. 81. 
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explicit mention of any other campaign objectives, but it was clear that they implied the 
destruction of the enemy force and its ability to fight. 587 
Although Hoskins had done much to reorganise the British forces, the exertions 
and overwork of the preceding year had taken a very heavy toll. Furthermore, the 
Germans retained interior lines in a territory still some 300 miles square and difficult to 
588 penetrate. For example, Mahenge to Liwale was a seven days' march for the Germans 
while for the British to have moved a force from Mahenge to either Kilwa or Lindi, still 
some distance from Liwale, would have taken the same number of weeks. The lack of 
maps and difficulty of the terrain amplified these disadvantages. 589 
BRITISH STRATEGY IN MID-1917 
By mid- 1917 Britain was running out of money to fund the war and the 
unrestricted U-Boat campaign was increasingly successful. In the first four months of 
1917, British losses to submarines had risen from 109,954 tonnes (35 ships) in January to 
516,394 tonnes (155 ships) in April. 590 At this rate, Britain would soon be starved into 
submission, as replacement ships could not be built fast enough to offset the losses. The 
War Cabinet was under no illusions as to the severity of the crisis and it closely scrutinised 
the amount of shipping being used to sustain the overseas theatres with the aim of making 
the maximum reductions. 591 By early July, the figures showed that, overall, the shipping 
employed on the overseas theatres, -some 328 ships, was the equivalent of less than two 
months' losses to submarines at peak levels and about nine months at the earlier rates. East 
Africa represented only 10.7 per cent of the shipping employed, but it took up 34.3 per cent 
of troop and horse ships and 21.9 per cent of hospital ships. 592 In any event, 35 ships 
5'7W033/953, Telegrams D2, No. 1852,22 May 1917, Telegram 340907, CIGS to van Deventer, p. 81. 
'" Van Deventer, Lt Gen J 1, Despatchfrom the General Commanding-in-Chief British Forces In East Africa, Relating to Operations 
From 31y' May to I' December, 1917, dated 21 January 1918, publ ished in London Gazelle, "Supplement7, No. 30611,5 April 1918, 
F, 
9172- 
Henceforth Van Deventer, Despatch L 
Van Deventer, Despatch 1, pp. 172-173. 
Marder, Arthur, From Dreadhought to Scapa Flow: 1917 Year of Crisis, Volume 4, London: Oxford University Press, 1966, p. 
102. 
"' CAB 23/3,29 June 1917, War Cabinet Meeting 172. Smuts, now a member of the War Cabinet, had been asked to compile a 
report and stated "In view of the submarine campaign and the urgent necessity to economise shipping, die Cabinet Committee on War 
Policy has asked me to investigate the possibility of reducing the quantity of shipping allotted to overseas expeditions outside France. m CAB 23/3,29 June 1917, War Cabinet Meeting 172,29 June 1917, Appendix I, "Shipping Allocated to Overseas Expeditions 
Outside France". The figures for troop and horse ships are 24 of 70; for hospital ships 7 of 32. 
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represented a great deal of capacity, particularly as the shortfall in shipping for the year was 
estimated to be 8,000,000 tons. 593 This did not escape the War Cabinet's eye and at a 
subsequent meeting it considered: 
"The urgent necessity of clearing up the position in East Africa once and for all, and 
the fact that [sic] the conduct of operations by us in that quarter was monopolising 
the carrying power of thirty-five ships, were [sic] pointed out. It was agreed that, in 
order that the campaign in this quarter might be brought to a close at the earliest 
possible moment, every reinforcement that it was found possible to send to General 
Van Deventer should be sent to enable him to do this. 594 
This was in partial response to a plea by van Deventer for more artillery and limited 
reinforcements were subsequently authorised . 
595 But despite the rhetoric, these were only 
tiny forces and could not transform the situation in East Africa. They reflected conflicting 
political pressures regarding war aims; on the one hand there were the imperialists who 
looked to displace Germany as a colonial power and on the other those, who despite their 
misgivings about strategy, saw the Western Force as the key to victory. 596 For all, concerns 
about the state of Ireland, conscription and war-weariness loomed large. Any political 
hopes for a quick and easy victory in East Africa had been dashed by the realisation that it 
would remain a lengthy and hard-fought campaign. 
THE OPPOSING FORCES IN JUNE 1917 
The deployments of the British had changed considerably since van Deventer had 
left in January. Only the Nigerian Brigade, based on Kibambawe, was situated on the 
Rufiji front, while further to the east at Iringa there was a small column of two battalions. 
The Belgians had begun to arrive in the Kilossa area and had pushed several battalions 
forward to Kidodi although it would be several weeks before the planned brigade was 
"3 French, Lloyd George Coalition, p. 77. 5" CAD 23/3,23 July 1917, War Cabinet Meeting 193. 
595 WO 33/953, Telegrams D 2, No. 2002,22 July 1917, Telegram G 447, van Deventer to CIGS, p. 129; CAB 23/3, War Cabinet 
Meeting 194,24 July 1917. Although several artillery batteries were also agreed, only a mounted regiment was sent to East Africa "96 French, Lloyd George Coalition, pp. 62-64; Turner, British Politics, p. 202. 
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complete. Northey's force, now reinforced, was spread between Ubena and Songea with a 
detachment operating in Portuguese East Africa against Abt von Stuemer. Brigadier 
General O'Grady commanded the Lindi column while Brigadier General Hannyngton 
controlled two brigade-sized columns operating from Kilwa. Far to the west and north, the 
equivalent of a brigade of Belgians was pursuing Naumann and there was a small central 
reserve at Morogoro. Local reinforcements in the form of two newly raised KAR 
battalions were due to be fielded by the end of June while other battalions were in various 
stages of formation in the rear areas, but it would be a considerable period before they 
could be considered remotely ready for operations. 597 Further help was also due from 
South Africa with two new reformed battalions scheduled to arrive at the end of the same 
month. 598 The Portuguese had landed a new expeditionary force of 4,500 at the port of 
Palma, but it would be several months before the troops were ready to take the field. 
599 
The Germans too had redeployed markedly in the preceding months. They 
remained in two major groupings, with the 0suruppen under von Lettow, based at 
Liwale, and the Wesuruppen commanded by Tafel at Mahenge. Exact numbers are not 
available, but an estimate of 6200 and 2500 based on known losses would seem 
reasonable, leaving combat strengths of 4100 and 1500.600 The 0suruppen had four main 
detachments; in the far south, At Looff had six companies and two guns between Lindi 
and the Portuguese border; At G6ring with seven companies and a gun held the ground 
near Mpotora against Hanforce; Abt Otto had seven companies and a gun on the Rufiji; 
while Kommando had six companies and four guns under its direct control, chiefly in the 
Mpotora-Liwale area. 601 ý 
The Wesuruppen under Tafel also had four substantial Ateflungen radiating some 
70 miles west, north and east of Mahenge down to Likuju, about 50 miles from Songea. 
They were A bt von Brandis with three companies and two guns near Kidodi; A bt A umann 
with three companies and a revolver gun along the Ruhudje River; Abt Lincke with five 
"7 Van Deventer, Despatch 1, p. 172. "8 WO 95/5329, War Diary Norforce, Entry 8 June 1917. Telegram G 775, van Deventer to Northey, 7 June. 5" Cann, "Mozambique and German East Africa7, pp. 131-133. 600 MS Boell, N14/30,26. Kapitel, pp. 2032 and 2044; On I April 1917, they had numbered 6,534 and 2,854 respectively, with 
effective battle strengths of 4,419 and 1,712. The revised figures are an estimate. 601 MS Boell, N14/30,26. Kapitel, pp. 2031-2032. 
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companies and two guns facing the main body of Norforce; and finally the long absent 
Abt Wintgens of six companies and gun now well to the north and west of the other 
German forces. 
PLANS FOR THE GENERAL OFFENSIVE OF 1917 
The general offensive for 1917 could not begin before the end of the rains and the 
subsequent drying out of the countryside in late June at the earliest. Van Deventer had 
very little time to settle into his new command, but, fortunately, Hoskins had set the 
necessary planning, reorganisation and regrouping in train. In conducting its appreciation 
of the situation, GHQ had identified five possible lines of advance for 1917. The first 
was 
' 
the Dodoma-Iringa-Mahenge route in the west. While it was the healthiest, it was 
also the longest and the country between the highlands of Iringa and Mahenge was 
difficult and low-lying. Furthermore, only a small portion of it could be made passable 
for MT and it was highly vulnerable to flooding in the wet season. The second option 
was slightly further east along the line Kilossa-Kidatu-Mahenge. It was shorter and more 
practical for MT than the first approach, but it too suffered from its vulnerability to the 
rains. 
The third approach followed Smuts' route across the middle Rufiji going via 
Mikesse-Kibarnbawe-Mahenge. Plunging as it did through the Mgeta and Rufiji valleys, 
it was by far the most physically difficult to support. The nightmarish conditions of the 
wet season were still all too evident while the country south of Kibambawe was a wild 
tangle of bush and almost totally impracticable for MT. The fourth option was an 
advance on the line Kilwa-Liwale. It had the unhappy reputation of having the 
unhealthiest climate of all, although it did offer the advantages of being close to a large 
proportion of the enemy's forces and to a first-class harbour. There was also the 
probability that sickness rates would fall with the onset of dry weather. The final choice 
was the approach Lindi-Massassi. Its chief advantage was that it offered a direct line of 
advance that could potentially cut off any retreat towards the Portuguese border, although 
the country was very difficult. Health, too, was a problem, and Lindi harbour had 
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considerable limitations, and could only be used by a proportion of the available 
shipping. 602 
The attractiveness of Kimbambawe as the base for a renewed offensive, which 
had never been high, now waned significantly. Apart from the unhealthiness of the 
climate, the difficulty of the countryside, that had so recently been heavily flooded, made 
the supply of the existing small garrison very difficult. The need simultaneously to build- 
up supplies and to build roads and river-crossings made it the least desirable option from 
van Deventer's point of view and fortunately Lettow's redeployments made it possible to 
drop this line of approach. A contributing factor was the insufficiency of MT; there were 
simply not enough vehicles to support concurrent advances across the Rufiji as well as 
from the coast. 603 
General Northey added his views, believing that the Germans would only move 
into Portuguese East Africa if pushed there, and, until the situation east of Mahenge was 
cleared up, there was the potential for another raiding force to break westward. He 
proposed similar converging simultaneous thrusts against the enemy, but, conscious of 
the time needed to get Murray's Column back and suitably rested, he expected that his 
advance would start after the others. 604 Van Deventer agreed, realising the importance of 
having Northey attack Mpepo and Mtarika as it would draw off enemy forces on the 
Ruipa line prior to the arrival of the Belgians. Once they were ready, Northey could then 
shorten his line by handing over the Ruhuje sector to them. By that stage, Murray's 
column would be rested and ready to participate in the general offensive. 605 
This would leave the Songea Column at about 1,000 rifles with 16 machine guns 
and two mountain guns, and the Fort Johnston Column with a similar amount. While 
these columns would be ready to start at the end of June, Murray's Column would need 
extra time to reach Songea and would not be ready to advance before 7 July. This would 
provide another 1,000 rifles, giving him over 3,000 men advancing on two axes. He also 
6'2 Van Deventer, Despatch I, p. 173. 
603 CAB 44/9, p. 67. 
6" WO 95/5293, War Diary GHQ, 26 May 1917, Appendix A195, Telegram NF 2957, Norforce to Hoskins, 25 May. 
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noted that two battalions' worth of reinforcements would be arriving in July, but neither 
would be ready for the field before August. 606 Likuju would also form an important 
staging base, as both a wireless station and small airfield were established there. 
At the end of May, Norforce had been stretched out over enormous distances and 
concentration was impossible in the short term. The pursuit of Naumann together with 
the countering of von Stuemer's threat to Nyasaland had drawn off all Northey's 
available reserves. However, as the campaign season approached, he began to receive 
more resources to achieve his difficult task. On 29 May, some 50 miles south of the 
Central Railway, Murray's Column was released from the pursuit of At Naumann and 
began its long march home. It was not expected to reach Neu Langenburg until 15 June 
and a considerable distance would then need to be covered until it could reach the 
forward areas. 607 
On 10 June 1917, van Deventer signalled his plan back to London. It reflected 
the changed strategic situation as well as the imperatives given in his own instructions 
during the previous month. The German re-deployment of its main body south from the 
Rufiji River to an area opposite Kilwa showed that Colonel von Lettow was aware of the 
possibilities of being cut-off and wished to maintain an escape route to Portuguese East 
Africa. It also reduced the importance of an advance from the north, and the need to 
supply a major force across the Rufiji Valley. The plan also reflected the likely increased 
importance of Lindi and its hinterland as a means of cutting off the enemy's withdrawal 
to the south. The elimination of Naumann's raiding force was a priority as the pursuit was 
tying up Belgian and British forces that could be better used against the main body of the 
Germans. 
Van Deventer's plan was as follows. First, to catch up with and destroy Abt 
Naumann as quickly as possible in order to rest and redeploy the forces involved. 
Second, to launch a limited attack around Lindi in order to secure the high ground 
"-'CAB 44/9, pp. 43-44. 
" WO 95/5329, War Diary Norforce, Entry 9 June 1917. 
6'" WO 95/5329, War Diary Norforce, Entry 29 May 1917. 
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surrounding the town and to secure a better water supply. Third, to attack the Ruipa 
River position from the direction of Iringa in order to deny that rich food-growing area to 
the Germans. Fourth, to generate an offensive from Kilwa as soon as sufficient 
reinforcements could be brought up. During these preparations, General Northey was to 
concentrate his force at Songea, having got Colonel Murray's column back, and then to 
advance eastwards as soon as he was ready. 608 
The commander-in-chief understood von Lettow's likely response to his plan: 
"The establishment of considerable food depots in the MASSASSI (GGF. F. 8. c. ) 
area, together with the presence of a considerable enemy force in PORTUGUESE 
EAST AFRICA, appears to point to his eventual retirement by this line. One of 
my chief aims must therefore to be to prevent his main force breaking through 
into PORTUGUESE EAST AFRICA, as that might necessitate a new 
,, 609 campaign. 
As he began to finalise his plans, General van Deventer needed to liaise directly 
with his Belgian counterpart, Colonel Hugyh6. Hiding his disappointment over the 
slowness of the Belgian build-up, he agreed to meet Huyghd at the Belgian Grand 
Quartier Gineral at Dodoma on 18 June. Prior to the conference, Huygh6 was requested 
to send a column of 1,200 rifles as quickly as possible to Iringa in order to operate against 
the Germans on the Ruhuje-Ulanga river line between Mpepo and Malinje. This column 
would be charged with the clearance of Tafel's forward troops from the Ulanga Valley 
between those two settlements. However, in the circumstances such speedy action was 
not possible as the reorganisation of the Force Publique was taking more time than 
anticipated. Shortages of transport and the need to shuttle troops along the railway meant 
that the earliest date of readiness would be at the end of July. 610 
6"W095/5293, War Diary GHQ, 10 June 1917, Appendix A74, TelegrainG 843, van Deventer to CIGS, 10 June. 
"9 WO 95/5293, War Diary GHQ, 10 June 1917, Appendix A74, Telegram G 843, van Deventer to CIGS, 10 June. 
6'0 Campagnes Coloniales Beiges, III, pp. 127-128. 
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This was unfortunate as van Deventer was very anxious to start operations as well 
as to prevent another German raiding force breaking west. In order to bolster the very 
thinly stretched net around the Schutztruppe, the British commander-in-chief pressed 
Huygh6 to provide at least a single battalion for the Iringa front. Despite having strict 
instructions not to allow his forces to intermingle with those of his allies, Huygh6 agreed 
to do so. 611 
The conference proved to be a success and both men accepted to the new strategic 
plan. The Belgians were given the role of taking on Tafel and securing the Mahenge 
area, although they would be dependent on British MT and carriers to move their 
supplies. The Brigade Sud was to establish itself between Colonel Tytler's column at 
Iringa and Norforce at Lupembe ready for the advance eastwards. In the vital matter of 
supplies, it was agreed that the British would supply food via its MT fleet and that 
Belgian pioneers would assist in the improvement of routes to the forward forces. The 
Brigade Nord had already commenced operations on 15 May with three battalions in 
pursuit of At Naumann while the remainder continued their concentration. 612 rhiS 
formation would now take over sole responsibility for the pursuit and destruction of that 
force with all British columns being withdrawn into reserve. The Belgian supply base 
was fixed at Dodoma and the provision of pioneers and other troops on road building 
tasks was also agreed. 613 
After this meeting, van Deventer telegraphed his instructions to both Northey and 
Tytler on 20 June. He informed them that the Belgians would take over the conduct of 
the operations against Naumann from 25 June and that they would also provide a column 
of 500 rifles to move from Dodoma via Iringa to Mtua to operate on the Malinje-Mpepo 
line. A further column of 1,200 rifles would be made available in the second half of July 
and it would probably advance on Mahenge from a base at Kilossa and Kidoti. Once 
Naumann had been dealt with, a further force of 700 rifles would then take over the area 
611 Campagnes Coloniales Beiges, III, pp. 128 and Annexe No 27, Instructions au Commandant Hubert, 19 June 1917, pp. 329-330. 612 CamPagnes Colonlales Beiges, 111, pp. 297-298. Instruction au commandant de la Brigade Nont ler Bureaz4 No 96, dated 15 mai 
17. 
613 Campagnes Coloniales Beiges, III, pp. 129-130. 
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controlled by Tytler who would be used elsewhere. Effectively, this would turn the 
whole of the Mahenge operations over to the Belgians. 614 
Following these discussions, van Deventer issued his final timetable for the 
offensive on 27 June. A preliminary operation in PEA would begin on the same day 
when a Norforce column would begin its advance on Mwembe. The main phase would 
commence on 2 July, with the Iringa Column attacking the Ruipa position supported by 
250 rifles from Norforce moving from Lupembe against Mpepo. The principal attack 
would follow on 4 July when Linforce moved on Mtua, with an assault planned there on 
the following morning. Also on 5 July, Hanforce would hit the Nguara River position. 
In the south, Norforce was to send its main column from Likuju towards Liwale on 5 
July. Finally, on the middle Rufiji, a battalion-sized force from the Nigerian Brigade 
would leave Kibambawe for an attack on Msswega on 9 or 10 July. 61 5 Furthermore, the 
Belgians would take over responsibility for the hunt of Abt Naumann as well as providing 
an advance column of 500 rifles to move from Kilossa towards Kidodi on 8 July, 
although the remainder would take some time to get into position. 616 
GERMAN STRATEGY FOR 1917 
Imperial German strategy for 1917 continued along the same lines as the earlier 
stages of the war. Solf and his colleagues continued to argue for a greatly expanded 
African empire largely at Belgian and Portuguese expense, they still lacked any means of 
directly influencing events there. This led to policy being decided in a partial vacuum, 
isolated from the events on the ground and totally dependent on military success in 
Europe. 617 
Colonial German strategy for 1917 was much simpler: it was to continue 
surviving for as long as possible in the face of superior enemy forces., Von Lettow 
614 WO 95/5293, War Diary GHQ, 20 June 1917, Appendix Al 16, Telegram G 976, BGGS to Northey and Tyder, 20 June. 
`5 WO 95/5293, War Diary GHQ, 27 June 1917, Appendix A140, Telegram G 91, Genstaff to Hanforce, GOC Lindi, OC Iringa and 
General Edwards, 27 June. 
`6 WO 95/5293, War Diary GHQ, 28 June 1917, Appendix A142, Telegram G 107, van Deventer to CIGS, 28 June; WO 95/5329, 
War Diary Norforce, July 1917, Attachment by War Office, M02(B), 29 June 1917, "East Africa - Prospective Advance". 6" Fischer, Germany's War Aims, pp. 317-319 (1917) and 586-590 (1918); Fischer, Griffnach der Weltmacht, pp. 258-260. 
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realised that he need not restrict himself to the colony, particularly as the bulk of his 
supply infrastructure had been already lost. He also understood that the Portuguese were 
the weak link in the situation as their unpopularity amongst their colonial subjects and 
military incompetence made for easy pickings. The sheer size of the potential area of 
operations made his main problem one of supply; he needed to protect the key mtama and 
rice growing areas from the British whilst they ripened. He resolved to continue his war 
of delaying tactics while using local opportunities to inflict defeat on any British column 
that strayed into him. 
He had already reduced his forces substantially during the wet season through the 
elimination of a large part of his lines of communication organisation. He was very 
concerned about his food supply and took great personal interest in the growing of crops 
for the coming year. As ever, he realised that he was outnumbered, but resolved to give 
any weak or isolated detachments a hard knock as the opportunity presented. 
THE INITIAL ADVANCE BEGINS 
The question of effective numbers remained a major concern, as sickness 
constantly depleted the units and those who were well enough to be forward were still 
weak. Two South African battalions were due to arrive, but not before the end of July. 
Furthermore, although they bore the titles of units experienced in the 1916 campaign, 
they were essentially new with only partial training at this stage. Finally, it is interesting 
to note that these units could not be sent to General Hoskins, but were so easily available 
to General van Deventer. 618 
Before the general offensive could begin, it was necessary to make a number of 
adjustments to the various columns and to launch several preliminary operations. The 
Kilwa force pressed for reinforcements before being launched into the attack onto the 
Nguara River position; although Hannyngton had two columns of 1200 and 500 
respectively, a shortage of officers and a large number of inadequately trained troops 
618 CAB 44/9, P. 72. 
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reduced their effectiveness. Van Deventer quickly agreed this and promised to send a 
619 
South African and up to two KAR battalions prior to beginning the advance. 
Most of June was taken up with preparations for the advance and the return of 
units from the exhausting chase to the west. Headquarters Norforce left Fort Johnston on 
24 June for Songea, arriving there on 2 July. The remainder of his troops made their way 
to the jumping-off position around Kitanda and LikuJu in the north while a separate 
; striking force under Colonel Shorthose prepared itself to clear Portuguese East Africa. 
620 
Northey too, had insufficient trained manpower, and a number of units had to be 
relegated to lines of communication duties. By 28 June, all was in readiness for the 
, advance. 621 
THE PURSUIT OF NAUMANN 
Naumann had out-marched and eluded his pursuers, reaching the southern shores 
of Lake Victoria in late June. The Belgian columns had tried hard to slow him down, but 
difficulties in obtaining supplies and poor intelligence made this difficult. Finally, on 29 
June, a combined Anglo-Belgian column caught up with the Germans at Ikoma, a few 
miles inland from the lake. An unsuccessful battle was fought and the attackers had to 
withdraw with numerous casualties. This gave Naumann a chance to escape, and turning 
south, his Abteilung now headed for Kondoa Irangi and the Central Railway. After 
dealing with their losses, the pursuers then spent much of July following the Germans' 
trail. "' 
THE MAIN ADVANCE BEGINS 
General O'Grady faced a difficult situation in early June 1917. Operations in the 
previous month had shown that the enemy was in good condition and full of fight. 
"' WO 95/5293, War Diary GHQ, 4 June 1917, Appendix A23, Telegram 0 884, Colonel Grant, Kilwa to BGGS, 4 June; War Diary 
GHQ, 7 June 1917, Appendix A 47, Telegram G 776, Genstaff to Colonel Grant Kilwa, 7 June. 
620 WO 9515329, War Diary Norforcc, Entries 24 and 29 June 1917. Stevens' Column now consisted of V/1", 2d/l" KAR, and 1' 
SAR. 2d SAR was employed on lines of communication security back to Lake Nyassa- 
621 CAB 44/9, p. 47. 
622 Campagnes Coloniales Belges, 111, pp. 56-57 and 105-107. 
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Equally, the brittleness of the new KAR battalions was also evident and reinforcements 
would be necessary for any successful advance. This meant securing the mouth of the 
Lukuledi River, which emptied into Lindi Creek about one mile south of the River 
Mohambika about five and a half miles south-west of Lindi town. The small village and 
port of Mingoyo, which lay along the Mohambika, was vital to any advance as it was 
here that lighters could offload supplies from ships in the anchorage directly to the trolley 
line. This was a peacetime line that had been built to service the local plantation and its 
capture would enable the British to bypass nearly 25 km of swamps that faced any 
overland advance. 623 The other advantage of the 
' 
confluence of the two rivers on the 
Indian Ocean was that the water was deep enough for monitors to approach to within a 
mile and a half of Mingoyo and provide heavy fire support. 624 
O'Grady had a battle strength of about 3000 rifles with which to dislodge an 
estimated six companies with around 600 rifles. 625 In reality, the situation was worse as 
there were seven companies totalling over 900 rifles, 16 machine guns and two guns. 626 
All in all, it was a difficult position to crack, particularly as the approaches were so 
vulnerable to observation and fire. 
At Wahle was deployed as follows: Abt Looff with two companies was nearly 
five miles south of the mouth of the Lukuledi near Namunda while the much stronger A bt 
Kraut mustered five companies, of which three were at the Ngurumahamba position with 
Wahle and the remaining two companies at Majani. 627 Conscious of the dangers of a 
frontal assault, O'Grady decided to make a bold pincer movement by land and sea. In the 
north, a column would move out from the northern edges of the Lindi defences and 
march west for the Lutende Hills. Once there, it would turn south and head for Naitiwi, 
thereby cutting off the Ngurumahamba position and threatening the trolley line along the 
Mohambika River. At the same time, an amphibious move would be launched up the 
Lindi Creek, landing two battalions which would then march for Tandamuti Hill before 
623 MS Boell, N14/32,28. Kapitel, p. 2247; Boell, Die Operationen, p. 333. 624 CAB 45n3, Sketch 100, "Operations at Lindi June 1917". 625 CAB 44/10, p. 9, footnote 1. 
"6 Boell, Die Operationen, p. 333. Wahle had a total strength of 900 rifles, 17 machine guns, and 2 guns. 627 MS Boell, N14/30,26. Kapitel, p. 2055 and 28. Kapitel, p. 2247. 
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turning north towards the Mohambika River. Once there, they would cut the trolley line 
and link up with the northern column. 
Working closely with the naval commander-in-chief, O'Grady drew up a detailed 
plan of action. The Germans were alert to the threat posed from the sea and watched the 
approaches carefully. Therefore, a night move was decided upon; a blacked out force of 
boats and lighters would move silently past the German outposts at high tide before the 
moon had risen, and would land between the Rivers Mohambika and Lukuledi at the 
Kenjengehe pier marking the southern terminus of the trolley line. Once landed, a two- 
battalion force would move initially south-west towards Mkwaya and then make the 
decisive turn north towards Mwreka. 628 However, this did not account for the presence of 
A bt Looff south of the River Lukuledi in the area of Namunda, rather than fw ther west as 
believed. 629 
The operation began on 10 June and the boats moved undetected past the forward 
German posts. However, observation posts in the hills had detected boat movement and 
reported it to Wahle. He immediately ordered his troops closer to the river, while telling 
At Looff to march north and rejoin the main body. Similarly, he recalled the other 
forward companies, leaving only a single one facing Lindi at the Ngurumahamba 
position. His intention was to hit the British from two sides; his main body would move 
from the north, while Looff converged from the south with the aim of driving O'Grady 
back into the water. 630 
British planning had been good and the leading troops landed safely at 
Kenjengehe. The lead battalion was ashore by early evening and disembarkation 
continued through the night. With the rising of the moon, visibility was good and early 
on 11 June the Konigsberg gun opened fire on HMS Thistle leading to a lively 
engagement. Wahle was now sure that this was no feint and ordered Kraut to attack the 
landing site with two companies. However, by this time O'Grady's troops had pushed 
62" CAB 44110, pp. 8-10. 
629 Boelt, Die Operationen, p. 333. 6» Boell, Die Operationen, p. 336; MS Boell, N14/32,28. Kapitel, pp. 2250-2251. 
231 
PE 
7D 
;4 I'A 
Al 1w 
"Lo 
f IL 
Iq A. TAw 
J4 
I klA -4; 
Of 40 
A Aua -1,4 
I r' 
0 Aolh. -4&, 4wq 
Dia- 
nearly five miles inland and had taken Tandamuti Hill, well to the south-west of 
Mingoyo-Mrweka. The second battalion had turned north-west near Ziwani Ridge and 
headed for Mrweka. Both sides collided there after daybreak and a heavy engagement 
followed with the British being held in the Mohambika valley. Both sides reinforced, 
although Wahle still believed he could drive the attackers back into the sea. 631 
Looff was the key to the plans, but despite frequent signals he and his troops were 
nowhere to be seen. The fighting raged on all day and in the afternoon Wahle received 
the highly unwelcome news that a second, undetected British column had marched out of 
Lindi moving via the Lutende hills and was now in possession of the key track junction at 
Naitiwi. This immediately rendered the Ngurumahamba position untenable as well as 
threatening his forward forces concentrated at Mwreka. He immediately ordered the 
evacuation of the vulnerable baggage train back from Ruaha to Narunyu, five miles up 
the Mohambika River. 
In the meantime, the battalion at Tandamuti Hill was ordered to the main fight at 
Mrweka. Its piecemeal arrival late in the day ended chances of German victory. 
632 
Looff s appearance around 1600 did little to change matters and the whole position was 
evacuated by darkness. 633 This was not the entire story, for At Looff had actually run 
into the rear of that battalion, several companies of which broke and ran. 634 Elsewhere on 
the northern flank, another KAR battalion secured Naitiwi while an Indian unit marched 
into Mrweka via Majani. The German forward position was lost and a withdrawal to 
Narunyu became necessary. 
The result of the action of 10-11 June was to advance the British line well inland. 
The Germans now occupied the line Tandamuti Hill - Mohambika Valley - southwest of 
Ruaha, while the British faced them from positions along Mkwaya - Mrweka - Majani - 
Naitiwi . 
635 However, neither side possessed sufficient strength to defeat the other and 
631 MS Boell, N14/32,28. Kapitel, pp. 2252-2255. 
632 MS Boell, N14/32,28. Kapitel, pp. 2258-2260; WO 95/5330, History of I'/2"dKM PP. 14-15. 
633 MS Boell, N14/32,28. Kapitel, p. 2262. 
634 Boell, Die Operationen, pp. 337-338. The Germans deployed 741 soldiers of whom five were killed, 20 were wounded and two 
were missing. 3/2' KAR lost two killed, nine wounded and 10 missing. 633 Boell, Die Operationen, p. 338. 
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reinforcements were needed for further offensive operations. Success had been close for 
both sides: the audacious and well-executed landings at Kenjengehe had caught the 
Germans off-balance, but this was squandered by the splitting of the two battalions 
between Mrweka and Tandamuti. Wahle, in his quest for a decisive victory, had failed to 
maintain adequate surveillance of Lindi and had weakened his northern flank so much 
that it fell without any fighting being necessary. Losses had not been light, with the 
Germans suffering 62 casualties as opposed to 31 on the British side. 636 
While the advances from Kilwa and Lindi were underway, Colonel Murray and 
his column were reaching their destination after a long and arduous absence. Having had 
a week's rest, they marched to Mwaya to embark on a steamer for Wiedhafen where they 
landed on 25 June. Murray then moved up to Songea where he assumed command of the 
force. It was joined by a Rhodesian battalion on 4 July, while the remainder of his 
former column remained in Songea as Northey's general reserve. 637 
On the northern flank, a smaller force was preparing to move against Abt 
Aumann, estimated at having some 300 rifles and five machine guns, at Mpepo. Ibis 
move was intended to draw off any German reinforcements for Mahenge and thereby 
assist the Belgian advance ftu-ther north from Iringa. Northey had instructed Capt 
Dickinson with three companies to move from Lupembe in conjunction with Lieutenant 
Colonel Carbutt's moving north from Kitanda. 
On the German side, on 27 June, Abt Lincke had four companies with a battery 
near Likuju. 638 Unaware of the scale of the British build-up, Lincke decided to attack his 
former camp. His troops moved through the bush on 28 and 28 June, putting in a strong 
assault that was failed to break in. Lincke was fortunate to break off the fight as two 
strong enemy columns were nearby and nearly cut him 0 ff . 
639 As soon the area was clear, 
the various units converged on Likuju for rest and final preparations. Before the 
636 NIS Boell, N14/32,28. Kapitel, pp. 2270-2273. The Germans fought with 741 soldiers and lost five killed, 20 wounded, and two 
missing. Td/2d KAR lost three dead, nine wounded and four missing. 
637 WO 95/5329, War Diary Norforce, Entry 3 July 1917; CAB 44/9, p. 48. Three companies of RNR and one BSAP were numbering 
400 rifles and eight machines constituted the reserve in Songea. 
638 NIS Boell, N 14/32, Doell, 29. Kapitel, pp. 2621-2622. 
639 CAB 44/9, pp. 48-49. 
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offensive began, Northey made one final change to his order of battle, disbanding several 
depleted European units and converted the remaining personnel into Lewis gunners. 
They were then distributed amongst the various African battalions to provide additional 
firepower and experience. 640 
While these preparations were underway, Tafel was making alterations to his own 
deployments, forming an enhanced reserve at Mahenge in early July. This was 
particularly important as an offensive was expected imminently at Kilwa and he needed 
to react quickly to changes. One of the major problems of the dispersed deployment was 
that it took two to three days for reports from the forward areas to reach him and a similar 
period was required to pass the information back to Kommando. 64 1A stronger reserve 
would weaken the forward fighting strength, but would allow him to react to the main 
threat more quickly. 
As June progressed, the weather improved and the country began the rapid 
process of drying up. While this was very helpful for supply purposes, it also meant that 
sources of spring and surface water were also disappearing at the same time. This 
imparted a degree of urgency to General Beves, temporarily in command at Kilwa. He 
considered that the Germans might withdraw ftirther inland through lack of water before 
a decisive battle could be fought. Accordingly, he decided to launch a pre-emptive attack 
whilst the enemy was still in easy range of his own supply bases. He therefore proposed 
to attack as soon as reinforcements had arrived, but without waiting for more transport. 
He saw the advantages in fighting close to his own base and trying to inflict heavy 
casualties as greater than the disadvantages of an immediate, prolonged advance 
thereafter. 642 To that end, on 13 June, he asked GHQ for permission to divert a battalion 
from Lindi as O'Grady had already achieved his initial objectives and his own 
reinforcements were still chasing Naumann. This was agreed by van Deventer and the 
latter increased the reinforcement to include a battery of 8 Stokes mortars. 643 
" WO 95/5329, War Diary Norforce, Entry 3 July 1917. 
641 MS Boell, N 14/32,29. Kapitel, pp. 2621-2622. 
642 WO 95/5293, War Diary GHQ, 14 June 1917, Appendix A 95, Telegram 0 955, Beves to BGGS, 13 June. 
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Beves's assessment proved to be correct as the Germans had begun to evacuate 
their forward positions at the end of June. Patrols located them in the Kiturika Hills, still 
within range of the force's logistical and operational range. As the South African 
reinforcements began to arrive somewhat earlier than anticipated, General Beves began to 
make his dispositions for the coming battle. He now had three columns: No I had four 
battalions, eight guns and eight 8 Stokes mortars; No 2 had three battalions, six guns and 
four Stokes mortars; and No 3, under Colonel Taylor, had about a battalion. His plan was 
to converge on the enemy's positions near Mchakama, and bring him to battle while 
attempting to cut off his retreat to the westward. 644 He faced a substantial force, as von 
Lettow had left Abt von Lieberman some ten companies and two guns to hold the area. 645 
General Hannyngton decided to use both his columns in a converging movement 
from the north, while the third, smaller column under Colonel Taylor would march south- 
west from Kilwa, cutting off the southern escape route. Leaving its jumping-off point 
after dark on 6 July, No I Column marched south-west for seven miles, before linking up 
with its forward reconnaissance elements. While these troops attacked the next morning 
in the thickly wooded positions, No 2 Column was engaged in an arduous approach 
march from the north-west. The attack was successful and a flanking movement by No I 
Column forced the Germans to retire to Mtshikama and the two columns linked up the 
next day. 646 
Hannyngton then took the opportunity to rebalance his columns, drawing No 2 
back to Kirongo in preparation for another flanking move while No I Column took over 
Mnindi. After four days of reconnaissance and planning, a move by that force coupled 
with pressure from the east by No 3 Column led the defenders to evacuate and move 
some 10 miles further south to Narungombe. Late on the evening of 17 July, Nos I and 2 
Columns linked up and readied themselves for the next stage. 
643 CAB 44/9, pp. 73-74. 
6" CAB 44/9, pp. 74-75. No I (Orr) had four battalions; No 2 (Grant) had three and a half battalions; No 3 (Taylor) had two 
battalions. 
"s MS Boell, N14/32,28. Kapitel, pp. 2287-2288. 
646 Orr, "Rumbo to the Rovurnar, pp. I 10- 111. 
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Orr was given command of Nos I and 3 columns for the planned fight at 
Narungombe, although sickness reduced one of his Indian battalions to company 
strength. The moves commenced on 18 July with No I Column, followed by No 3, going 
for the water holes at Kihumburo, about six miles from Narungombe. Apart from its 
garrison, the latter place had a good source of water which made it vital in such a parched 
land. Indeed, failure to take it would inevitably force a return to Kibumburo, and, if its 
water proved to be insufficient, then a move even further back might be necessary. 
By 1730 hours that day, contact between the opposing sides was lost, and No I 
Column bivouacked about two miles short of Narungombe. Captured prisoners revealed 
the presence of eight companies and two guns around the water pool with the possibility 
of reinforcements arriving from the south. Receiving permission to employ No 2 
Column in his operation, Orr planned to use No I Column to engage the enemy from the 
front while No 2 moved against the enemy's left flank and No 3 on his right flank. A 
bombardment by mountain guns and Stokes mortars would commence as soon as 
daylight permitted. 
Abt von Lieberman had its position across the road and facing generally north. 
On its right flank was a substantial swamp while to the left was a hill covered in virtually 
impenetrable bamboo and bush. The approaches had been carefully cleared and were 
backed by three sets of trenches and rifle pits. The overall frontage was about 1800 
yards. 647 The attack went ahead early the next day. Only limited progress could be made 
to the front while the two Ranking moves went ahead, with No 3 Column making good 
progress on the right. After several German counter-attacks, Orr put in heavy attack in an 
attempt to break through the defences. A newly raised KAR battalion in No 3 broke and 
for a time the column was nearly overwhelmed. However, a final push on the left by No 
2 Column broke into the defences and saved the situation. Unable to progress further and 
unwilling to give up their gains, the British dug in for the night preparatory for another 
attempt in the moming. 64' 
647 Ridgway, "With No 2 Columie', 1, pp. 22-23. 
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Before dawn, patrols found that the enemy had evacuated his remaining positions 
and Orr promptly occupied Narungombe and the vital water holes. They were joined by 
Force HQ and, in light of the casualties and need for water, a further advance was called 
off. No I remained in possession of Narungombe, while No 2 was sent back 12 miles to 
Rungo where water was plentiful. Liebermann now moved back to Mihambia, where he 
was joined by an irate von Lettow who had only been a few miles away when the former 
had evacuated the most important position for many miles. 
Narungombe was one of the hardest fights of the campaign and one of the first in 
which the Germans had been fought out of rather than manoeuvred out of position. 
Casualties on both sides had been heavy and the fighting had been conclusive before the 
arrival of von Lettow and four extra companies. It also revealed the degree to which the 
new KAR battalions still needed experience; P/3 rd KAR in No 3 Column was only 
partially trained and had disintegrated when it lost a high proportion of its officers and a 
severe bush fire swept through its position; its collapse had accounted for the difficulties 
in which the column found itself that afternoon. 649 
A strong position was now developed at Narungombe with a line of forward 
outposts established about two miles in front of the defences. A week later, on 28 July, 
No 2 Column moved south-west towards the enemy post at Mssindy, about ten miles 
distant. After a number of encounters, the British occupied that place and now had a 
second well-watered jumping-off point from which to conduct a further advance. 650 
Norforce began its advance on 2 July with the aim of catching up with At Lincke. 
It was located the next day, some 23 miles from Likuju at the important track junction 
linking Songea-Liwale and Songea-Mahenge. A KAR battalion was ordered to attack, 
while the remainder of Murray's Rhodesians arrived at Songea, completing the arduous 
return march . 
65 1 The move on Lincke took a few days to develop as Murray endeavoured 
to cut Lincke off and the deep ravines and densely vegetated valleys were difficult to 
6" WO 106/273, History of3 KAR, P. 70. "9 Orr, "Rumbo to the Rovume, pp. 114-115. 
00 Ridgway, "With No 2 Columrf', 1, pp. 26-27. 
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negotiate. Finally, with the encirclement complete on the night of 6/7 July, the Germans 
hastily evacuated the very strong position, leaving behind a considerable amount of 
equipment. Escaping with a number of casualties, they made good use of darkness and 
some newly cut bush paths. Lincke himself was evacuated sick to Mahenge and 
command devolved onto Poppe. 652 Further south, a battalion under Colonel Shorthose 
was closing in on Mwembe, some 150 miles north-west of Fort Johnston, preparatory to 
attacking there. After ambushing a German patrol on 5 July, the battalion attacked 
Mwembe the next day and drove out the defenders. 653 
The main advance continued with the retreating enemy moving north rather than 
towards the expected destination of Liwale. Good use was made of the slender air 
resources with the aircraft based at Likuju reconnoitring and bombing the new German 
positions. Supply dumps, usually based in highly flammable grass huts, were a favoured 
target and the Likuju aircraft as well as another based in Mwembe were able to bum 
several. 654 Murray's advance was beginning to outpace the supply situation, as MT, 
ordered some time previously, had yet to arrive. Owing to the lack of food, Poppe's 
tactics were strictly delaying and he took care not to become decisively engaged. 
On 13 July, Northey succeeded in having his orders changed from an advance on 
Liwale to one on Mpondas, as he wanted to concentrate on destroying the enemy rather 
than seizing empty territory. His request to continue the simultaneous drives against Abt 
Aumann in the north and Abt von Stuemer in the south were approved by van Deventer, 
although he warned that the Belgian build-up was proceeding very slowly. Once 
Mpondas had been reached, the commander-in-chief would consider the situation before 
issuing ftirther instructions. 655 
By the middle of the month, Norforce was fully engaged in all three areas, 
pushing back the various enemy detachments. The welcome news of the arrival of the 
"' WO 95/5329, War Diary Norforce, Entries 2 and 3 July 1917. 
6" WO 95/5329, War Diary Norforce, Entries 6 and 7 July 1917. 
... WO 95/5329, War Diary Norforce, Entry 8 July 1917. 
6" WO 95/5329, War Diary Norforce, Entries 10 and II July 1917. 
655 WO 95/5329, War'Diary Norforce, Entry 12 July 1917. Telcgrarn NF 4139,12 July Norforce to BGGS; Entry 13 July, Telegram G 
300 BGGS to Norforce. 
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first Belgian contingent at Iringa was received on 15 July together with reports of an 
impending attack at Mpepo. 656 This was countered a few days later with the 
disappointing news that the Belgians would not now take over the Lupembe- Mpepo 
sector as previously agreed, although van Deventer promised to send another KAR 
battalion from Iringa in recompense. 657 
The Songea Column advanced steadily and fought a number of minor, but time- 
consuming, rearguard actions reaching to within about three miles from Mpondas, while 
Tafel had brought reinforcements with him on moving from Madaba to Mahenge. 658 
Further to the north, the column now commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Fair had forced 
back At Aumann between Mpepo and Mkapira on the right bank of the River Ruhudje 
by 26 July. 659 Progress had been good considering the relative closeness . in strengths 
between attacking and defending columns: Hawthorn's Songea Column had about 900 
rifles as compared to Lincke's 600, while Fair's 650 faced 350 of Aumann's around 
Mpepo and Shorthose's were pushing back von Stuemer's 400 or so. 660 
The time spent in these static locations was not wasted, as daily patrols were sent 
out to locate water sources and roads, as well as to find the enemy and disrupt his supply 
system. Deforestation, through burning, was also used as a means of denying the enemy 
covered approaches to the defences. No 2 Column was joined by a flight of aeroplanes at 
Mssindye and later by the mounted troops of the 250' (Indian) Cavalry, who immediately 
began raiding the enemy lines of communication, often with considerable success, and 
disrupting the enemy's supply arrangements. 661 
Elsewhere, von Lettow was encountering other difficulties as the Germans' 
control of the Makonde Highlands was becoming unsustainable. Largely supported by 
the British, the Makonde tribe rose in active revolt against the colonial regime. Two 
656 WO 95/5329, War Diary Norforce, Entry 15 July 1917. 
657 WO 95/5329, War Diary Norforce, Entry 24 July 1917. 
619 WO 95/5329, War Diary Norforce, Entry I August 1917. 
659 WO 95/5329, War Diary Norforce, Entries 26 July and I August 1917. Abt Aumann was about 350 strong with three companies. 
"0 WO 95/5329, War Diary Norforce, Entry 31 July 1917. A captured field state, signed by Lincke on 24 July, gave a fair indication 
of the strength of the German opposition with some 63 Germans, 540 Askaris and 428 carriers on the strength of his Abteflung. 
661 Ridgway, "With No 2 Column", 1, p. 28. 
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companies were despatched in an attempt to re-assert German rule as well as to protect 
vital food-gathering parties in the area. On hearing of the fighting at Mrweka, Von 
Lettow also sent six companies to reinforce Wahle, with another three drawn from Abt 
Otto being moved to the Kilwa front. Marching with the reinforcements, the 
Kommandeur set up his headquarters at Nahungo on 24 June. His intention was to 
prevent a breakout from Lindi as well as to attack any detached portion of Linforce that 
came within range. Five days later, he moved on to the area of Lutende, which had not 
662 been occupied following the British advance, and began his preparations. He sent At 
von Chappuis with two companies to the area of the Lutende Hills while Abt K6hl with 
three companies was held around Naitiwi. 663 A subsequent personal reconnaissance by 
von Lettow on 8 July of the Naitiwi position concluded that the chances of a surprise 
attack were unfavourable and without it no chance of success was possible. 664 
Back at Lindi, O'Grady wanted to develop his earlier advance, but needed more 
troops. He had been promised another KAR battalion, but as it would not arrive before 5 
July, large-scale operations were out of the immediate question. However, reports of 
patrols in the Lutende area led him to order his own patrols to investigate on 29 June. 
Not realising the presence of enemy reinforcements, a half battalion had successfully 
attacked Lutende on 30 June. The response was immediate and, as the defenders 
streamed back, von Lettow counter-attacked with his three fresh companies. The blow 
fell heavily on the Indians and they were driven out of their newly acquired position. 
Casualties were heavy, including the loss of their commanding officer and two machine 
guns, and the Lutende position was in German hands once again. 665 
Following this setback, O'Grady, always an aggressive commander, proposed that 
Linforce advance along the road running from Lindi to Massassi, in order to cut off von 
Lettow's escape route. Believing that the Germans would not hold Liwale but would fall 
back to Massassi and thence into Portuguese East Africa, he pushed for an initial 
662 Boell, Die Operationen, p. 338. 
663 MS Boell, N14/32,28. Kapitel, pp. 2287-2288. 
6" MS Boell, N14/32,28. Kapitel, pp. 2292-2293. 
665 Boell, Die Operationen, p. 339. The British lost 73 dead, 19 wounded and 18 taken prisoner, while the Germans lost nine killed 
and 26 wounded. 
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advance along the road as far as Mahiwa, with a subsequent move onward to Massassi. 
666 
Given the temporary exhaustion of Hanforce and the closeness of this view to his own 
thoughts, General van Deventer assented to O'Grady's wishes and authorised the 
reinforcement of his command. 667 
On the German side, despite his inability to attack, von Lettow chose to remain in 
the Lutende area for a number of days, using the opportunity to gather supplies and 
consume as much of the rich stocks as possible. Finally, on learning of the difficulties 
faced by Abt von Debermann further north, he marched off with five companies and two 
batteries, leaving Wahle a single company as reinforcement. 668 
The latter part of the month of July was spent ferrying troops and the all- 
important carriers from Dar-es-Salaarn into Lindi. The reinforcements were substantial, 
consisting of three infantry battalions, a mountain battery and the Stokes mortar 
battery. 669 While all the organisational. and administrative preparations were underway, 
Brigadier-General O'Grady conducted his reconnaissances and developed his plan. 
As van Deventer's operations progressed throughout July and the Belgian build- 
up continued, friction between the British and Belgian commands began to mount. These 
were chiefly due to a lack of British troops in the Iringa area and the slow arrival of 
planned Belgian reinforcements. By the end of that month, one battalion was under 
direct British command and the various columns were interposed. 670 
Originally, both governments had agreed that the British would set the strategic 
direction of the campaign and would set the mission for the Belgians within a distinct 
zone of operations. Within this framework, the Belgian commander-in-chief was 
responsible for the detailed deployment and operation of his own units and columns. He 
had been specifically ordered not to allow the formation of mixed allied columns and to 
6" WO 95/5293, War Diary GHQ, 13 July 1917, Appendix AS and A6, Note on Situation at Lind! and Note on the relative importance 
of the Kilwa (A) and Lindi (R) lines ofadvance by Brigadier-General OGrady, 13 July 1917. 
667 CAB 44/10, p. 7. 
"s Boell, Die Operationen, p. 339. 
669 CAB 44/10, p. 7. 
670 Campagnes Colontales Beiges, 111,3, p. 141. 
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maintain a distinctly Belgian area of command. Given the pace of deployment and the 
pressure of operations, this principle had been ignored and Colonel Huyghd now came 
under national pressure to rectify this situation. This took place at a meeting in the British 
GHQ in Dar-es-Salaarn from 20 to 23 July 1917, whose aim was both to resolve these 
disputes and to settle the more prosaic questions of supply and transport. 
After much discussion, it was agreed that Mahenge would remain the immediate 
Belgian objective. To that end, the Colonne Hubert, presently en route from Iringa to the 
Kilombero Valley was instructed to reinforce Colonel Tytler's column along the line of 
the River Ruipa. The Brigade Sud, having concentrated at Uleia was then to advance to 
Kidatu and start preparations to cross the River Ruaha. Once in position, Tytler was to 
withdraw his column and Hubert was to come under Belgian orders once again. It was 
also agreed that the British-installed telegraph line would be turned over to the 
Belgians. 671 
As ever the question of transport loomed large, with the British agreeing to supply 
African rations to the Belgians, while the purchase of livestock and rice was left to their 
Royal Commissioner at Kigoma. British MT would move supplies forward from the 
railheads at Dodoma and Kilossa to the forward line of the Ruipa. From there, the 
supplies would be moved forward by British carriers and mules. Owing to a shortage of 
Belgian personnel, the British agreed also to provide overseers to supervise Belgian- 
recruited carriers. 
For their part, the Belgians agreed to take responsibility for the improvement of 
the road leading from Kilosa to Kidoti and later extended this onward to Kidatu on the 
Ruaha. They also had to meet the challenges of bridging the many rivers en-route, with 
the greatest being the requirement to allow eight-tonne vehicles to cross the Ruaha and 
Ulanga Rivers. As these were, respectively, 70 feet wide and 10 feet deep and 300 feet 
wide and 20 feet deep, they represented a major task. 672 
671 Campagnes Coloniales Belges, III, pp. 140-141. 
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THE ADVANCE IN AUGUST 1917 
By early August, the situation was as follows. The Germans remained divided 
into two major groups under Tafel and von Lettow. The Kommandeur kept a strong force 
at Mihambia where it could easily reinforce either Liwale or Massassi with columns 
facing both Hanforce and Linforce. The British were still unsure as to his ultimate 
intentions; whereas he had initially appeared to be headed for Portuguese East Africa, he 
now appeared to be staying in the Mahenge-Liwale area. Furthermore, they believed that 
the reinforced and aggressive operations from Lindi would draw him in and that 
673 resistance would be substantial. 
Van Deventer was taking no chances and considered the clearance of AN von 
Stuemer from Portuguese territory and the denial of the rich southern districts of the 
German colony to be essential. By early August, the first stage had been achieved. 
Shorthose's Column was now moving on Tunduru, an important fanning area and road 
junction. Also germane to van Devnter's plan was the reintroduction of mounted troops 
into the campaign as the reformed South African mounted regiment began to arrive in 
East Africa. 674 
Van Deventer paid a personal visit to Lindi in early August, conferring at length 
with O'Grady and setting out his policy for a further advance. After the losses in June and 
July, the commander-in-chief ordered that more detailed reconnaissances be carried out 
beforehand and that a frontal attack was not to be repeated. Instead he wanted a turning 
movement, using the fordable right bank of the River Lukuledi, against the strong enemy 
positions. 675 To achieve this, O'Grady had just received substantial reinforcements 
together with a large number of individual replacement officers and NCOs and eight new 
Lewis guns per battalion. 676 
67' Campagnes Coloniales Belges, III, pp. 142-143. 673 WO 95/5294, War Diary GHQ, 7 August 1917, Appendix A4, Telegram G 650, van Deventer to CIGS, 7 August. 674 WO 95/5294, War Diary GHQ, 8 August 1917, Appendix B, Telegram G 675, van Deventer to CIGS, 8 August. 675 CAB 44/10, p. 19. Van Deventer left Lindi on 5 August 676 CAB 44/10, p. 7. 
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The new plan required a number of changes in the British deployments and O'Grady 
decided to thin out his forward positions with the bulk of his troops being concentrated in 
two mobile columns and only weak garrison troops holding Lindi. Colonel Taylor's column 
of 1,200 rifles was to assemble at Mkwaya to make the outflanking march and to seize a 
position on the German line of retreat "so as to compel the enemy to leave his 
entrenchments to fight his way southwards. " O'Grady also planned to lead a column 
himself, about 1200 strong, that would provide the main punch for the attack, which was set 
for 9 August. 
The arrival of the last troops on 6 August meant that all was in readiness for the 
advance to begin three days later. Intermittent aerial bombing of Tandamuti Hill was used 
in an attempt to focus Gen-nan attention on that place. Taylor's Column set off in mid- 
afternoon of 9 August, crossing the Lukuledi near Mkwaya, and bivouacked near Kiwambi 
Hill. The next morning the fire plan, which included all the available guns including the two 
monitors, opened up on Tandamuti Hill. O'Grady's Column then marched west between 
the hill and the trolley line, hoping to cut off the retreat of the defenders. Opposition was 
slight, but the dense bush made for slow going and it was not until dusk on 10 August that 
the leading battalion reached the trolley line about two miles west of the Loop. The column 
then halted and dug in for the night. In the meantime, Taylor's Column had continued on to 
its objective, a point one mile east of Narunyu, and began to entrench itself. The plan was 
now to wait for the Germans to try and break out. At about 1800 hours, a probe from 
Narunyu was driven off but it was the only engagement of the night and the next morning 
the defenders found the enemy had withdrawn around their trenches and were now astride 
the trolley line at Narunyu. 677 
The advance to Narunyu had been successfully accomplished and the Germans 
forced out of their strong position at Tandamuti Hill. However, the next phase would prove 
more difficult as the Lindi force was beyond the range of the ships' guns and sickness was 
rising after heavy rains. Van Deventer signalled O'Grady on 14 August again to avoid 
frontal attacks and use flanking movements on the Narunyu position. However, this was 
677 CAB 44/10, pp. 19-21; WO 106/273, History of3 KAR, pp. 19-20. 
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easier said than done, as the ground was exceptionally difficult since the southern side was 
protected by wide and impassable swamps formed by the River Lukuledi and the Narunyu 
stream. The eastern face was largely covered in a dense sisal plantation, while the small 
stretch of open ground near the trolley line was lined with trenches protected by a sisal 
abattis. The trenches on the low ground were flanked on the northern side by a steep 
escarpment, and on the top of the high ground and sheer slope were further entrenchments 
amid thick bush. However, in the north the country was more open and held the possibility 
of a flank march. 
While these operations were underway, von Lettow had been very active. On 
hearing of the British attack on Tandamuti Hill on 3 August, he had left Mihambia with five 
companies and several guns. He had: 
"decided to join General Wahle with some of the companies from Ndessa and 
perhaps bring off the operation that had failed at Narungombe; a decisive success by 
an unexpected reinforcement. , 678 
Marching by way of Mawerenye, he crossed the Mbennkuru at Nakiu below 
Nahungu, thence to Nahungu and Nyangao, reaching about eight miles to the rear of 
Wahle's positions at Nyengedi on 15 August. By the morning of 18 August, the German 
positions were: Abt Kraut on the right with three companies; Abt Rothe on the left with two 
companies; and Abt von Chappuis with two more in reserve. Von Lettow with two 
companies remained behind Wahle's troops. 
O'Grady decided to use the northern option and issued orders for the move on 13 
August. However, continuous heavy rainfall forced the postponement of the attack until the 
evening of 17 August. His plan was straightforward, a feint towards the marshes to the 
south coupled with an artillery bombardment of the main position to cover the move of the 
('78 Lettow, Reminiscences, p. 204. 
245 
main body to the north. 679 Retaining his two-column organisation, O'Grady detached a 
single battalion to hold the line and make the demonstration against the marshes. 
As previously, Taylor led the advance before dark on 17 August. After halting for 
the night, the advance was resumed before dawn the next day along a compass bearing. 
Emerging onto a newly made road that ran east-west, the lead battalion ran into minor 
opposition that was quickly cleared. Despite using the road as a new axis, the 
surrounding bush became so thick as to make deployed movement impossible and this 
slowed the advance considerably. By afternoon on 18 August, the lead unit reached a 
small collection of huts held by elements of Abt Kraut. A brisk fire-fight secured the 
position, but increased firing from the bush induced the battalion to halt and dig in until 
reinforcements arrived. This proved to be a wise precaution as German reinforcements 
continued to arrive through the afternoon. Wahle, having already committed one 
company in the morning, sent in his last reserve at 1500 hours but it was unable to make 
significant headway owing to the heavy fire. Taylor pushed his troops forward as quickly 
as possible and by 1600 both his battalions were facing an enemy outflanking movement. 
Owing to the ground, he pulled back about 600 yards, just as von Lettow arrived with two 
companies. A close-range battle raged through the night and neither side gave way. 680 
Finally, von Lettow had had enough and ordered Wahle to hold his existing positions and to 
refonn an adequate reserve. 681 
While this confused fighting was underway, General O'Grady was following Taylor 
with his own column; it was difficult to move and patrols were dangerously active. Indeed, 
O'Grady narrowly escaped capture by a German patrol Whilst moving between units. In 
this situation, he decided to wait until morning before making any further moves. Early on 
19 August, he pushed forward, driving back a number of German parties before linking 
up with Taylor. They found that the enemy had withdrawn less than half a mile to the 
west and was strongly entrenched, supported by the fire of a Konigsberg gun. It seemed 
clear that substantial reinforcements had arrived; a view that was confirmed by GHQ 
679 CAB 44/10, pp. 22-23. 
60 Boell, Die Operationen, pp. 346-348; CAB 44/10, pp. 23-24. The 1'/2"d KAR under Lt Col Giffard was a much steadier and 
reliable unit than the battalion that had broken and run in May. 
246 
682 
intelligence reports that von Lettow had brought half of his main body to the south. 
The situation had now changed materially, with Linforce stalled some 20 miles inland and 
continually losing troops from sickness. The Germans had a marked superiority in numbers 
and put any ftirther advance out of the question. For this reason, O'Grady pulled back 
Taylor's Column from its exposed forward position and established defences with a strong 
reserve back on the Lukuledi River. Linforce now went over to the defensive until support 
could be obtained from Hanforce, still finther north. 683 
NORTHEY'S OPERATIONS AUGUST TO SEPTEMBER 1917 
Northey continued to be very concerned about the dispersion of his force, 
particularly the detachment operating against Mpepo, as it left him nothing to deal with 
Tunduru on his right flank. He asked van Deventer to send the promised KAR battalion 
to Mpepo so that he could in turn concentrate his Rhodesian units further south on the 
Liwale-Tunduru axis. Despite having a force of nearly 4,000 effective rifles, Northey 
was forced to cover a front of 300 miles with five columns, which meant that only a small 
proportion could ever be brought to bear in one place. 684 However, he also noted that the 
main force under van Deventer had already ground to a standstill, with a start strength of 
5,000 now being reduced to 2,000. Unhappy with events, he arranged a meeting with 
General Sheppard, the BGGS, at Iringa, to discuss the future conduct of operations. 685 
Shorthose's battalion continued to make good progress having pushed von 
Stuemer back through 250 miles of Portuguese territory. He had out-manoeuvred his 
opponent, crossing the rapidly flowing and crocodile-infested Rovuma without boats by 
improvising rafts and ropes out of tree bark and grass. He had to live off the country for 
two weeks before switching his base from Fort Johnston to Wiedhafen, some 300 miles 
apart. After a hiatus in communications owing to Shorthose's isolation and the weather, 
68 1 Lettow, Reminiscences, p. 205. 
612 CAB 44110, pp. 25-26. 
"' Boell, Die Operationen, p. 348; CAB 44/10, pp. 27-28. 
6" WO 95/5329, War Diary Norforce, Entries 5 and 8 August 1917. 
"s WO 95/5329, War Diary Norforce, Entries 9 and 10 August 1917. The meeting was set up for 16 August and facilitated by 
Northey's completion of a motor road from Songea to Iringa, nearly 300 miles long. 
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on 4 August Northey ordered him to continue towards Tunduru while retaining three 
other battalions in reserve in Nyasaland. 686 
In the meantime, Northey met Sheppard at Iringa and was able to clear up a large 
number of queries and differences. The passing of the crisis in Nyasaland enabled him to 
return Colonel Hawthorn to command operations further north. 687 As he was building up 
his strength for an attack on A bt Lincke still heavily-fortified at Mpondas, he used Murray 
and his Rhodesians to take over the lines of 'communication. The investment of Aumann 
at Mpepo continued with Fair's troops dug-in close by and heavy firing taking place. 
The Germans struck back on 22 August, launching counter-attacks both at Mpepo 
and Mpondas that failed to make any impression on the British positions. It was 
becoming apparent that the stubborn defences of both places were being used to cover the 
withdrawal of the forces north of Mahenge to the east. At the same time, van Deventer 
issued fresh instructions to Northey with the aim of increasing the pressure from the west. 
He was now ordered to attack both Mpepo and Mpondas until they had fallen while also 
denying the enemy the Tunduru district and any attempted re-entry of Portuguese East 
Africa. 688 
Events began to gather speed in late August as Shorthose made a daring move on 
Tunduru, taking it on 23 August while Fair continued to tighten the noose on Aumann at 
Mpepo. That place was evacuated during the night of 27/28 August, but a hot pursuit 
followed in which the Germans suffered heavily, with nearly a third of their force as 
casualties. 689 By the end of the month, Norforce had inflicted significant losses on the 
Westtruppen, with 22 Germans and 241 Askaris being confirmed casualties and three 
gunstaken. 690 August had brought success at relatively low cost. 
'" WO 95/5329, War Diary Norforce, Entry 14 August 1917. 
6S7 WO 95/5329, War Diary Norforce, Entry 15 and 16 August 1917. 6n WO 95/5329, War Diary Norforce, Entries 21 and 22 August 1917. 
"9 WO 95/5329, War Diary Norforce, Entries 28 and 30 August 1917. The Germans suffered 26 killed and 55 taken prisoners; the 
British lost eight dead and 15 wounded. 690 WO 95/5329, War Diary Norforce, Entry 31 August 1917. 
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As these operations were in full swing, communications between the respective 
commanders-in-chief were limited to telegrams and liaison officers. By early September, 
during the pause to regroup before renewing the attack, Huyghd and van Deventer met 
for a second time at the British headquarters in Dar-es-Salaarn from 6 to 9 September. 
Van Deventer explained that the coming rainy season in December would make 
communications between Kilossa and Mahenge virtually impossible and proposed to 
reduce the garrison of the latter to the minimum and to keep the bulk of the Belgian 
forces as a reserve on the railway. This information was unwelcome to Huyghd as his 
forces were now at maximum strength and the carriers recruited in the Belgian Congo 
were in the process of moving forward to the front. While the British idea was not taken 
up at the time, as van Deventer wanted the Mahenge area cleared and an overland 
advance towards Liwale undertaken, it would bear fruit in the medium term. 
A modified campaign directive came out of the meeting, in which the advances of 
the Kilwa force on Nahungu, the Lindi force towards Massassi, and Norforce on 
Mponda/Liwale, would be co-ordinated with the Belgians moving on Mahenge. Once 
that place was taken and cleared of the enemy, a blocking position was to be taken up 
from Mponda to Luwegu River in order to prevent any breakout to the west while making 
preparations to send a substantial force to occupy the rich food-growing area around 
Liwale. Should the combined actions prove insufficient to wind up the fighting before 
December, then Huyghd was to be ready for a further campaign operating either from 
Ifakara on the Central Railway or possibly from Liwale or Kilwa. While no dates or 
exact timings were given to the Belgians, van Deventer urged them to bring the Germans 
to decisive battle and to act as speedily as possible. 691 
To that end, Tytler's Column would only remain in the area of the River Ruipa 
until the Brigade Sud could move forward from Kilossa and start preparations for the 
crossing of the River Ruaha. The Hubert Column, which was presently en route from 
"' CampagnesColonialesBelges, III, pp. 364-366, Annexe No. 36,7 September 1916, Letter van Deventer to Huygh6. 
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Iringa towards Makuas-Mpanga to reinforce Tytler would remain in the area and rejoin 
the Belgian main body on MiVa, 692 
Meanwhile in the north, the problem of Abt Naumann remained unsolved 
although he had been gradually losing strength. It had reached the Kilimanjaro area in 
late August and threatened to enter British East Africa. Finally, faced by reinforcements 
moved hastily by rail, it turned south again. Van Deventer had reinforced the Belgians 
with a battalion plus mounted infantry who began to outpace the raiders. Wishing to 
speed up the Belgian concentration further south, on 12 August he made the elimination 
of the Germans a solely British responsibility. "' 
Finally, after much dogged pursuit and effort, the remnants of Abt Naumann were 
trapped at Luita, north of the Central Railway. It had been run down by the superior 
mobility of the mounted infantry and was seriously short of supplies. Surrounded in a 
waterless position, the last Germans surrendered on 2 September. "' The small force had 
created disruption all out of all proportion to its size, but now the British could 
concentrate on destroying the enemy main body. 
By the middle of September the time was ripe again for the advance; both the 
Kilwa and Lindi forces had been substantially reinforced and motor transport was now 
available to the entire force. Van Deventer wished to push the Kilwa force south with a 
concurrent move south-westerly by the Lindi force; his aim was to catch the German 
main body whatever course of action it took. The western troops, both British and 
Belgian, were to carry on aggressively in order to contain the troops in the Mahenge 
area. 695 
HANFORCE PUSHES SOUTH TO THE LUKULEDI 
692 Campagnes Colontales Belges 
, 
III, P. 141. 
693 Campagnes Coloniales Belges, III, pp. 117-118; CAB 44/8, pp. 73-78.. 694 WO 33/953, Telegrams D 2, No. 2116,3 September 1917, Telegram G 095, van Deventer to CIGS, p. 168; CAB 44/8, p. 120. 69' Van Deventer, Despatch 1, pp. 183-185. 
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While the advancing columns were pushing hard against the Schutztruppe in 
German East Africa, British intelligence had gathered much useful information about the 
strength and state of morale from the Portuguese side of the border. Captured prisoners 
revealed that at the end of July some 1800 Europeans remained in the field, of whom 
some 300 were sick and another 600 were employed on the lines of communication 
leaving less than 1,000 in the front line units; morale remained good. 696 This information 
was supplemented a week later by intelligence showing that resistance would continue 
and that German morale was being sustained by the reports of the enormous Allied 
shipping losses: 
"... Prisoners estimate total European force in field including L of C and sick 
1200. GW in firing line and out hospital thinks they will fight on owing 
enormous influence personality Von LETTOW. Enemy not recruiting askaris or 
,, 697 ruga ruga. Consider askaris remaining good and prepared to fight on... 
Reinforced with the Nigerian Brigade and Colonel Dyke's reserve brigade, Force 
HQ was well forward, co-located at Mssindy with the bulk of its units. It faced two enemy 
groupings, with the larger at Ndessa facing No 2 Column and the weaker at Mihambia 
opposite No I Column. The plan was to use the two columns to turn out the defenders 
from their strong positions, while the Nigerians were used to make a deep outflanking 
move to cut off their retreat to the River Mbemkuru. The greatest problem was the lack of 
water and the need to find, secure and develop suitable sources - as ever the best positions 
were usually defended. 
The advance of Hanforce began early on 19 September, with No I Column moving 
towards Mihambia and a small flanking force making for Nitshi, some 12 miles south-west. 
A local outflanking action, despite the presence of unexpected depth defences, was 
successful and the all-important waterholes were captured by early afternoon. A further 
advance the next day achieved only slight success, and, as it appeared unlikely that Nitshi 
and its water supply could be reached, Hanforce HQ ordered Off to return to Mihambia on 
6% Wo 158/478,7 September 1917, Telegram No 127/5, Capt Cohen to Force Intelligence, 5 September. 
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21 September. Development of the water supplies and difficulties in moving rations 
forward delayed progress until late on the next day. Opposition was slight and two days of 
hard marching in hot sun with little food followed. By 24 September, the whole of No I 
Column was in Bweho Chini. 698 
The Nigerian Brigade, less one battalion, had been collected and reached Kilwa by 8 
September and began the long move forward to Mssindy, some 80 miles distant. Leaving 
on 18 September, it was given the intermediate task of developing water sources some 20 
miles south-west of Mssindy. On hearing the action at Mihambia on 20 September, the 
leading battalion moved south trying to find the track that led to the Mbemkuru River before 
the opposition arrived. 699 On 22 September, the small village of Bweho Chini was reached, 
and after a short, sharp fight, was hastily occupied. As this lay directly on the most probable 
escape route to Nahungu, the brigade closed up and began preparing its defences. A strong 
reconnaissance of two companies was sent out to the north-east, but hardly had it left Bweho 
chini than it was heavily engaged and nearly cut off. At the same time, a strong attack was 
launched against the eastern side of the hastily dug perimeter. The advanced force managed 
to fight its way back to the boma, having suffered heavy losses, while the German attack 
intensified. Charges were led against the northern and eastern faces of the defences and 
patrols were probing the other sides. By 1700 hours, the brigade was encircled and heavily 
engaged on all sides. Fighting was fierce and, just before sundown, a very strong attack, 
supported by heavy machine gun and rifle fire, crashed into the defences. The defenders 
just held and then a company counter-attack with fixed bayonets drove back the Germans. 
During the night a lull developed, and the time was used to collect the wounded, improve 
the trenches and to coral the frightened carriers. Ammunition was beginning to run short 
and there was no sign of the other columns. 
The battle was resumed at 2130 hours by moonlight and continued throughout the 
evening. A number of attacks followed and faing continued, but the main impetus had been 
lost so that by midnight the action had been reduced to sniping while the attackers collected 
'97 WO 158/478,14 September 1917, Telegram No 144-1, Cohen to Force Intelligence, 12 September. 
' Orr, "Rumbo to the Rovuma7', pp. 116-117. 
6" CAB 45/19, Nigeria Regiment Record, pp. 33-35. 
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their dead and wounded. At dawn, it became clear that the battle was over and the Germans 
had broken up into small parties, moving toward Nahungu. Considerable stores and 
ammunition were left behind while patrols later rounded up a number of stragglers. Pursuit 
was impossible owing to the lack of food and water, while the remaining porters were 
insufficient to carry either the wounded or first line supplies. Finally, the dead had to be 
collected and buried; a task that lasted all day. 
On the morning of 24 September, a patrol linked up with the battered column and 
cable was re-laid. The wounded were evacuated up the road to Mihambia and the troops 
marched off to Bweho Juu and rejoined the rest of the brigade. It had been a severe test for 
both sides, but the Nigerians had retained the field of battle. 700 
In the meantime, No 2 Column and Dyke's Reserve Column were preparing to 
move on Ndessa. In order to avoid a frontal assault, Dyke and elements of No 2 Column 
would attack from the north, while the bulk of No 2 Column would move around the 
position to cut off escape to the west and south-west. , With only 1,400 rifles and four guns 
to cover a frontage of over four miles, it was not an easy task. 
In order to achieve success against the inevitable counter-attacks, a modification of 
lines of communication defence was used. As was usual, the Germans had a series of three 
to four defensive lines sited in depth and centred on the main road. To counter the strength 
of the defences, a new road, cut to a point some 3 miles west of Ndessa, was cleared by the 
flanking force. Protected by a small garrison, the remainder of the column marched up this 
track and then deployed facing the direction of the enemy. After a pre-arranged advance, 
the left hand battalion peeled off half left, moving on a compass bearing for a specified 
distance, then halted, and re-aligned itself with the original direction of advance. It then 
began constructing a boma as silently as possible. In the meantime, the remainder of the 
column kept advancing to a pre-determined distance, and then repeated the actions of the 
first battalion. Finally, the fourth and reserve battalion prepared its position to the rear of the 
right forward unit. After four and a half hours of marching and construction, the boma was 
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ready and the artillery opened up on the defences at 1030 hours. Assailed from the front and 
taken from an unexpected left flank, the defences were not held long and the Germans 
attempted to break out to the west. A strong attack was launched against the right hand 
battalion of the boma but was repulsed, followed by another attempt, this time on the left 
hand unit at 1900 hours. It too failed, and a final drive on the centre of the British line was 
unsuccessful about midnight. This marked the end of the Ndessa position and a number of 
stores were abandoned as the Germans withdrew hastily to the south-east. 701 
The loss of both the Ndessa and Mihambia positions increased the pressure on the 
Germans. Retreating rapidly to the south-east and then turning south-west along the track 
between Mihambia and Nahungu, the combined detachment suffered heavily when it ran 
into the block at Bweho Chini and the Nigerian Brigade. As a consequence of the hasty 
retreat, No 2 Column captured the empty position at Mawerenje together with food stocks, 
10,000 rounds of ammunition and a bomb factory. 
The next objective was Nahungu. 'Me defences in the north were collapsing and 
momentum was with the British. After the main columns linked up around Bweho Chini on 
24 September, the next steps were taken. No 2 Column went south towards Nakiu on the 
Mbemkuru while No 1 Column and the Nigerian Brigade pressed south-west to Nahungu. 
After several days of marching and pushing back rearguards, Nahungu fell without 
difficulty. 
Once Nahungu was secured, attention turned to pushing south of the Mbemkuru. 
The enemy had taken up a strong position at Ngarnbururu, some 15 miles to the south-west 
of Nahungu. Von Lettow had marched up with his reserve, reinforcing the somewhat 
demoralised force and had developed a very strong position along the road. The British, 
realising that such defences would be difficult to take as well as wanting to link up with 
Linforce as quickly as possible, decided to launch a deep right flanking movement aimed at 
seizing Ruponda and then Lukuledi. No 2 Column was given the task of locating and fixing 
700 CAB 45/19, Nigeria Regiment Record, pp. 36-39. Casualties were eight British and 127 Africans killed or wounded. A total of 16 
Germans and 87 Askaris were found dead on the field of battle. 
70' Ridgway, "With No 2 Column", II, pp. 248-249. 
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the opposition at Ngambuniru in order to cover the others. Again, the tactic of cutting a 
road about a 1,000 yards parallel to the existing one was used, together with intensive 
recomaissances, including aeroplanes. 
The tactic worked, for as soon as von Lettow began to withdraw his detachment to 
deal with the pressing matters in the south, No 2 Column was able to drive out the 
rearguards in early October and push south. It was pressed for another 30 miles, going via 
Ruangwa and ending at IýRoe, a small village on the edge of the waterless plain that led 
down to the Mkemburu Valley. Ultimately, the advance was too successfid, as the forward 
columns literally outran their lines of supply; on 10 October No I and No 2 Columns were 
recalled to Ruponda and Ruangwa respectively in order to build up sufficient stocks of food. 
Water, too was in very short supply and would be a major constraint on the final link-up 
with Linforce. 702 
THE ADVANCE UP THE LUKULEDI 
In early September, General van Deventer issued general instructions to his principal 
commanders. In them, he expressed the belief that the powers of the enemy's resistance 
were perhaps over-estimated and that one or two serious reverses would bring the end of the 
campaign nearer. He recognised that transport would be the critical limiting factor and that 
every effort would be made to improve communications. On the tactical front, he instructed 
that frontal attacks should be avoided as being slow, costly and indecisive. He wanted 
formations to seize positions in the enemy's flanks and rear and to defend them. This would 
force the Germans to attack and return the advantage to the British. However, as a precursor 
to any operations he required extensive reconnaissance to be carried out by long range 
patrols, aircraft observation and the Intelligence Scouts. Finally, he expected the 
forthcon-drig operations to be continuous and without pause. By making great sacrifices 
now, he hoped to draw the campaign to an end within two or three months. 703 
702 Ridgway, "With No 2 Column", II, pp. 250-253; Off, "Rumbo to the Rovuma7, p. 120; WO 95/5294, War Diary GHQ, 14 October 
1917, Appendix B, Telegram 7 WO, van Deventer to CIGS, 14 October; and 15 October 1917, Appendix B, Telegram 6 WO, van 
Deventer to CIGS, 15 October. 
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With the advance of Hanforce southward, attention again turned to Lindi. It had 
been on the defensive since 21 August and had received some rest and reinforcement. 
Equally important was the belief that the Germans had reduced their forces in the area in 
order to deal with the threat to the north. Intelligence estimated that the British now held 
local numerical superiority. On 4 September, GHQ instructed Linforce that the next 
advance should be to turn Narunyu. from the south. This would involve a strong column 
moving up the right bank of the River Lukuledi, with a crossing near Mtua and the seizing 
of a position astride the German lines of communication. However, given the increasing 
size and importance of the force, it was decided to send Major General Beves to take 
command, and he left Dar-es-Salaam by ship and arrived in Lindi on 9 September. He then 
reorganised the force into four groups. The main striking force was based on two columns, 
each roughly the size of a brigade, under the command of Brigadier General O'Grady and 
Colonel Taylor. In keeping with the organisation of Hanforce, the columns were renamed 
No 3 Col and No 4 Col respectively. A Force Reserve was created and the remaining troops 
were placed on lines of communication dutieS. 704 
On 18 September, Beves submitted his plans to GHQ for approval. The proposed 
organisation was as follows: No 3 Column would have three battalions totalling 1,300 rifles, 
17 machine guns, 18 Lewis guns, two mountain guns and four Stokes mortars; No 4 
Column would have four battalions and a machine gun company with 1,250 rifles, 29 
machine guns, 29 Lewis guns, four mountain guns, and four Stokes mortars; Force Reserve 
had two battalions each of 800 rifles, 12 machine guns, 16 Lewis guns and six guns. 705 Asa 
preliminary to the planned move, a number of reconnaissance and fighting patrols were 
launched around the Narunyu position supplemented by aerial observation and artillery 
bombardments. On 8 September a patrol had found a good crossing on the River Lukuledi 
near Mtua and this became the first objective for the advance. 
Operation orders were issued on 20 September. No 3 Column was instructed to 
make the flanking move to the crossing site in the Lukuledi valley while No 4 Column was 
703 WO 95/5294, War Diary GHQ, 2 September 1917, Appendix A3, Telegram G 059, BGGS to Hanforcc and Lincol, 2 September. 
7" CAB 44/10, pp. 29-30. Two battalions were sent to Lindi on &'9 and 19/20 September. 
70-' CAB 44/10, p. 3 1. 
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to remain opposite Narunyu, in readiness to advance in its support. The leading elements of 
No 3 Column set off before dawn on the morning of 23 September. Lying up to avoid 
observation during the day, a temporary bridge was constructed over the river. The advance 
was resumed after nightfall, although progress was slow. Finally halting in the early hours 
of the morning of 24 September, O'Grady again had his troops lay up for the day. Again 
starting after dark that evening, No 3 Column had to hack a trail out of the virgin bush and 
reached the designated crossing point just before dawn on 25 September. Withoutpausing, 
the two leading companies waded across the river and pushed onto the main road. 
The defenders, At Rothe, initially assessed this move as being merely a patrol. 
Quickly proven wrong by heavy firing, Rothe sent his reserves forward to prevent further 
penetration. These were sufficient to stop the attackers, 
706 who then started to dig in and 
called in heavy artillery fire. By 1300 hours, hopes of dislodging the crossing began to fade 
and despite the arrival of reserves, Wahle decided to abandon the Narunju position and to 
fall back on the Nambalika's position. 707 In the evening, the two guns followed by At 
Kr6ger were pulled back while Rothe acted as rearguard. 
While No 3 Column was underway, No 4 Column had been cutting paths through 
the dense sisal plantations in front of Narunyu- Artillery fire on the main defensive position 
covered this slow work on both 24 and 25 September; the attack was due to go in once No 3 
Column had closed the Germans' escape route. This was achieved on 26 September, but 
was too late; the defenders had slipped away to the west during the night, evading No 3 
Column on the main road. "' 
A patrol soon located the new positions along the line of the Nengedi Stream and 
Beves ordered his troops to close in on the enemy. Advancing up the thickly vegetated 
Chirumaka Hill and along the main road, No 3 Column ran into a number of strong 
positions and counter-attacks. By nightfall, the whole Column was committed as was the 
706 CAB 44/10, pp. 32-33. 
707 MS Boell, N14/32,28. Kapitel, p. 2582. 
703 WO 95/5294, War Diary GHQ, 28 September 1917, Appendix B, Telegram 0 378, van Deventer to CIGS, 28 September. 
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lead battalion of No 4. Casualties were relatively heavy, but the ridge was cleared and a 
final counter-attack was successfully beaten 0 ff . 
709 
After a day for reorganisation and further planning, General Beves ordered the 
advance to resume on 30 September. No 3 Column moved along the existing road around 
the northern end and western side of Chirumaka Hill as well as along the newly cut track. 
Troops on the latter route pushed back German outposts, launching a battalion attack at 
1400 hours, driving back the defenders. On the existing road, a Nigerian battalion had 
worked around the northern slopes of Chirumaka with considerable difficulty but faced no 
effective opposition. They reached their objective, a track junction, and rapidly dug in, 
while one company was sent further forward. It was heavily attacked at 1100 hours, and 
several hours later it was forced back to the main body. The enemy followed the 
withdrawing company closely until it reached the main defensive position, whereupon a 
vigorous attack was launched. The defences were sound and the Germans were unable to 
make any headway although heavy firing continued until dark. O'Grady sent a battalion to 
reinforce the hard-pressed Nigerians, but it only managed to arrive after dark owing to the 
difficult terrain. By this time, however, the enemy had broken off contact completely and 
had slipped off in the darkness. 
Overall, the day's immediate objective, the occupation of Chirumaka Hill, had been 
achieved and it offered excellent observation of the Nengedi Valley for many miles. 
However, as so often happened in attacks through thick bush, casualties had not been light 
and the enemy had got away. General Beves cautiously decided to delay further advance 
until Hanforce was in closer proximity. 710 
THE ADVANCE TO NYANGAO 
If the British were to catch and destroy the German main body in battle, the Lindi- 
Massassi road that ran east-west, largely following the course of the River Lukeledi, 
7'9 CAB 44/10, p. 38. The British casualties were 13 killed, 107 wounded, and six missing. 'Me Germans lost five killed, 32 wounded and 
one missing. 
711 CAB 44/10, pp. 36-37. The British casualties were 30 killed, 75 wounded and five missing. The Germans lost four dead and 23 
wounded. 
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offered the most favourable opportunity. Massassi was an important supply centre and 
711 
communication node that linked Songea to the west and Newala in the south. The 
difficulty of the terrain and lack of alternative routes made the road of considerable 
operational importance to both sides. Hanforce had made good progress in the north and 
the time for a co-ordinated move with Linforce now seemed to have arrived. 
General Beves was in local command of the operations and believed that the 
Germans had eight to nine companies between the Nengedi River and Mahiwa, of which six 
were around Mtama. His plan was to have No 3 Column make a frontal push from the east, 
while No 4 Column advanced up the north bank of the Lukuledi River, crossing at Mputo 
and then engaging Mtama from south. In the meantime, the Nigerians in the north were 
to cut the Lindi-Massassi road at Mahiwa and then move north-eastwards into the 
German rear. They were to prevent the enemy from withdrawing, while Nos I and 2 
Columns moved south on Massassi. Concurrently, cavalry patrols would range freely to 
find and destroy as many food supplies and supply depots as possible. 712 The plan was a 
bold one, but required a speedy advance, close co-operation between widely-spread 
columns, and aggressiveness. 
In the first week of October, a large number of patrols had been sent out to locate the 
enemy positions. By 7 October, O'Grady had gained a foothold on the far bank of the 
Nengedi River, launching a reinforced battalion onto the high ground overlooking the river. 
Supported by artillery fire, the infantry reached their objective, but were hit by a strong 
counter-attack. Sensing the situation's importance, another unit was pushed forward. This 
was hit by a strong German counter-attack and the high ground was lost. Fighting stabilised 
with the arrival of further British reinforcements and the bridgehead on the western side of 
the Nengedi River was retained. This was followed by a resumption of the advance on 
Mtarna, the next day. )While O'Grady's troops continued to progress, the resistance was 
711 CAB 45n2, Map 9508, "The Strategic Situation 20* December 1917"; WO 95/5294, War Diary GHQ, 23 September 1917, 
Appendix A25, "Instructions to O. C. 25' Cavalry", 16 September. 
712 Downes, With the Nigerians, p. 197. 
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increasingly stiff and it was becoming clear that the Germans intended to fight hard and 
cause delay. 713 
In light of the strong defences, Beves now decided not to press a direct attack on 
Mtama and to encircle it instead. On 12 October, he sent No 4 Column, now under the 
command of Colonel Tytler, marching west and crossing the Lukuledi below the 
confluence with the Nengedi stream. After an arduous march lasting several days, the 
river was crossed and Mtama was entered in the afternoon of 15 October, but the 
defenders had withdrawn. At the same time, No 3 Column had been moving west along 
the road, pushing back the German rearguards until they linked up with No 4 Column 
near Mtama. Van Deventer was anxious to give his opponents no rest and kept pressing 
Beves to maintain unrelenting pressure. 714 
On 13 October, Beves made a major alteration to the plan, issuing his orders by 
wireless. The Nigerian Brigade was to march north-west of Mahiwa while sending one 
battalion to cut the Lindi-Massassi road south-west of that village with the remaining 
units to attack Mahiwa on 15 October. At the same time, No 3 and No 4 Columns would 
continue their convergence on Mtama. The die was set for the major, possibly decisive, 
engagement that van Deventer had been seeking since resuming offensive operations. 
THE BATTLE OF MAHIWA 
In his haste to cut-off the Germans, General Beves had greatly underestimated the 
time required for the Nigerian Brigade to reach its objectives. They had only reached 
Namupa Mission by late on 14 October and lost direction in the thick bush and darkness. 
Exhausted, the column dug-in for the night unaware of the exact location of the eneMy. 715 
Colonel Mann, now in temporary command, was concerned about the vulnerability of his 
baggage train, and decided to leave it at Namupa Mission. He also had serious misgivings 
713 CAB 44/10, pp. 3940. 
714 Van Deventer, Despatch I, p. 187; CAB 44/10, pp. 41-42. Cites Telegram 552, BGGS to Linforce 15 October 1917; "Chief wishes you 
to push on now as fast as possible towards Massassi. Give enemy no time to make defensive positions and make every endeavour to capture 
his guns. Enemy is now much shaken, and a determined advance on your line combined with operations outlined in my 549 will probably 
have decisive effect. " 
715 CAB 44/10, pp, 42-43. 
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about his role as his own intelligence pointed to a much stronger enemy at Mahiwa than 
that assumed by General Beves. 716 
Early on 15 October, a single battalion left the brigade camp to carry out its task 
of blocking the Lindi-Massassi road at Nyangao. Coming under sporadic fire shortly 
after leaving, the battalion pushed back the rear guards until just two miles short of 
Nyangao. After a serious fight, supported by artillery, the Nigerians drove back their 
opponents and pushed on to their objective. There, they dug in and prepared to meet 
Wahle's force. In the meantime, the brigade's main body, two battalions strong, left at 
0530 hours marching south towards Mahiwa. 717 The advanced guard of two companies 
encountered heavier resistance almost from the outset, although the enemy rearguards 
were forced back toward the Mahiwa River. 
Despite the evidence of opposition, Beves instructed Mann to press on as quickly 
as possible. By I 100 hours, the leading company had nearly reached the Mahiwa River 
when it came under heavy fire. This was clearly no rearguard, but a substantial German 
position. At this point, the lead battalion consolidated and began digging in immediately, 
receiving a further company as reinforcements. However, this delay was not received 
well by Beves and Mann was again instructed to press forward. Realising that a frontal 
advance was not possible, he sent a company off to try and find a route on the eastern 
flank of the enemy. Leaving at 1645 hours, it was only able to advance before being hit 
by a strong frontal attack which forced it to withdraw. The cost had been heavy with 
some 40 per cent of the company becoming casualties, especially officers and NCOs. 718 
The Nigerians were now in a difficult situation with the Germans holding the 
dominating feature of Mremba Hill. The newly-arrived Abt von Ruckteschell 
immediately launched a heavy attack on the main defensive positions from the south and 
south-east. The battalion desperately clung to its ground and fended off the attacks until 
716 Downes, With the Nigerians, p. 197. 
717 CAB 44/10, p. 44. The main body totalled 1,100 rifles, 16 machine and 16 Lewis guns, two Stokes mortars and two 2.95" guns. 
7'8 Downes, With the Nigerians, pp. 198-20 1. British casualties totalled 63; CAB 45/19, Nigeria Regiment Record, pp. 474 8; Boell, 
Die Operationen, pp. 373-374. 
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a lull around 1800 hours. Just after dusk, a sudden attack on the eastern flank threatened 
to overrun the defenders, but again they held on with both sides suffering heavily. 
By the evening of 15 October, it was clear to Mann that a large German force was 
moving forward to attack the Nigerian positions. Furthermore, his battalion at Nyangao 
and baggage column at Namupa were also under threat. With the heavy expenditure of 
small arms ammunition, supplies were running low and concentration seemed essential; 
he pulled his troops together onto a hill overlooking the Mahiwa River. He then radioed 
Beves to tell him that both water and ammunition were running short and to ask for the 
return of his detached unit. This was agreed and the battalion was instructed to rejoin the 
main body at first light on 16 October. 719 
The situation worsened overnight as AN G6ring with two companies had moved 
around the Nigerians, cutting the road and telephone line leading to Namupa Mission. 720 
On the afternoon of 16 October, two guns were brought onto to Mremba Hill and began 
bombarding the trenches. The fire raked the rear of the trenches, forcing the defenders to 
abandon them after suffering heavy casualties. After the Nigerians had been under the 
relentless bombardment for some time, the artillery lifted its fire and the infantry surged 
towards the defences from the east and south. The dazed Nigerians managed to stagger 
back to re-occupy the empty trenches moments before the Germans arrived. A heavy 
fire-fight ensued with AN von Ruckteschell being halted about 100 yards from the 
forward positions. Unable to break in, the attackers withdrew after an hour. 721 
As ordered, the blocking battalion returned to Namupa Mission on 16 October, 
where it took control of the transport, numbering some 3,000 non-combatants in all. The 
battalion then marched to the relief of its comrades. Hearing the firing, the advanced guard 
ran straight into At Goring, which was on its flanking move. Heavily outnumbered and 
reduced by serious casualties, it was driven back towards Namupa Mission. The rest of the 
battalion could do little as it was split between escorting the carriers and providing the 
719 Downes, With the Nigerians, pp. 202-203; CAB 45119, Nigeria Regiment Record, pp. 49-51; CAB 44/10, pp. 4546. 7" MS Boell, N14/36,30. Kapitel, p. 2802. 721 CAB 44/10, pp. 4647; Boell, Die Operationen, p. 374. 
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rearguard. At GOring was nowi0ined by At Kohl, and numbering nearly seven companies 
they launched a strong attack onto the extended Nigerians. 722 The fighting was bitter and 
very close range, with the two mountain guns firing at point blank. At the same time, the 
terrified carriers panicked and attempted to flee only to be held by the fixed bayonets of the 
rear guard. Desperate not to lose the brigade's reserve ammunition, the troops managed to 
collect the majority of dropped loads and to move slowly back towards Narnupa Mission. 
This place was reached after dark and order was gradually restored. It had been a bad day 
with the battalion losing a quarter of its strength and a number of loads lost. 723 
Meanwhile, Linforce was still some way to the east. No 3 Column had left Mtama 
early on 16 October and reached Nyangao by lunchtime. Unable to find the expected 
battalion, O'Grady heard the distant sounds of battle that marked a heavy engagement. He 
then received a message from General Beves informing him that three enemy companies 
were reported west of Nyangao, and it would be up to his judgement whether he attacked 
immediately or awaited the arrival of No 4 Column. Without hesitating, O'Grady ordered 
No 4 Column to close with the enemy along the road, while No 3 Column moved north 
against the Gennan flank positions. 
These moves took place in the late afternoon with No 4 Column making good initial 
progress. However, Wahle reinforced his forward troops, sending in a counter-attack that 
stopped the advance. Back at Mtua, Beves received a report from the Nigerians at 1600 
hours and despite their situation, he ordered them to attack and drive the enemy south along 
the road. He wanted a co-ordinated attack with Linforce, but the Nigerians' critical shortage 
of ammunition and physical weakness from lack of food made it impossible. 724 
O'Grady's columns were straining to reach the beleaguered Nigerians. They had 
marched through the night while great teams of carriers had dragged two 5" howitzers 
forward. He had been reinforced by a battalion from Force Reserve which was 
722 CAB 44/10, pp. 48- 49. 
72' CAB 44/10, pp. 49-50. The British casualties were 217 killed and wounded; CAB 45/19, Nigerian Reginwitt Record, pp. 48-49. 
724 CAB 44/10. pp. 51-52 W033/953, Telegrams D2, No. 2224,17 October 1917, Telegram 10 WO, van Deventer to CIGS. 
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immediately sent to relieve Namupa Mission. He then followed briefly up the Namupa road 
with his own three battalions, before turning south-west and moving cross country. 725 
By mid-morning on 17 October, No 4 Column was attacking Abt Wahle along the 
road, supported by machine gun, Stokes mortar and howitzer fire. The Germans retaliated 
with fire from their own howitzer and a hot battle developed. O'Grady heard the heavy 
firing and ordered No 3 Column to move in support of its comrades. Extremely dense bush 
slowed movement and the infantry ran into the enemy at I 100 hours. The leading units 
were rapidly drawn into the firing line with several attacks and counter-attacks raging over 
the next three hours. Finally, in late afternoon, O'Grady committed his reserve battalion just 
in time to thwart a major German attack and restore the situation. His forces now fully 
committed, No 3 Column could advance no ftu-ther. 726 
Back on the main road, the fortunes of No 4 Column waxed and waned. On hearing 
the firing of O'Grady's troops, Colonel Tytler had renewed the attack on the German 
positions. By 1530 hours, both his leading units were hit by a strong counter-attack on their 
front and left flank. They were unable to hold against the fresh opponents and the day's 
gains had to be abandoned. A counter-attack by his reserve then stopped the enemy attack 
and the situation stabilised. After dark, No 4 Column returned to the area of its start 
positions of that morning. 727 
Elsewhere on 17 October, von Lettow renewed his efforts to destroy the Nigerian 
Brigade. Heavy rifle and machine gun fire was directed on the trenches, eventually 
destroying the vital wireless mast. Now without communications, the only indication of the 
situation was the sound of firing to the south-east. No attack was pressed and the defenders 
clung on with grim determination. A break-out was out of the question and the only option 
was for Linforce to continue its drive through the encircling force. However, with Force 
HQ still far in the rear at Mtua, Beves was unable to exert detailed control of the operations 
725 CAB 44/10, pp. 53-54. 
726 CAB 44/10, pp. 55-56. 
727 CAB 44/10, p. 57. During the 17th Lettow had sent forward reinforcements at intervals to strengthen Wahles force but pulled most of 
them back into reserve after darlaiess; Boell, Die Operationen, pp. 375-376. 
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and O'Grady was again given local tactical control. He then issued instructions for an attack 
at dawn the next morning by all units of No 3 and No 4 Columns. 728 
Early on 18 October, O'Grady launched the main body of No 3 Column through the 
bush while the attached battalion was sent to link up with the Nigerians. Concurrently, No 
4 Column surged forward with two battalions leading. Engaged heavily by the defenders, 
the assault troops drove them out and began to dig in rapidly. The British howitzers and 
mountain guns soon came into action, suppressing the Germans to their front. However, 
the advance of No 3 Column was soon checked by a well-sited machine gun to its front. 
O'Grady made a personal reconnaissance to his left flank, guiding several units in the 
confusion and rallying some shaken troops. Now seriously weakened, the left flank of his 
column was rolled up by an enemy counter-attack and pushed back some distance. While 
the situation was far from happy, the relievers brought the good news that the Nigerian 
Brigade had been successfully extracted. 729 
To the south, No 4 Column was not having much greater success in breaking 
through the defenders. The initial advance had resulted in German reinforcements and a 
heavy fire-fight developed. The lead units had lost heavily in officers, and at I 100 hours a 
strong attack forced both battalions once more back to its starting positions. As they 
withdrew, the British howitzers came into action and inflicted a number of casualties on the 
attackers who abandoned any pursuit. The two sides then took up hasty defensive positions 
on opposite banks, everyone being exhausted and having fought each other to a standstill. 730 
Unexpectedly, the main opportunity of 18 October was with the Nigerian Brigade. 
Its patrols had discovered a gap in the Germans' encirclement and Mann ordered a breakout 
when the battalion from No 3 Column linked up with his patrols. It promptly moved 
forward, taking over the trenches while the defenders marched out, harassed only by sniper 
fire, and returned to Nyangad unimpeded. The relief was successful and crisis was over. 
729 CAB 44/10, p. 59, footnote 1. 
729 CAB 44/10, pp. 60-63; WO 95/5330, History of 1'/2"dKM pp. 25-26. 730 CAB 44/10, pp. 64-66; Boell, Die Operationen, p. 375; WO 95/5330, History of 1`1204KAIý pp. 27-28. 
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By late afternoon, Beves was some six miles from the battle lines, still too far to be 
in direct touch with events. O'Grady adjudged that the retirement of No 4 Column left his 
left flank exposed while all his troops were much weakened by the strenuous fighting and 
casualties suffered. Beves ordered him to move back into conformity with No 4 Column at 
1700 hours and to set up a defensive line. The move had barely started when a German 
attack threatened the situation. However, the infantry, well supported by mountain guns, 
held off the attack with little problem and the withdrawal continued without ftirther 
interference. 
This final counter-attack marked the end of the battle of Nyangao or Mahiwa, as it 
was called by the British and Germans respectively. It had been the bloodiest battle of the 
entire campaign, with the British fighting units suffering losses of between 40 per cent and 
50 per cent of their strength while ammunition supplies were nearly exhausted. The 
Germans did not get off lightly either as At Wahle lost 30 per cent of its strength, while A bt 
Gbring, Kbhl, and von Ruckteschell all lost about 16 per cent. "' The evacuation of 
casualties, reorganisation and resupply of material would take some time, and for the 
immediate future the advance of Linforce had halted. Beves himself arrived at the forward 
positions on 19 October, but his position had been seriously weakened by the failure of the 
offensive. He was recalled the same day to Dar-es-Salaarn in order to make a personal 
report to the commander-in-chief and was subsequently sacked. "' 
Mahiwa had been an opportunity for both sides to achieve a great success, but 
neither attained it. It was tactically indecisive and losses were very heavy, with each side 
losing nearly a third of its fighting strength. Von Lettow had his long-awaited chance to 
defeat the British in detail, as they had fought with insufficient co-ordination and were too 
far apart for mutual support. Beves had ignored the dangers of too hasty an advance without 
knowledge of the enemy positions and blundered into a trap. Then at the end, the 
withdrawal of the Nigerians for food enabled the defenders to escape unscathed when Beves 
might have been able to hit them with his other columns. Tbroughout the battle, he was too 
731 CAB 44/10, p. 72; Boell, Die Operationen, p. 377. The British suffered 1,455 casualties as compared to 611 Germans, 
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far in the rear and had a very imperfect grasp of the conditions facing his troops. On the 
other hand, the Germans had suffered major losses and had consumed a great deal of their 
ammunition. Von Lettow despite having a very strong initial advantage, had been unable to 
destroy either the trapped Nigerians or No 3 Column. His desire to inflict a heavy defeat 
had drawn him into an attritional slugging match that the British desired and that he could ill 
afford. Despite his later comments about the scale of his victory, his strategy of prolonging 
the campaign would not survive another such battle. At the operational level, von Lettow 
had disrupted van Deventer's planned advance and slowed down his concentration of forces. 
Linforce was essentially paralysed for three weeks at a time when its presence might have 
been of vital importance and the battle therefore enabled von Lettow to march away to 
reinforce Major Kraut much ftirffier to the west. 733 
THE PUSH TO THE PORTUGUESE BORDER 
While the serious fighting around Mahiwa was underway, the rest of van Deventer's 
columns were pushing ahead. Following his plan of cutting off the enemy's food supplies, 
the newly arrived cavalry was causing a great deal of trouble for the Germans. Hanforce 
had reached Ruponda on 11 October, capturing a number of sick whites and askaris in the 
hospital as well as some 2,000 loads of grain. 734 The Belgians had taken Mahenge and were 
now in the process of advancing towards Liwale, while one battalion had landed at Kilwa 
and cut a road from Mssindy to Liwale before joining its comrades. The Portuguese, too, 
resolved to help, through the despatch of three columns across the Rovuma towards 
Newala. 735 On 17 October, No 2 Column had driven At Kohl back to Mkoe while No I 
Column had reached Chingwea, en-route for Lukuledi Mission. 
One of the reasons for the advance on Mahiwa had been logistical; Kilwa was too 
distant to be effective as a supply centre and it was intended to switch Hanforce to the Lindi 
lines of communication as soon as the road to Massassi was cleared. The check at Mahiwa 
732 CAB 44/10, p. 67; WO 33/953, Telegrams D2, No. 2229,20 October 1917, Telegram OA 559, van Deventer to CIGS. Van 
Deventer was dissatisfied with Beves's performance and removed him from command, although he did acknowledge that the latter 
had been suffering from malaria which may have affected his judgemenL 
733 CAB 44/10, pp. 70-7 1. 
734 WO 95/5294, War Diary GHQ, II October 1917, Appendix B. Telegram 4 WO, van Deventer to CIGS, II October. 
733 WO 95/5294, War Diary GHQ, 13 October 1917, Appendix B, Telegram 6 WO, van Deventer to CIGS, 13 October. 
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forced van Deventer to reconsider his plans. In the short term, No I Column had to return 
north to Ruponda from its forward position at Lukuledi Mission shortly after the battle was 
broken off. An operational pause of about two weeks now ensued as the British brought up 
food and ammunition preparatory for the next phase of the advance. 736 
Water difficulties were a major constraint on operations as sources were scarce in 
the regions inland. However, the construction of roads and rail links continued at top speed 
with the railhead reaching some six miles south-west of Mtua by 26 October. 737 with 
Linforce still slowed down by reorganisation and reconnaissance, it was up to Norforce and 
the Belgians to maintain the pressure. This was consistently applied, although the 
approaching rainy season in the Mahenge area forced the phased withdrawal of the bulk of 
the Belgians from there. By 30 October, Norforce had taken Liwale and the Belgians were 
still attacking near Ligombazi. Importantly, the motor road between Mssindy and Liwale 
was nearing completion and a Belgian column was approaching Liwale. 738 
At the same time, and against General van Deventer's wishes, the new Portuguese 
Expeditionary Force was beginning a preliminary move north of the Rovuma, with the aim 
of taking Newala, Matua and Nangyadi739 The move was unwelcome mainly because GHQ 
had a complete lack of confidence in the ability of the Portuguese to succeed. Nonetheless, 
the British commander-in-chief tried to co-ordinate the Portuguese moves with his own 
advance, following the pause imposed by the battle of Mahiwa. 
Throughout October, General Northey in the south and west had maintained 
steady pressure as ordered. Shorthose sent a strong detachment north-east from Tunduru 
to the Mohesi River. By mid-October, it had moved forward to Abdallah-Kwa-Nanga, 
which was in the centre of a fertile district some 50 miles south of Liwale. From there, it 
moved up to Liwale itself, taking the village on 29 October together with some 24 whites. 
Colonel Hawthorn continued to push along the Luwegu River and by 5 October had 
established himself on the north bank east of the enemy's position. He attacked on 16 
736 Off, Colonel G M, "Von Lettow's Escape into Portuguese East Africa, 1917". Army Quarterly, MII, (1925), pp. 50-5 1. 
737 WO 95/5294, War Diary GHQ, 26 October 1917. Appendix B, Telegram 17 WO, van Deventer to CIGS, 26 October. 733 WO 95/5294, War Diary GHQ, 30 October 1917, Appendix B, Telegram 21 WO, van Deventer to CIGS, 30 October. 
268 
October, but the enemy was forewarned and withdrew down the Luwegu River, having 
first destroyed his two remaining field guns. Hawthorn followed up relentlessly and by 
the end of the month both sides were along the river at a point south of Liganduka's. 740 
The combined British-Belgian pressure was felt most strongly by the Germans, 
and by 28 October the local commander, Captain Tafel, was reported to be withdrawing 
all forces from the Mahenge area towards Kahambu. Desertions were numerous and 
many started to surrender to the Belgians in large numbers. It was evident that the whole 
enemy front in the west was giving way, but Allied supply difficulties and long lines of 
communication prevented the full exploitation of the situation. 
While the pursuit to the south of Mahenge was underway, Colonel Huyghd arrived 
at Kilwa on 27 October to discuss future operations with General van Deventer. With 
Mahenge secure and his troops in pursuit of the Germans to the south, the discussions 
centred on supply problems during the coming rainy season. Having learnt the lessons of 
the previous year, it was decided to abandon the advance from Mahenge to Liwale and to 
withdraw the bulk of the Belgian forces before the roads became impassable at the end of 
November. This would leave a garrison of only two Belgian battalions in Mahenge and 
spelt the end of offensive operations in the west. Furthermore, if the troops there ran out of 
food or were attacked in strength, they were given advance approval to withdraw north of 
the River Ulanga; van Deventer was not taking any chances. 
However, he was keen to use the Belgian RO to support his advance in the east. It 
was to be reinforced to a strength of about 2,000 rifles with artillery and services. Under 
previous arrangements, the RO, led by Commandant Hdrion, had left Dar-es-Salaam by sea 
for Kilwa, landing there on 13 October. It was then to move forward to Mitondo where it 
would halt and assist with route maintenance and the clearance of any German stragglers. 
If the area were clear, then the RO was to push onto Liwale where it would receive fin-ther 
instructions from the British in dealing with Abt Tafel. Finally, as soon as the rains 
739 WO 158/478,13 October 1917, Telegram 92, Colonel Macdonell to Genstaff, 13 October. 
740 Van Deventer, Despatch 1, p. 189. 
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commenced, the motor transport used to support the Kilossa-Mahenge line would be 
transferred to work the Kilwa-Liwale route in order to sustain the R0.741 
Following the meeting, the retirement of the Belgian main body began on I 
November and only a regiment remained south of Mahenge. By mid-November, only a 
small force of some 2,100 rifles was left in and around Mahenge. At this time, the RO 
had been sent to Liwale to help push At Tafel into the British net. On 25 November, all 
remaining Belgian forces around Mahenge were recalled to Kilossa and the occupied 
territory was handed over to their British allies there. By 2 December, the bulk of the 
forward western troops had reached the railway where they would shelter for the wet 
season. 742 
THE SITUATION IN NOVEMBER 1917 
Anxious to wind up the campaign, van Deventer ordered his troops forward with all 
speed. At the same time, work on lines of communication continued with the Lindi- 
Massassi route taking over from the 200 mile link between Hanforce and Kilwa. Similarly, 
the Lukuledi-Mwiti road was much improved, while the tramline now reached Mtama. The 
sappers and miners, two Belgian battalions and the whole of No 4 Column were engaged in 
fixther road building. The newly formed Mounted Column was also hard at work in 
attempting to cut the Germans' lines of supply and destroying food depots. 
By early November, the situation was as follows. At Otto with about 6 companies 
was facing Norforce and a Belgian column in the area of Liganduka's. Tafel remained in 
overall command of the forces in the northern area, controlling some 15 companies. In the 
south, von Lettow disposed of about 25 companies, with seven holding the Mahiwa area, 
one to two at Mnacho, two mainly convalescent companies at Newala and the main body of 
12-13 held centrally between Nangoo and Lukuledi. 743 Indications that Tafel was moving 
southwards to join von Lettow were evident to the British; accordingly the bulk of Norforce 
7"' Campagnes Coloniales Belges, 111, pp. 219-221. See also Annexe No 48, Confirence de Kilwa, d Kilwa de is. <Pemba>, le 27 
octoher 1917, p. 387-388; WO 33/953, Telegrams D 2, No. 2311,25 November 1917, Telegram 42 WO, van Deventer to CIGS. 
742 Campagnes Coloniales Belges, III, pp. 221-222. 
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now swung to the south-east in an attempt to head off any move towards Portuguese 
territory. 744 
The advance resumed on November with Hanforce marching southward to its 
former positions around Lukuledi Mission, arriving there on 8 November. Further east, 
Linforce, now suitably reorganised and brought up to strength, began pushing Wahle's 
rearguard south-west the following day. No I and 2 Columns wheeled south-east on the 
same day, moving down the Lukuledi Mission-Chiwata track and making good progress. 
On the flank, the Mounted Column was ordered to seize Mwiti about 5 miles south of 
Chiwata in order to deprive von Lettow of a great deal of food and supplies, but also to cut 
the tracks leading south to the Rovuma. 745 However, No 1 Column was then ordered to 
move north-east to take the village of Ndanda, on the northern edge of the Makonde Plateau 
in the belief that Wahle's rearguard would have to pass through there. 
The movements of the Germans remained unclear to their opponents - Abt von 
Lieberman was fighting around Ndanda while Wahle was moving south via a little-known 
trail from Nangoo to Chiwata. Once again, the lack of detailed topographic infonnation had 
slowed down the British advance. Realising the changed circumstances, GHQ recast its 
plans on the night of 10/11 November. Orders were issued for a strong northerly drive on 
Chiwata, using No 3 Column from Ndanda and the Nigerian Brigade from Nangoo, 
supported by an advance from the west by No 2 Column, while No I and the Mounted 
Column swept south-eastwards towards Kitangari, deep in the enemy's rear. This bold 
move was based on intelligence that indicated Kitangari as being von Lettow's next 
objective. "" However, once again misunderstanding struck; the Kitangari on British maps 
was not the same as that on the Gen-nans', who were headed for Simba's, some nine miles to 
the north-east of the former place. 
In the meantime, the pressure continued. Late on 14 November, No I Column had 
seized the Mwiti defile and blocked any escape route to the south-west. The Mounted 
7" WO 95/5294, War Diary GHQ, 2 November 1917, Appendix B, Telegram 23 WO, van Deventer to CIGS, 2 November. 
7" WO 95/5294, War Diary GHQ, 9 November 1917, Appendix B, Telegram 29 WO, van Deventer to CIGS, 9 November. 
7"s Orr, "Von Lettow's Retreaf', pp. 52-53. 
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Column had reached Mkunde and was pushing on to Kitangari. No 2 Column was about a 
mile west of Chiwata with the Nigerian Brigade just north of the town, and No 3 Column 
was fighting hard against the German rearguards on the Makonde Plateau, to the north-east 
of that place. The net was closing tightly around the Schutztruppe. 
747 
Chiwata, fell unopposed on 15 November to No 2 Column and the Nigerians. No 3 
Column continued its fight with At Wahle on the plateau while the Mounted Column was 
ordered to cut the communications between Newala and Kitangari at Lulindi. The next day, 
it was clear that the enemy was moving south-eastwards and the Nigerian Brigade was sent 
to clear the ground just below the scarp of the Makonde feature and Mwiti Hill while No I 
Column was sent over the hill towards Lutshemi. No 2 Column was placed in reserve, 
having cut a number of new roads, and moved to Mwiti, while, in order to deal with any 
eventuality, No 4 Column was ordered to improve a track between the east edge of the 
Makonde and the sea. 748 
As this was happening, Wahle kept to the high ground, while von Lettow's main 
body was moving just below the plateau and ahead of the Nigerians towards Nambindinga. 
Again, the British believed that place to be Lutshemi, which was actually about a mile away 
and on lower ground. By nightfall on 17 November, No I Column had occupied Lutshemi, 
after a very difficult march and secured its water source from von Lettow's rearguard. 
Again, using darkness, the Germans were able to slip away to Nambindinga that evening. 
Deciding to leave over 300 Germans and 700 askaris behind, the Kommandeur led his 
troops neatly out of the closely-drawn net and made his way east towards Simba's. The 
British were now aware that Kitangari could not be the new objective and that the main 
body was moving away from them. 
The occupation of the Makonde Plateau now began in earnest and was notable for 
the difficulty of movement rather than the ferocity of the defence. The major hospital and 
base at Chiwata was threatened by a flanking move of No 3 Column to the north-east and 
746 WO 95/5294, War Diary GHQ, 10 November 1917, Annex Bjelegram 30 WO, van Deventer to CIGS, 10 November. 
747 Off, "Von Lettow's Retreat7, pp. 53-54; WO 106/273, History of3 KAR, p. 84. 
748 Off, "Von Lettow's Retreat", p. 55. 
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No 2 Column together with two Nigerian battalions to the west. It was taken after a sharp 
fight on 15 November. Nearly 500 prisoners were taken and some 70 prisoners of war were 
released. This made the aggregate figure of enemy casualties, since the beginning of the 
month, total some 463 Europeans, 1072 askaris killed, captured or surrendered, plus two 4.1 
inch guns, 33 machine guns, and over 1,000 rifles. 749 
The next objective was Lushemi which was held in some force. On 16 November, 
the Nigerians drove back the rearguards to within a half mile of the main position while No 
3 Column advanced some five miles to the south-east of Chiwata, fighting a number of 
small engagements. No 1 Column moved east and north-east from Mwiti in an attempt to 
cut of the Lushemi force, but the ground was very difficult and the going SJOW. 750 Two days 
later, the British were in possession of Lushemi, the enemy having pulled back to Simba's 
during the night of 17/18 November. A further large haul of prisoners was taken from a 
camp a few miles away, some 20 officers, 242 NCOs and 700 askaris as well as 14 civilian 
males. This was accompanied by the seizure of 172 undamaged rifles and the release of 32 
allied officer prisoners. 751 
Elsewhere, the march of the Belgian RO had progressed according to plan, and 
after two weeks of marching under the blistering sun, its advance guard reached Liwale 
on 30 October, linking up with elements of Shorthose's Column, who had arrived the day 
previously. The British handed over control of the village and then returned towards 
Abdallah-Kwa-Nanga on 2 November. 752 At the same time, the transfer of a second 
Belgian battalion together with mountain guns was underway, with the troops arriving in 
Kilwa on 30 October; a third had been planned, but its participation had been cancelled 
after its abortive march from Mahenge. 
On the night of 1/2 November, Hawthorn attacked and seized the position at 
Liganduka's, taking 24 prisoners and a machine gun. The remaining enemy on the 
Luwegu retired to the east; the British followed, with Hawthorn moving to Kabati Mzee 
7" WO 95/5294, War Diary GHQ, 15 November 1917, Appendix B, Telegram 34 WO, van Deventer to CIGS, 15 November. 
71 WO 95/5294, War Diary GHQ, 16 November 1917, Appendix B, Telegram 35 WO, van Deventer to CIGS, 16 November. 
751 WO 95/5294, War Diary GHQ, IS November 1917, Appendix B, Telegram 36 WO, van Deventer to CIGS, 18 November. 
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and Fair towards Kabati Moro. They maintained the pressure, with Hawthorn having 
driven the enemy rearguards from both banks of the Luwegu by the evening of 5 
November and to within a mile of Kabati Mzee. Fair reached Kabati Moro the next day 
receiving the surrender of some 142 Germans and 140 Askaris as well as finding three 
machine guns and some hundreds of damaged rifles. 753 On the same day, 82 more 
askaris surrendered to the Belgian Column; over the next day or two more sick soldiers 
surrendered at Kahambu and Mlembwe. Apart from this, it was clear that the Germans 
were now moving south through Dapate. Hawthorn turned to the south-east while 
Murray, with 250 rifles, pushed east along the Songea-Liwale road. 
At Liwale, there was no major activity until 14 November when a party of 16 
Germans, 22 Askaris and 85 porters from At Tafel surrendered to their advanced posts. 
Patrol contacts and deserters had already made it clear that this force was not far away. 
At Abdallah-kwa-Nanga, Major Hawkins held on with a half battalion of KAR, anxiously 
awaiting the arrival of the remainder under Colonel Shorthose from Tunduru, while 
Murray, now with 400 rifles, pushed south-east towards his position. 
The Westtruppen, who were now on top of Hawkins, attacked shortly thereafter. 
Heavily outnumbering the KAR, they cut-off off the garrison and threatened to destroy it. 
Fortunately, the Belgians came to the rescue, sending a reinforced company from Liwale 
on the morning of 14 November and marching until early on 16 November. 754 
Surprising and capturing a water party, they learnt that seven companies were attacking 
the KAR; despite the disparity in numbers they moved forward, hitting the German main 
body in the rear and scattering them and taking a number of prisoners. Apart from saving 
Hawkins from destruction, the Belgian intervention also resulted in the capture of 
documents showing Tafel's routes and order of march. 
Huyghe met with van Deventer at Ndanda on 18 November to discuss the future 
use of the RO. They agreed that it would move to Massassi where it would assist in the 
712 Campagnes Coloniales Belges, III, pp. 222-223. 
75' Van Deventer, Despatch I p. 190. 
754 Campagnes Coloniaks Belges, III, pp. 223-224 and p. 389,13 November 1917, Telegram No 10873, Huyghd to Hdrion. 
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reduction of the German main body while the remainder of the Belgian forces would 
remain at Dodoma and Kilossa. However, two additional battalions were already 
marching to join the RO, reaching Mnero at the end of November and subsequently 
Liwale a few days later. 755 
Van Deventer was ready to finish off the fighting. On 5 December, he informed 
General Robertson that he would take vigorous action to round up von Lettow before the 
rains recommenced. With an estimated two months of campaigning weather left, he 
proposed to hold the southern border along the Rovuma strongly, pushing the Nigerian 
Brigade as far south as supplies would permit while General Northey would make the main 
advance from Nyasaland towards Mwembe. However, he recognised that if the Germans 
moved south of the Lujenda River towards the Medo district that they would effectively 
place themselves out of reach in the period before the rains. 756 
The pressure continued and the isolation of Tafel now assumed major proportions. 
From captured documents, the size of his force was now known to be double that previously 
imagined. With over 1700 rifles, it was a serious force to be reckoned with although its 
ultimate intentions were still unclear. On the British side, three columns were continuously 
engaged in the advance with the fourth working on road making in the rear areas. The 
situation was still not good as the road from Ndanda and Newala was still very difficult for 
light cars and there were insufficient technical troops to improve the situation. 757 
On 18 November, a liaison officer sent by Tafel find von Lettow was captured by 
the British. His papers revealed that At Tafel had left Abdallah-kwa-Nanga on 16 
November and that it was now headed towards the Makonde. 758 Consequently, GHQ held 
No 2 Column and the Nigerian Brigade ready to deal with this new threat. On 23 
November, Tafel was reported to be on the upper Bangalla River and the two columns were 
sent in pursuit. 
75-'Les Campagnes Coloniales Beiges, III, pp. 224-227; WO 33/953, Telegrams D 2, No. 2311,25 November 1917, Telegram 42 WO, 
van Deventer to CIGS, p. 238. 
756 WO 95/5294, War Diary GHQ, 5 December 1917, Appendix A6, Telegram 402, van Deventer to CIGS, 4 December. 
757 WO 95/5294, War Diary GHQ, 19 November 1917, Appendix B, Telegram 37 WO, van Deventer to CIGS, 19 November. 
751 Ridgway, "With No 2 Column", 11, pp. 256-257. 
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Concurrently, No 3 Column was following von Lettow down the track to Simba's, 
with No I Column moving towards Lulindi, the Mounted Column was reconnoitring north- 
east and east, while No 4 Column was still on road work. On reaching Simba's on 18 
November, von Lettow was desperately short of food and ammunition; it was now time to 
abandon German East Africa and move into Portuguese territory. Turning south, he reached 
Newala on 20 November and conducted a final reorganisation of his bedraggled force. All 
the sick, infin-n and uncommitted were left behind as the remaining 300 Germans, 1700 
askaris and 3000 porters marched south-west to Mpili on the north bank of the River 
Rovuma, arriving there early on 21 November. 759 
No I Column entered Newala at 1630 hours on the same day, just a day behind their 
prey. The Mounted Column was pursuing and reached Luatala, some ten miles north of the 
Rovuma, but the chances of capturing von Lettow were fading rapidly and attention turned 
to Tafel. Simba's was taken unopposed with 52 Germans and 75 askaris surrendering there 
while No I Column also occupied an undefended Newala taking a further 126 Gennans and 
78 askaris prisoner. Morale was reported to be very low and the troops much tired, but von 
Lettow was still holding his force together with a combination of exhortation and threats. 760 
The tension increased as everybody neared the Rovuma River. On 23 November, 
Tafel was located moving south along the Bangala River towards the confluence with the 
Rovuma, which indicated that a link up was imminent. Two days later, von Lettow was 
moving rapidly with No I Column in hot pursuit, while intelligence indicated that Tafel was 
unaware of the main body's move south and that he was still moving towards Newala. 761 
Depite the difficulties of terrain and supply, the trap was closing. Tbree columns were now 
moving on Tafel while a fourth was attempting to catch von Lettow, who was now at 
7" Orr, "Von Lettow's Retreat", pp. 56-57. 
7'0 WO 95/5294, War Diary GHQ, 21 November, 1917, Appendix B, Telegram 38 WO, van Deventer to CIGS, 21 November. The 
statement on morale was "His force, both European and African is reported to be very tired of the campaign; but VON LETTOW 
keeps them going by exaggerated tales of German successes in Europe and by assuring the askaris that G. E. A. will very soon be 
handed back to the Germans and that every deserter will then be hung. This is the enemy's trump card now, and is probably the only 
thing that enable VON LETTOW to keep his askaris with him. " 
761 WO 95/5295, War Diary GHQ, 25 November 1917, Appendix B, Telegram 43 WO, van Deventer to CIGS, 25 November. 
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Ngomano. Further to the west, Northey was manoeuvring to prevent any move northward 
towards Tunduru . 
762 
On 24 November, it was clear that Tafel was still marching south along the Bangala. 
River and the various columns were unleashed. No 2 Column moved south-west from 
Massassi and No I Column left Luatala at 1600 hours. The weather was very hot and 
trying, but the British columns were now at both ends of the river. 763 It was here that the 
efforts of Major Pretorious, the chief scout, paid off in big measure. Having captured a 
letter from Tafel to von Lettow, Pretorious moved to the nominate junction, and cleared all 
food and inhabitants from the area. On 27 November Tafel reached his destination, and, 
unbeknownst to either party, von Lettow's marched north-westwards less than a mile 
away. 764 
No I Column then hit the Wesuruppen in the front while No 2 Column ran into their 
rear. Now surrounded and very short of food Tafel decided to surrender. On 27 November 
some 27 Germans and 178 askaris with 1112 porters of the rearguard surrendered while that 
evening Tafel's offer of capitulation was received. The next day, he and the remaining 13 
companies surrendered, comprising some 1115 Europeans, 33 82 askaris, 43 machine guns 
and four guns. 765 At a stroke, the Schutziruppe had been halved, while Tafel had also 
destroyed 1200-1400 rifles, 25-30 machine guns and two guns. 766 
Despite failing to catch von Lettow, this was a major success and marked the end 
of the campaign in German East Africa. Considering the major fighting over, the British 
wasted no time in reducing the size of their force and the Belgians did likewise. The RO 
returned to the coast where it was shipped from Lindi to Dar-es-Salaarn prior to returning 
to the Belgian Congo. By early 1918 all Belgian forces were ready to return to the Congo 
or the Belgian zone of occupation. 767 Henceforth, the campaign would be conducted by 
the British and Portuguese only. 
762 WO 95/5294, War Diary GHQ, 27 November 1917, Appendix B, Telegram 44 WO, van Deventer to CIGS, 26 November. 
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The political and military situation was evolving rapidly. Von Lettow, known to be 
short of food, had disappeared south of Ngomano and into the interior of Portuguese East 
Africa. On 2 December, van Deventer sent a letter to Dr Schnee, informing him of Tafel's 
surrender and asking for the surrender of the remaining troops, in order to avoid further 
suffering of the African populations. 768 At the same time, he was in close consultation with 
the War Office over the future of the campaign. 
London soon came to a decision. Given the feebleness of Portuguese military power 
and the hatred for their form of colonial rule, it was deemed too dangerous to let von Lettow 
roam around Portuguese East Africa. However, given the small numbers of the remaining 
enemy, the EAEF was to be reduced to division size and all of the Indian units were to be 
sent to other theatres. Similarly, the West African units were to be returned to their homes 
while finther Belgian co-operation was seen as being too time consuming, in terms of both 
necessary reorganisation and political decision-making. The desired option was a land 
campaign, using Norforce as the main striking force, with operations based on the 
Mozambique coast to be avoided if possible owing to the shipping shortage. Finally, 
reductions in numbers of troops were agreed and the campaign was to become largely an 
African one supported by Imperial technical troops. 769 The continuation of the campaign 
was a blow to the British, but at least the Schuatruppe had lost the bulk of their fighting 
power. 
TACTICAL INNOVATION 
Tactics had moved on considerably since Smuts' departure. The policy of 
attrition through a constant search for battle combined with operations against the rear 
areas made good sense in the East African setting. Innovation also played its part, as 
column commanders sought to neutralise the defender's advantages with new methods. 
The Germans had long based their centres of resistance around the sole track in an area; 
the response was the construction of new roads in the forward areas by the fighting 
76'WO 95/5294, War Diary GHQ, 2 December 1917, Appendix A2a, Letter van Deventer to Schnee, 2 December. 
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columns prior to engaging the defenders. One technique worked as follows. Pioneers 
began working on a track as the leading troops of the column marched past them, hacking 
a way through the bush. This continued until the entire column had moved forward for a 
fixed time and then halted. All troops then spent seven minutes of the 10-minute halt 
cutting back the undergrowth on either side of the new track before resting. The pioneers 
then moved up the now 5-10 foot wide track and began to improve the surface for animal 
and vehicular traffic. The column then resumed the process. This simple method, 
although tiring for the fighting troops, enabled columns to march on the enemy while 
allowing the vital supply columns to follow up relatively closely. It represented a major 
improvement in both tactical mobility and sustainability of operations as the previous 
method of hacking only footpaths through the bush made linking up very slow and 
difficult. Subsequently, once the area had been cleared, engineers and road gangs would 
develop the surfaces further. 
Owing to the thick bush, these methods enabled the attackers to move close to the 
Germans without being detected. Once ready to attack, flanking columns would blaze 
tracks to a point about three miles parallel to the enemy position. From there, they would 
strike inward towards the vulnerable flanks and rear. A further refinement to this 
technique was the construction of a strong boma at the end of the new track. Now in 
close proximity to the enemy, the column would establish itself behind thom and brush 
defences, which could be erected in several hours. Once the Germans detected the 
British presence or tried to withdraw, they would be forced to attack the well-ensconced 
flanking column. This neatly turned the relative advantage of attackers and defenders 
around while also disrupting the evacuation of the position. 
Van Deventer also grasped the importance of good lines of communication and 
devoted considerable efforts to building and improving the road network. Apart from 
easing the problems of supplies, they enabled him to shift forces much more rapidly and 
healthily. New equipment was used to good advantage; the Lewis gun was introduced in 
early 1917 to battalions on the same scale as machine guns. It was much more mobile 
769 WO 95/52394, War Diary GHQ, 3 December 1917, Appendix A4, Telegram 47022, CIGS to van Deventer, 2 December. 
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than the Maxim and added considerable flexibility to the attacker who now used the 
heavier machine guns in the firing line keeping the Lewis guns available for the assault 
group. They increased considerably the firepower available to the attack considerably 
and were very useful in fighting off counter-attacks. 
Another weapon of considerable importance was the Stokes mortar. While it was 
heavy and its ammunition required a considerable baggage train, its high angle of fire 
made it especially useful in overcoming strong frontal defences as it could fire over trees 
and small hills. It complemented the Indian mountain guns and could be brought into 
action quickly. The Germans found it difficult to counter and disliked its effects 
intensely. Finally, the Mills bomb, a hand grenade, enhanced close range firepower and 
was effective in both the attack and defence. All in all, the British forces had been much 
more aggressive and successful in their aim of defeating the Germans in battle. 
280 
CHAPTER 8- THE OPERATIONS OF 1918 
As soon as von Lettow left German territory, the various British columns were 
rapidly broken up and the units reorganised for the next phase. However, it was not long 
before Portuguese unpreparedness forced a modification to these plans. The advance of At 
KdhI towards Montepuez threatened Port Amelia on the coast and British reinforcements 
were requested on 12 December. A force (Rosecol) under Colonel Rose was formed to 
secure the port and the Gold Coast Regiment landed there the next day. He intended to have 
the column ready to move inland by the end of December, but much depended on the water 
supply and the state of the port, which was reported to be primitive. 770 
The supply situation caused concern as ever. On 23 December, the need to support 
the Port Amelia force forced a redeployment of the Lindi forces. Ngomano, on the Rovuma 
River, was held by the Nigerian Brigade, with a battalion in reserve at Massassi, and the 
remainder of the fighting troops were moved back to the railhead at Mtarna. In the west, 
Hawthorn's Column was in the area of Namwera with a battalion operating towards Uniago. 
However, an unlucky accident was to hinder the actions of Port Amelia force; a troopship 
carrying the bulk of the Gold Coast Regiment ran aground near Mikindani and the troops 
had to evacuated and returned to Lindi to await more shipping. 771 
At the end of December 1917 the situation was largely quiet, apart from near the 
Nyasaland border. Rosecol was completed at Port Amelia by 29 December while patrols 
from the Rovuma River had vainly searched up to 110 miles south for the enemy. 'Me 
Rovuma River was beginning to rise rapidly and the Nigerian Brigade was moved back to 
the north. In the west, Northey's troops were in contact and were pushing east and north 
from Mtengula and Namwera. Everywhere, the rain was beginning to fall and the roads 
started to dissolve. 772 
7" WO 95/5294, War Diary GHQ, 12 December 1917, Appendix B, Telegram 52 WO, van Deventer to CIGS, II December; 13 
December 1917, Appendix B, Telegram 53 WO, van Deventer to CIGS, 13 December. 
771 WO 95/5294, War Diary GHQ, 23 December 1917, Appendix B, Telegram 62 WO, van Deventer to CIGS, 22 December; 25 
December 1917, Appendix B, Telegram 63 WO, van Deventer to CIGS, 24 December. 
772 WO 95/5294, War Diary GHQ, 29 December 1917, Appendix B, Telegram 68 WO, van Deventer to CIGS, 28 December; I 
January 1918, Appendix B, Telegram 71 WO, van Deventer to CIGS, 31 December. 
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The main body of the Schuatruppe had narrowly escaped the tightening British 
coraon and was unaware of the fate of Abt Tafel. Moving rapidly along the Rovuma valley, 
their immediate problem was lack of food as there were only sufficient supplies to last until 
I December. Ammunition was also in very short supply and urgent action was required. 773 
Von Lettow realised that the imminent rainy season, due to start at the end of December, 
would halt any major British offensive operations. Furthermore, the almost totally 
undeveloped nature of Portuguese East Africa meant that would take time and a great deal 
of effort to build up the stocks and infrastructure to support a substantial enemy force. This 
meant that he could deal with the Portuguese first and then split his troops for foraging. 774 
At the end of November 1917, the German intelligence assessed the Portuguese as 
having a strong force of some 6500 rifles, 42 machine guns and 14 guns with which to guard 
775 their border along Rovuma River, a distance of some 400 k-m. Of these, they believed 
that Colonel Rosa had deployed nearly 3,000 in a number of posts between the coast and the 
major boma at Ngomano. 776 The fort at Ngomano, which commanded the confluence of the 
Lugenda and Rovuma rivers, was estimated to support between 1,800 to 2000 rifles. Mile 
these were substantial numbers and well-armed, patrols had deterrnined that most posts were 
poorly laid out and carelessly sited. 777 Past experience had made the Germans 
contemptuous of their putative foes and von Lettow actually viewed their garrisons as 
potential supply bases rather than a serious threat. Ngomano was isolated enough from the 
Portuguese main body and sufficiently far away from the British bases to offer a tempting 
target. 
Although weakened by hunger, the force deployed by von Lettow was still sizeable. 
Led by Abt Goring, with three companies, as the advance guard, next came the main body 
of 15 companies together with all the support troops, followed by a single company 
rearguard. Altogether this made for 19 companies, totalling 268 Europeans, 1700 Askari, 
77' Boelt, Die Operationen, p. 399. 
774 Lettow, Reminiscences, pp. 236-237. 
775 MS Boell, N14/36,1. Kapitel, p. 1. 77" Boell, Die Operationen, p. 399. 
7" MS Boell, N 14/36,1. Kapitel, p. 2. They had the 3,21,25,26,27,28 Native Companies and 2 machine gun batteries. 
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and about 3,900 carriers and 370 "boys". Not included in these numbers were over 600 
wives and children, plus a fin-ther 700 Askari "boys" who had to find their own rations. 
778 
In order to preventing any reinforcement of Ngomano, von Lettow sent A bt Goring 
off separately to isolate the smaller Portuguese boma at Nampakesho. The main body 
continued up the Rovuma towards Ngomano. It was reached early on 25 November and 
von Lettow decided to attack off the line of march. Despite the crossing of the river being in 
full sight of the garrison, the latter remained passive and did nothing to disrupt the attackers. 
A mountain gun began shelling the fort from the west while 4 bt von Ruckteschell launched 
a fixing attack from the north-west. In the meantime, Abt Kohl was sent on a southerly 
march to hit the Portuguese flank. This was done and it stormed the fort supported by 
artillery and small arms fire. The shock and violence of the attack achieved its aim at a cost 
of just over 30 casualties; the Schutziruppe killed 187 Portuguese and captured well over 
500 prisoners, the majority unwounded. 779 The seizure also yielded six heavy machine 
guns, 600 rifles and a quarter of a million rounds of ammunition. This restored the fighting 
power of the Germans at a stroke, although African food remained in very short supply. 780 
After a brief halt to treat casualties and collect their booty, the main column set off 
down the Lugenda valley on 27 November. Von Stuemer's raid earlier in the year had 
shown it to be very sparse in food, but the area ftirther south was much more promising. 781 
However, it was some distance away, and conscious of the precariousness of his stocks, von 
Lettow split up the force to forage independently. Fortime, and poor Portuguese 
dispositions, led to the discovery by Abt Kohl of a small platoon-sized boma at Nanguare 
which it duly stormed on 2 December. It was rewarded by a haul of 70 rifles and 300,000 
rounds of ammunition. More important was the find of 858 packs of African food. They 
provided about eight days' rations and would have to suffice for the coming journey through 
the largely uninhabited and foodless stretch that lay ahead. Despite the find, K6hl's carriers 
77' MS Boell, N 14/36,1. Kapitel, p. 3. 
"9 Lenow, Reminiscences, pp. 229-232;. Schnee, Deutsch-Ostaftika, p. 311. He states that German casualties were eight dead and 25 
wounded; MS Boell, N14/36, Kapitel 1, p. 3. About 400 Portuguese Askaris also ran away. The German battle strength was 675 
soldiers, II machine guns and two guns; their losses were seven dead and 26 wounded. 
"" Boell, Die Operationen, p. 399. 
7" MS Boell, N14/36,1. Kapitel, p. 5. 
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were surviving on half rations and his Askaris were spending a great deal of effort in local 
forag . ing. 782 
In the meantime, At Gdring was isolated and out of touch with the main body. It 
had captured some Portuguese papers showing the existence of a magazine at Nampakesho. 
Marching rapidly, the garrison was able to bum the fort with the petrol stocks held there and 
only a few supplies were saved. Concerned about his own survival, G6ring then marched to 
Ngomano where he expected to find the rearguard. Arriving on 1 December to find the 
British there, he waited in concealment for two days before setting south down the Lugenda 
valley. 783 It was not until 12 December that he was able to catch up with the rearguard, 
although von Lettow did not learn about the link-up for another six days. 
784 
Fortified by these local successes, the main body set off for the south on 4 
December, trying to pass the foodless belt as quickly as possible. It reached the post at 
Chirumba on II December, surprising the occupants and taking it without a fight. This was 
another major coup as 800 loads of African food and another 80 of flour were seized, easing 
the food situation considerably. More success followed as a patrol seized another 15,000 
rounds of small arms ammunition and 300 mountain gun shells. Finally, Abt Wahle, which 
had been moving slowly as it foraged, came across a dug-in Portuguese position at Ndimbo 
in the Mkula Hills. Despite the near parity of numbers, the position was easily overrun and 
a large quantity of supplies, including valuable quinine and 18 days' food, was taken on 8 
December. 785 This was followed by minor captures of food and weapons at another post in 
the Oizulo Hills on 27 December, in which 34 Portuguese and Askaris were killed. 786 
Von Lettow now had the resources to complete his march to the fertile areas in the 
area of Mwembe - Chirumba - Lusinje - Medo, which, apart from food, also put him at the 
maximum distance from the various British detachments. 787 En-route, a party under the 
792 Boell, Die Operationen, pp. 399-400; Schnee, Deutsch-Ostafrika, p. 314. 
7" MS Boell, N14/36,1. Kapitel, pp. 8-9. 
7" MS Boell, N 14/36,1. Kapitel, pp. 20-21. 
"' Schnee, Deutsch-Ostafrika, p. 320; MS Boell, N14/36,1. Kapitel, pp. 14-15. 
7" MS Boell, N14/36,1. Kapitel, p. 30. Six Portuguese and 28 Askaris were buried there while 41 rifles, 4,700 rounds and 130 loads 
of food were taken. 
787 MS Boell, N14/36,1. Kapitel, p. 10. 
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white flag reached his rearguard at Ngomano, bearing General van Deventer's call to 
surrender dated 4 December. It finally reached von Lettow on 8 January and formally 
informed him of Tafel's surrender, although it appears he had learned of that fact following 
the capture of Ngomano on 29 November. 788 It was too late to have any effect, for the 
Germans were now buoyed by their considerable successes against the Portuguese and were 
approaching a land of plenty. 
The Germans had used their first two weeks in Portuguese territory very fruitfully, 
passing from a state of extreme shortage to relative comfort. They had taken some 680,000 
rounds of small arms ammunition together with 12 machine guns and 750 rifles. The 
critical food situation had been greatly ameliorated, at least in the short term, by the very 
substantial captures and local foraging. 789 For General van Deventer, it was a bitter blow as 
the Portuguese had effectively collapsed at nearly every stage while presenting the enemy 
with the means of to carry on the campaign. He could not be said to be surprised at such a 
dismal performance, but it was highly disappointing, especially as he would be unable to 
deploy substantial forces south of the Rovuma for several months. 
ALLIED PLANS FOR 1918 
The end of 1917 saw politicians, and most especially Lloyd George, concerned 
about three major areas: manpower, casualties and Ireland. The heavy fighting in Flanders 
had temporarily drained the BEF of its offensive power and the prime minister looked for a 
success in Palestine to sustain public morale. With the slow build-up of American forces 
and the collapse of Russia, the war seemed unlikely to end before 1919.790 The need to 
conserve manpower for the perceived final effort meant that reinforcements were 
unavailable for East Africa, even had the shipping been available. 791 For while the U-Boat 
threat had been contained, it was far from being eliminated, with merchant shipping losses 
in the latter part of 1917 running at 241,260 tons or 75 ships per month. 792 
7U MS Boell, N14/36,1. Kapitel, pp. 6 and 11-12. 
7"9 Boelt, Die Operationen, p. 400. 
7" French, Lloyd George Coalition, p. 169; Hughes, Brush Strategy in the Middle East, p. 27. 
791 French, Lloyd George Coalition, p. 180-18 1. 
792 Marder, 1917 Year ofCrisis, IV, p. 277. 
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Another area concerning policy-makers was that of the fate of the captured colonies. 
From the beginning of the war, the British Government had been careful not to declare any 
annexations or make formal claims on captured territory. Initially, it had not wanted to add 
to the size of the Empire and had rebuffed attempts by South Africa and Belgium to 
proclaim their suzerainity over South-West Africa and Ruanda/Urundi respectively. 
However, as the war progressed and the complexion of government had changed, attitudes 
began to harden . 
793 Imperialists, such as Curzon, Milner and Amery, and sub-imperialists, 
such as Botha and Smuts, continued to demand the permanent retention of Germany's 
overseas possessions. 794 
An influential report in April 1917, presented by a committee chaired by Lord 
Curzon, looked for substantial gains in African and elsewhere. Supported by the Imperial 
War Cabinet, although not binding on the British Government, it showed the strength of 
feeling on the issue. 795 The prolonged resistance in East Africa played its part, as lack of 
resources had impelled the British to make widespread use of the indigenous Africans, and 
former German subjects, in their war machine. In German eyes, this constituted treasonous 
betrayal, and widespread retribution was threatened against perceived collaborators. Smuts 
noted: 
"The Germans also asserted that ... any native who had deserted during the war 
would be hanged by the order of the Gennan Government when that war was over. " . 
This view was certainly shared by General van Deventer: 
"No German deserter will return to the enemy lines as he knows that he will be 
forthwith shot or hung ... Last and most 
important is the question of a guarantee and 
protection ... The Germans assiduously assert even granting they 
lose German East 
793 Smith, Gaddis, "The British Government and the Disposition of the German Colonies in Africa, 1914-1918". Giffard and Louis 
Britain and Germany, pp. 283-285. 
794 Louis, W R, "Great Britain and German Expansion in Africa, 1884-1919 ", Giffard and Louis, Britain and Germany, pp. 4042; 
French, Lloyd George Coalition, pp. 63-64; CAB 24/4,8 December 1917, Paper G 182. German and Turkish Territories Captured in 
the War, by Lord Curzon, p. 10. 
791 Smith, "Disposition of the German Colonies", pp. 288-289. 
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Affica now it will assuredly be given back to them at the end of the war, and that 
every man who has deserted or who has helPed us in any way will infidlibly be 
hung. And this certainly would be the case unless we can authoritatively refute the 
statement. ""' 
At a local level, the British realised that the Schutztruppe was vulnerable although it 
still had considerable power and resilience left in it. However, there were a number of 
important factors to consider for the campaign of 1918. The first was the perennial problem 
of manpower and health. Many units were now worn out and heavily depleted by sickness. 
This was by no means restricted to the British and South Africans, as the Indians and West 
Africans were also suffering badly. Believing that the native East Africans were better able 
to withstand both the rigours of the climate and the ravages of disease, the bulk of non-KAR 
fighting troops were sent to other theatres or returned home. However, substantial numbers 
of Imperial technical and administrative soldiers were retained to support the new 
campaign. 797 
Shipping was a major limitation as heavy losses from submarines continued to 
constrain both the numbers and quantities of supplies that could be sent to East Africa as 
well as the intra-theatre movement of supplies. Because of limitations of vessels, port 
capacities and unloading facilities, all arrivals into theatre had to come through Dar-es- 
Salaam. It was uneconomical and virtually impractical to send personnel and stores direct to 
the sea-base of destination. Instead, a complicated process of unloading at Dar-es-Salaam, 
waiting and then loading before sailing to Kilwa, Lindi or Mombasa had to be followed. If 
major operations south of the Rovuma River were to be undertaken, then it would be 
necessary to set-up and operate one or more ports in PEA, with all the extra effort and delay 
that that implied. 
796 WO 33/953, Telegrams D2, No. 2203,6 October 1917, Telegram 380, van Deventer to CIGS; Louis, "Great Britain and German 
Expansion", pp. 40 and 4546; CAB 24/4,8 December 1917, Paper G 182, German and Turkish Territories Captured in the War, by 
Lord Curzon. 
'" WO 33/953, Telegrams D 2, No. 2412,29 December 1917, Telegram X 9842, GOC to War Office, pp. 271-274. Out of a total 
strength of 52,000 over 11,000 Indian, 10,000 British and 3,700 South African troops remained in theatre. 
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The commander-in-chief was well aware that the area south of the Rovuma was 
sparsely settled and had little food to offer. But, from the previous year's operations against 
At von Stuemer, he also knew that the central districts of the Nyassa Company's holdings 
were both fertile and healthy. This was ideal for von Lettow as he could stay there 
indefinitely, while his own approaches from either the coast or Nyasaland were long and ill- 
served by roads. He was on the homs of a dilemma, for if left undisturbed the Germans 
could build up strength and recruit more Askaris, posing a potentially greater threat than 
hitherto. On the other hand, a British advance could disrupt and possibly destroy the enemy, 
but at the cost of immense difficulties in supply and reinforcement. However, his 
instructions from London were quite clear and PEA would have to be cleared. 79' 
Van Deventer had three aims: the first was to fight the enemy wherever and 
whenever possible in order to cause maximum attrition; the second was to prevent the 
invasion of Nyasaland; and the third was to prevent the enemy from re-entering German 
East Africa. 799 In the short term, the approaching rains would make it difficult to achieve 
the first goal although the others would be helped by the impasse. Once the dry season 
returned, an aggressive and offensive policy would be needed. 
The regrouping of the British force had been underway since the clearance of 
German East Africa, but had taken some time owing to the need to extract units from 
forward positions, columns had to be completely reorganized and fresh battalions had to be 
brought forward. At the same time, scarce shipping was taken up with the withdrawal of the 
Belgian troops, the removal of the substantial numbers of prisoners of war, and the 
evacuation of the many sick and wounded back to the base at Dar-es-Salaam. As the 
Rovuma River would flood from January onwards, it would be impossible to maintain any 
substantial forces across it until the dry season. This meant that the bulk of British forces 
would have to remain in the German colony. For the wet weather, van Deventer deployed 
the Nigerian Brigade north of Ngomano, with a KAR battalion at each of Massassi and 
7" WO 33/953, Telegrams D 2, No. 2334,2 December 1917, Telegram 47022, CIGS to van Deventer, p. 246. 7" Moyse-BartleM The King's Aftican RV7, es, p. 390. 
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Tunduru. The remainder of the main force was concentrated at Ndanda, for ease of supply 
800 
and training. 
The new striking force would be largely East African and two brigade-sized 
formations were created at Ndanda. The columns were based on the 2 nd and 3 rd Regiments 
KAR, known as Kartucol and Kartrecol, each deploying three battalions of the respective 
regiments. Norforce was also to play a key role operating from Songea, and southern 
Nyasaland. Its principal column was based on the three battalions of the I" Regiment 
KAR commanded by the redoubtable Colonel Hawthorn. Northey also had three 
battalions of 4h Regiment KAR, together with various Rhodesian and South African units 
deployed as garrisons and a reserve. 
Northey's lines of communications would remain essentially the same as those 
employed during the earlier clearance of Portuguese East Africa. Those for the main 
force would be more difficult as the Rovuma was a significant barrier to movement in the 
rainy season and the land to its south was barren. Any supplies moved overland would 
have to come from Lindi via Massassi to Ngomano before going into the largely roadless 
Portuguese territory. It was a long and tortuous route that promised to be difficult. On 
the other hand, the sea offered the best possibilities for supply with the harbour at Port 
Amelia being one of the best on the entire East coast. It also offered a relatively direct 
route to the main body of the German forces, and, almost uniquely for the coast, it was 
virtually malaria-free. 801 
At the same time, the Portuguese continued to be alarmed by the progress of the 
German incursion and especially about Port Amelia. Van Deventer had already 
despatched Rosecol to secure the port and now decided to develop it as a new advanced 
base. However, a lack of porters meant that mobile operations beyond the immediate 
802 area of the town would be impossible for some time. 
8'0 Van Deventer, Lt-Gen Sir J 1, Despatchftom the Lieutenant-General Commanding-in-Chief East 4#tcan Force, 30 September 
1918 published in London Gazette, "Supplement", No. 31069,16 December 19 18, p. 12 1. Henceforth van Deventer Despatch 11. go' Admiralty (NID), A Handbook ofPortuguese Nyasaland, London: 1920, p. 5 1. 
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Van Deventer was determined to bring the Schutztruppe to battle as quickly as 
possible and with delays caused by the rain and a lack of carriers, he ordered General 
Northey to start pressuring the Germans from the west. His intention was to drive in the 
German outposts in order to restrict the enemy's foraging and to harass his tired units. 
803 
He was equally sure that operations with the Portuguese would be unsuccessful without a 
unified command and on 1 January he requested the War Office to seek their 
subordination to him. 804 
The Portuguese at this time held a general line Mocimboa-do-Rovuma-Chomba, 
securing the area between the Rovuma and Porto Amelia. 
805 The Portuguese fielded a 
substantial force, on paper at least, of one European battalion and ten Askari companies 
and a battery of mountain guns. They were deployed with the battalion and three 
companies near Nampula, three companies in the south moving towards Alto Molokwe, 
and the remaining four companies dispersed amongst a number of stations. The 
mountain battery was due to move to Nakature, but was immobile owing to a lack of 
carriers. 806 
The uneasy relationship between the British and Portuguese had to be kept on 
track, for, despite their private misgivings, the British needed close co-operation if there 
was to be any chance of ending the fighting in 1918. Accordingly, a conference between 
van Deventer and the acting Governor-General was held at Lourenco Marques on 29 
January. The national governments had agreed that military operations in the Portuguese 
colony should be under unified command with the British taking the lead. 807 This was 
absolutely essential as the disasters of January had shown, but it involved a more tactful 
and sensitive approach to Portuguese national pride. 
$02 WO 95/5294, War Diary GHQ, 29 December 1917, Appendix B, Telegram 68 WO, van Deventer to CIGS, 28 December. 
303 Van Deventer Despatch 11, p. 122. 
8'4 WO 95/5295, War Diary GHQ, 3 January 1918, Appendix A2, Telegram I B, van Deventer to War Office, I January. 
603 WO 95/5294, War Diary GHQ, 4 December 1917, Appendix B, Telegram 49 WO, van Deventer to CIGS, 2 December. 
3" Boell, Die Operationen, pp. 406-407. 
m WO 95/5295, War Diary GHQ, 29 January 1918, Appendix A5(l), "Minutes of Conference between the Acting Governor General 
of Mozambique and General van Deventer", 29 January. 
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Van Deventer then saw Northey, who had come to Beira for a conference, and 
subsequently went north to Mocimboa-da-Praia, where he met Colonel Rosa on 12 
February. It was agreed that both Northey's and Rosa's forces would co-operate in trying 
to defeat the Germans in their present locations, or, if necessary, to drive them south of 
the River Lurio in the hopes that their Askari would desert. Further south, the Portuguese 
were asked to provide a mobile column at Chomba of some 1,500 rifles to attack the 
enemy from the north in conjunction with the British. KAR battalions were sent to hold 
Mozambique and the fertile Namule district (60-70 miles east of Lake Shirwa), while 
other Portuguese forces were asked to secure the line Ribaue-Inagu lying between those 
808 units. 
An inspection of the main body at Mocimboa left van Deventer distinctly 
unimpressed and he considered the bulk of the troops militarily worthless; an opinion to 
be vindicated during the course of the campaign. 809 
GERMAN PLANS FOR 1918 
By January 1918, von Lettow had achieved his immediate goal of positioning his 
force in the more fertile portions between the Rovuma and Lurio Rivers. His efforts were 
now set on obtaining further supplies of food while sheltering the troops from the effects 
of the wet season. He expected the enemy to resume their technique of concentric 
movements as soon as the rains stopped and the country had dried out. 810 
His plans were to occupy the area between the River Lurio and the line 
Montepuesi - Msalu - Mtende for as long as possible, and at least until the new crop 
could be harvested sometime in March-April. The protection of these supplies was a 
high priority while he also knew that the longer his troops stayed in an area, stripping it 
of supplies, the more it denied support to the British. As well, this position maximized 
the length of the enemy's lines of communications with a concomitant weakening of 
goo Van Deventer Despatch 11, p. 123. 
a" WO 95/5295, War Diary GHQ, 12 February 1918, Appendix A5, Telegram 36 S, van Deventer to CIGS, 12 February. 
"0 Lettow, Reminiscences, p. 242. 
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forward fighting power. 811 Thereafter, he would have to react to the actions of his 
opponents. 
For supply reasons, the Germans were broken into five groupings, with At 
Wahle, three companies, in the area Likopolwe-Mwembe; At Goring, also with three 
companies, around Muabala; At Otto, with two companies, en-route from Chirumba to 
Luambala; Kommando, controlling a single company, at Chirumba; and Abt Kohl of five 
companies stretching from Muo to Namunyo opposite Port Amelia. 812 
OPERATIONS JANUARY - APRIL 1918 
Norforce was due to strike first in 1918, and by early January it was divided into 
two main components: Colonel Murray and the Rhodesian elements and two battalions of 
the 4th KAR were garrisoning the Wiedhafen-Songea-Tunduru line and its vital food 
supplies, while Colonel Hawthorn with three battalions of I" KAR, and the Cape Corps 
were operating out of Nyasaland into Portuguese territory. 813 
Hawthorn's column was sent north on 3 January to dislodge Abt Wahle which was 
the closest force to the Nyasaland border and was now gathering food around the River 
Lugenda. Arriving there on 7 January, he had two battalions with him, as the others were 
further west, unable to move further owing to a shortage of transport. 814 Von Lettow 
received word of this two days later, and despatched At Otto as reinforcements. Wahle 
met Hawthorn's troops above Luambala, causing some delay, but he fell back east on the 
night of I 1/ 12 to protect his magazines. In the meantime, .4 bt Otto had been instructed to 
reinforce Wahle's threatened position and marched from Chirumba on 12 January. 
However, difficult going and the rising river meant that he was only able to cross the 
Lugenda River on 15 and 16 January; too late to effect a junction and increasingly short 
on supplies. Wahle abandoned the boma on the night of 16/17 and withdrew east. 815 The 
8" MS Boell, NI4/36,2. Kapitel, p. 72. 812 Boell, Die Operationen, p. 403. 8'3 WO 95/5330, War Diary Norforce, Entry 1 January 1918. 
8'4 WO 95/5330, War Diary Norforce, Entries 4 and 7 January 1918. 
813 MS Boell, 1414/36.2. Kapitel, p. 49; Boell, Die Operationen, p. 403. 
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British occupied Likopolwe on 14 January and Luambala four days later, thus achieving 
their immediate goal, but now hampered by the increasingly heavy rainfall. 8 16 
As these actions were underway, the rains continued to fall with their customary 
violence. Further north, Colonel Fitzgerald's Kartrecol was engaged in its task of 
securing the border with GEA along the line Ndanda-Massassi. It had the secondary aim 
of being ready to raze crops along the banks of Rovuma River and of moving the 
population northward should the enemy re-emerge. Finally, it was given the 
unglamorous, but vital, job of building roads up the Lugenda Valley to Nanguare and also 
west to Tunduru. 817 
The Kommandeur also learned of the British activity in the Mkula Hills, further 
north. This and Hawthorn's advance meant that an expansion of food-growing areas was 
impossible and the expected stocks of food in Mwembe - Chirumba - Luambala would 
only last a few days. Faced by shortages, von Lettow decided to move the main body 
back to Nanungu, via Mtende, while reinforcing Chirumba with a company from each of 
Wahle and K6hl. 818 
Northey's advance came as a distinct surprise to von Lettow, coming as it did 
from the least expected direction. 819 Lettow decided to intensify his food-gathering 
operations while trying to hold off the enemy columns. Abt Wahle was despatched to 
Chirumba to oversee the transportation of food stocks there while Abt Otto maintained a 
barrier to the west. However, the local African population was now struggling to feed 
itself and began to hide food supplies from the askaris. The rising waters and 
deteriorating tracks meant that transport was considerably more difficult and slow than 
previously. Operationally, the German commander was hamstrung until he could collect 
enough food to carry on elsewhere. 820 
916 W095/5330, War Diary Norforce, Entries 14 and IS January 1918; Van Deventer Despatch 11, p. 121, states that the latter place 
fell on 14 January. This is contradicted by the War Diary. 
317 Moyse-Bartlett, The King's Aftican Riflcs, p. 390. 
"a MS Boell, N14/36,2. Kapitel, p. 49. 
819 MS Boell, N14/36,2. Kapitel, pp. 32-33. 
"'0 Boell, Die Operationen, p. 404. 
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Matters were not helped by a clever British campaign against his African troops. 
Leaflets and rumours were spread about the hopelessness of the German cause and 
offering good treatment to deserters. It was effective, as 112 askaris and 150 carriers 
deserted in the month of January; since this represented 10 per cent of the nine western 
companies it could be ill-afforded. 821 The effects of success against the Portuguese had 
been offset by the unexpected speed of the follow-up and growing war-weariness. By 
von Lettow's order of 2 February, the commanders read out and publicly dismissed the 
British arguments while some deserters were caught and executed. 822 
This, coupled with the Hawthorn's advance, led von Lettow to move his forces 
further east, starting on 27 January. A bt Wahle was ordered to act as rearguard in the 
West while Abt K6hI fulfilled the same function in the east, with the main body heading 
for the large supply depot at Nanungu. 823 At the same time, Rosecol had pushed inland 
nearly 50 miles from Port Amelia, reaching the village of Pamune on 24 January, where 
it drove back the defenders and captured 5,000 kg of food. Food was beginning to run 
out in the forward area, and by the end of JanuaryAbt Kdhl had concentrated at 
Montepusi. 824 Despite the rain, Rosecol was able to occupy Ankuabe by the end of 
January and maintained contact with At Kohl some 23 miles further west. 
825 The 
importance of guarding the ripening crops, due for harvest in mid-February, kept K6hl 
firmly in position and prevented any withdrawal to help relieve the pressure in the 
west. 826 
This pressure was maintained throughout the rest of January and well into 
February 1918. Operations were heavily constrained by the rain as many bridges were 
washed away with a number of Wahle's askaris and carriers being drowned. 827 In the 
west, Hawthorn had cleared the left bank of the Lujenda River and was forcing the 
$21 Boell, Die Operationen, p. 404. 
822 MS Boell, N 14/36,2. Kapitel, pp. 61-62; 
$23 Boell, Die Operationen, p. 404; WO 95/5330, War Diary Norforce, Entry 20 January 1917. 
224 MS Boell, N14/36.2. Kapitel, pp. 66-67. 
$25 Van Deventer Despatch 11, p. 122. 226 Lettow, Reminiscences, p. 245. 
127 MS Boell, N14/36,2. Kapitel, p. 62. 
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German rearguard east, while Northey conferred with the commander-in-chief about 
future strategy at Beira on 4 February. "' 
By early February, the British had four battalions facing the five enemy 
companies on the road Chirumba - Mtende - Nanungu. On 7 February, K6hl and Otto 
were ordered to give up a company each to support the threatened area. 829 The 
exhaustion of supplies around Mtende forced a contraction on Nanungu with Abt Goring 
retiring on the latter place by 14 February. Abt Wahle, in turn, was sent off to reconnoitre 
and to gather as many supplies as possible. By 22 February, Hawthorn was at Mtende, 
some 75 miles to the east of Luambala while Rosecol occupied Meza a week later, it 
having been abandoned by K6hl owing to lack of food. 830 
This renewed pressure was worrisome and late in February, von Lettow made the 
protection of his food supplies the highest priority. He assessed that he faced three 
columns of some 20-30 companies in the west with at least 30 in the east. He believed 
that these forces would encounter major difficulties in maintaining sufficient supplies and 
that he could counter them by concentrating the maximum number of companies to hit a 
single British column. There were two possibilities: either to march north to the Lujenda 
towards Luarnbala or to go south to Hawella-Malema 831 
The British had continued their converging movement, with Northey reporting the 
area north-east of Luambala clear for 100 miles and his troops occupying Malokotera on 
5 March. The sarne day, Rosecol had clashed with a German detachment some 27 miles 
to the east of Medo Boma, which was clearly held in some strength. As it was a key road 
junction and led to the main body of the Schutztruppe, van Deventer correctly surmised 
that it would be strongly defended. 832 He decided to reinforce Rose with another column 
of two battalions of 2 nd KAR and half a mountain battery under Lieutenant Colonel 
"" WO 95/5330, War Diary Norforce, Entry 4 February 1918. 
129 MS Boell, N14/36,2. Kapitel, pp. 63-64. 130 Van Deventer Despatch 11, p. 122; Bcmll, Die Operationen, p. 404; CO 691/15, War Diary Norforce, Entry 22 February 1918. 831 MS Boell, N14/36,2. Kapitel, p. 84. 832 Van Deventer, Despatch II, p. 123; CO 691/15, War Diary Norforce, Entry 10 March 191 S. 
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Giffard in mid-March. 833 Both columns were placed under the overall command of 
Brigadier-General Edwards and known collectively as the Port Amelia Force (Pamforce). 
The third KAR battalion was sent on to Mozambique to protect the local area and stiffen 
Portuguese resolve. 
834 
At the end of March, the Schuatruppe were deployed in three main areas: the 
Kommando and six companies were south-east of Chizona; At Wahle with two 
companies were at Nanungu; and Abt K6hI with six companies and the mountain guns 
around Montepuezi. With the British closing in onto the new German positions, von 
Lettow had been active in ensuring that the newly-ripening crops were harvested. A 
considerable number of the Askari were employed on this crucial task while others were 
engaged in training. By the end of March, this foraging had been successful enough to 
garner food enough to last to the end of May. The Germans now had their freedom of 
action restored, at least for several months. 835 
THE BATTLE OF CHIRUMBA HILL 
Despite the rain and generally soggy conditions, van Deventer was anxious to 
bring his opponent to bay as quickly as possible. He had Parnforce with its two columns, 
Rosecol and Kartucol, pushing westwards on the Medo-Mwalia road against At Kohl, 
while in the west Hawthorn was closed up with Abt Otto. Parnforce found the first 
opportunity to attack when it ran into a strong German position of about six companies 
around Chirumba Hill, a long rocky outcrop that paralleled the road running from Medo 
to Mwalia. General Edwards determined to seize the hill and to press on to Medo as 
quickly as possible. 
The defenders had placed only two companies on the eastern edge of the hill, 
where they could block the road. The remainder, under K6hl, were echeloned south-east 
of the defences, ready to counter-attack or conduct an ambush. This was unknown to 
'" Moyse-Bartlett, The King's Aftican Rifles, p. 39 1; WO 95/5330, History of 1"12'4 KAR, p. 37. 
834 Van Deventer Despatch 11, p. 124. 
g's Boell, Die Operationen, p. 406 
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Rosecol who reached and seized the eastern end of the position by the evening of 10 
April. The next day, Kartucol was sent on a flanking movement to the south of Chirumba 
Hill with the aim of cutting off the Medo-Mloco road and thence to Medo on 12 April, 
while Rosecol launched a holding attack along the Chirumba Hill to cover the move. 
Giffard's column moved off successfully at dawn on II April and made 
reasonable progress bypassing the hill despite encountering a large swamp. However, it 
was here that he would meet AN K6h1 in its depth positions. 836 By mid-morning, the lead 
battalion was halted by heavy machine gun fire which continued until 1330 hours, when 
Kbhl launched all four companies into the counter-attack. In the meantime, Rosecol had 
been pushing slowly westwards along the road towards Medo with two battalions. They 
did well and began to push back the defenders. As the counter-attack was beginning to 
threaten Kartucol, K6hl noticed that the Rosecol had occupied the high ground to his 
flank. Despite trying to push them off, he was unsuccessful and with the main position 
astride the road lost, he decided to break off the battle. The fighting continued until dark 
when AN Spangenberg with two companies was left to form the rearguard while the 
remainder went on to rejoin the main body. 837 
This battle, the first major encounter in Portuguese East Africa, cost both sides a 
number of casualties and forced K6hl to expend some 53,000 of his precious rounds. As 
well, food was becoming short and he had to live off the land as much as possible in 
order to conserve stocks. The loss of Chirumba Hill threatened his stores and he had 
them evacuated from Namunyo to Mdalamia, but was forced to fight another action on 
16/17 April to cover that move. This action cost him another 46,000 rounds and he 
continued to withdraw under pressure, while using fighting patrols to try and disrupt the 
British supply system. 838 
""Clifford, The Gold Coast Regiment, pp. 238-239; WO 95/5330, History of 1'12 od KAR, pp. 37-38. 
$37 Clifford, 7he Gold Coast Regiment, pp. 244-245; MS Boell, N14/36,2. Kapitel, p. 113. German losses were 13 killed, 48 
wounded, four taken prisoner and two missing out of 620. The British lost 18 killed, 55 wounded, and one taken prisoner out of 2,000 
rifles. 833 Boell, Die Operationen, p. 407. 
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The British advance continued slowly against a series of small-scale ambushes 
that were greatly enhanced by the very difficult country and thick bush in the area. 
Mwalia was reached on 20 April, with the columns having averaged about 4 miles per 
day since leaving Medo. 839 Abt Kohl continued its move toward Nanungu, taking up a 
position around Mblama on 24/25 April. Despite the difficulty of the advance and the 
unfavourable conditions, the British scored a minor coup as Kartucol attacked a German 
convoy and seized all the spare rifles, ammunition and documents for K6hl's six 
companies. 840 
Parnforce ran into heavy opposition on I May when a German counter-attack 
nearly led to the loss of a mountain battery near Koronie. A flank attack onto Kartucol 
caused a high number of British casualties including 42 dead and the loss of two 
mountain guns. This setback forced a temporary halt in the advance, as General 
Edwards had to reorganise after the battle and bring up much-needed supplies. 841 
In the meantime, van Deventer had sensed von Lettow's intentions and ordered 
his forces to converge on Nanungu. Northey was instructed to advance from his position 
at Mahua while maintaining forces to the north to prevent a breakthrough in that 
direction. Edwards was told to carry on driving along the Mwalia-Nanungu road while 
Colonel Rosa was asked to use his troops to cover the gap between the two forces. 
In the west, Northey's troops had occupied Mahua on 5 May, having overrun and 
dispersed a German company the day previously. This move had been worrying von 
Lettow, who had had moved westward with five companies to block the advance. The 
British columns reacted to the German response by digging-in near Makoti, less than 25 
miles south-west of Nanungu. On arrival, von Lettow launched a ferocious attack, using 
two flanking movements. Despite the strength of the blow, it was unable to dislodge the 
defenders and von Lettow had to regroup under cover of darkness. Casualties were 
heavy on both sides with the Germans having over 100 and they had to amalgamate two 
1"9 Clifford, 77je Gold Coast Regiment, p. 256. "0 Van Deventer, Despatch 11, p. 125. 
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companies, reducing their overall strength to 13.842 For their part, the British suffered 
over 200 losses and were forced to halt to sort out the casualties. 843 
This sharp action led the British to believe that Lettow still considered a move 
north, a fact apparently confirmed by the statements of prisoners. To that end, van 
Deventer ordered one column to hold the north along the Msalu River while the 
remainder of Edwards's and Northey's troops would close in on Nanungu in an attempt 
to bring the Germans to a decisive battle. 844 The advance resumed on 17 May with 
Kartucol entering Nanungu unopposed two days later. Finding that place abandoned 
except for a hospital full of sick soldiers, Edwards despatched Kartucol down the Mahua 
road in pursuit of the withdrawing Germans. Rosecol and Grifcol were sent off on 
flanking marches to the north and south of the road respectively on 20 May. 845 Von 
Lettow had already left in a south-westerly direction along the Mahua Road going in the 
direction that the British were least prepared and least able to deal with. He had organised 
his force into four Ateilungen with the customary advance and rearguards ready for a 
move south of the River Lurio. 846 The first major stop was at Korewa, some 24 miles 
south-west of Nanungu while the Kommandeur kept alert for an opportunity to strike at 
an isolated column. 
The next day, Kartucol ran into At Kohl, now the rearguard, and quickly started 
working around its position. This the Germans to pull back further through the dense 
bush and out of British clutches. Despite the break south, the situation was beginning to 
look favourable for van Deventer as the bulk of the Schutztruppe were being concentrated 
into a fairly tight area, albeit rocky and thickly vegetated, while the flanking columns 
were pressing in. However, he was unaware that von Lettow was now preparing to strike 
back at his pursuers. 
841 Boell, Die Operationen, p. 407; Moyse-Bartlett, The King'sAfrican Rifles, pp. 394-395, WO 95/5330, Histoty of 10121d KAR, pp. 
3940. 
942 Van Deventer, Despatch II, pp. 125-126; Boell, Die Operationen, p. 408. Boell cites German casualties as being 34 killed, 106 
wounded. This represented 26.7 per cent of their strength with three companies reduced to less than 35 per cent while the British lost 
103 killed, 100 wounded and six taken prisoner. 
"3 Boell, Die Operationen, p. 408; WO 33/953, Telegrams D 2, No. 2650,6 May 1917, Telegram G 269, van Deventer to War Office; 
WO 95/5330, War Diary Norforce, Entry 5 May 1918. 
"4 Van Deventer Despatch 11, p. 126. "s Clifford, 77te Gold Coast Regiment, p. 269. ' Boell, Die Operationen, p. 409. 
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Having first sent off the baggage train to a safe distance, von Lettow instructed 
Abt Kbhl to launch a spoiling attack on the morning of 22 May. It was not intended to be 
decisive, just enough to disrupt the advance and enable the rearguard to break clear and 
slowly move back. At 0900, Kartucol came into battle as the road went into a narrow 
gorge flanked by impassable hills. The lead battalion engaged K61il's troops with its 
mountain guns and Stokes mortars to good effect while the flanking columns moved on. 
Grifcol emerged from the south onto the Mahua road to the rear of K61il's main body, 
surprising a company at its midday meal and driving it off. Moving on, it then captured 
Abt K6hl's baggage while cutting the German force in half. "" Von Lettow was not far 
behind, with both Abt Poppe and G6ring, and immediately advanced on hearing the 
firing. In danger of being trapped, K6h1 had begun withdrawing through the gorge when 
the Kommandeur arrived. A furious counter-attack was launched onto Grifcol by eight 
companies, including two of K61il's, but the Germans were unable to dislodge the now- 
surrounded column. Further east, Kartucol kept pressing hard and von Lettow was 
compelled to despatch two companies and later a third to protect this flank. His blow had 
failed, and, in considerable danger of being destroyed in place, he ordered the battle 
broken off. The night provided an opportunity for the weakened Schuatruppe to escape 
through the dense bush and regroup to the south. "' 
The two-day battle cost both sides heavily, but especially the Germans. They had 
suffered heavy casualties, losing over 100 troops and 300 carriers. Four companies were 
effectively destroyed, with the Governor, both artillery batteries and At Kohl losing their 
baggage. Over 30,000 rounds had been expended while a further 70,000 were captured 
by the British; this left only 613,000 for the entire force. Furthermore, food was running 
short and the whole situation had a distinct resemblance to November 1917 when the 
force had barely escaped from a similar scrape. This setback forced von Lettow to break 
contact and march south slowly in order to evacuate the seriously wounded and sick. 849 
"7 WO 95/5330, History of 1`12"d KAR, pp. 4142. 
"a WO 95/5330, War Diary Norforce, Entry 22 May 191 S. 
"' Boell, Die Operationen, p. 4 10; MS Boell, N 14/36,2. Kapitel, pp. 166-167. Of a German strength of 880,17 were killed, 88 were 
wounded, 317 taken prisoner (296 were carriers) representing some 10.5 per cent of their strength; WO 33/953, Telegrams D 2, No. 
2674,24 May 1918, Telegram 2 10 WO, van Deventer to War Off ice, p. 3 54. The British reported losses of about 70. 
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From the British point of view, the battle had represented a chance to end the 
campaign. Had Rosecol been able to join battle, it might have made the difference. As it 
was, the Germans were mauled heavily, although at some cost to the advancing columns 
and a significant reduction in their fighting strength. Nevertheless, they were still not 
beaten and the British had run into the limits of their supplies again. Nanungu marked a 
turning point in the campaign as the Germans were under severe pressure to gain both 
food supplies and ammunition. 
THE MOVE SOUTH TO MOZAMBIQUE 
Reorganising on the spot, Rosecol was broken up while Kartrecol deployed a 
battalion to secure the road along the line Malema-Mozambique while another was sent 
to stiffen the Portuguese detachment along the Ribane-Maleme road. It was left to 
Kartucol and Grifcol to carry on the pursuit of von Lettow in parallel columns. Rearguard 
actions were the norm and were only broken up by the capture of another hospital left 
behind by the Germans. 850 1 
Von Lettow remained as wily as ever and quickly moved his reduced force south 
gaining a day and a half s head start on his now-halted opponents. His aim was to 
replenish his diminished stocks and to secure enough food to live off-, going south offered 
the best opportunities while putting more strain on his opponents' supply lines. By 27 
May, the advance guard had reached the River Lurio and had reconnoitered a suitable 
crossing site near Watiwa. 851 
By I June, the Germans had almost completely crossed the River Lurio at Watiwa 
and now threatened to break through the difficult area between the river and Inagu and 
into the more settled areas around Mozambique. The land was exceptionally difficult 
with numerous hills, very thick bush, little cultivation and few paths. The indigenous 
"0 Van Deventer, Despatch II, pp. 126-127. One captured hospital yielded 15 Germans, 47 Askarts, and 31 Porters as prisoners on 28 
May; CO 691/15, War Diary Norforce, Entry 27 May 1918. 
851 Boelt, Die Operationen, p. 412. 
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population was also strongly anti-Portuguese and willing to assist the incoming Germans. 
Given the past weakness of the Portuguese forces, van Deventer had to assume that they 
would be incapable of serious resistance and therefore had to deploy his own troops to 
support them. He asked Colonel Rosa to move some of his troops from their positions 
just south of the River Rovuma to the port of Quelimane and to be prepared to move 
them inland from there. The final arrangements were agreed at a meeting in Dar-es- 
Salaam on 8 June, although subsequently the Portuguese commander's enthusiasm for 
attacking had to be curbed by van Deventer. Instead, Rosa was instructed to await 
reinforcement and was to ensure the fortification of the supply base at Nhamacurra, at the 
end of a small railway line north of Quelimane. 852 
The German push south forced van Deventer to reconsider the ever-lengthening 
lines of communication. As things stood, Port Amelia was too distant, but the shifting of 
the entire base by sea to the port of Mozambique was out of the question owing to 
shortages of shipping. Consequently, a motor road was cut from Medo down to Nanripo, 
where the Lurio was crossed, and then south to Mcuburi and finally on to Nampula. 853 
Van Deventer was particularly concerned about the ability of the Portuguese to defend 
themselves and decided to reinforce their key garrisons with his own troops. A new 
column under Colonel Fitzgerald, named Fitzcol, was formed from two KAR battalions 
854 at Muo Nluku. Hoping to box the enemy in the Malema area, he sent a unit to Inagu 
while another moved into Malokotera with an Anglo-Portuguese column concentrated at 
Ribaue. Further north, both Grifcol and Kartucol were still struggling to cross the Lurio 
in the face of German rearguards, finally making the crossing by 5 June. 855 
The Germans were wasting little time and managed to evade the converging 
columns on the Malema line. The advance guard, At Miller with three companies, 
attacked the Portuguese boma at Malema after it had been reinforced by several 
companies of KAR on 31 May. For once, the attack was unsucessful and the defenders 
$52 W09515295, War Diary GHQ, 21 June 1918, Entry Quelimane Area; W0331953, Telegrams D2, No. 2688,1 June 1918, 
Telegram 218 WO, van Deventer to War Office, pp. 357-358. $33 Van Deventer Despatch II, p. 128. '-"4 Boell, Die Operationen, p. 412; WO 95/5330, History of 1`12"d KAP, p. 43. '" Van Deventer Despatch II, p. 128; CO 69 1/15, War Diary Norforce, Entry I June 1918. 
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held firm. "" Muller remained there for a few days and then marched off, rejoining von 
Lettow and the main body on 8 June. The Kommandeur then decided to march in the 
direction of least resistance and sent off Muller towards Alto Molokwe. Arriving there 
on 12 June, the boma was found empty, its garrison of two Portuguese companies having 
fled without a shot, and a rich haul of food and documents were taken. Most importantly, 
the captured papers mentioned an incoming ammunition column. Muller immediately 
followed up this lead and went off searching the local area for its whereabouts. 
Occupying Ille, Alto Ligonye, Nampave and Muyeba in turn, he seized 2200 loads of 
food and various materials. Furthermore, the tracks of a column were found and Mueller 
captured 150,000 kg of food and numerous other supplies on 23 June. A subsequent 
attack on a lone Portuguese company yielded several machine guns, some food and 
13,000 rounds of ammunition. Despite these considerable successes, the munitions 
column could not be located and ammunition remained scarce. 857 
After halting on the Malema line to sort out the supply situation, on 16 June van 
Deventer ordered the three mobile columns to move south, with General Edwards 
assuming command of the Mozambique theatre. The new base at the port of Mozambique 
opened up the next day, while the lead units of Colonel Rosa's northern troops landed at 
neighbouring Quelimane on 20 June. It was van Deventer's intention to trap and hammer 
the Schutztruppe between the villages of Ille and Alto Molokwe, and then to drive it 
towards the coast. General Hawthorn, now having taken over Norforce, brought the bulk 
of his troops to Ille while Philcol moved to Nakwa and Alto Ligonye; Fitzcol was due to 
link up with them near Ribawe, while the Portuguese were relegated to securing the 
coastal towns. "' But, van Deventer miscalculated as his opponent had already 
determined to continue south-east and just beat the British to Ille. On 25 June, the lead 
unit ran into the German advance guard, AN Spangenberg, but was unable to push 
through. While fighting was underway, the enemy main body and rearguard bypassed 
the fighting and slipped away. 859 
$56 CO 691/15, War Diary Norforce, Entry 2 June 191 S. 
857 Boell, Die Operationen, p. 413. 
8" CO 691/15, War Diary Norforce, Entries 15,20 and 24 June 1918. 
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More troops were now brought into the fighting as Kartrecol was taken off its 
duties along the Rovuma and brought south. Fitzcol left Mbalama and after a long and 
exhausting march, joined General Edwards at Nampula on 30 June. This was now more 
important as von Lettow threatened the port of Quelimane which supported a major 
supply base at the railway terminus at Nhamacurra, a number of miles north. 
Nhamacurra was essential for the support of any columns operating north of that port and 
had a large stockpile of food and essential stores. Van Deventer was especially 
concerned about its security and he ordered Colonel Rosa to reinforce it while also 
providing a half battalion of KAR. On at least two occasions, he sent explicit 
instructions for its defence, charging Rosa with responsibility for the execution of his 
orders. This was important as the British were short of information owing to the hostility 
of the local population, but they did realise that von Lettow was in the area. 860 
On paper the garrison was formidable, with three Portuguese infantry and one 
artillery companies together with the two KAR companies. The defences were laid out 
over a distance of 3,000 yards with three sectors, the western and central being allocated 
to the Portuguese and the eastern to the British. The railway station formed the right of 
the position and was held by the KAR. The Nhamacurra, River marked the left before 
swinging around the rear of the defences. 861 
On 27 June, von Lettow sent off his advance guard, At Miller, with orders to 
obtain more ammunition and intelligence with the main body remaining a day's march 
behind it. Friendly Africans informed MUller of the position at Nhamacurra and he 
promptly decided to march on it. Emerging from the bush only 30 metres from the 
Portuguese positions around the sisal factory in the western sector, he was surprised to 
run into the enemy. However, they fled at literally the first shots and the position quickly 
collapsed, with substantial quantities of weapons and ammunition being captured. 
Moving toward the centre of the position, MUller's troops ran into further Portuguese and 
some British troops, who put up some resistance but were eventually forced out. 
859 Boell, Die Operationen, p. 414. 
80 WO 33/953, Telegrams D 2, No. 2718,17 June 1918, Telegram 234 WO, van Deventer to War Office, pp. 369-370; No. 2729.22 
June 1918, Telegram 238 WO, van Deventer to War Office, p. 371. 
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Consolidating on the objective, he awaited the arrival of the main body who duly 
arrived on 2 July. Patrols had located the KAR positions at the railway station and MI. 
now resolved to attack it. Well dug-in and disciplined, the KAR held their positions and 
inflicted heavy losses on the attackers. 862 Heavy machine gun and rifle fire continued 
throughout the day as well as most of 3 July. At 1500 hours, one of the captured 
Portuguese mountain guns was made serviceable again and began firing. The first round 
hit the railway station building and drove out a number of Portuguese . 4skaris and carriers 
in a blind panic. They stampeded through the KAR positions causing chaos while the 
Germans took advantage of the confusion to infiltrate. Now overwhelmed and being 
overrun from the rear, the position began to collapse. The defenders tried to withdraw 
over the deep Nhamacurra, river to their rear and many drowned or were shot down as 
they tried to escape. 863 
The result was a disaster. The Portuguese garrison had been largely wiped out as 
well as the KAR companies. More importantly, vast quantities of food, weapons, 
ammunition and stores fell into the Germans' hands, relieving their supply worries at 
once. It gave them the ability to fight on for some considerable time. They seized some 
five heavy machine guns, three light machine guns, 484 rifles, 327,000 rounds, 300,000 
kg of food, and, critically, 3.75 kg of quinine. 864 
This disaster also caused considerable panic to the Portuguese administration as 
Quelimane was now directly threatened. On 4 July, Colonel Rosa ordered the families 
evacuated and the bullion stores placed on ships as a precaution, while there was wild 
talk of abandoning the town. However, the British resolved to hold it and von Lettow 
had other ideas. He realised that the Zambesi was in flood and therefore impassable 
while the British strength lay in their ability to move by sea. He decided to reverse his 
steps and to head north-east with the secondary aim of disrupting their newly created 
lines of communication. Marching in five groups with the standard advance guard of Abt 
$61 MS Boell, N14/36,3. Kapitel, pp. 216-218; WO 106/273, History of3 KAR, p. 89a. 
262 WO 106/1460, Schnee Diary, [2-4 July] 19 18, pp. 146-147. 
163 Moyse-Bartleft, The King's Aftican Rifles, pp. 399-400; WO 106/273, History of3' KAR, pp. 90-9 1. 
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Miller and rearguard of Abt KAI, the Gennans set off on 5 July. 
865 However, owing to 
the loss of contact and active deception by the local population, the British lost track of 
these movements for a few days. 
Finally, Philcol ran into the leading elements of the Schutztruppe near Ociva on 
11 July. Thus warned, General Edwards sent Fitzcol north from Nhamacurra towards 
Ociva while the redoubtable Kartucol was ordered to try and head off the Germans at 
Murrau. Van Deventer released the last of his battalions along the border of German East 
Africa, sending two KAR battalions from Fort Johnston to Mozambique. 866 
The chase was back in full flight. A Portuguese post at Mtiba fell easily, but 
Philcol and Kartucol were now closing hard, and K6hl had to hold them off as the main 
body slipped off north towards the small post of Namirrue, held by two companies of 
KAR. Fitzcol reached the Namirrue River about 25 miles west of the boma on 20 July. 
Setting off the next day, it could hear the sounds of battle from the direction of the 
garrison; the column marched as quickly as it could through the heavy bush. Pausing 
only briefly on the night of 21/22 July, Fitzcol emerged onto the Alto Ligonha-Namirrue 
road to find the boma was already under attack by the six companies of von Lettow's 
main body while the three companies of advance guard secured the flank. 
Fitzgerald was well aware of the potential seriousness of the situation and his lead 
battalion pressed on to reach the beleaguered garrison. By 1600, the leading German 
outposts had been driven in, but an hour later a strong attack checked the column's 
progress. The enemy withdrew at nightfall and both battalions dug-in in line. Von 
Lettow had been informed about the threat to his rear and had launched a night flanking 
attack. At 1900 hours, it hit the right flank of the forward position which was still under 
construction. The Schuatruppe managed to break into the defences and routed the 
battalion completely. The shock was so complete that the commanding officer and his 
"4 Boell, Die Operationen, p. 415; WO 106/1460, Schnee Diary, [24] July 1918, pp. 146-147. He states that over 100 drowned. 
165 MS Boell, N14/36,3. Kapitel, p. 230; WO 95/5330, War Diary Norforce, Entry 4 July 1918. 
'" Boell, Die Operationen, p. 416; CO 691/15, War Diary Norforce, Entry 13 July 1918. 
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headquarters staff were taken prisoner. 867 Stragglers quickly reached the second battalion 
and alerted Fitzgerald to the impending threat. A desperate fight ensued until 2100 hours, 
when the battle was broken off by the attackers. A much-weakened column then 
withdrew to protect its baggage train. The next day revealed that one battalion had 
practically ceased to exist and the other was reduced to less than 200 effectives. Against 
the main body of the enemy, the column was now helpless and could do little more than 
defend itself. 868 
The defeat of Fitzcol sealed the fate of the unlucky garrison holding the boma at 
Namirrue. Cut off from its water supply and overwhelmingly outnumbered, the post fell 
on 23 July after a final assault at 1700 hours and surrendered . 
869 However it did cost the 
attackers dear, as one company commander was killed in the attack and another severely 
wounded. 870 During this time, Kartucol had been far from idle as it had left Munevalia 
on the night of 2/3 July. It had spent some considerable time chasing rumours of the 
Germans heading south towards Quelimane when news was received about the disaster at 
Nharnacurra. The column returned to Munevalia on 14 July, having marched 187 miles 
or an average of 17 miles per day through heavy bush. Despite their considerable fatigue, 
there was no opportunity for rest and they marched straight off towards Tipe in an 
attempt to head off von Lettow before he could cross the River Molocque. 
Kartucol reached its objective on 20 July only to find At Kohl holding the 
crossings. Showing great determination, crossings were forced and the column pushed 
up against the Germans until 22 July when firing could be heard from the direction of 
Namirrue. The enemy's camp was located on 24 July, but the column did not attack until 
the arrival of reinforcements and a much needed food resupply. 
871 It then advanced to the 
site of the camp to find it evacuated and burnt out. On hearing that the Germans had 
turned east, Giffard ordered a forced march to Calipo, north-east of Namirrue, where he 
then halted to link up with the remnants of Fitzcol. A brief rest ensued as Kartucol had 
967 Boell, Die Operationen, p. 417; Moyse-Bartlett, The King's Aftican Riges, p. 402; CO 691/15, War Diary Norforce, Entries 22 and 
23 July 1918. 
1" Moyse-Bartlett, The King's Aftican Rifles, p. 402; WO 106/273, History of3d KAR, pp. 92-93. '69 Van Deventer Despatch 1, p. 130. 870 WO 106/1460, Schnee Diary, Entries 22-23 July 1918, pp. 152-153. '71 CO 691/15, War Diary Norforce, Entry 24 July 1918. 
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marched 330 miles in a month with little food, no blankets or personal kit. It was a 
remarkable achievement. 872 
The unsatisfactory military situation led to another meeting between General van 
Deventer and the Governor-General at Quelimane on 22 July. It was decided to give 
each nation separate zones of operation, with the Portuguese being allocated the defence 
of the sea ports from Quelimane to Antonio Ennes together with local inland operations. 
The British took upon themselves the task of maintaining forces south of the line 
Mozambique-Malema. 
A week later on 29 July, van Deventer met with Edwards at Nampula to decide 
future operations. The Germans were now known to have turned again and this time 
headed east to the area of Chalaua, which was fertile land lying between the Ligonha and 
Meluli Rivers. The local population was in a state of near revolt and was actively 
assisting the invaders against the hated colonial power and its allies. Notable too, was the 
virtual cessation of desertions since the crossing of the Malema line on 10 June which 
may have been attributed to the great distances between the Askaris' homes and the 
location of the fighting forces. 873 
Von Lettow's calculations had been influenced by documents captured at 
Namirrue that indicated that the area to its north had few supplies of food. The area east 
of Ligonye had a number of Portuguese posts, mostly abandoned, and, although over 
13,000 loads of food were discovered, the lack of porters meant that most had to be 
destroyed. The Kommandeur decided to go east and marched to Pekera, arriving on 24 
July, before moving on to Chalaua two days later. 874 The force managed to spend a week 
in the area and the lack of a close pursuit gave the force time to consider some essential 
measures regarding manpower. It had been possible to make up the diminished numbers 
of Askaris through the promotion of the best carriers, but in the eight months in 
Portuguese territory over a third had been lost (1190 from 1790) while 3 10 good porters 
'72 Moyse-Bardett, The King's Aftican Rifles, p. 402.; WO 106/273, History of3 KAR, pp. 93-94. '73 Van Deventer Despatch If, p. 13 1. '74 WO 106/1460, Schnee Diary, 24-31 July 1918, pp. 154-155; Latow, Reminiscences, pp. 290-291. 
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had been enlisted to replace them and began immediate training. However, more serious 
was the diminition of the irreplaceable German officers and non-commissioned officers 
who had dwindled by nearly 30 per cent in the same time (197 remaining out of 281). 
The loss rate of 10- 11 per month was increasingly serious, particularly when the need for 
good leaders was especially acute. 875 Pitched battles were becoming too expensive and 
were working in favour of the British. 
While these operations were underway, the British continued their work on 
improving the communications in Portuguese East Africa. The extension of the motor 
road from Medo to Nampula was completed quickly and large numbers of vehicles were 
moved via this route to the Mozambique line rather than by sea. The road leading from 
Mnapo to Chinga was extended to Ribaue and Malema, while General Hawthorn's 
engineers continued the road from Nyasaland to Malokotera. Similarly, the Portuguese 
built a road from Ngomano through Chomba to Medo. The net effect of this activity was 
that, by the end of August, it was possible to drive from the Rovuma to Medo, through 
Nampula and Malema and on to Zomba in Nyasaland. 876 It was a major achievement and 
greatly aided the movement of supplies and troops. A number of smaller tracks were also 
constructed, as were improved telegraphic links from Nyasaland and the major ports of 
Quelimane and Mozambique. 
These efforts'were to have beneficial effects in the next stage of events. With a 
brief rest being granted to the most tired units, a number of smaller columns were sent 
out to protect the vulnerable lines of communication. Then, on 9 August, van Deventer 
initiated a converging movement on Chalaua with the aim of trapping von Lettow. The 
latter, of course, had no intention of being caught and had already started to collect his 
dispersed force, with a preliminary move on 7 August toward Namatil as a feint towards 
Mozambique. His real aim was the British magazine in the rich area of Nyamaroi- 
Regone. The rapidly closing British forced him to halt on 10 August and then he turned 
south followed by west and then north-west, in a successful attempt to confuse the 
*75 Boell, Die Operationen, pp. 417418. '176 Van Deventer Despatch II, p. 13 1. 
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scent. 877 However, a captured telegram was to have fateful consequences as the 
Kommandeur learnt that the supply centre at Mukubi was being evacuated to Regone. 
This tipped the balance and he now ordered his columns to make for Regone. 878 
The threat to Nyasaland was never far from van Deventer's mind and the latest 
move by the Schuatruppe led him to order the reinforcement of his western flank. 
General Hawthorn was ordered to hold Regone while Kartucol was sent rapidly to Alto 
Molocque; the remaining troops were instructed to follow the Germans as closely as 
possible. On 24 August, Numarroe had been reached and Abt Mfiller ran into a battalion 
of KAR. A heavy fight ensued with the battalion being forced back to the boma at 
Regone. 879 It was an advanced supply base of some considerable value, as it contained 
10,000 loads of food, 500 cases of small arms ammunition and 200 of Stokes Mortar 
bombs; its loss would have severely hindered British operations in the area apart from 
providing the Germans with a large augmentation to their resources. 880 
Von Lettow wanted to take Regone by the use of small side paths, thereby 
avoiding the main defences. However, his plan miscarried through heavy fog, rain and 
difficult going. He reached the boma on 26 August to find it well defended and recently 
reinforced. In view of its strength and the approaching columns, he made the decision 
not to attack and to move off to the north instead. 881 
While these movements were underway, Hawthorn's troops had dug themselves 
in south of Lioma while Kartucol had its three battalions spread between Inagu and 
Muanhupa having arrived there from Alto Molocque. A hastily reinforced Fitzcol also 
went to Muanhupa to add to the defences. On 30 August, the Schutziruppe located and 
attacked the Norforce in its entrenched positions, with eleven of its twelve companies 
being committed to the assault. Despite being hit from all sides, the battalion held on 
tightly and was relieved by the arrival of Fitzcol on the same day. That unit sent in a 
$77 WO 106/1460, Schnee Diary, 10 August 1918, p 3. 
87' Boell, Die Operationen, pp. 418-419. 
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counter-attack that was followed by another battalion arriving from Muanhupa early on 
31 August. This resulted in the taking of Abt Maller's baggage column and the loss of 
50,000 sorely needed rounds. Realising that he had stumbled into a strong position, von 
882 Lettow changed his plans and began moving north from about 1500 hours. Kartucol 
followed up with its usual vigour as it located the enemy crossing the Muanhupa River on 
the next day; its lead battalion launched an attack from the west supported by another 
from the east. Although able to deflect these blows, the Germans' lost of two of the 
Governor's key staff officers, a medical officer and the field hospital. 883 
The operations in the Numaffoe-Regone-Lioma area had cost both sides heavily. 
For the British, one battalion had taken a heavy pounding and the remnants of a second 
were largely finished off at Numarroe. However, the Germans suffered one of their 
closest escapes at Lioma - Regone. Trying to defeat the British in detail, they were very 
nearly caught in a trap. Casualties were heavy and the losses of military equipment and 
medical stores were marked. Sixty-three were killed with a further 70 wounded, while 
some 250 valuable carriers were captured by the British. 884 
Prisoners taken by the Schuatruppe indicated that yet another KAR battalion was 
now to the east coming from Alto Molocque and Malema. Increasingly desperate to 
escape the British trap, the Kommandeur decided to move north and recross the River 
Lurio, which was now a trickle. Forced marches between I and 3 September were 
interrupted only by attacks on the rearguard by the persistent British columns. 885 On 5 
September, the Germans had their first rest day in 25, but could only pause briefly as the 
pursuers were close at hand. Supplies were again growing very short, and the country 
was devastated from previous incursions and the German columns had to separate widely 
in order to seek food. 
912 CO 691/15, War Diary Norforce, Entries 31 August and I September 1918; Moyse-Bardctt, 7he King's African R07e$. p. 406. 
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Shortcol. was sent ahead to try and prevent the crossing of the Lurio, but collided 
with the rearguard on 5 September. Kartucol left its camp on the same day and made for 
the Germans' expected position. But a German detour into the bush quickly confused 
matters; Kartucol thought that the enemy was some way to its north (and front) when it 
came under contact. Quite unexpectedly, it had hit the main body while in column of 
march. This unexpected collision caused great confusion in both opposing columns as 
the rear battalion of Kartucol clashed with the middle of the German line, that of 4bt 
Midler. The engagement was fought in terrain with very limited visibility and it took 
several hours for reinforcements to arrive on both sides, owing to the dispersed nature of 
the respective columns. The confusion was exacerbated by the Germans running into the 
rear of the column and seeing only their transport. They believed that they had chanced 
upon a supply convoy and initiated a rapid attack. The KAR were placed under heavy 
pressure as it had to react quickly, while the rest of the column was some two and four 
miles ahead respectively. It took several hours for the second unit to come into action 
and stop the German attack at around 1400 hours. Finally, the lead battalion reached the 
battle at 1700 hours and launched a final counter-attack. This was successful, and the 
battle was broken off and the Germans moved off into the bush. Kartucol had suffered 
heavily in the encounter and was unable to continue the advance which was given over to 
886 Shortcol. Again, the Germans lost heavily in terms of officers and suffered against the 
good British defences. 887 
The inevitable reorganisation after battle included the collection, treatment and 
evacuation of the wounded. Kartucol had to deal with over 200 stretcher cases, including 
the enemy's, and deliver them to the Lurio where they were met by the MAC. This was 
completed on 8 September, while it was not until 13 September that the battered KAR 
battalion was able to rejoin the column. 
The battles at the end of August and early September were painful to both sides. 
The Germans had lost 39 soldiers killed, 133 wounded and 51 captured, as well as 437 
carriers lost. Telling was the impact on the command structure as 2 Ateflung leaders and 
"" Moyse-Bartlett, The King's Aftican Rifles, pp. 407-408; CO 691/15, War Diary Norforcc, Entry I Septembcr 1918. 
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3 company commanders had been either killed or seriously wounded. The force was 
reduced to 12 companies which had lost a great deal of baggage together with 40 packs of 
crucial medical supplies. "' The weather was also hurting the Germans' health as the 
intense heat of the days was followed by severe cold at nights, coupled with little food or 
water. An epidemic of lung influenza broke out in early September. 
889 For their part, the 
British had lost 8 soldiers killed and 71 wounded from one unit alone on 6 September. 
THE BREAK TO THE NORTHAWST 
By now, von Lettow was anxious to avoid another series of battles and did his 
best to break free; Mwembe was reached on 17 September after another exhausting 
march only for the Germans to find all its stores burnt or removed. 890 Shortcol could 
only support one battalion in the pursuit owing to supply difficulties. Durcol reached 
Inagu and Malema in early September, only to be disbanded once the enemy crossed the 
River Lurio. Kartucol lost one of its battalions which went into reserve near Tabora, 
while the remaining two crossed the Rovuma on 28 September. 
While the reasons for this loss of momentum were quite clear to General 
Hawthom, the commander-in-chief was very displeased. A sharp telegram accused 
Norforce of having lost its drive and determination. While Hawthorn's angry rebuttal 
had some justification, it verged on the insubordinate. There was truth in both views, as 
some of the column commanders had let opportunities slip, but equally it was clear that 
the overall strategy had not been a great success either. Firmly rebuked, Hawthorn was 
given the task of pursuing von Lettow northwards and of bringing him to battle at any 
cost. 
891 
The break northwards naturally gave concerns about the safety of both Mahenge 
and Songea, which were fertile areas and very familiar to von Lettow. The newly 
3" WO 106/1460, Schnee Diary, Entry 6 September, pp 21-22. 
us Boell, Die Operationen, p. 420. 
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developed road system came in extremely handy as units were re-deployed throughout 
September. Kartucol was broken up, having marched an incredible 1600 miles, crossed 
29 large rivers and fought 32 engagements. Its well-worn troops were sent into reserve to 
secure the southern portion of German East Africa in the area Massassi-Ndanda. Fitzcol 
was disbanded and the bulk of units transferred to a new formation, Cenforce, to be 
commanded by Colonel Fitzgerald. Cenforce was based on the Central Railway between 
Morogoro and Dodoma with columns extended south to Mahenge and Iringa. 892 Van 
Deventer's aim was to use his strategic mobility to reinforce threatened areas as required 
while keeping up the close pursuit by Shortcol. Hawthorn recalled his forward units to 
Fort Johnston, preparatory to a move by steamer up Lake Nyassa and thence to 
Sphinxhafen. He wanted to catch the Schutaruppe in the flank before they could reach 
the Rhodesia-Nyasaland border. Orders were given by GHQ to send Norforce to Songea 
and Ubena, with battalions sent to garrison Mahenge and Iringa while the remaining 
infantry battalions were concentrated around Massassi. 893 
However, the age and decrepitude of the vessels on Lake Nyassa meant that 
frequent breakdowns impeded the speed of deployment. Hawthorn's lead battalion left 
Fort Johnston on 18 September and concentrated at Sphinxhafen by the end of the month. 
It too was tired, having been marching and fighting continually since the previous March. 
The Rhodesian police units followed up as quickly as resources permitted. 894 
If the Germans had made good their escape from the clutches of General 
Edwards, they were not having an easy time of it. Health worries impinged in a major 
way as influenza and pneumonia hit the force. Weakened by the continual marching and 
poor rations, all members of the Schutztruppe and its followers were suffering from 
serious weight loss and weakened resistance to disease. At times 50 per cent had 
influenza and each company had 6 -8 pneumonia cases. Only 90 of the worst cases 
could be carried and the rest had to walk. Between I and 22 September, 12 askaris and 
20 carriers had to be abandoned due to exhaustion, while 24 askaris and 67 carriers had 
1192 Moyse-Bardett, The King'sAftican Rifles, p. 409. 393 WO 95/5295, War Diary GHQ, 19 September 1918. 
894 Moyse-Bartlett, Vie King's Aftican Rifles, p. 409. 
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deserted. 895 Matters came to a head on 20 September when Governor Schnee sent a letter 
to General von Lettow stating that the carrying along of the seriously ill was an 
unjustifiable sacrifice of lives and that they should be abandoned as advised by the 
doctors. 896 This went down poorly with the Kommandeur and he retorted that to do so 
would irretrievably weaken his combat power and many of the sick would recover in 
time. The situation was not helped by the continued reports of the unfavourable military 
situation in Europe from the remaining wireless receiver and captured newspapers. 897 
Having rebuffed the Governor, von Lettow then called in all of his Abteilung 
leaders and emphasized their mission of tying up as many Allied troops as possible and 
telling them not to be depressed by the apparently bad news from Europe. 898 It was a 
crisis of confidence that appears to have been staunched for the time being. However, the 
pressure was beginning to show in the columns as they had had only had one day's rest 
out of 35 marching. Desertions amongst the African troops were increasing - At Kraut 
lost 300 of its experienced carriers in two days while over 200 prisoners of war managed 
to escape. 899 
Having kept his force together with the strength of his personality, von Lettow's 
next move was to cross the Rovuma some 30 lans east of Mitomani on 29 September and 
re-enter German territory after an absence of some 10 months. 900 It had been a difficult 
time, particularly from British pressure in the latter months, and the German force had 
shrunk from 278 to 168 Europeans, from 1,600-1,700 Askaris to just over 1,000, and the 
experienced carriers from 4,000 to about 2,000.901 While the fighting power of the 
Schutztruppe remained formidable, the constant sufferings and losses were taking a toll 
of its morale. At Wahle was broken up on 2 October and the force became even more 
concentrated than ever. 902 
195 MS Boell, N 14/36,3. Kapitel p. 32 1. '96 WO 106/1460, Schnee Diary, 19 September 1918, pp. 31-32. 
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Patrols soon found that the British were holding Mitomani and captured 
documents indicated that two further companies were en-route from Sphinxhafen to 
Songea. This resulted in an action on 4 October as Abt Spangenberg blocked the 
progress of these companies along the Wiedhafen-Songea road, while the remainder of 
the force bypassed to the west and continued their march north. 
903 Although successful, 
this action cost another 30-40 casualties while both. 4skaris and carriers were deserting in 
greater numbers. 904 
The options facing the Germans at this stage were several, as the British could not 
move troops rapidly enough to go off in the direction of their choice. Furthermore, the 
rains were due in December and this would make the roads from the Central Railway to 
Iringa and Mahenge unusable. Therefore, if either place could be seized prior to then, it 
would be almost impossible to dislodge them until the following May. With the bulk of 
the British forces in the long process of redeploying from the heart of Portuguese East 
Africa, it would be some time before a suitably large formation could be assembled. 
As a precaution, van Deventer ordered the reinforcement of the Lindi-Tunduru 
area in the south with additions to the garrisons of both Mahenge and Iringa while roads 
leading south from the railway were improved. The main reserve was kept on the Central 
Railway and, as Tabora appeared the most likely objective, General Edwards was placed 
in command with his headquarters there. 905 
Having bypassed the first blocking force, von Lettow continued his rapid march 
north, his intentions still unknown to his opponents. Hawthorn was anxious to stop him 
at the northern end of Lake Nyassa and ordered two battalions to move by ship up to Alt 
Langenburg as quickly as possible. With shortages of carriers and food, it was only 
possible to keep one battalion in the pursuit. Furthermore, the poor condition of the Lake 
fleet meant that two of the three available ships broke down in the middle of one movc. 
90' Boell, Die Operationen, p. 42 1. 
9" WO 106/1460, Schnee Diary, 5-8 October 1918, pp. 44-50. About 30 Askaris and 40 carriers disappeared in this period; MS Well, 
N14/36,3. Kapitel, p. 327. The Germans lost eight killed, 53 wounded and II missing out of 283 riflcs. Losses were II per cent. 
90" Van Deventer, Lt-Gen Sir J L, Despatchfrom the Lieutenant-General Commanding-in-Chlef East. Vrican Force, 30 September 
1918, published in the London Gazette, "Supplement" 31310,26 April 1919, p. 263. 
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The battalion was finally complete at Alt Langenburg on 18 October and further 
reinforcements still en-route. 
On 15 October the KAR regained contact with Abt Kohl and maintained it over 
the course of the next few days. The Germans were also successul in foraging as some 
906 10 days' supplies were found and carried off during the engagement. On 17 October, 
von Lettow felt able to have a rest at Ubena, the first in 17 days. It was here that the 
redoubtable General Wahle was wounded. It was a remarkable effort by a 66 year old 
man, who had previously retired from the Saxon Army and who had suffered a double 
hernia and much malaria during the arduous campaign. 907 He was left behind with a 
number of sick and wounded troops and their followers. 
On 19 October, the columns moved onto Gambawano where a quantity of food 
was collected over the next two days, while the British were unable to pursue and 
remained static in Ubena. Here, the Kommandeur decided to turn west and enter 
Northern Rhodesia instead of carrying on to Tabora as expected by van Deventer. His 
troops had largely recovered from the epidemic in September, but badly needed rest, 
while the low stocks of ammunition constrained their ability to fight battles. 
Northern Rhodesia had not been touched heavily by the war since late 1915 and 
there were few defences to slow down an invader. Von Lettow considered going on to 
the West Coast and Angola in particular, as neither the Portuguese nor the Belgians could 
do anything meaningful to stop his movements. The British would have to redraw their 
extensive lines of communication and commence another campaign. All of this time 
would enable new harvests to be gathered and the Schuatruppe would be able to continue 
their actions, suitably refreshed. 908 On the other hand, the dire situation in Europe was 
apparent to the German element and the desertion of carriers continued unabated. As the 
Governor recorded in this diary: 
' WO 106/1460, Schnee Diary, 15 October 19 18, pp. 66-67. "7 Boell, Die Operationen, p. 422. 90'Boell, Die Operationen, p. 422. 
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"Everyone hopes for peace ... deliverance 
from out situation, which grows ever 
more unbearable and which consciously or unconsciously will leave its mark 
permanently on us ... The terrible privations and 
hardships, the constant danger to 
health from unhygienic and other causes, the perpetual sickness, frequent periods 
of insufficient nourishment, the uncertainty of the final result, and the very 
unpleasant conditions, all have told unfavourably on the health and spirits of the 
Europeans and our good blacks have worked in vain (one wonders? ). 909 
The movement had been very good indeed as they had averaged nearly 18 miles 
per day since 12 August with only two or three rest days. The long service Askaris and 
porters from the Wanyamwezi tribe were capable of great exertions under pressure. 
THE END OF THE CAMPAIGN 
Now aware of the changed enemy direction, van Deventer made a number of 
strategic deployments to contain it. He sent one battalion to Bismarkburg at the southern 
end of Lake Tanganyika, while two others were moved from Ndanda to Lindi from where 
they were sent by ship to Beira and then on by railway to Broken Hill in Southern 
Rhodesia. Hawthorn despatched another to Brandt in all haste, arriving on 25 September, 
but only in time to meet with the rearguard. 910 
Still expecting the Germans to turn north or west, van Deventer was surprised 
when they continued south into the relatively foodless areas of Northern Rhodesia. Fife 
was occupied only hours before the Germans arrived on I November; an attack the 
following day was held off by the defenders. Unable to secure the vital stores there, the 
Germans decided to make further south to Kasama which was the major supply depot 
from the south. It was a rich source and was also the key to the crossing of the Zambesi 
River and von Lettow's hopes for a continued campaign. The main body arrived in 
Kasama on 12 November, while K6hl's rearguard collected supplies back in Brandt. In 
"9 WO 106/1460, Schnee Diary, I November 198, pp. 81-82. 910 Moyse-Bartlett, The King's Aftican Rifles, p. 420; Broken Hill was 500 miles south of Fife and Elizabethville was 400 miles to the 
west 
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the meantime, von Spangenberg's advance guard was reconnoitering crossing sites on the 
Zambesi. 
Desperate to catch the Germans before they moved off again, Hawkins with the 
KAP, left his supplies far behind and attacked the main body with only his 750 men on 
12 November. A number of casualties were inflicted, but he could not move further until 
his baggage train caught up with him. This was to be the last engagement of the war as 
the armistice had been already signed in Europe although it was not until 13 November 
that von Lettow received formal notification from van Deventer. 
It was the end to an extremely arduous and hard-fought campaign in which both 
sides had marched incredible distances in virgin bush and on very short rations with 
almost no creature comforts. The force that surrendered consisted of 20 German officers, 
6 medical officers, the Governor and 32 officials, 3 subordinate officials and 122 German 
NCOs, 1168 Askaris, 1522 Carriers, 130 Prisoners of War Carriers, 428 Agricultural 
Carriers/Workers, 282 "Boys" for the Europeans, 427 Wives, and 392 "Boys" for the 
Africans. An overall total of 155 Germans and 4416 Africans remained together until 
the end. 911 
911 Boell, Die Operationen, p. 424. 
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CHAPTER 9- INTER-ALLIED COOPERATION 
Despite the joint desire to defeat Gen-nany, the British and Belgians found 
working together in Africa difficult and troublesome. By far the stronger power, Britain 
had required Belgian assistance in taking the western tracts of German East Africa owing 
to the distances involved and insufficient local forces. Anglo-Belgian military co- 
operation was uneasy during 1916 and the capture of Tabora in September did little to 
reduce tensions. One senior officer described the combined advance on Tabora: 
"... want of cordial co-operation between the two elements of the force. As a 
matter of fact the movement would be almost better described as the advance of 
two forces, to some extent in co-operation, and with a similar object. "912 
The campaign had been marred by personality clashes between commanders and 
differing national goals. Practical military co-operation ended on a sour note in the 
autumn of 1916, partly because the Belgians had achieved their immediate political goals 
and partly over a prolonged dispute about the division of the spoils. Above all, their 
Government wanted the complete return of occupied Belgium and by seizing sufficient 
German territory they had strengthened their hand in any peace settlement. They were 
well aware of German designs on the Congo colony and the possession of Rwanda- 
Urundi gave them additional security. Ultimately, they wished to add the captured 
territories to their Congo colony, an approach which clashed with the British desire to 
leave such settlements to the end of the War. 913 
Aware of British interests, they offered to hand the town over to British 
administration on 8 September, but the Colonial Office did not reply until nearly two 
months later. 914 In the meantime, they established their own administration and re- 
exerted political control over the African population. As time progressed, they made the 
912 Fendall, ne East AM= Force, p 78. 913 Louis, Ruanda Orundi, pp. 208 and 216-217. 914 FO 371/2856, Folio 7930,2 January 1917, "Belgian feeling over question of Tabora & other points". *Extract of a letter from Sit F. 
Villiers to Mr. Balfour". 
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retention of this area a condition of their further participation in the campaign. This was 
deemed unacceptable by the Colonial Office as it viewed the area as belonging to the 
British sphere of influence. A memorandum stated: 
"... They propose, as the price of their future military co-operation with General 
Smuts, a recognition of their rights over the occupied territories in sense described 
above and acceptance of the principle that Belgium should reap advantages, to be 
defined hereafter, from her further participation in the campaign in proportion to the 
measure of her future efforts. " 915 
Bonar Law was intransigent and his uncompromising attitude was reinforced by 
Smuts's hostility towards Belgian ambitions. Given the disparity of power, the Colonial 
Office eventually prevailed. 
"It appeared to Mr. Bonar Law quite impossible to discuss further Belgian co- 
operation on any such terms ... 
It is therefore presumed that the question of 
seeking further military co-operation with the Belgians is settled, and that the 
Belgian Government will be informed that His Majesty's Government arc unable 
to discuss the question of their co-operating further on the terms which they 
propose. " 916 
However, it was at a cost and the Belgians felt very strongly about the rebuff-. 
"In short it [giving up Tabora] would be a "humiliation" -I quote the word used to 
me several times over by the Prime Minister ... In order to make the point more clear 
I must explain that the King of the Belgians takes a direct interest in these African 
questions and supports the adoption of a strong line. It is reported that Ministers 
have positively declared that they will not give up Tabora. " 917 
915 FO 371/2856, Folio 7930,19 January 1917, Colonial office Memorandum, [n. d. ) enclosed with letter Long to Balfour. 
9'6 FO 371/2856, Folio 7930,19 January 1917, Colonial Office Memorandum, [n. d. ) enclosed with letter Long to Balfour. 
917 FO 371/2856, Folio 7930,2 January 1917, "Belgian feeling over question of Tabora & other points", "Extract Of 2 letter from Sir F. 
Villiers to Mr Balfour"; Albert ler, [Belgium], Les Carnets de Guerre, ed Thielcmans, Marie-Rose, Paris: Duculot, 1991. Entry I 
November 1916, pp. 290-291 and 14 February 1917, p. 289. 
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The intervention of the Foreign Office soothed Belgian feelings to an extent, but 
in the end they were forced to withdraw to the west. In the circumstances, the Belgians 
suspended further military operations, although the breach was not irrevocable and did 
not rule out future co-operation. Only days after the handover, the CIGS announced that 
Belgian troops would indeed be available for operations without condition and General 
Smuts accepted the offer. 918 This was in fact an error, as the Belgian position had not 
changed and the War Office withdrew the telegram on 21 November. 919 However, 
Robertson did point out that at no time had the Belgians ever categorically refused further 
assistance, and that they could probably be induced to help if necessary. In reply, Smuts 
made little effort to retain their services, stating that he did not believe that further 
Belgian assistance would be needed, even if the campaign were to go into 1917, although 
he would be happy to have a reserve column of 1,500 rifles available at Tabora. 920 
Given the desperate state of Smuts's own forces in this period, his was a very 
tepid response; with his own expansionist ambitions, he sought to discourage competition 
during the post-war settlement. Little action of substance followed and by late December 
GHQ was officially informed that all negotiations with the Belgians had been dropped . 
92 1 
The failure to use his allies in the pursuit of the Westtruppen was soon apparent with the 
breakthrough and near overwhelming of Norforce in October and November. Thus, the 
first phase of Anglo-Belgian cooperation came to an ungracious end in mid-November 
1916, with both sides seemingly more interested in arguing over territory rather than 
beating the common foe. 922 
However, by early 1917 the shortage of manpower led the British to re-opcn the 
question of Belgian assistance. The first approach came on 17 January 1917, when the 
British Government made the Belgians aware of the possibility of asking for more troops. 
9'a WO 95/5292, War Diary GHQ, 19 November 1916, Entry GHQ- 
919 WO 95/5292, War Diary GHQ, 21 November 1916, Entry GHQ. 
9" WO 95/5292, War Diary GHQ, 30 November 1916, Appendix 42, Telegram OA 198, Smuts to CIGS, 30 November, FO 371/2856. 
Folio 7930,2 January 1917, "Belgian feeling over question of Tabora & other points", "Extract of a letter from Sit F. Villiers to Mr 
Balfour". 
921 WO 95/5292, War Diary GHQ, 20 December 1916, Entry GHQ. 
922 WO 95/5292, War Diary GHQ, 10 November 1916, Appendix 13, Telegram 6150, Bonar Law to Smuts, 9 November. 
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A few weeks later, on 9 March 1917, the British formally notified their allies of the 
approach of At Wintgens towards Bismarckburg and concluded by a request for 300 
Belgian soldiers to take over its defence in order to allow British forces to concentrate to 
contain the menace. This was easier said than done as the demobilisation of the Belgian 
colonial forces had started in January 1917 and only four battalions remained in occupied 
German East Africa. The remainder of the force was either disbanding or in the process 
of travelling to their permanent garrison locations, many of which were far in the interior 
of the Congo. 923 
In the circumstances, the Belgian response was quite generous, as they not only 
prepared to take over Bismarckburg, but also deployed several other units near Lake 
924 Tanganyika and ordered another five battalions to concentrate around Kigoma. 
However, whatever the new found spirit of co-operation, it would take some time to 
rebuild and redeploy forces back into the main theatre of operations. 
Other factors were at play, not least of which was the attitude of General Hoskins 
who recognised that additional transport was essential to his plans. The recruitment of 
porters in Belgian territories offered a local solution and he requested this measure in his 
925 draft plans to the CIGS. General Northey had always seen the use of Belgian troops as 
essential and he pressed Hoskins to bring them back, a view that was forwarded to 
London. 926 These measures were agreed to within a few days, and again the discussions 
were resumed with the Belgian Government. 927 
In mid-March, the British ambassador formally asked for permission to use the 
Belgian-controlled section of the Central Railway as well as lake steamers for the 
movement of British forces in an emergency. Two weeks later, he placed a furthcr 
request before the Government, this time to recruit African soldiers for the British forces. 
According to the Belgians, highly sensitive to the situation in their occupied home 
9"CampagnesColoniales Beiges, III, pp. 13-14; W095/5292, War Diary GHQ, 10 March 19I7, TelegTam3075S, CIGS to Smuts, 10 March. 
924 WO 95/5292, War Diary GHQ, 16 March 1917, Appendix A25, Telegram 10077, Huyghd to Hoskins. 16 March. 92-' WO 95/5292, War Diary GHQ, I March 1917, Appendix At, Telegram G 337, Hoskins to CIGS, I March. 9M WO 95/5292, War Diary GHQ, 28 February 1917, Appendix J, Telegram NF 24 10. Norforce to Hoskins, 27 February. "7 WO 95/5292, War Diary GHQ, 7 March 1917, Appendix A4, Telegram 30514, CIGS to Hoskins, 6 MarclL 
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territory, such recruiting clashed with the Hague Convention, whereby occupants of an 
928 
occupied territory could not be forced to take up arms against their former country. 
They were very concerned about the possibility of retaliation against their own people in 
occupied-Belgium and little progress followed on this contentious subject. 
-The British attitude had modified substantially since late 1916. The first and most 
important reason was the growing realisation at the War Office that the campaign was far 
6orn over despite Smuts's utterances. The second was the sheer lack of resources, both 
in terms of soldiers and of transport, with which to prosecute the fighting. The third was 
the strain imposed on Britain's shipping resources, now exacerbated by the unrestricted 
U-Boat campaign. Local Belgian participation, considered a needless encumbrance in 
late 1916, now became an urgent priority. Finally, inter-departmental rivalries in London 
played their part. Bonar Law, the Colonial Secretary, had carried out the earlier 
negotiations in a manner that can only be described as tactless, verging on the rude. 
However, the Foreign Office differed both in manner and point of view; in early April, 
the War Office sought its help: 
"... The military situation in East Africa has, as Mr. Balfour is aware, becn 
engaging the anxious attention of the Council. Several factors have contributcd to 
the prolongation of the campaign, notably (1) the rainy season; (2) the necessity 
of exchanging units debilitated by long Service in the country; (3) the abnormally 
high sick-rates amongst both white and Indian native troops; (4) the difficulty of 
placing newly-recruited and locally-raised African troops in the field in a 
sufficient time; (5) the ineffectiveness, hitherto of the Portuguese co-operation. 
Moreover, as regards projected future operations, the Council havc 
experienced difficulty in making available the large quantity of mechanical 
transport, and the great number of carriers, needed for an offensive, whilst in view 
of the shortage of shipping the maintenance of the strength of the Indian and Wcst 
m Campagnes Coloniales Belges, III, pp. 14-1 S. 
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African troops represents a diversion of tonnage which it is most desirable to 
929 
release... " 
The War Office highlighted its need for ftu-ther Belgian military co-operation 
together with the urgency of the situation. Abt Wintgens was seriously disrupting its 
preparations for the offensive and had sapped Norforce of much of its manpower. 930 
Equally important, there were insufficient troops either to cover the gap in the Iringa- 
Mahenge area or to clear it of enemy forces. The degree of anxiety may be measured in 
the fact that the Foreign Office arranged a bilateral meeting in London for II April, being 
unwilling to wait even the two extra days proposed by the Belgian Government. 931 
The conference was successful as the two national governments agreed to resume 
combined operations. The main two priorities were established, with the first being the 
rounding up of Abt Wintgens, and the second being part of the encirclement and 
destruction of the German main body in the south-east of the colony. It was provisionally 
agreed that three Belgian columns, totalling some 2,000 rifles with supporting services 
and carriers, would be provided, although the exact details were left to the military 
commanders on the spot. Refinement of the numbers was then carried out by the two 
commanders-in-chief at the Belgian headquarters at Ujiji between 18 and 19 April. "' 
After much discussion, the force levels were modified to a total of 3,000 soldiers divided 
into two mobile columns of 1,200 rifles, each supported by an operational reservc 
battalion of 600 rifles, plus a further two battalions of 500 men each to provide individual 
replacements for casualties. 933 The final agreement laid down the contribution as having a 
maximum of 4,000 rifles and that the Belgian troops were not to be mixed with British 
forces. Importantly, and with an eye to the future, the Belgian Government reservcd its 
right to decide on any extension of the campaign, should it move into Portuguese East 
Africa. 
929 FO 371/2857, Folio 72473,7 April 1917, Letter Secretary, War Office to Under-Secretary of State, Foreign Office. 
WO 95/5293, War Diary GHQ, 3 April 1917, Appendix A25, Telegram 32025, CIGS to Hoskins, 2 April. 
FO 371/2857, Folio 72473,8 April 1917, Telegram 3 1, Foreign Office to Sir F. Villiers, Havre. 
WO 9515293, War Diary GHQ, 14 April 1917, Appendix A104, Telegram 32670, CIGS to Hoskins, 14 April. 933 Campagnes Coloniales Belges, III, pp. 29-30, Map 3. 
325 
For their part, the British promised to provide supplies and equipment for their 
allies'. columns. Overall direction of the campaign would be exercised by the British 
commander-in-chief who would be the senior officer. He would set out both the 
objectives and the respective zones of operations for each contingent, but within those 
constraints, the Belgian commander-in-chief was free to execute his missions as he saw 
fit. 934. 
The military plan of operations was divided into two distinct phases that reflected 
both the exigencies of the moment and the difficulties of remobilisation. The first phase 
was the most pressing and involved despatching all the available troops in occupied 
German East Africa, some 1,200 rifles, against 4bt Wintgens in co-operation with 
Colonel Murray's column in the south. The aim of this force was to encircle and destroy 
the raiders as quickly as possible. The second and subsequent phase, envisaged a 
reinforced Belgian contingent of some 2,000 to 3,000 rifles working with General 
Northey's troops in the west and south. Together, they would help to drive the Germans 
into the general operational encirclement planned for June and jUly. 935 These 
arrangements were presented back to the national governments for approval, with the 
Belgians signalling their assent on 26 April. Despite the irritations of previous disputes, 
the Belgians were back in the campaign. 
The change of command between Generals Hoskins and van Deventer at the end 
of May 1917 had little immediate effect on Anglo-Belgian co-operation. The gcncral 
strategy devised by Hoskins was little changed and the Belgians continued to build up 
their forces in preparation for the planned drive on Mahenge. 936 However, before the 
main operational objectives could be reached, there were several preliminary operations 
that had to be completed beforehand. In the prospective Belgian sector to the west, van 
Deventer wanted them to clear the Kilombero valley while also advancing from Iringa 
towards Ifakara. This move was aimed at inducing the Germans to weaken the line along 
934 WO 95/5293, War Diary GHQ, 21 April 1917, Appendix A132, Telegram P 16, Hoskins to CIGS, 19 April, Campagnes Coloniaks 
Beiges, III, pp. 33-35. 
'"5 Campagnes Coloniales Beiges, 111, pp. 294-295. instruction au commandant de la Brigade NM4 ler Bureau No 5811 dated 25 
avril 17. 
m CamPagnes Coloniales Belges, III, pp. 125-127; WO 95/5293, War Diary GHQ, 27 April 1917, Appendix B2 1. TeicgmmalO, Hoskins to CIGS, 27 April; 10 June 1917, Appendix A74, Telegram G 843, van Deventer to CIGS, 10 June. 
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the Ruaha River, notably at Kidatu, while covering the move forward of the Belgian main 
body from Kilossa. Eager to get underway, van Deventer pressed Huyghd to provide a 
column of 1,200 rifles to clear Kilombero valley by mid-June, but it could not be readied 
until the end of July. However, a reduced bid for 500 men to fill a gap around Mpanga, 
south-east of Iringa was agreed, despite breaking the principles of a concentrated Belgian 
deployment. 937 
Abt Naumann occupied the Belgian forces for much of the period May-August 
1917 as they chased the ever diminishing raiders through much of the northern part of the 
German East Africa colony. Despite several checks, they continued the follow up until 
September, when the British resumed full control of the operations. Henceforth, the main 
effort focused on the encirclement and destruction of the main body of the Schulztruppe 
in the south-westem comer of the colony. 
For the remainder of the campaign, the biggest irritations between the two nations 
were the Belgian inability to supply its own forces and its demand for a separate and 
distinct sphere of operations. The British provided a great deal of MT and other transport 
assistance, but as the area of operations constricted, the mixing of British and Belgian 
units became increasingly hard to avoid. "' By late 1917 as the RO was operating out of 
Kilwa, Huyghd came under heavy pressure for allowing "mixed" columns and van 
Deventer sought assistance in resolving the matter. The Foreign Office put pressure on 
the Belgian Government to relax its rule on the grounds that it would delay the 
completion of the campaign. 939 Finally, it was agreed to allow some intermingling of 
units and the remaining Belgian units were able to play their part in the clearance of 
German East Africa. 
937 Compagnes Coloniales Beiges, 111, pp. 126-128; WO 95/5293, War Diary GHQ, 20 June 1917, Appendix At 16, Telegram 0 976. BGGS to Northey and Tytler, 20 June. "s WO 95/5293, War Diary GHQ, 5 August 1917, Entry Iringa Column, 13 August 1917, Appendix At 0, Telegram 22011 -1,1 luyghd to van Deventer, 6 August; 27 August 1917, Appendix A17, Letter van Deventer to Huyghd; 9 September 1917, Appendix A 11. Pricis Huyghd to Sheppard. 
939 WO 95/5293, War Diary GHQ, 6 November 1917, Appendix B, Telegram 26 WO, van Deventer to CIGS, 6 November.; WO 33/953, Telegrams D 2. No. 2271,7 November 1917, Telegram X 900, van Deventer to CIGS, p. 225; No. 2272,8 November 1917. Telegram 44997, CIGS to van Deventer, p. 225; No. 2291,17 November 1917, Telegram 45875, CIGS to van Deventer. p. 232. 
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,, The end of Anglo-Belgian military co-operation came in December 1917 with the 
capture of the Wesuruppen. The Belgian Government had reserved its right to consider 
continuing the fight in Portuguese territory while the British now saw the campaign as 
largely, over. Faced with the difficulties of working with the Portuguese, it saw the 
negotiations for a continued Belgian presence as being too time consuming, in terms of both 
necessary reorganisation and political decision making. 940 In the end, the two nations cnded 
on a much more amicable note than the year previously. 
ANGLO-PORTUGUESE COOPERATION 
Despite its age and duration, the Anglo-Portuguese alliance was never evenly 
balanced and relations during the war were seldom easy. The British believed the 
Portuguese to be incapable of serious military effort and put a great deal of Pressure on 
them to remain neutral from the outbreak of the war. 94 1 However, as shipping grew 
scarcer, the British attitude changed and by early 1916 they were encouraging the 
Portuguese to seize German vessels in their territorial waters. 942 They realised that such a 
course would probably lead to war between the two countries, having previously tried to 
discourage Portuguese colonial aspirations: 
". - -We do not want Portugal to establish too great a claim on our gratitude or to be 
under obligation to protect their Colonies or divide up German territory VAth 
them ... In view of the above we have discouraged the Portuguese from assisting us 
either in South West Africa or East Africa in spite of repeated offers on their 
99943 pad... 
The British had long suspected that German mail and contraband had bccn 
passing clandestinely through Portuguese East Africa and that many local merchants 
940 WO 33/953, Telegrams D 2, No. 2317,27 November 1917, Telegram 299, van Deventer to CIGS, p. 240; No. 2325,29 November 
1917, Telegram 46804, CIGS to van Deventer, p. 243; WO 95/5294, War Diary GHQ, 3 December 1917, Appendix A4. Telegram 47022, CIGS to van Deventer, 2 December. "' Vincent-Smith, John D, "Britain, Portugal and the First World War, 1914-16", European Studies Review, IV, No 3. (1974), pp. 210-211. 
942 Stone, Glyn A, "The Official British Attitude to the Anglo-Portuguese Alliance, 1910-1945". The Journal of Contemporary History, X. No 4, (October 1975), p. 732. 
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were engaged in cross-border trade. The opening of hostilities would probably be the 
onlyway in which such exchanges could be stopped, although it would take a major 
military and naval effort to achieve succesS. 944 On the other hand, as long as Portugal 
remained neutral, it would have been politically difficult for the Schutztruppe to move 
south of the Rovuma especially without authority from the Imperial Government. 
. -ý-Tbe seriousness of the situation was underlined 
by the dismal failure of the 
Portuguese expeditionary forces sent out in 1915 and 1916. Both attempts to seize 
German territory had resulted in humiliating reverses and large losses in troops in 
equipment. National pride was further affronted by the need to ask for British assistance, 
particularly as General Smuts, a man well known for his appetite for the Portuguese 
colony, commanded the forces: 
"General Smuts, though not extremely popular in Government circles in 
Portuguese East Africa owing, I am given to understand, to some severe criticisms 
he has had occasion to express in regard to Portuguese East Africa... " 945 
'' .C On the other hand, the weak and highly decentralised rule in Portuguese East 
Africa gave rise to a very different situation in Anglo-Portuguese relations. Portuguese 
administration was much less developed than that of other nations and the fiat of the state 
often did not extend far beyond the various governorships. 946 Furthermore, the north of 
the colony was under chartered company rule and was virtually unexplored and was quite 
undeveloped. As well, the severity and rapacity of colonial rule had led to widespread 
opposition by the African population that would shortly lead to open, armed rebellion. 
By the middle of 1916, relations between the British and Portuguese forces were 
far from cordial. Attempts to improve the situation were unsuccessful, as an attempt to 
attach a British political officer to the portuguese headquarters was abruptly rebuffed in 
"3 WO 106/308, "Memorandum on the Situation which may arise as the result of Portugal complying with the request made by the British 
government that German shipping in the Tagus should be commandeered. ", [n. d. ] [likely early 19161, p. 2. 9" WO 106/308. "Memorandum on the Situation which may arise as the result of Portugal complying with the request made by the British 
vernment that German shipping in the Tagus should be commandeereV. [nA] [likely early 19161, pp. 3-4. 
FO 371/2857, Folio 55352,26 January 1917, Letter Consul General (Errol Macdonell), Lourenco Marques to Foreign Secretary. "6 Newitt, Malyn, A History ofMozambique, London: Hurst & Company, 1995, pp. 367-368, 
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early November. 947 This attempt to supervise Portuguese administration naturally caused 
offence and prevented any meaningful exchange of information. For their part, it added 
to the British sense of distrust of their ally's intentions. The feeling was mutual for the 
prewar Anglo-German negotiations to carve up the Portuguese colonies had inflamed 
passions, although the Portuguese had used the formers' rivalry to some advantage since 
the Anglo-Boer War at the turn of the century. 948 Many local officials were opposed to 
supporting Britain while also wishing to maintain their exploitation of the local 
population. Furthermore, neutrality permitted an extensive and lucrative, if clandestine, 
trade with Gennan East Africa that would be ended by war. 
Attempts were made to work together. With the recall of General Gil in 1916, 
and despite the planned sending of another expeditionary force in early 1917, the 
Governor General, Dr Alvaro de Castro, assumed the role of commander-in-chief. 
Although a civilian, he had served in the Army, reaching the rank of captain. fie was 
conscious of the weakness of his position and asked for a meeting with General Smuts in 
late 1916. However, this was not possible for a number of reasons and it was not until 25 
January, two days after he had relinquished command in East Africa, that Smuts met with 
de, Castro in Portuguese territory. By rights the new commander-in-chief should have 
conducted the meeting, but it seems highly likely that Hoskins was too busy with his new 
command and conducting the offensive to make the j ourney. 
It is notcworthy that Gcneral van Deventer, also on his way home, attended the 
meeting as did the British Consul General from Lourenco Marques. During the 
conference, Smuts pressed for the Portuguese to clear a line 50 miles south of the 
Rovuma of all food and to prevent the inhabitants from sowing any crops in January or 
February. This reflected his continued belief in a German surrender: 
"... the General's argument being that if the enemy are aware that there are not 
food supplies to be obtained within easy reach of the Portuguese frontier, they 
947 WO 95/5292, War Diary GHQ, 7 November 1916, Appendix 8, Telegram OA 968, Genstaff to CIGS, London, 7 November. 
"s Newitt, Malyn, Portugal in, 4frica, London: Hurst & Company, 1981, pp. 33-35; Willequct, Jacques, "Anglo-German Rivalry in 
Belgian and Portuguese Africa? ", Giffard and Louis, Britain and Germany, p. 265. 
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will, perforce, surrender to the British troops without having invaded Portuguese 
049 territory... 
Smuts went on to advocate that the Rovurna be held only lightly by a line of 
observation posts and that any garrisons must be strong enough to withstand heavy 
German attacks. Furthermore, he emphasised both the quality of the enemy troops as 
well as the need for the thorough training of any newly raised units. For his part, de 
Castro announced that he was in the process of raising the troops and carriers necessary 
to make a simultaneous advance with the British at the beginning of the dry season. 
Overall, the meeting was adjudged a success with Smuts performing very well 
and showing considerable diplomacy. The Portuguese were impressed with him and the 
Governor General pronounced himself convinced of the need to work closely with the 
British in the future. Little concrete action appears to have been agreed, although one 
tangible outcome was the agreement to swap liaison officers in the near future and 
regular communications between the two commanders-in-chief. 950 The meeting also set 
the scene for much closer co-operation under General Hoskins. 
If the renewed Belgian assistance was welcomed, General Northey faced further 
problems in the south on the Nyasaland-Portuguese East African border. Apart from being 
weakened by the pursuit of Wintgens, he also needed trained troops to deal with the 
developing German threat posed there by AN von Stuemer. Although the Portuguese were 
held in generally low regard, General Hoskins did try to involve them in support of both his 
and Northey's operations although the lack of a professional military officer at the head of 
the forces hindered their military planning. Whatever his qualities, the Governor General 
was not the man to direct operations. 95 1 For their part, the Portuguese remained 
suspicious of British intentions and were very reluctant to allow their forces into their 
colony. 
949F0371/2857, Folio 55352,26 January 1917, Letter 227/17/52, No. 13, Macdonell to Foreign Secretary. pp. 2-3. Ilislater 
incorporates the minutes of the meeting held on 25 January as well as some comments by the Consul General. 
950 FO 371/2857, Folio 55352,26 January 1917, Letter 227/17/52, No. 13, Macdonell to Foreign Secretary, pp. 4-5. 
"' WO 158/477,17 April [May] 1917, Letter No 5. Macdonell to Foreign Secretary and Hoskins, covering Despatch dated 16 May 
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As the campaign moved increasingly to the south of the German colony in 1917, 
the possibility of having to continue operations in Portuguese territory became more and 
more likely. As the British held no faith in the ability of the Portuguese to defend 
themselves, diplomatic overtures to the Portuguese Government aimed to determine a 
joint strategy in the event of invasion. Matters were improved by the appointment of the 
civilian consul general, Major Macdonell, as military liaison officer to the Portuguese 
Headquarters in mid-March 1917.952 However, such an apparently straightforward and 
logical post was not viewed as such by the incumbent: 
"The Portuguese are extraordinarily proud and are convinced that in military and all 
other matters they are as experienced as any other nation. - They are adverse to any 
sort of extraneous interference, and on the slightest provocation they consider that 
the "brio nacionar' (national honour and prestige) has been offended. A very large 
number of Portuguese Officers and men are fully alive to the fact that they have up 
to the present made a hopeless fiasco of the German East campaign, and though this 
has been stated to me in private, if any foreigner were to make a similar statement 
he would incur the obloquy of the Military, Press and public ... I shall be looked 
upon with suspicion by the military authorities and it will be with the utmost 
difficulty and only with the exercise of considerable ingenuity that I shall be able to 
obtain exact infori-nation or be cognizant of the conditions, movements, an-nament, 
supplies &c. of the Portuguese Expeditionary Force. It must always be born in 
mind that the Portuguese hate and suspect all foreigners, and I regret to say that in 
my opinion they hate the British most of all because they fear them, and also there 
are many who still remember the British Ultimatum of 1891 ... 9053 
The appointment was shortly reciprocated in early April with a Portuguese 
professional officer, Major Azumbuju Martins, being sent to join British GHQ as a 
liaison officer. 954 He had some experience of the conditions in East Africa and German 
932 WO 158/477,19 March 1917, Telegram 617, Macdonell to Hoskins, 18 March 1917. 
933 WO 158/477,20 March 1917, Letter 634/17/127, Macdonell to Hoskins, 20 March 1917. 
'54 WO 158/477,7 April 1917, Telegram 778, Macdonell to Hoskins, 6 April 1917. 
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capabilities, having until recently been the Chief of Staff to the ill-fated expedition under 
General Gil. Such appointments were the vital precursors to effective cooperation; the 
first task for Major Macdonell was to ascertain Portuguese deployments and to find out 
whether they even intended to try and defend the Rovuma River boundary. 
955 
Finally, a meeting between General Hoskins and Dr de Castro was held at Dar-es- 
Salaam on 9 April 1917. To the former's dismay, de Castro proposed to send a force of 
over 700 rifles from the coast to Chinde, thence up the Zambezi River into southern 
Nyasaland and into Lake Nyasa where it would land at Mtengula which was believed to 
be von Stuemer's objective. He suggested that it would take place between 15 and 20 
May, but this was hopelessly optimistic given Portuguese transport facilities. Although 
received diplomatically, it was a most unwelcome suggestion as the force was likely to 
get, in Northey's way and would cause major supply problems. From the British 
perspective, it would be far more useful for the Portuguese to establish a strong blocking 
force along the Rovuma as well as protecting the vulnerable line of communication 
running up the Zambesi River. Hoskins put his suggestions as tactfully as possible, and, 
956 
unable to change de Castro's mind, he left the matter unresolved . 
The conference was successful in resolving several other issues; the first was that 
the British should deal with the German threat to Mwembe and second that their 
Intelligence Scouts should be allowed to operate freely across the border, receiving full 
support from the Portuguese authorities. These discussions resolved several thorny issues 
and gave the Governor General a highly positive view of the South African's 
intentions. 957 Further British pressure was exerted through their growing intelligence 
service in Portuguese territory. On 3 July, agreement was reached between Major 
Macdonell and the Portuguese Chief of Staff that all intelligence and interrogation of 
prisoners would be conducted by British troops who would also make their dispositions 
as they saw fit. 958 
955 WO 15 8/477,4 April 1917, Letter Sheppard to Macdonell, 4 April 1917. 
936 CAB 44/9, pp. 39-40. 
"7 WO 158/477,17 April [May] 1917, Letter No 5, Macdonell to Foreign Secretary and Hoskins, covering Despatch dated 16 May 
1917. 
9"" WO 1581477.9 August 1917, "Precis of Interview with the Chief of Staff Portuguese Expeditionary Force", Macdonell to van 
Deventer, 3 July 1917. 
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,,::, However, in view of the imminent arrival of the new Portuguese commander-in- 
chief, Colonel Sousa Rosa, discussions were delayed until the matter could be discussed 
in detail. His coming did little to inspire confidence, as the liaison officer reported to 
GHQ: 
"This appointment has caused the greatest disatisfaction [sic] among officers of 
all arms. It appears that the Colonel is one of the most unpopular Officers in the 
Army and has the utmost difficulty in getting Officers to serve under him. He is a 
very pronounced Republican and introduces politics into his military duties... "959 
The likelihood of a German re-entry into Portuguese East Africa rendered detailed 
cooperation even more vital than previously and Macdonell was instructed to: 
"Try to find out quietly whether the direct assistance of British or Belgian troops 
in the field in P. E. A. would be welcomed or not. It looks as if the Germans were 
going to try to break into P. E. A. at or near MOCIMBOA ROVUMA and it may 
be essential to close this door flnnly.,, 960 
However, the prospect of any British intervention was quickly quashed, and, at 
Portuguese insistence, General Northey's troops were withdrawn from Mwembe. 961 At a 
local level and in order to improve relations, British GHQ came up with the idea of 
sending a French officer, Colonel Viala, on a mission to the Portuguese commander-in- 
chief. He had been attached to the East African Force for some time as an official 
observer and was well disposed towards the British. The aim of his mission was to find 
out the detailed plans and intentions of the Portuguese as well the extent of their transport 
problems. Importantly, he was also to ascertain whether the direct support of British or 
Belgian troops would be acceptable to Colonel Sousa Rosa. On the surface, it was a 
"9 WO 158/477,8 August 1917, Letter No. 10, Macdonell to van Deventer, 14 July 1917, p. 9. 
"0 WO 158/478,10 September 1917, Telegram G190, BGGS to Macdonell. 10 September 1917. 
"' WO 1581478,5 October 1917, Telegram G 450, van Deventer to Macdonell, 5 October; WO 95/5294, War Diary GHQ, 30 
September 1917, Appendix A27. Telegram 83, Macdonell to van Deventer, 29 September. 
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highly unusual method of liaison, but the state of Anglo-Portuguese relations was poor 
and in the words of Brigadier General Sheppard: 
"... The Portuguese are probably less suspicious of the French than ourselves, and 
I think VIALA's visit will have excellent results, for he is a first class fellow, and very 
,, 962 keen on helping on the campaign in any way possible. 
Some three weeks later, the initiative had proved to be a success and Colonel 
Sousa - Rosa's attitude had shifted favourably. Colonel Viala, together with the 
professionalism and drive of the British Intelligence Scouts operating south of the 
Rovuma, had made a strong impression on the Portuguese about the competence of their 
allies. 963 Even more radically, Colonel Rosa now proposed to lead a three-pronged 
advance into German East Africa towards Newala, the scene of a previous Portuguese 
defeat. General Northey was particularly against any such move, having worked with 
their forces for nearly two years, while the reports of the British liaison officer also 
alarmed the high command. 964 In a private signal, General van Deventer was highly 
pessimistic about the chances of Portuguese success: 
"... I think that the Portuguese proposals if carried out will be fatal. The 
Portuguese troops well entrenched on the line of the ROVUMA may possibly be 
able to prevent a thrust on the left (2) between them on the part of the enemy but 
in the open field they have no chance whatever against the Germans. Everyone 
who knows them agrees with this view ... I shall be most grateful therefore for any 
assistance you can give in this matter. The Portuguese are most touchy and 1 
,, 965 cannot force my opinions for fear of giving offence. 
Matters had not been helped by the tactlessness of Major Martins, the Portuguese 
liaison officer at GHQ, who was thought to be ill disposed towards Colonel Sousa Rosa: 
%2 wo 158/469,24 September 1917, Telegram G 345, Sheppard to Macdonell 
963 WO 158/469,18 October 1917, LetterNo 19, Macdonell to van Deventer. 
%4 WO 158/478,6 October 1917, Telegram NF 4662, Norforce to Genstaff, 5 October', 8 October 1917, Telegram 390 S. van 
Deventer to Genstaft for onward transmission to the Portuguese, 7 October. 965 WO 158/478,8 October 1917, Telegram 391 S, van Deventer to CIGS, 7 October. 
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"... I was also infonned that the question of British and Belgian cooperation had 
been telegraphed to the Commander in Chief by Major Azambuja Martins and in 
such a peremptory form that Colonel Souza Rosa was offended and unwilling to 
,, 966 consider the matter... 
Fortunately, the efforts of Colonel Viala were also successful in presenting the 
offer of assistance in much more diplomatic terms, thereby neutralising the hostility of 
his own liaison officer. 
If matters at the highest levels were gradually being smoothed out, the situation 
on the ground gave the British ample worries. Reports about the weakness of defensive 
preparations, low morale, and lack of leadership reached General van Deventer on a 
regular basis, but there was little he could do except to exhort Colonel Rosa to do 
more. 9" There were very great limits on such leverage, and it would take considerably 
more to overcome long-term and structural defects in the Portuguese colonial military 
structures. 
Interestingly, the possibility of introducing the Belgians into Portuguese East Africa 
was quietly explored by the British in September 1917. Acting on a suggestion of Colonel 
Huyghd, a low key reconnaissance of the harbour and facilities of Mocimboa da Praia was 
carried out by the naval authorities and without the knowledge of either of the other 
prospective parties. 968 However, for reasons that remain unclear, this project never went 
beyond the planning stage. 
The balance of power shifted decisively in early 1918, after the disaster at 
Ngomano. Then the Portuguese authorities, now in a state of great concern, consented to 
the main British force operating in their territory-119 The need to build up a new base at 
"6 WO 15 8/469, Paper 16, Letter No 20, Macdonell to van Deventer, 18 October 1917. 967 WO 158/478,29 August 1917, Appendix to Letter No 11, Macdonell to van Deventer, 14 August. 
9"W095/5924, War Diary GHQ, 10 September 1917, Appendix A21, BGGS to GSOI, "Establishing a Belgian Force at Mocimboa da Praia7. 
969 WO 158/478,1 December 1917, Telegram 46895, CIGS to van Deventer, 30 November. 
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Port Amelia in late December made for'the first major clash between methods; within a 
few days, the British found it difficult to recruit labour as the local Nyassa Company 
officials were obstructive and unwilling to help. This led to the British Ambassador in 
Lisbon being fonnally instructed to seek: 
"... Entire control of everything connected with movements of troops and stores at 
Port Amelia, including hiring and management of dhows. Control, by arrangement 
with local Portuguese Authorities of the Base and lines of communication 
inland ... It is important that Portuguese 
Government should agree that actual 
engagement and payment of carriers &c. should be done by British Authorities, 
070 
experience having shown danger and inefficiency of Portuguese methods... 
These wide-ranging demands were accompanied by private information for the 
ambassador that General van Deventer suspected the local Portuguese military authorities 
of colluding with the Germans. 
This was followed the very next day by a demand for further control: now 
the War Office was asking for the Portuguese to place their military forces under General 
van Deventer's command. Again the language was notable for its directness and lack of 
diplomacy: 
"... The course of events since the crossing of the frontier by Major-General Von 
Lettow with a small and exhausted force about November 27h last has shown that 
the Portuguese command is incapable of conducting military operations, or is 
unwilling to offer effective opposition to the Germans. Detachments have been 
left in advanced and isolated posts, despite the representations of the British 
Headquarters, and have surrendered after a feeble resistance with their arms 
ammunition and stores of supplies, on which the German troops have mainly 
9MI subsisted... 
F0371/3128, Folio 655,2 January 1918. Telegram No. 3, Foreign Office to Sir LCamegie, Lisbon. 
FO 371,3128, Folio 2132,3 January 1918, Letter 0165/9270 (MO. 2), DMO to Under-Sccretary of State, Foreign Office, 3 January. 
This move had been requested in F0371/3128, Folio 2132,2 January 1918, Telegram Lb., van Deventer to CIGS, I January. 
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The pressure and a concurrent change of government in Lisbon soon achieved the 
desired results: the Portuguese acceded to a joint command provided that it was under the 
highest ranking officer and that a "mixed" headquarters was formed. 
972 However, 
tensions were never far from the surface, whatever the assurances of the home 
governments. Matters reached a head in late June 1918 when van Deventer felt obliged 
formally to reassure the local administration that British forces would withdraw from the 
colony once operations had been successfully concluded. After obtaining Cabinet 
approval for the statement, he then informed the Portuguese of Britain's adherence to past 
treaties and agreements. 973 However, even explicit assurances were not enough and 
differences continued to rankle on both sides. Only a few days later, General van 
Deventer, fed up with the continuing Portuguese practice of leaving small detachments 
scattered throughout the country without adequate support or proper defences, sent a 
withering critique to the War Office. Instead of adding to his military power, such 
outposts acted merely as a supply of food, weapons and ammunition for von Lettow, and 
neutralised many of the successes gained in battle. 
Equally exasperated from constantly pressing Colonel Rosa to draw up a 
more concentrated and workable plan of defence, and achieving little, van Deventer now 
sought drastic measures: he proposed to relegate all of the Portuguese military forces to 
rear areas or coastal protection, while all elements of the civil administration were to be 
withdrawn from the area of operations owing to their obstructiveness. For the sake of 
good relations, he praised Colonel Rosa's efforts as well as the civilian Governor of 
Nyassaland although the Governor of Mozambique was directly accused of being 
obstructive and unhelpful to the military effort. 
"... I think time has come when the Portuguese authorities must be told the 
truth, namely that their troops in Portuguese East Africa are totally unreliable and 
a source of grave danger to their allies. The personnel both European and African 
is of the poorest possible quality, and the natives of Portuguese East Africa detest 
FO 371/3128, Folio 5578,10 January 1918, Telegram No. 16 (D), Sir L. Carnegie, Lisbon to Foreign Office, 9 January. 
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Portuguese to such an extent that when we act in conjunction with Portuguese 
troops we can get no help from them. When acting alone removed from 
,, 974 Portuguese sphere of influence natives help us freely... 
The British Ambassador was instructed to deliver this highly undiplomatic 
message; it was a measure of the desire to conclude the campaign in East Africa that the 
government assented to such drastic terms. For good measure, the Portuguese Government 
was to be informed that their colonial authorities were incapable of ruling effectively and 
were opposed by their Affican subjeCtS. 975 
By July, operations had moved inland and away from the main concentrations of 
the Portuguese forces. As van Deventer sent his troops in hot pursuit of the Germans back 
towards German East Africa, the need for detailed assistance faded, no doubt to his relief. 
Interestingly, at the end of the war he felt it necessary to draft a supplementary and secret 
despatch that described his true thoughts about the Portuguese in the strongest possible 
language. For example: 
".. Through the operations of the early months of 1918,1 managed to keep the 
Portuguese troops out of direct contact with the enemy without, I think, hurting 
their feelings ... 
In May, Colonel Rosa pressed me to give his troops a more active 
role; owing, I have reason to believe, to urgent representations from LISBON ... Ile 
076 
results were disastrous... 
After cataloguing the inadequacies of his ally's force, van Deventer summed up the 
relationship as follows: 
"In fact, the Germans simply looked on the Portuguese forces or posts as 
convenient Ordnance and Supply dumps. The effect of these easy conquests on the 
' FO 371/3128, Folio 112227,27 June 1918, Letter 112227/W/I Foreign Office to Secretary, Army Council, 27 June. 
974 FO 371/3128, Folio 115649.26 June 1918, Telegram G 962, van Deventer to War Office, London, 25 June. 
"5 FO 371/3128, Folio 115649,29 June 1918, Letter 0148/694 (MO. 2), DD Cubitt to Under-Secretary of State, Foreign Office, 29 
June. 
976 WO 158/475,1 October 1918, Letter van Deventer to Secretary of State for War, p. 3. 
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morale of the enemy's troops was very great; and it can perhaps be conceived what 
an incredible handicap the Portuguese forces have been to me, ever since the enemy 
,, 977 crossed the ROVUMA in November 1917. 
It was fortunate for diplomacy and good relations that this document remained secret. 
977 WO 158/475,1 October 1918, Letter van Deventer to Secretary of State for War, p. 5. 
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CHAPTER 10 - CONCLUSIONS 
Four major points emerge from the Iiistory of the East Affican campaign. The first 
was the sheer difficulty of conditions, most notably climatic and terrain. In many ways, 
fighting was the least of all problems as any force was under more threat from tropical 
disease, starvation or dying of thirst than being killed in battle. When assessing the outcome 
of the campaign due consideration must be given for numerous and severe obstacles faced 
by all combatants. It was a story of the utmost determination and effort to fight in one of the 
most difficult areas on earth. 
The second factor was the absolute requirement for a well organised system of 
transport and supply. This as much as anything else determined many of the tactical and 
operational decisions on both sides. Without an understanding of this critical limitation, 
the course of the campaign is very difficult to understand. All suffered severely from 
insufficient rations and equipment and the difficulty of the physical conditions 
exacerbated any shortages. 
The third point was the immense damage caused by tropical diseases. Virtually 
no humans escaped the ravages of malaria, dysentery, typhoid or pneumonia while 
animals were wiped out by trypanosiamis and horse sickness. Despite the advances in 
medicine, the combination of extremely difficult conditions, poor transportation and lack 
of discipline meant that the forces suffered extremely heavily throughout. The high 
levels of sickness were to be the outstanding factor in the campaign. 
The fourth is the quality of the generalship which has been the subject of many 
inaccurate generalisations and assessments. On the British side, General Smuts has been 
presented as the great general who achieved a huge and relatively inexpensive success, 
capturing much of German East Affica. There is no doubt, that from his arrival, Smuts 
supplied a style of dynamic leadership that was badly needed in East Africa. He instilled a 
sense of drive and purpose that inspired both the staff and regimental soldier of his polyglot 
army. He certainly achieved what he set out to do; the acquisition of large tracts of territory 
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with the minimum cost in battle casualties. While his forces had taken the capital, all the 
major ports, both railways and some of the best farmland, they never defeated the 
Schuatruppe in battle. Smuts left the theatre with his opponents' army possessing both a 
high degree of combat effectiveness and good morale. More seriously, his claims that the 
campaign was nearly over were subsequently rebutted by his successors' need to conduct a 
difficult and arduous campaign for the following year and a half. Furthermore, if he had 
failed to destroy the enemy's forces, his techniques had largely incapacitated his own army; 
over 12,000 had to be repatriated through ill-health with the unfortunate P Division lasting 
only four months in the field. 
There were two serious criticisms that can be levelled against Smuts' generalship; 
the first was his reluctance to focus on the enemy's forces and the second was the dire 
state in which he left his army. Regarding the first, he admitted that he was interested in 
manoeuvre not fighting. His political concerns, both in avoiding casualties and capturing 
ground, led him to set unrealistic goals that either exceeded the capabilities of his force or 
left it seriously under-resourced. This sense of haste and desire to capture ground, 
coupled with his inexperience of staff work, led him to ignore the vital link between his 
Administrative and General Staffs. This failure to understand that, without a supply and 
transport system of sufficient capacity, lift and range, grand operational aims would 
inevitably founder resulted in the troops suffering immense and, in many cases, 
preventable hardships. It was not simply, as he put it, "efforts like these cannot be made 
without inflicting the greatest hardships on all", 978 but a question as to whether better 
planning could have alleviated the worst. 
As to the second criticism,. ' 
it is undeniable that there were serious shortcomings in 
the provisioning, feeding and medical care of the force during his tenure in command, 
although he preferred to refer to the obstacles of nature rather than the inadequacies of 
planning. Two major enquiries found serious faults with the organisation of his forces 
and the results were plain to see. It was only his political connections and influence that 
prevented either report from becoming publicly available. 
" Crowe, General Sinuts'Campaign, Foreword by JC Smuts, pp. xii-xiii. 
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The final phase of General Smuts's command ended in sombre misery. Although 
he proclaimed the success of his campaign to the outside world and was initially taken at 
his word, the reality was rather different. If his army had been in a bad way by 
September 1916, it was in a shocking state by the time of his departure in January 1917. 
He had driven his force hard, but without consideration for the essential factors of supply, 
transport and health. Now, it was largely ineffective and it would fall to others to restore 
its effectiveness. 
He was succeeded by General Hoskins, a regular soldier of wide East African 
experience. Hoskins had no opportunity to influence the final unsuccessful offensive of 
which he unexpectedly found himself in command. The rains forced him to halt and he 
spent the remainder of his tenure trying to rebuild the shattered army left by Smuts. He 
was a capable officer, but his planning and haphazard requests did not inspire confidence 
in the War Office and ultimately resulted in his downfall. However, he immediately set 
about refurbishing his force while maintaining Norforce as his principal offensive 
formation. The Wintgens raid did not help his reputation in London, but, given the 
situation, there was little anybody could have done to prevent it. Pursuit of a small, 
ruthless force in the bush of East Africa was never going to be easy and Hoskins was 
unlucky on several occasions not to round the raiders up sooner than finally happened. 
Most importantly, he realised that the way to beat the Germans was to bring them to 
battle and to deprive them of resources, most particularly food. He set in train the 
necessary reorganisation and strategy for victory, but had to give way to another to 
achieve it. 
In turn, General van Deventer never fulfilled his instructions although he came 
close on a number of occasions and the Schutztruppe was reduced to very small numbers. 
He had learned from his earlier experiences of the folly of simply trying to capture 
territory and the absolutely critical need for an efficient system of logistics. 
Consequently, he was prepared to delay moves in order to build up adequate stocks of 
supplies, although, when the opportunity presented itself, he was just as capable as Smuts 
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in demanding tremendous efforts on reduced rations. He adopted Hoskins's dual 
strategies of attrition and food denial, and pursued it vigorously. Likewise, once he 
found himself operating in areas free of the tsetse fly he re-introduced mounted forces 
that operated to great effect. On the other hand, he did have a tendency to over-control 
and at times gave far too many detailed instructions to column commanders operating in 
barely mapped bush. In his keenness to end the campaign, he occasionally committed 
too many troops to elaborate moves; apart from complicating matters, they also put too 
great a strain on the supply system and restricted the range of key columns. Largely 
unnoticed was the vast amount of work that he directed on road making, which eased his 
supply difficulties considerably. The northern portion of Portuguese East Africa was 
virtually a trackless expanse at the end of 1916; by war's end it was possible to drive a 
car from Lindi to Quelimane and Zomba. 
The greatest factor that denied him success was the performance of the allied 
Portuguese forces. Their ineptitude gave von Lettow the opportunity he needed to carry 
on the campaign on numerous occasions. 
General von Lettow had succeeded in his self-imposed task of drawing away 
British strength, but at considerable cost to his own strength. While the number of troops 
actually diverted from the main theatres of war were much fewer than he proclaimed, his 
campaign cost the British a great deal of money and tied up badly needed shipping until 
the end of the war. In the process, he had lost the bulk of the Schutztruppe and the whole 
of German East Africa, but the retention of the colony was never a priority. 
He had marked success against Smuts in 1916 and showed great tactical cunning 
throughout the campaign. He was undoubtedly a very able commander and achieved a 
number of notable victories. On the other hand, the bulk of pitched battles were fought in 
1917 and 1918, in which victory was often divided between the two sides. While von 
Lettow was always a dangerous foe and was quick to pounce on any column that strayed 
too far, his judgement was not always as good as he portrayed. He was particularly taken 
with the concept of decisive victory and he sought to win battles of annihilation rather 
344 
than to inflict steady attrition. As a result, the British suffered heavily, but so too did the 
Schuatruppe, and its losses were much more difficult to replace. Of course, such sharp 
blows frequently halted the advancing British columns and forced reorganisation, giving 
von Lettow time to withdraw along pre-planned routes, but they cannot hide the fact that 
his forces declined from over 9,000 strong at the end of 1916 to less than 1,500 by 
December 1917. 
His, and others' claims for him, of being a guerrilla fighter are not borne out by 
the facts. He was a bush fighter and tactician of the first order, but there is scant evidence 
of him employing any of the precepts of the concept in the modem, accepted sense. His 
forces followed normal German military doctrine, adapted for African conditions and 
generally fought as conventional companies. Von Lettow made no real use of armed 
civilian irregulars and nor did he try to raise the populace against the invading British. 
There appear to have been few attempts to subvert or demoralise the enemy's troops and 
followers, while he recruited only few replacements during his sojourn in Portuguese 
territory. On the contrary, it was his opponents who showed a far greater mastery of such 
techniques as they employed over a thousand armed Intelligence Scouts, recruited from 
the local population, as well as raising several battalions of ex-German Askaris and 
inspiring uprisings against German rule, as with the Makonde. They also distributed 
leaflets encouraging desertion and did their utmost to weaken support for the Germans. 
Von Lettow never showed any interest in politics, a key element of guerrilla 
warfare, and treated the governor with disdain. He treated the campaign in East Africa as 
a strictly military problem and considered that everything else should be subordinated to 
its achievement. In outlook, he shared much more with the conservative officers of the 
Prussian Army than with such noted guerrilla leaders as Mao, Giap or even his opponent 
Smuts. This is not to diminish von Lettow's achievements, but an understanding of true 
guerrilla warfare was not one of them. 
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